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The Abstract
The focus of this work is to examine the way the law has been 
used in the development of Ceylon (called Sri Lanka, after 1972), 
both during the British Colonial period (1796-1948) and thereafter. 
Each chapter in this thesis deals with the relationship of law and 
the resulting changes. This thesis has been divided into five parts. 
Part A provides a brief historical introduction into the period under 
review. Part B examines three main areas relevant to the culture of 
the inhabitants of Ceylon, namely, Religion, Education and Language. 
The three chapters which make up that part deal with the impact of 
Colonial Laws and policies. Part C considers the twin developments 
of Constitutional reforms and Judicial reforms on the Island. The 
constitutional progression of Sri Lanka from a Colony to Independence 
is examined within a historical framework. The social factors rele-
* ' K
vant to each historical stage of Constitutional development is con­
sidered as an introduction to Constitutional reform. Part D deals 
with the role of Law and policy in Economic development. The focus 
of the three chapters in this part includes, the reform of property 
ownership (both Immovables and Movables),. reform of Banking, reform 
of Institutional Aids to Economic development and aspects of Revenue 
reform. Finally, Part E attempts to draw appropriate conclusions 
(while explaining the role of law in development), in the light of 
the observations that were made in the first thirteen chapters of 
this thesis.
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Chapter I
An Historical Introduction to the Study
The recorded history of the Island of Sri Lanka goes back to 483 
B.C.  ^ It is alleged that the Island was discovered by a group of 
exiles from Bengal during that year, and that they, under a Prince
2
known as Vijaya, founded the first Kingdom in Sri Lanka, with Vijaya
3
as the first Sovereign of that Island. According to the Mahavamsa,
quoting ancient Pali commentaries, the passing away of the Buddha and
the arrival of Vijaya and his followers took place on one and the same 
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day. This also marked the commencement of what has now come to be
known as the Sinhalese race. The Mahavamsa attributes the name Lanka
to a death bed dialogue between Buddha and Sakra (the keeper of the
heavens according to the Buddhist scriptures), moments before the
passing away or Parinibbhana of Buddha in 483 B.C. Addressing Sakra,
Buddha is alleged to have said:
"My doctrine, 0 Sakra, will eventually be 
established in the Island of Lanka; on this 
day, Vijaya, eldest son of Sinha Bahu, king 
of Sinhapura in the Lata country, lands 
there with seven hundred followers, and will 
assume the sovereignty there. Do thou, there­
fore, guard well the king and his train 
and the Island of Lanka"? ^
This dialogue explains both the origins of the name Lanka and the origins 
of the Sinhalese race as an off-shoot of the inhabitants of Sinhapura 
the subjects of King Sinhabahu. The present name of the Island is a 
mere constitutional recognition of that ancient name. The prefix 
'Sri' provides an article of veneration which preceeds the name 'Lanka'. 
The history of the Island between the reign of King Vijaya and its 
assumption of Dominion Status or Independence in 1948, was punctuated 
by sporadic invasions from foreign lands. Until 1505 A.D. such in­
vasions came mainly from the kingdoms around the Southern end of India.
As a result of such invasions an indigenous group of persons, known 
as the Tamils formed nearly 12% of the total population on the Island, 
at Independence, in 1948. Those who claim descent from the original 
group of exiles who had arrived with Vijaya, in 483 B.C., formed
nearly 70% of the population at Independence. These were the Sinhalese. 
The difference in their cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic at­
tributes became a basis for the identification of these two groups as 
two separate indigenous communities on the Island. The vast disparity 
in their population strengths relegated the Tamils to the position of 
an ethnic minority, yet one with deep historical roots on the Island.
This single factor appears to play a central role in the problems con­
cerning education, language and constitutional development on the Island.
The foreign invasions between 483 B.C. and 1505 A.D. were largely 
from South India. These periodic invasions did not measurably destabi­
lise the existing socio-political compact of early [Sri] Lankan Society. 
A great many scholars have produced a large number of works about that 
period from a socio-political standpoint. Apart from snippets of 
information on the legal systems of ancient Lanka, gleamed from these 
writings, there is no comprehensive work exposing the laws and legal 
institutions of the pre-Kandyan period.  ^ However, the jurisprudence 
of the Kandyan Legal System received considerable exposition during
g
the early days of British rule. In addition to Sir John D T0ylyfs
work on the Constitution of The Kandyan Kingdom, Sawer’s Digest of
9 10Kandyan Law and Armourfs Notes on Kandyan Law; two scholars,
Panabokke and Le Mesurier, translated into English in 1880 the Nithi- 
niganduwa, ^  a compilation of the substantive Laws of the Kandyan 
Kingdom. For one thing, the available information does not go be­
yond the recognition that the Sri Lankan kings were in the classical 
mould of the European monarchs and of the Roman Emperors. They 
were the supreme law-givers, autocratic and dictatorial in their out­
look. They always had advisory councils which they appointed from 
persons of a select caste. By the effluxion of time, that caste be­
came recognised as the highest caste in the land. By 1815, when the 
last Sri Lankan king was deposed and exiled, the highest caste had 
come to be known as the Radala caste.
Despite the autocratic nature of their rule, many Sri Lankan . 
monarchs earned the reputation of having established and operated a 
legal system based on universal concepts of justice borrowed largely
from religious beliefs. In this case they were derived from the
12
Buddhist religion. A commentator had observed that:
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J "there are-- indications that the Sinhalese
kings decided cases according to Law. Thus,
Aggabodhy is said to have ’stopped the way 
of those who set false cases' by deciding 
them according to decrees issued to enforce 
discipline among the priesthood." 13
There was also a hierarchical court structure: final appeal lay to
the Sovereign's Court, in which the monarch himself, with his ad-
14visers, would preside. Parallel to these formal institutions
for the adjudication of disputes there were the councils for conci­
liation or Gamsabhavas. The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 
recommended their retention ^  and in fact they fall now under The
Conciliation Boards Act of 1958. ^
18The Mahavamsa, the 'Great Chronicle of Ceylon History*, which
has come down to this day by being periodically updated in the form
of a historical diary, describes the access to justice in the Court
of King Elara (205-161 B.C.). It is said that:
"The King administrated justice between 
friends and foes with an equal measure.
He had in his chamber a large bell which 
hung above the head of his bed. The bell 
was connected with a long rope which ex­
tended to the perimeter of the Royal 
Palace. This device was so established 
as a result of King's interest in making 
him available at all times to settle dis­
putes and render justice. Persons may 
ring the bell by pulling its lengthy rope.
This would signal the Monarch that a worthy 
subject of his, had come in search of 
justice."
Right up to the end of the Sri Lankan Kingdoms in 1815, the available 
20evidence suggests that there was a well-established system of justice 
and that there were channels open for ready and easy access to it.
Until the 17th century the Island was ruled by several kingdoms. By 
the 17th century these several kingdoms in the Maritime Provinces 
had either become absorbed into the colonial administration of the 
Portuguese, or had been rendered ineffective by it, leaving the 
Kandyan Kingdom to survive until its conquest by the British in 1815.
The fertility of the soil and the availability of water resources 
supported a largely agrarian economy. There were no industries and 
the only export product that remains recorded in history until the 
Portuguese conquest was the rice grain, known as Paddy.
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The year 1505 A.D. saw the first arrival of a Western colonising 
power in Sri Lanka. That was the Portuguese. Their arrival heralded 
the conquest of the Maritime Provinces on the Island, and they re­
mained there until 1656 A.D. The Portuguese changed the name of the 
Island to Ceylon, while the hinterland still retained the name of 
Lanka, which until 1815, frequently interchanged it, with Sinhale, 
the land of the Sinhalese. The one and a half centuries of Portuguese 
rule on the Island were punctuated by frequent forays into the hinter­
land. Each attempt to conquer the rest of the Island was repulsed 
by the Sri Lankan Kings. During their rule, the Portuguese espoused 
two principal aims. First was the conversion of the Maritime pop­
ulation to the Roman Catholic faith; second was the exportation of 
cloves, cinnamon, cardomans and coconut (to a lesser extent) to Europe. 
They showed no interest in introducing a viable administrative structure 
or an effective and just legal system. They attempted to a large 
extent to hold the colony either by conversion or by coercion and 
at times by both. Nothing of their legal system survived their rule 
which came to an end in 1656.
The conquest of the Maritime Provinces of Ceylon by the Dutch
21in 1656 produced a bloody spectacle. The Dutch found nothing of 
substance by way of a socio-political or legal infra-structure worthy 
of adoption. The Dutch, therefore, commenced to work from a ’bottom- 
up* position, with care and diligence, to establish a viable admin­
istrative structure and a legal system to make the colonisation of 
the Maritime Provinces an orderly process. They introduced an 
effective system of civil administration and of education. They 
embarked on a scheme for the clarification of titles to land and 
the registration of titles in what referred to as 'Thombus^. The 
Roman Dutch Legal System which the Dutch introduced recognised the 
twin principles for the perfection of imperfect titles: Usucapio
and Longi Temporis Praescriptio. This secured to the Maritime Provinces 
the certainty that titles to land were immutable, which proved to 
be a valuable incentive to Dutch investments in the Maritime Provinces. 
Furthermore, unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch adopted a policy of 
appeasement with the Sri Lankan Kings in the hinterland. This pro­
vided the much needed stability for those provinces. In addition, 
the Dutch established a Scholarchal Commission which was responsible
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for the establishment of a well-organised educational system, and
a system for the registration of births, marriages and deaths on 
22
the Island. The Portuguese maintained church registers for these 
three events but limited them to those who professed the Roman Catholic
faith. The Dutch, on the other hand, made the registration of these
three matters a concern of the State and therefore, provided its 
facility to all, irrespective of religion.
The greatest contribution which the Dutch made to the Island’s 
administration was the introduction and the establishment of the Roman 
Dutch Law, which has to a large extent survived as the Common Law 
of Sri Lanka today. The colonisation of the Maritime Provinces by 
the Dutch came to an end in 1796. As a result of the defeat of the 
Dutch at Colombo in that year, the Maritime Provinces were handed 
over to the British East India Company under a Treaty of Capitulation. 
The British East India Company administered the Maritime Provinces 
until 1802. In that year, the administration of the Maritime Provinces 
passed into the hands of the British Government. Thus Ceylon became 
a Crown Colony, and remained as such until her Independence one
hundred and forty-six years later in 1948.
24By a Proclamation dated 23rd September, 1799 Governor North
extended the application of the Roman Dutch Law and the Dutch legal
25institutions into the British Period. Subsequently, after the
capture of the Kandyan Provinces in 1815, the application of the Roman
26Dutch Law was extended to the former Kandyan Kingdom. The British
Administration in Ceylon appeared to recognise the value and standing
of the Roman Dutch Law. Although the Roman Dutch Law was not declared
to be applicable to the nationals of the United Kingdom while residing
27in Ceylon, the Courts by 1886 had extended its application to every­
one, including the Europeans, found on the Island.
The principal theme of this dissertation covers the period between 
1796 and 1978. During this period, and particularly after 1802, the 
Island experienced a number of historical events which have a direct 
relevance to the subject matter of this dissertation. The annexation 
of the Kandyan Kingdom by the British Administration of the Maritime 
Provinces in 1815 marked the first occasion when the Island as a
whole came under the rule of a single political authority. The Con- 
28vention under which the Kandyan Provinces became a part of the 
British Empire, was to become an issue of some controversy, regarding 
the position of Buddhism and Buddhist Temporalities during the 19th 
century. The attitude of the British Administration towards the Temple
Lands became an issue of great significance for the plantation 
industry, which was to commence with coffee plantations around 1840. 
Prior to that period, the Island had experienced a revolt against 
British Rule: the rebellion of the Kandyan Chiefs in 1818. The
1818 rebellion appears to have had a profound impact on the attitude 
of the British Administration upon certain obligations it had under-
9
taken under the Convention of 1815. In particular, the British 
Administration after 1818 took a less enthusiastic posture towards 
the commitment it had made in 1815 to protect the Buddhist religion. 
In Article 5 of the Kandyan Convention of 1815, Governor Brownrigg 
on behalf of the British Crown accepted the obligation to ensure 
that:
"The Religion of Boodhoo (i.e. Buddhism) 
professed by the chiefs and inhabitants 
of these provinces is declared inviolable 
and its rites Ministries (i.e. Priests) and 
places of worship are to be maintained and 
protected." ^0
However, by 1833, the British Government had obtained a report from
a Commission of Enquiry consisting of Messrs. Colebrooke and Cameron.
31The Commission reported separately on the reform of the then 
existing colonial administration on the Island and on the reform
32of the Judicial system respectively. The 1833 Charter of Justice,
which resulted out from this Report, provided a legal infra-structure
and a system of adjudication which was to survive to a large measure
until today. It certainly survived Independence, as no substantive
changes were introduced into the structure established in 1833 until
33the Administration of Justice Law was enacted in 1973. The In- 
34structions issued under the Colebrooke-Cameron Report and sent
by the Colonial Office to the British Governor in Ceylon, may be
considered as the first Constitution of Ceylon. That Constitution
35remained effective until the Crewe-McCallum reforms were intro­
duced nearly eighty years later, in 1911.
During the operation of the Colebrooke Constitution the British 
Administration faced a second revolt against its rule, in 1848. By 
that time, colonial economic expansion had begun and the British 
Administration was beginning to be actively engaged in displacing 
the land tenure systems that were operating in the Kandyan Provinces. 
This activity was largely connected with the need to acquire land for
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the expanding plantation industry on the Island. It was also seen 
as a strategy to reduce the economic, social and political import­
ance of the Buddhist clergy who were suspected of playing a sinister 
role in both the 1818 and in the 1848 uprisings. Apart from the 
British Administration’s interest in securing land, by 1869, it had 
become involved in the spread of education on the Island. However, 
ever since the days of Governor North, at the beginning of the 19th 
century, the British Administration appears to have given both direct 
and indirect encouragement to the Missionaries to have them utilise 
their own skills and resources to provide a sound vernacular and an 
Anglo-vernacular education to the Island’s children. The British 
Administration, as a possible inducement for greater involvement 
in educating the native population on the Island, left the 
Missionaries free from any Government control. The British Admin­
istration foresaw that the Missionary involvement in Native edu­
cation could lead to the conversion of the nation into Christianity 
through education.
Constitutional development in Ceylon appears to have proceeded
rather swiftly after 1911. The Crewe-McCallum Reforms of 1911
37were succeeded by the Temporary Constitution of 1921. Both Con­
stitutions introduced into the Island the notion of elections, 
admittedly upon a very limited franchise. There was a further ex­
pansion of the elective principle in the Manning Reforms of 1924.
Not until the elections of 1931, however, under the Donoughmore
Constitution, did the Island experience ’Universal Adult Suffrage1.
38The Donoughmore Constitution produced a universal model of 
democratic government, through an Executive Committee system, which 
proved a remarkable success. Its success was related to the need 
to bring several diverse communities, particularly, the Sinhalese 
and the Tamil Communities, together, in the art of Government. The 
Donoughmore Constitution stood as the pen-ultimate point of Consti7 
tutional advancement before Independence. That Constitution was 
modelled upon recommendations made in a Report issued by a Royal 
Commission of Enquiry which held its hearings in Ceylon in 1928, under 
the Chairmanship of Lord Donoughmore. The ultimate point of Con­
stitutional advancement leading up to Independence was reached as 
a result of the recommendations made by the Soulbury Commission
in 1945. Thisrresulted in the enactment of the Ceylon Independence 
39Act in 1947, which gave Ceylon her Independence on February 4th, 
1948.
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Two years prior to the grant of Independence a new political 
party known as the United National Party (U.N.P.) had been formed 
out of the Ceylon National Congress (established in 1915) and the 
Sinhala Mahasabha (established in 1937). The U.N.P. formed in 1946, 
was elected to power in 1947 and therefore was responsible for re­
ceiving the Instruments of Independence from the British Government.
The period between 1948 and 1952 saw very little constitutional
40change, except the passage of the Ceylon Citizenship Act in 1949.
By this Act the Government effectively disenfranchised nearly 10% 
of the population who were descended from the indentured coolie 
labour, brought into the Island by the British Administration during 
the m i d - - c e n t u r y  to work on the British owned plantations. 
This was made possible by the fact that, unlike other colonial con­
stitutions which were drafted for the purpose of granting Independence, 
the Ceylon Independence Act had left the issue of Citizenship out 
of the Act, leaving that matter to be determined by the legislature 
after the grant of Independence. At the 1952 elections the United 
National Party was returned to power with an increased majority under 
a new leader, Mr. Dudley Senanayake, who only a few months before 
had succeeded his late father, Mr. Stephen Senanayake, as the leader 
of the party. Almost a year before the 1952 elections, a political 
controversy had occurred among the leadership of the United National 
Party and one Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the then Minister of Local 
Government, leader of the House and deputy leader of the party had 
resigned from these three positions to form a new political party 
in opposition called the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (S.L.F.P.), in 
1951. The S.L.F.P. in essence was a resuscitation of the Sinhala 
Mahasabha which Mr. Bandaranaike had once led and which in 1946 had 
merged with the Ceylon National Congress to form the ruling United 
National Party.
The period between 1952 and 1956 was an important one. During 
that period both the S.L.F.P. and the U.N.P. had begun to project 
the idea of *Sinhala1 being declared the only official language on 
the Island. This marked the commencement of a new political contro­
versy on the Island which had by now come to be known as the *Language 
problem*. The Federal Party, a party of Tamil-speaking persons seeking 
to establish a Federal State in Ceylon was formed in 1949. The Marxist
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parties that had existed from the ' 30's joined ranks with the Federalists 
at that time to form a lobby against the proposal for declaring the 
Sinhala language as the only official language on the Island. How­
ever, at the 1956 elections the U.N.P. suffered a crushing defeat.
Mr. Bandaranaike, at the head of a coalition of several political
parties, formed a government and within a few months parliament en-
41acted the Official Language Act of 1956, declaring Sinhala to be 
the only official language of the Island. The period between 1956 
and 1958 was charged with communal tension. During a serious out­
break of communal violence between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the
42Government passed the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. 
This Act provided certain concessions to the Tamil speaking people.
Mr. Bandaranaike was assassinated on the 25th of September, 1959. 
Between September, 1959 and July, 1960 the Island passed through a 
politically unstable period. The General Elections of March 1960 
failed to produce a majority Government. The U.N.P. Administration 
which took office in April of that year was defeated during a vote on 
the 'Throne Speech'. The ensuing elections in July 1960 returned the 
S.L.F.P. into power with a comfortable majority. At these elections, 
the leadership of the party was assumed by Mrs. Bandaranaike, who 
had no previous political experience of any sort - elective or admin­
istrative. However, she became the Prime Minister for the first time 
in 1960.
The period between 1960 and 1965 was principally concerned with
averting a serious economic crisis on the Island. A great number of
laws providing for a stronger central control of the Island's economy
and laws, to facilitate centralised direction of economic activities,
were passed. The era of the public corporations and statutory boards
commenced during these five years of S.L.F.P. rule. But the most
critical political issue which the Island faced during this period
43was the nationalisation of schools. This placed the Government 
upon a collision course with the Catholic church, and a confrontation 
was avoided only by the timely intervention of the late Pope 
through his emissary, Valerian Cardinal Gracias of India. During 
these five years the Government passed a series of Tax Laws which 
clearly indicated that the Island's economy was bad. At the General 
Elections of 1965 the S.L.F.P. was defeated and the U.N.P. took office 
at the head of a seven-party, coalition in a National Government in
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March of that year.
The National Government was concerned with keeping the coalition 
together throughout its five years in office. One of the coalition 
partners was the Federal Party, which had canvassed for a Federal 
State to be established on the Island. The principal political de­
bate that arose during the last two years of the National Government 
concerned the sovereignty of the Parliament of Ceylon. The. Privy
Council had some years previously delivered its opinion in Ranasinghe
44v. The Bribery Commissioner. In that advice Lord Pearce had de­
clared that section 29(2) of Ceylon’s Independence Constitution was 
unalterable. The argument proceeded that that sub-section encap­
sulated the racial, ethnic, religious and language rights of the 
diverse communities which formed the nation. The acceptance of the 
Independence Act by these communities through their representatives 
in 1947 had been conditional upon those guarantees being fixed and 
made unalterable. Therefore, the Privy Council considered that that 
sub-section should be regarded as "unalterable under the Constitution". 
This Privy Council view questioned the sovereignty of Ceylon’s Con­
stitution and of Parliament functioning under it. The 1970 elections 
were fought inter alia upon that issue. The S.L.F.P., from the 
opposition, submitted to the electorate that the introduction of 
a new Constitution was the solution and therefore asked the electorate 
to provide that party with a mandate to draft a new Constitution 
through a Constituent Assembly. The S.L.F.P. did not believe that 
Parliament had a power to draft a Constitution which did not contain 
the entrenched provisions contained in Section 29(2). The U.N.P., 
however, thought that while Parliament had the power to promulgate a 
new Constitution omitting section 29(2), it could not alter the sub­
section under the existing Constitution. For these and other reasons, 
the General Elections resulted in the S.L.F.P, with its Marxist part­
ners, being voted into office in 1970.
The period between 1970 and 1977 was the most interesting period 
in the political history of Ceylon. Between 1970 and 1972 the Parlia­
mentarians, sitting as members of a Constituent Assembly, drafted, 
adopted and promulgated a new Constitution, by means which were not 
within the contemplation of the preceding Constitution. Between 1972 
and 1977 the Government engaged itself in introducing a complex programme 
for the reform of both immovable and movable property on the Island.
-10-
It also introduced a number of pieces of social legislation such as
45the ceiling on incomes, the creation of novel social units called 
46the Janawasas and a whole collection of laws which were designed
to alter the socio-economic foundations of the nation. In addition,
the Government restructured the basis for the settlement of disputes
on the Island by moving away from adjudication and towards conciliation.
Above all, the Government created new concepts of proprietory rights
as alternatives to the concept of ownership. The creation of the
48’Tenant-Cultivator1 is a good example of these new alternatives.
The Law recognised in the ’Tenant-Cultivator* a group of proprietory 
rights which dwarfed and eclipsed the traditional rights of an owner.
The programme for the reform of property holdings had a wide ambit.
49 50 51It embraced not only Dry Land, Paddy Land, and Housing Property,
52but also included tea, rubber and coconut estates owned by multi­
national corporations. The latter was responsible for creating a 
plantation economy on the Island during the middle of the A .
century. The Law nationalising these estate-lands created the Land 
Reform Commission as an agent of the Government to receive, take over 
and maintain the land. This duty was shared with the Plantation Cor­
poration and various other Public Corporations and Boards. This new 
arrangement indicated that the country had come a full-circle, and 
the land that had once been extracted from the nation through the 
instrumentality of the law at the time, was now being returned to 
the nation through the same instrumentality, namely, the law.
The S.L.F.P. Government was subjected to a crushing defeat at 
the 1977 General Elections. For the first time in Ceylon’s history, 
the 1977 Elections voted a single party, with no coalition partners, 
into office: that was the U.N.P. The U.N.P. in contesting the 
General Election had called for an electoral mandate to change the 
1972 Constitution, not through a Constituent Assembly but through
Parliament itself. The result, therefore, was the promulgation of
53a new Constitution in 1978. The 1978 Constitution introduced a 
presidential system of Government which appears to blend the con­
stitutional models of both France and of the United States of America.
Besides producing this amalgam, the Constitution of 1978 introduced a
54complex form of voting for all electoral processes. The system 
which was introduced for voting marries both the concept of propor­
tional representation and the principle of redistribution of votes.
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The method thus provided replaced the traditional 1 first past the 
post* form of elections, which appeared to have created a fixed 
pattern for replacing the U.N.P. with the S.L.F.P. and vice-versa 
at successive General Elections of Sri Lanka. This kind of change 
after each five-year period, with a concon'yitant change in political 
ideology, could be harmful for development. In this sense the Island 
waits anxiously for the next General Elections, which is scheduled 
to be held no later than 1983. This exposition is merely to pro­
vide a historical framework for the study that will follow in the 
next thirteen chapters. Most significant historical incidents 
whether legal or political, will be considered in the body of this 
work. The discussion will focus principally on law and its relation­
ship to development within a historical period commencing in 1796 
and extending up to 1978. The work will conclude by attempting to 
examine the relationship of Law to Development. However, the 
theme that will be pursued throughout this work is one that espouses 
the notion that the role of law is merely to legitimise policy 
leaving the task of implementation to locally based social insti­
tutions which the law may create and establish for that purpose.
The study of law and development is a study of the characteristics 
of development and an analysis of the modalities which the law and 
legal institutions provide for translating those characteristics 
into normative propositions, which could aid the particular social 
institutions in implementing them. This raises a two-tier analysis 
of the role of law in development. The concluding chapter will 
offer a deeper analysis of this theme for the purpose of isolating 
some essential elements relevant for a theory of law and develop­
ment .
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CHAPTER 2 :
Land, Religion and Under Development
I, An Introduction
Buddhism becomes relevant to Development in the 
Ceylonese context, particularly, when one examines the 
methods used by the British Administration in Ceylon for 
the acquisition of land to establish a plantation economy. 
After it was agreed by the British Government that as a 
matter of colonial policy the new Crown Colony shall have a 
plantation based economy, the next step was to find land 
suitable to implement that policy. The land in the Maritime 
'Provinces raised some basic problems which made them 
unavailable for the new plantation industry. For one thing, 
the Maritime Provinces had been colonised since 15055 
first by the Portuguese (1505-I656) and then by the Dutch 
(1656-1796) and, therefore, land in those geographical 
areas of the new colony had become utilised to the fullest 
extent. The second problem was that ownership of land in 
the Maritime Provinces was governed by the Roman Dutch Law 
and under that law much of the land was found to be 'tied up* 
by the institution of Fideicommissum. Untying of such land 
was found to be a somewhat difficult problem. The British 
Administration, however, found room in the Maritime 
Provinces to introduce the Liberian coffee plant which was 
to become by 18^5 a major export product. The Liberian 
coffee plant required humidity and warmth, as it had 
found in its mother country, Liberia. The Maritime . 
Provinces provided those ideal conditions. However, 
stricken with blight, the coffee industry, by 1875» had 
begun to be replaced by the Tea Industry as the Principal 
export product* It was the introduction of the Tea plant 
in Ceylon which made Buddhist temporalities an element in 
the Colonial Development of Ceylon. The Tea plant, unlike 
the coffee plant, required a higher elevation because of
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its need to grow in a cooler environment. The Maritime 
Provinces, therefore, proved unsuitable for the Tea 
plant and the British administration in Ceylon was at 
this stage compelled to look towards the Kandyan 
provinces in its search for land.
In the Kandyan provinces, most of the unproductive 
land was found to be a part of that vast land mass owned 
and possessed by the Buddhist Temples. They were a part 
of the land received as gifts from the Kandyan kings 
either in the form of Dewalagam (gifts to Dewalas) or 
Viharagam (gifts to the Buddhist clergy) and the rest 
were the result of gifts made by devotees. The problem 
which the British Administration faced was one of providing 
a legal basis for the appropriation of these lands. The 
Temple Lands Registration Ordinance of 1856 and the 
Commission created under it may be considered as having 
the greatest significance in providing this much needed 
legal basis for dismantling the economic empire of the 
Buddhist clergy.
Aside from the Temple Lands the rest of the un­
utilised or under utilised land were Nindagam lands.
These were lands gifted by the Kandyan kings to worthy 
citizens of the Kingdom, for work or services rendered 
to the Kandyan monarchs. Strategy conceived by the 
British Administration in Ceylon towards obtaining 
these lands for the plantation economy was a special 
one. This is to be found in the Services Tenures 
Ordinance of I87O.
The two Ordinances of I856 and of I87O provided 
for the absorption of hill-country land which lay 
within the boundaries of the former Kandyan Kingdom. ■
But some of the land that the Administration required 
fell outside the former Kingdom of Kandy and those 
were governed by the Roman Dutch Common Law of the Island. 
To cater for this problem the British Administration 
passed a third Ordinance, in 1876; namely a law to amend 
the Law regulating the entail and settlement of immovable 
property on the Island. This struck at the roots of the 
institution of Fideicommissum.
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This chapter will deal with all three Ordinances 
and shall attempt to show how the colonial policy towards 
obtaining land for the establishment of a plantation 
economy was carried out, within a framework of law. None­
theless, it is important to recognise the large questions 
of policy which underlined the strategies conceived. As 
a question of fact, the attitude of the United Kingdom 
Government towards the Buddhist religion, may appear to be 
a factor which may have influenced the colonial policy 
towards the Buddhist religion. An opinion tendered by 
Sir John Stephens, the Legal Adviser to the Colonial office 
in 1844 seems to support this view.
IX• The Early Relationship between the Buddhist and 
the British;
The cultural heritage of the Sinhalese race springs
from Buddhism and Buddhistic thought. To that extent it
is correct to say that Sinhalese culture and Buddhist
cultures are inextricably inter woven.'*' "From the time
2of the conversion of Devanampiyatissa, Buddhism, as the
state religion, was intimately connected with the Kings,
who seem to have occupied towards it a position very
similar to that held by the English Kings with respect to
3
the Church of England." The Crown was considered as the
lay head of the religious institutions. There being no
supreme ecclesiastical ruler, like the Pope or the
Archbiship of Canterbury, the Monarch was entitled to
interfere not only in matters concerning the temporalities
4 5but also in matters of doctrine and discipline. Hayley
describes a number of instances where the Sinhalese Kings
had disciplined the Priests by disrobing them.
The effect of Article 5 of* the Kandyan Convention,^
in so far as the Kandyans were concerned, was to have the
British government take the place of the Kandyan kings.
7
During the early period of British rule, the British 
government played its part as the Protector of the Buddhist
g
faith without noticeable reluctance. As for instance,
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it has been recorded that, in 1819, the Chief* Priest of*
the Malwatta Vihare requested the payment of* his customary
allowance from the British Administration of the Kandyan
Provinces. Sir John D'Oyly, the then British resident
in Kandy, recommended the continuation of the payments
which the Malwatta Temple had received under the Kandyan 
9Kings. Yet another instance could be found in I838,
when the District Court of Kandy dismissed the Chief
Priest of the Huduhumpala temple from that position. It
was alleged that he, being a member of the Siamese sect,
11had left that sect and had joined the Amarapura sect.
The temple in question being a place following the tradi­
tions of the Siamese sect of Buddhism, could not accommo­
date the Chieftancy of a priest from the Amarapura sect.
The change of sect by the Chief Priest did not change
12the sect to which the temple belonged. Therefore, the
court dismissed the convert from his position as the
Chief Priest of that temple. Again in 1820, the Judicial
13Commissioner's Court held that, where the incumbent of
a temple died and other priests of that temple petitioned
the Lieutenant-Governor for the appointment of one of
their members, the Lieutenant-Governor must, as the Kandyan
kings did, appoint the one chosen by the petitioners
although he may rank junior to the rest of the clergy at
that temple in age or in learning or in both.
14
Until the Proclamation of the 21st November, 1818, 
promulgated after the first rebellion against British 
rule, the British Administration made their policies 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the Buddhist religion 
and its institutions. A few days after the signing of the
15
Kandyan Convention, Governor Brownrigg, in a despatch to 
The Earl of Bathurst, The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, wrote:
"The 5th article /of the Convention/ confirms 
the superstition of Boodhoo in a manner more 
emphatical than would have been my choice.
But as the ... secure possession of the country 
hinged upon this point, I found it necessary to 
quiet all uneasiness respecting it, by article 
of guarantee couched in the most unqualified 
terms. " ^
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The Kingdom of4 Kandy had never permitted the intrusion
of other religions until the accession of the members
17of the Nayakkar dynasty to the Kandyan throne. That
was in 1782. Even thereafter, the temples of the Hindu
gods occupied a secondary position while Buddhism
l8remained under the protection of the Crown. Since
1815, the British Government had come under mounting •
pressure, particularly from those missionaries who had
already been admitted to the Maritime Provinces. The
Baptists came in 1812, the Wesleyans in I8l4, the American
missionaries in I8l6, and the Church Missionary Society
in 1818. The last mentioned appeared to have had the
19heaviest political clout. Their collective complaint
was that the British Government had failed to facilitate
their missionary work in the hinterland. Indeed the
British 'Government, true to their difficult commitment
under the Kandyan Convention, had barred the entry of
missionaries to the hinterland - the Kandyan provinces.
Disillusioned by the rebellion of 1818, pushed by
20the lobbyists for the Church Missionary Society in 
London, Governor Brownrigg included a curiously worded 
article, in the Proclamation, of 1818.
Article 16 reads:
”As well the priest as all the ceremonies and 
processions of the Budhoo religion shall receive 
the respect which in former times was shown them; 
at the same time it is in nowise to be understood 
that the protection of Government is to be denied 
to the peaceable exercise of all other persons of 
the religion which they respectively profess, or 
to the erection under due license from His 
Excellency of places of worship in proper situations.”
The absence of the commitment to maintain the inviolability
fof the religion of the Boodhoo1 was a significant ommission
from the Proclamation of 1818. The crucial issue was
whether the obligations assumed by the British government,
under that Convention, could be cognizable in a court of
21law. Although the Kandyans maintained that it created a
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legal obligation binding upon the British to observe
the Articles of* that Convention, the British government
placed it no higher than a framework within which a new
political association between the Kandyan chiefs and the
new British administration could be spun. Professor 
22de Silva. while commenting on the Convention wrote:
"The peculiar form taken by the Convention of
1815 reflected the political factors operating
at that time. The concessions made to Kandyan
interests in that document were granted because
the political situation suggested these as
essential to the purpose of conciliating groups
who had rendered valuable assistance to the
British. Thus the Kandyan Convention preserved
intact the powers and privileges, of the Chiefs,
the laws, customs and institutions of the
country and what in the eyes of the Kandyans
was more important than all else ... the
Buddhist religion. The fifth clause of the
Convention, employing language described by
Brownrigg as being "more emphatical than would
have been my choice,” declared that "the
religion of Budhoo, professed by the Chiefs and
inhabitants of these provinces is declared
inviolable, an<3. its rites, ministers and places
of worship are to be maintained and protected"
. . .  Only by making it clear that the fifth
clause of the Convention would be scrupulously
observed could the British gain the adherence
of the BhikkhuSoo and chiefs." „22a 2J
It is important to note that the Convention was signed 
by the Kandyan chiefs on the one side and Governor 
Brownrigg on the other. At the time of signing the 
Convention, the Kandyan Kingdom was recognised by the 
British government as a sovereign State. By Article 
2 of the Convention, the signatories purported to 
depose the King and, under the constitutional conventions 
applicable to Kandy, the sovereign powers vested there­
after in the body of the Ministers of the State — 
namely, the Adhikarams, the Adigars and the Dessaves 
who in fact were the officers of the Kandyan Kingdom 
and the signatories on behalf of that Kingdom. It 
may, therefore, be said that under International Customary
2 kLaw the Kandyan Convention stands as a Treaty binding
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the two parties. Its ratification by the British Houses 
of Parliament sets the seal of validity and, therefore, 
in Public International Law it should be recognised as a 
Treaty of State Succession, namely, the succession of 
Great Britain to the sovereignty of the deposed King of 
Kandy.
The preamble to the Convention reads:
"At a Convention ... between ... Brownrigg,
Governor ... acting in the name and on 
behalf of His Majesty George the Third ... 
on the one part, and the Adigars, Dessaves 
and other principal Chiefs of the Kandyan 
provinces ... ."
The legal significance of treaties entered into between
the British Crown and the colonial chiefs has been the
24asubject of much penetrating research. The conclusion
2 4 breached both by the colonial courts and by the British 
24cCourts was that such treaties are not legally enforce­
able under the English Law, being in the nature of Acts
of State. Against that background it is now necessary to
24dexamine Basnayake Nilama v. The Attorney General. the 
only decision in which the Ceylori Courts were called upon 
to determine the enforceability of Article 5 of the 
Kandyan Convention. The facts are clear. The plaintiff 
was an officer in charge of the Wallahagoda Dewale in 
Gampola. As an immemorial custom during the month of 
Esala, in 1912, he conducted the Esala perahera. The 
perahera or procession consisted of elephants and tom-tom 
beaters. Since 1912, the Government Agent, using powers
24econferred upon him by section 69 of the Police Ordinance
24fand section 64 of the Local Boards Ordinance, had 
issued the licence to conduct the perahera, with the 
limitation that strict silence was required to be 
observed from within 100 yards in both directions of the 
Muhammaden mosque situated on Ambagamuwa Street, in 
Gampola. The plaintiff challenged that restriction. He 
argued that the obligation assumed by the British Govern­
ment under the Kandyan Convention of 1815 could not be
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amended by the aforementioned Ordinances. The plaintiff 
argued that the beating of the tom-toms from the Dewale 
to the Mahaveli River for the 'water cutting ceremony* 
and back according to ancient rights, must be unbroken. 
Therefore, the restriction placed by the Government 
Agent in pursuance of the said Ordinances, the plaintiff 
alleged, constituted a violation of the particular obli­
gation undertaken by the British Government under the 
Kandyan Convention. The Acting District Judge of Kandy,
Sir Paul E. Pieris, upheld the plaintiff's claim.
Zhe:Summarising his judgment, Shaw. J .. said in the
24bDivisional Court:
"The Learned Acting District Judge having 
heard a large quantity of verbal evidence, 
and having received in evidence a large 
number of documents, found that this Esala 
Perahera was a rite of the religion of 
Buddha which was undertaken to be maintained 
and protected under the Convention, and that 
the accustomed route of the perahera and the 
continuous performance of the music was an 
essential part of the rite, and held that 
the Kandyan Convention constitutes a law or 
compact binding and unalterable in all 
following times, however urgent might be the 
motives, and however extreme the exigency 
demanding the alteration of it."^^
Against this decision the Attorney-General appealed to
24 ithe Divisional Court. That court unanimously allowed
the appeal on the grounds that the Kandyan Convention 
being in the nature of a treaty between two sovereigns, 
was not cognizable before a municipal court. De Sampayo. J .. 
after examining a number of colonial and English decisions, 
wrote:
" ... and it should, I think, be held that, 
if the provisions of the Police Ordinance,
I865, and local Boards Ordinance, 1898, in 
respect of licences for processions and 
tom-toms in any way contravene the Kandyan 
Convention, which, as I have already ventured 
to express my opinion, they do not, neither 
the District Court nor this Court has 
jurisdiction to enforce the Convention as 
against the Ordinances."24k
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The unanimous decision of the Divisional Court falls into 
line with a line of decisions stretching back to the 18th 
Century; to the The Nabob of the Carnatic v. The British 
East India Company. S o m e ^ m of the eighteenth and 
early 19th century decisions quite clearly make the point 
that treaties and agreements in the nature of treaties 
were not to be the subject of a dispute before a Municipal 
Court, The position naturally differs when the treaty 
becomes incorporated into a legislation. This argument 
too appears to have been raised by the Respondents before 
the Divisional Court, in the present case. The Respondents 
counsel took the point that the Kandyan Convention was 
not in the nature of a Treaty but was‘in effect a piece 
of legislation, binding the Crown, Accepting that con­
tention, Shaw, J ,, held that, like any other legislation, 
the present legislation had in effect been impliedly
2^4" ii.
repealed by the later Police Ordinance of I865 and by
2 h othe Local Boards Ordinance of 1898, These were the
Ordinances which empowered the Government Agent to restrict 
the rights of citizens to meet in an assembly and march 
on the streets by requiring licences for such activities*
It is to this aspect of the Respondent’s argument that
the Learned Judge referred, when he said:
"What the court was here asked to construe 
and to enforce were alleged rights under 
the Proclamation of March 2, 1815. In my 
opinion this Proclamation is not a Treaty,
The Treaty or Convention was entered into 
prior to the Proclamation, and is contained 
in a separate document signed by the various 
chiefs of the Kandyan provinces• • , • The
Proclamation affirming what was agreed to by
the Convention appears to me to be a piece
of legislation by His Majesty, who then had 
the sole power of legislating in the ceded 
provinces, to give effect to the agreements 
arrived at, and is subject to be construed 
and enforced by the Courts in the same 
manner as any other act of legislation,
The two learned judges, Shaw and De Sampayo, covered 
both flanks of the argument. If it was a treaty, then 
according to De Sampayo, J , the matter cannot be
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litigated before a municipal tribunal. This is trite 
law. If it was a legislative enactment, then presumably 
in the absence of an entrenched provision, that agree­
ment could be varied impliedly by a subsequent enactment* 
This too was trite law. But the socio-political 
implications of this decision, delivered by the Divisional 
Court on February 2nd, 1915» could be seen in the 
Buddhist-Muslim riots of that year. The Buddhist—Muslim 
riots commenced on the 29th May, 1915* Commenting on 
the riots and linking it directly to the decision of the
Divisional Court in Basnayake Nilame v. A.-G.,
2 b aSir Ponnambalam Ramanathan wrote:
"The Buddhist were in utter despair when they 
perused the judgments of the Supreme Court 
Judges. 'How shall we hereafter celebrate 
our national and religious festivals in our 
own country without molestation? Who has 
ever opposed us in our own Kandyan provinces 
except the newly arrived Muslims?1 they cried,
Fortunately, for the Muslim community, subsequent events 
concerning the Tamil population helped to erase the 
enmity generated from these riots and by the time of 
Independence, in 19^8, lines for social confrontation 
had been differently drawn. It was no longer a 
Buddhist-Muslim conflict but a Sinhaleu-Tamil conflict 
which influenced the destiny of the newly independent 
nation of Ceylon.
Ill. Land Tenures Under the Kandyan Law
It must be mentioned that the Kandyan legal system 
was based upon the concept of status arising out of 
birth and caste. Locked into the caste structure were 
property rights. The sense of belonging to a particular 
caste was often associated with a property right.
Political power, not to be divorced from religious power, 
rested on property rights. The confiscation of property
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which was associated with a number of* offences under
the Kandyan laws was a 1hard-hitting’ punishment* To
understand this, one must briefly examine the system
of tenures in the Kandyan legal system* The British
government, it will be shown later, understood that the
control and re-distribution of temple property, which
in fact was based upon a tenurial system, diluted and
demoted both the political power and the religious
power which the temples wielded in the Kingdom of Kandy.
This presented the government with a neat stratagem to
by-pass their commitment to Buddhism under Article 5
of the Convention, without actually breaching it. To
some extent this situation formed the corner-stone of.
British colonial policy towards the Buddhist religion.
The development strategy thus conceived was to result
in cultural and religious problems for the post-
independence period in Ceylon, culminating in the
enactment of a number of laws aimed towards the
reversal of the socio-economic directions inherited
from the Colonial period.
It is said that the village communities which
formed the basis for the system of tenure in the
Kandyan legal system could.be regarded as a ’phenomena
2 5of considerable antiquity1. The idea of communal 
ownership of land appears to pre-date the concept of
the ’universal dominium of the sovereign* in Western
26 27Jurisprudence. For many centuries, the Sinhalese
Kings were regarded in law as ’Lords Paramount of the
Soil’. All property was derived from the Monarch and
the property without an owner reverted back to his 
28Treasury. Describing the tenurial system under
29the Kandyan law, Dissanayake and de Soysa wrote:
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"The Kings granted lands and even whole 
villages to Temples and Dewales. These 
villages were known as Viharagam and 
Dewalagam. The Kings also made grants 
of lands and villages to individual 
relatives, courtiers and chiefs. These 
lands were known as Nindagam. The Ninda 
proprietors had to perform services to 
the King and furnish a certain quota of 
men for the King in time of war, but the 
tenants in those villages performed 
their services or paid their contribu­
tions direct to their Ninda Lord. The 
lands so granted were not only forest 
and waste lands, Malapala and Nilapala 
and confiscated lands but also included 
villages already tenanted. These 
villages were known as Koralegam. The 
grantees of such villages became their 
overlords and those who held lands 
subject to their overlords came to be 
known as Nilakarayas or tenants.
The entire kingdom was thus classified under 
five types of land tenure systems. First. the 
Gabadagam or Royal villages. These were the sources 
from which the king derived his income for his own 
maintenance. People who worked on his fields and his 
lands in the Gabadagam received no direct recompense.
But they were the grantees of other lands on the 
condition that they rendered the Gabadagam free
labour. After 1815, the former Gabadagam fell under
31the various Crown Lands Ordinances which formed the
32basis for the plantation industry.
Second, the Koralegam. These were lands gifted 
by the King to his chieftains for services of an extra 
ordinary nature rendered to the King; viz. victory in 
battles, putting down insurrections or rendering aid 
during floods. The gift in the case of a Koralegam 
was in the nature of a gesture. The land in question 
was often tenanted land, owned by the King, as Gabadagam.
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Since these tenants held licences from the King, the
new lord of the land - now a Koralegam - had no right
of dispossession. The services were rendered directly
to the King or through the new lord, indirectly to the
King. In law, the tenants were referred to as
Paraveni-pangu-karayo. Although the economic benefit
to the lord of the Koralegam was nominal, given the
correct attitude, the Paraveni-pangu-karayo could
constitute a powerful constituency providing a
substantial political force, even against the King.
The insurrection against the last King of Kandy in 1815
and the rebellions of 1818 and 1848 against the British
arose out of dissident Korales of the Koralegams.
Third. the Viharagams. These were lands gifted
outright to the temples. The tenants of such lands were
of two kinds. Their tenures were somewhat different
from one another. They were the Paraveni—pangu-karavo
and the Maruveni-pangu-karavo. The Buddhist Tempora—
33lities Ordinance of 1905 defined them in this way:
"Paraveni panguwa - shall mean an allotment 
of land held by one or more hereditary 
tenants subject to the performance of service 
or rendering of dues to a temple, and
Maruveni panguwa — shall mean an allotment of 
land held by one or more tenants—at-will 
under a temple and subject to the performance 
of service or rendering of dues to a temple."^
The difference between this type of tenure involving
Temple lands and other types of tenures was that the
tenants owed their economic power, not to the King,
directly or indirectly, but to the incumbent Priest
of a temple' and to his disciples. The Ordinance No. 8 
35of 1905 defined the incumbent of a temple as:
" ’Temple1 shall mean Vihare, Dagoba and 
Dewale and shall include the Dalada Maligawa 
and the Atamasthane at Anuradhapura, and
’Incumbent* shall mean the chief resident 
priest of a temple".
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This economic power which the temples wielded, over a 
large number of inhabitants, was one of the reasons why 
the British administration thought it unwise to promote 
the cause of Buddhism. In fact the Colonial policy 
towards the control and re-distribution of temple 
property had the direct effect of diluting the economic 
and the political power of the Buddhist clergy.
Fourth, the Dewalagam. These were lands given to 
Dewales. The intimacy in law and in fact between the 
Dewalagams and the Viharagams were such that they were 
treated as inter changeable legal concepts. The British 
government treated the two institutions as one and the 
law relating to Buddhist Temporalities applied equally 
to both types of tenures. There too the incumbents of 
the Dewale.wielded an economic power over the tenants.
Fifth..the Nindagams. These were lands granted to
individuals, who were required to perform certain services
to the King. The King’s ministers were all Nindagam
holders. Their economic power was derived from the
tenants or Nilakarayas who performed certain services
to the.Ninda - Lord. In Perumal et al v. Dambagahagedara
Korale. the plaintiff alleged that the land was given,
verbally, by the King to his ancestors as Nindagam for
providing dancers to the King. The land in question
was, he said, originally a Gabadagam a Royal village.
The plaintiff, the Ninda — Lord had not recently
performed any services to the King, (now the British
Crora), On appeal before the Judicial Commissioners
for Kandy, it was held that Nindagam land was, unlike
other tenures, held at the will and pleasure of the King,
who frequently "changed them from one favourite to 
37another". Therefore, as the particular services for 
which the land was originally gifted were no longer 
rendered, because they were no longer needed, the Crown 
as the successor to the King, could repossess the land.
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It could be given out to different Ninda - Lords for
different services. But until then, the land remained
Crown land and under the Crown Lands Ordinance. This
decision was correct and followed the Kandyan law regarding
Nindagams. Unlike the Koralagam, Viharagam and Dewalagam.
the Nindagams could be changed at the will of the Crown.
The Koralagams were seldom changed because it was not an
38economic unit but merely a token of Royal recognition.
As we shall see later, the foregoing decision was a 
useful legal weapon in the hands of the British /)dminis— 
tration to turn some Nindagam property into Crown lands 
and then make them available for the commencement of the 
plantation industry which became the preserve of Britisli 
companies.
IV. The Control and Re-Distribution of Temple Property:
(a) The Strategies Conceived
The control and the re-distribution of temple 
properties served British policy, possibly in three ways. 
Firstly, the reduction of the total extent of temple 
lands reduced in proportion the capital available for 
the temples to propagate the religion. To an extent 
it reduced the comforts of the clergy and increased 
their dependence on the British administration. Secondly, 
by releasing the tenants or the Paraveni and Maruveni 
sharers, the British government effectively reduced the 
extent of the political power wielded by the incumbent 
priests. It reduced their constituents, their dependants, 
over whom the incumbents exercised economic control. 
Thirdly, it created a vast ’Land Bank* of Crown property 
which could be made available for economic exploitation 
by the plantation industry. It would be convenient to 
examine the laws affecting the control and re-distribution 
of temple property in the light of these three goals.
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As a developmental strategy, these laws were used, well, 
towards laying down a viable economic substratum, in 
the form of land available for colonial exploitation.
In the absence of expanding industries, the plantation 
industry became the basis for the colonial economy in 
Ceylon. It is towards this end that the policy of control 
and re-distribution of temple land appears to have been 
directed.
By Article 21 of the Proclamation of 21st November,
391818, the British Government declared that:
"The Governor, desirous of showing the 
adherence of Government to its stipulation 
in favour of the religion of the.people, 
exempts all lands which now are the 
property of temples from all taxation 
whatever ••. ."
The foregoing article was strengthened by a Proclamation
40of the 18th September, 1819. . In that Proclamation, 
the Government declared that:
"Whereas by our proclamation bearing date, 
the 21st day of November, 1818, we did 
declare that all lands which then were the 
property of temples should be exempted from 
all taxation whatever, ... . The persons
having the charge of the revenues of every 
temple ... shall, and they are hereby 
required, to deliver into the Revenue 
Commissioner ... a list of lands of all 
descriptions which did belong to the said 
temples, under their respective charge, at 
the date of the said proclamation •.. .
Within twelve months from this date; where 
upon the said lands shall be registered by 
the Revenue Commissioner, if he is satisfied 
that such lands are the property of the said 
temple ... and a certificate of such enregis— 
tration shall be granted by such Revenue 
Commissioners ... the production of which 
shall alone be considered sufficient proof 
that such land is exempted from taxation.
This for the first time introduced governmental control 
over temple property. The incumbents did not take 
this intrusion into their preserve with equanimity.
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As they were not too conversant with the art of
litigation before a British court, using English
principles of Constitutional Law, the constitutionality
of the Proclamation was never tested. But the incumbents
reacted by adopting the posture of ascetics, by ignoring
such secular demands. By a subsequent Proclamation of
4221st May, 1822, the British government warned the
incumbents that failure to register might end their right
to exemption from tax and might even place their title to
43property in jeopardy. By the earlier Proclamation, the 
government reserved the power to refuse registration where 
"the Revenue Commissioner ... is not satisfied that any 
land was the property of such temple". In that event, the 
Proclamation required the Revenue Commissioner to submit 
the matter "to the consideration of the Board of Commissioners, 
who shall direct a proper course of inquiry into the validity 
of the claim, and report the same to us, The Governor, for 
our decision how the said land is to be considered." 
Considerable difficulties were faced by the incumbents when 
attempting to establish their land claims before the 
cominissioners. The lands inherited by the incumbents were 
lands gifted to them by the Kings of Kandy, not several 
decades earlier but several centuries before. In most 
cases the gifts were made verbally by the monarch, which 
was not evidenced by any written document. If the 
commissioners were to question their title, the incumbents 
would now be placed in considerable difficulties while 
attempting to establish their claims. The point must, 
therefore, be made, that insofar as the registration 
went, the temples were placed squarely at the mercy of 
the commissioners who could, if they thought necessary, 
find every justification for refusing to register a claim.
It may be suggested that policy often played a predominant 
part in the process of registration at times even eclipsing 
the available rules.
k hThe principal Proclamation of 1819 had a
carefully worded clause controlling gifts to temples.
The clause made it unlawful to donate or bequeath
"any land whatsoever to or for the use of any temple
... without having first ... received a licence in
writing to give or bequeath the same". A violation of
this caveat made such land not 11 to be considered as the
property of a temple, but shall be given to the nearest
heir of the person who has disobeyed the law ... provided
he sues for the same before the Judicial Commissioner
... within twelve months ... or else the land shall •
become forfeited to the Crown." This prohibition placed
the British government upon a collision course with the
religious susceptibilities of the Kandyan Buddhists.
For one thing it was considered to be a spiritual
prerogative to give some property to the temple at one's
death bed. That property could be land, and therefore
it placed quite clearly, an unavoidable duty upon the
family of a dying Kandyan to carry that wish through.
There was often little or no time left to rush out and
seek a licence from the competent authority to make that
death-bed donation legal. For another, no heir, would
under the social constraints and the recognised mores
of a Kandyan household sue for a return of such property,
if a death-bed gift was subsequently declared void.
Considered within this social and religious framework,
it is evident that the ultimate des tination of such
property was not the temple but the *Land Bank* of the
Crown. By 18^6, the relationship between the government
and the Buddhists had become sufficiently strained that
the British Administration thought it necessary to
propose a Bill 'to provide for the management of Buddhist
45
Vihares and Dewales in the Kandyan provinces."
Although the British irjdministration was performing the 
tasks formerly undertaken by the Sinhalese Kings, in 
providing a military guard for the Tooth Relic, and in 
the Governor himself attending the ceremonies associated
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with the annual exposition of the Tooth Relic, their 
interference with the temple property was considered 
to have no previous precedent* No Sinhalese King had 
ever attempted to control and redistribute temple 
property. Therefore, a clearer statement of the role 
expected from the British government was urgently 
required. The Bill of 1846 was meant to re-state that 
role in unmistakable terms. The legislature passed 
that Bill unanimously and it was subsequently dispatched 
to the United Kingdom, for ratification. Commenting on
46the Bill, Dissanayake and DeSoysa wrote:
"It was framed on the principle that 
government was not only bound to secure 
the Buddhists against molestation and 
injury in their persons or in their 
property on account of their religious 
observances, but were bound to advance 
further, and to enact and execute laws, 
having for their express object the 
more easy, convenient, and orderly 
celebration of the Buddhist rites and 
ceremonies."^
The pith of the Ordinance was to make the government's
involvement in the activities of the Buddhists more
intimate. The enactment of this Bill was naturally
regarded as a significant victory for-the Buddhists of
Ceylon. Unknown to them, "the propriety of a Christian
government acting as head of the Buddhist church began
48to be questioned", both in Ceylon and in the United 
Kingdom. As expected, the Colonial Secretary, Earl
49Grey, "refused to advise the Queen to confirm the 
50said enactment ... as he declined to admit that the 
Convention of 1815 was capable of being interpreted 
in the manner put forward by the framers of the 
Ordinance."^ On the 30th August, 1847, Viscount 
Torrington, the then Governor of Ceylon, informed the 
Legislative Council^2 that Ordinance No. 10 of 1846 
had been rejected by Her Majesty's Secretary for the 
Colonies. He informed the members that Earl Grey,
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had written to say that " ... to separate the British
government from all active participation in the practice
53of heathen worship, they conceive to he a plain and
54simple, though urgent duty’1, of the British government. 
The Bill would have required the British government to 
participate in the "appointment and removal of priests 
and the internal discipline of the ministers of the
C C
Buddhist religion", and would further require the active
British participation in protecting the proprietary rights
56of the Buddhists. The Governor concluded his report to
the Legislative Assembly by emphasising that hereinafter
the Buddhist * Church1 will be treated "as any (other)
57corporate body" in the country. Following this state— 
ment of policy, the government withdrew totally from 
participating in Buddhist affairs. By 18^7, the government 
ceased to pay any allowances to priests, which they had 
previously done as a continuation of an ancient custom 
of the Kandyan Kings. The priests were left to regulate 
their activities, discipline their order and execute
58their regulations as best as they could. The refusal 
to recommend the adoption of the Bill of 1846 and the 
consequent change of attitude towards the Buddhist 
religion may be seen as a result of a legal opinion 
given by Sir John Stephens to the Colonial Office on 
July 4th, 1845. The importance of that opinion in 
understanding the change in the British attitude towards 
Article 5 oF the Convention, merits extensive reproduction 
here. Sir John Stephens wrote:
"The conquest of Kandy, was, I fear, an 
unprincipled aggression on an independent 
people. It was one step in that progress 
which has created our eastern empire of 
which, I believe, the best that could be 
said is, that we have made ... atonement 
by the right use of our powers, for the 
inequity of the means by which we obtained 
it. When the Kandyan monarch was deposed 
and his family and chiefs exiled, and his 
whole country confiscated, to avenge an 
insult with which, apparently, he had 
nothing to do, the conquered naturally
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enough thought that we should make war on 
their religions in the same spirit as on 
their political state. To dispell that 
alarm the Convention declared the * religion 
of Budhoo inviolable1 and that the British 
government were 1 pledged to the maintenance 
and protection of the rites, Ministers, and 
places of worship of the national religion 
of the people.1 We further under took that 
due respect should be paid to their Priests, 
ceremonies and processions.
Founding himself on this language, W. Buller 
declares it to be 'undeniable1 that the 
British government placed itself fin the 
precise position of the Kandyan government 
that is, at the head of the national 
religion as its chief authority and guardian.1 
He says that the British government pledged 
itself fto watch over the interests of that 
religion so that they should not suffer from 
the corruption of its Ministries, or from 
the indifference of the people that its rites 
should be kept up with due and punctual 
solemnity1 - that we undertook that the 
* national religion should not be left to shift 
for itself but should be maintained and pro­
tected by the whole weight of the secular 
power*. He describes the British government 
as the 'avowed defender of the Buddhist faith 
which is neglected and betrayed by them.'
Nothing, I think, but an inveterate habit of 
viewing all subjects sarcastically could have 
induced the chief legal advisor of the local 
government to address it in such a strain at 
this period. It seems superfluous to refute 
by argument assertions of this kind in behalf 
of which no argument is aduced. The words of 
the Treaty have scarcely anything in common 
with this gloss on them. The object of the 
Treaty cannot justify such an expression of 
the plain .meaning of its words. That object 
was to reassure, on the subject of their 
religion people from whom we had taken every­
thing else. The Treaty did not and could not, 
mean that King George III should succeed to 
the religious duties and character of the 
King of Kandy and that the defender of the 
Christian faith should in the same sense 
become the defender of the Buddhist faith.
The Treaty meant merely (and every inhabitant 
of the country knew that it meant merely) 
this - if you will surrender to Great Britain 
all its secular dominion you may keep up your 
religion. Xf you will deliver up to us your
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treasury, your temple lands shall be inviolate.
If you will become subject of our King he will 
permit no one to interrupt your religious 
officers or to despoil your priest or your 
temples. How maintenance and protection can be 
supposed to have meant all that W. Buller as­
cribes to those words is a question which he has 
not answered, and which, I believe, is unanswer­
able by anyone else. He stands quite alone among 
the local authority in his views, and X think 
they may be safely laid aside as untenable•”^ga
As a strategy for the disintegration of the monastic
order this attitude towards the Buddhist religion proved
an effective recipe. The priests, unlike in the past,
had no means "of compelling attendance, and no power of
59inflicting penalties for non-attendance before the 
monastic colleges, having the authority to discipline 
them. This hostile policy generated a sense of hopeless­
ness among the Buddhists which escalated into open
60rebellion with ease. But the psychological damage 
done both to the Buddhists and to the British government 
was to leave an indelible mark upon the future relation­
ship of these two important groups for the next Century, 
in fact until independence in 19^8. During the next 100 
years the British Administration in Ceylon pushed forward 
their strategy for economic development, through the 
plantation industry, which needed land and more fertile
land. It is in this light that the Temple Lands Registra—
6l 62tion Ordinance and the ServicesTenures Ordinance
require scrutiny.
\
(b) The Temple Lands Registration Ordinance of 1856.
The Temple Lands Registration Ordinance (herein— .
after referred to as the Ordinance of 1856) laid down
six basic principles.
First: the Ordinance empowered the Governor to
appoint "one or more persons, not
exceeding three in number who shall be
the Commissioner or Commissioners for 
carrying into effect the provisions of 
this Ordinance.11 ^
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Second: Under the Ordinance, the Commissioner(s) 
were "authorised and required to inquire 
into the boundaries of* all lands, of 
whatsoever description • . • belonging or 
alleged to belong to or in possession of 
all Vihares and Dewales within any 
district of the Kandyan provinces, to 
which the privilege of exemption from 
taxation of temple lands extended,
Certain procedures attending that 
determination were made statutory. ^
Third: The Ordinance made it lawful for such
Commissioners "to inquire and determine 
the right and title of any such temple to 
exemption from taxation in respect of any 
lands alleged to belong thereunto". ^
However, the Ordinance expressly prohibited 
the Commissioners from settling disputes 
as to title "between any such temple and 
any person (except differences or disputes 
between such temple and Our Lady the Queen
Fourth: By Section l4 of the Ordinance, the
Commissioners were required to be, "guided 
by equity and good conscience only, and by 
the best evidence that can or may be pro­
cured, although not such as would be required 
or be admissible of ordinary cases; nor shall 
they be bound by the strict rules of law in 
any case." The Ordinance laid down rules for 
summoning witnesses and penalties for non- 
appearance .
Fifth; The Commissioners, having first satisfied
themselves as to the title and the boundaries 
of the temple and Dewale land, were there­
after required to draw up a registry of lands 
and have them registered at the fcachcheri^  
of the area where the land was situated.70 
At the request of the persons who were:in 
charge of the revenues of such lands, the 
Commissioners were empowered to issue 
certificates of registration. Such certifi­
cates were declared as proof of exemption 
from taxation, "and no other proof of 
exemption shall in any case be admitted or 
received in any court.
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Sixth: It was made clear, in the preamble of
the Ordinance, that the law herein 
enacted was supportive of the decisions^ 
made by the British government in 1819, 
to exempt lands from taxation. This
Ordinance was merely a means by which the
government intended to determine the 
boundaries of such lands before exemption 
from taxation was granted to them.
(c) The Effect of the Complexities of the Buddhist 
Ecclesiastical Law on Colonial Development
Within the framework of these six principles, the 
Ordinance of 1856 came into effect on the first of 
January, 1857* It is important to lay stress on two 
principal difficulties. As matters lay in 1837> the 
temples and the Dewales were placed in a very difficult
position to establish their titles. It would have been
even more difficult to establish their precise boundaries, 
particularly when one realises that the Kandyan Kingdom 
had no survey maps or experienced surveyors. The 
application of these provisions to the temples and 
Dewales of the Maritime Provinces could have been 
significantly easier; for the Dutch maintained an 
effective survey department during their administration 
of the Maritime Provinces. But the Ordinance of I856 
was limited, in its application, to the Kandyan Provinces. 
The second difficulty was in establishing title to land, 
not by the Kandyan Law, but by the Buddhist Ecclesiastical 
Law, to the satisfaction of a lay Commissioner, or 
Commissioners, who in fact were of foreign origin, being 
British, with little or no understanding of the religious 
framework within which the particular ecclesiastical law 
was conceived. The succession rules under the Buddhist 
Ecclesiastical Law rested on two distinct and different
bases - the Sishiyanu Sishya Paramparawa (hereinafter
\ 7 hreferred to as S.S.P.;. and the Sivuru Paramparawa
(hereinafter referred to as S.P.). The two lines of
succession could lead to very different results.
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In S.S.P., the intention to introduce a line of succession
based on that type of succession must be born out in the
original dedication of the property in question, Words
such as "to X and his pupils in their generations"
75would constitute an S.S.P. succession.
In Saranakara Unnanse et al v. Indra.ioti Unnanse
' • 1 ■ L. 1 ■
et al. the Supreme Court recognised four types of
pupils mentioned in the ancient texts. These were:
11 (i) Pabba.j.jantevasika is a pupil who has been 
admitted by robing to the Pabbajja (or Samenara) 
ordination by his preceptor, or Upagghaya. ...
(ii) With regard to the second class of pupils,
Upas ampadant evas ika, this is a pupil who receives 
the upasampada ordination from his preceptor. ...
(iii) The third class of pupils is the
Nissayanevasika.77 m m m
(iv) The fourth class of pupillage is
Dhammantevas ika.7° ... All four classes of pupils 
are alike pupils under the Buddhist Sacred Law, 
i.e., they rank as pupils of the priests who have 
been robed, ordained, instructed them, or given 
them a nissaya. But, for purposes of the pupillary 
succession,7 9 unless a distinction has been made in 
the instrument of dedication, I understand that the 
first two forms of pupillage are alone regarded*
This is natural, as these establish a permanent 
relationship; whereas the last two imply only a 
temporary and transient relationship. " q q
8lRelying on the available case-law and the opinions of 
82 8 3commentators, Hayley distinguished S.S.P. from S.P. 
in this way:
"The main distinction between the two forms of 
succession is that in S.S.P. the successor, 
whether nominated by the incumbent or selected 
by operation of law, bases his claim on 
spiritual relationship or nomination as a 
priest, while in the S.P. the right depends 
upon blood relationship, and the person entitled 
to succeed need not at the time of the death of 
his predecessor be in robes, although he must be 
robed before he can assume the incumbency."g^
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The S.S.P. is regarded as.the normal method of succession.
85In Sangharatana Unnanse v. Weerasekera, the Divisional
Court held that, where the terms of the original 
dedication of property are such that it is not clear 
as to which method of succession the donor preferred, 
the assumption is that succession to property should be 
governed by S.S.P. rather than by S.P. The Divisional 
Court recommended this rule hot only for the Kandyan 
Provinces but also for the Maritime Provinces of the 
Island.
The purpose of this excursus into succession under
the Buddhist Ecclesiastical Law was merely to show its
complexity. This sufficiently indicates the difficulties
the persons entitled to the revenues of the temples and
the Dewales faced when attempting to establish their
titles before the Commissioners functioning under the
Ordinance of I856. For they were all nurtured in a
different legal system functioning within a different
legal culture.
Although the Ordinance of 1856 stated clearly that
the purpose of the Commission was, indeed, to put the
86decisions reached in 1819 into effect, there is strong 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Commission 
was merely an element in the overall development strategy
chartered by the Colonial Administration of Ceylon.
1
(d) The (Declared) Policies of the British Administration. 
Although the Commission commenced its work in 1857>
87even in I865 its work remained incomplete. Recommending
the continuation of the work of the Commission to the
Legislative Council of Ceylon, Sir Hercules Robinson, the 88 — — — — — — — — — — —
Governor said:
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”1 am happy to inform you that the labours 
of the Temple Lands Commissioners are 
nearly completed; but I find that at the 
present rate of progress, the survey, the 
early completion of which forms an essen­
tial part of the scheme, would take six or 
seven years. In order, therefore, that the 
labours of the Commissioners may not be 
thrown away, I have authorized the Survey- 
General to enter into a contract for the 
survey of the Temple Lands, not yet surveyed, 
at the rate of 75>000 acres per annum. It is 
calculated that the survey will be completed 
at this rate in about two years, at a cost of 
upwards of £22,000; but a considerable portion 
of this expense will be recovered from the 
temples under the terms ^ of the Ordinance 
No. 10 of I856, and the whole goyernment outlay 
will be far more than re-couped by the sale of 
lands which have been set free of temple claims 
by the adjudication of the Commissioners.
By 1865, with the opening of the coffee plantations, a
sense of land hunger was beginning to set in. The
manipulative processes available to the Commission while
functioning correctly within the ambit of the Ordinance
of 1856, were thought adequate to free sufficient temple
land for development - i.e., to provide for an expanding
plantation industry. But, by 1872, the planters had
begun to fan out into the Tea Planting Industry. The
early experiments had proved successful and Sir William 
91Gregory promised the Legislative Council in September, 
921872 that he would arrange " two experts in the manipula- 
93tion of tea" to come from India to help the Ceylon
Planters for a couple of years. By 187^ -, the success of
the tea planting industry had begun to blossom and Sir
William was able to tell the Legislative Council that
"tea has already been tried to some extent, and its
undoubted excellence has encouraged applications for a
large amount of forest land to be employed in its 
9 hcultivation."
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The hunt for land was now on and the prime target
appeared to be temple property. In I87O, the British
Administration in Ceylon passed into law, The Service
95 /Tenures Ordinance, (hereinafter referred to as the
Ordinance of 1870)» which became law on the 1st
February of that year. The structure of this Ordinance
97bears a close similarity to the Ordinance of 1856.
The I87O Ordinance primarily rested on five principles.
First: The preamble carried the intention of
freeing the Kandyan peasants from 
service obligations to temples and the 
Dewales. The British Administration 
in Ceylon declared that the retention 
of service tenures was "repugnant to 
the Constitution of the' Colony and 
... tends to check its advancement and 
improvement•"
Second; Under the Ordinance, Commissions of one 
or three persons were a p p o i n t e d . T h e y  
were required99 to determine, and compile 
a list of property, names of their 
proprietors, the names of the Nilakarayas 
and to ascertain the nature of their 
PanguJ-QJ- — whether it is Paraveni^- o r  
Maruveni .3-Q3 The Commissioners were 
further required to determine and list 
the type of services which the Nilakarayas 
were required to p e r f o r m , ^  to the 
proprietors.
Third: The Ordinance required the Commission to
assess "The annual amount of money payment 
for which such services may be fairly 
commuted at the time the registries are 
made."105 The Ordinance made that deter­
mination *final and conclusive* in any 
future proceedings
Fourth: The Nilakarayas were given the right, by
Section 14, toapply, if they so desire 
to have their tenures commuted to one of 
tenancies at a rent fixed by the Commissioners 
according to their 1determination*107 under 
Section 10 of the Ordinance.
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Fifth: Once the Commissioners had made an order
under Section 15, to have the tenures 
commuted to one of tenancies at a fixed 
rent, that decision was final and coneIn­
conclusive . Thereafter, the tenure 
became a nullity, and the relationship 
of a Nilakaraya and a Proprietor became 
one of tenant and Land Lord under a 
fixed rent. The Ordinance of I87O seems 
to establish this relationship for ever; 
being a statutory tenancy, it would not 
be within the landlord1s power to alter 
the terms of the arrangement, such as by 
raising the rent at a future point of 
time.
Within the framework of these five principles, the British
Administration in Ceylon appointed a Commission in the
Kandyan provinces. The key to its success from the
British point of view was the rent. The lower the rent
that was fixed under Section 10, the greater was the
chance of tempting the Nilakarayas to break ancient and
traditional ties with their proprietors and.seek a
commutation of their tenures into tenancies. This would
in turn tempt the Kandyan landlords to submit to the
economic pressures surrounding them and decide to sell
and alienate ancestral property. The obvious and only
buyer of such property was the Crown, which was merely
acting as a real property agent for the plantation
industry. Viewed in this light the developmental strategy
of the British government becomes clear. The Ordinance
of I87O, like the Ordinance of 1856, thus appears
principally as a legal instrument contrived to achieve
a desired economic goal. The British Administration,
however, 'attempted to conceal this developmental strategy
by recommending the Ordinance of 1870 to the Legislative
108Council upon different grounds. On the eve of the
presentation of the Bill to the Council, Sir Hercules
109Robinson, the Governor, informed its members:
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M ... that the services to be performed 
in respect of such tenures are varied in 
character and differ in every village. They 
appear in the Nindagamas to include every 
description of labour which one man can 
perform for another as a cultivator, artisan 
or menial, whilst in the temple villages, in 
addition to the performance of the usual 
agricultural and menial tasks, there are 
allotted to the Nilakarayas, irrespective of 
their superstitious feelings, the temple 
services, consisting of repairing the temples 
and idols, furnishing the daily guards, carry­
ing the images at festivals, and providing 
musicians and devil dancers. The whole 
system, in short, is described by those who 
have carefully watched its effects, as 
degrading to humanity. Under it men are 
bought and sold with the land — industrial 
enterprise is blighted - agricultural improve­
ment is barred - litigation is encouraged - 
oppression is legalized - and, in the case of 
temple tenants, the freedom of conscience is 
interfered with.’’^ ^^
By 1876, two new elements had been added to the
expansion of the plantation economy of Ceylon. One
was tea. The Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson informed
112the Legislative Council in 1872 that British experts
had found the sample tea grown in the highlands "of
such quality as to warrant a more extensive .cultivation 
113of the plant". He particularly emphasised the
importance of tea, at this juncture, for it could be
grown at a much higher elevation than coffee and
therefore would open up much of the hitherto unused
114
land in the Kandyan provinces. This naturally.
intensified even more, the need to find more available
land in the Kandyan provinces. The second element was
the introduction of Liberian coffee. By 1876, Sir
William Gregory, the then Governor, was able to inform
115the Legislative Council of the success which the 
planters had with Liberian coffee. Being a product of 
hot and humid Liberia, the coffee plant grew best in
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the Maritime Provinces. With cinnamon, cocoa, cardamons, 
black pepper and vanilla already established as economic
n  6crops there, the introduction of Liberian coffee 
placed new pressures on land in the Maritime Provinces 
as well.
(e ) New Strategies for Colonial Development
The developmental strategies surrounding the
117. registration of temple lands and the abolition of 
118tenures, had, by 1876, become spent. The Government
was therefore persuaded to move in a new direction.
Both in the Maritime Provinces and in the Kandyan
119provinces, land remained 'tied' to a single line of
succession through several generations (as did the land
120of the well-known Thellusson family in England). The
.English law of trusts settled that problem by an Act of
1800, which is known variously as the Thellusson Act and
the Accumulation Act. Under that Act property in England
can now be limited only to a succession by a 'life in
being*, that could succeed within 21 years of the death
of the testator. If no person nominated by the testator
comes into being, to claim the trust within 21 years of
the settlers death, the income thus accumulated will go,
free of the trust, to the person entitled to it upon 
121intestacy. The Thellusson Act served a very real
purpose in the United Kingdom to release land which had
come to be regarded as being under the 'dead hand*. The
British Administration in Ceylon identified the
122Fjdei Commissum in the Maritime Province, and ’settled 
123and entailed1 property in the Kandyan provinces, with 
the proverbial 'dead hand'. It was the belief of the 
Government that, by releasing land from the grasp of these 
two 'dead hands', further land would be available both in 
the Maritime Provinces and in the Kandyan Provinces for 
the two new crops — (Liberian) coffee and tea respectively.
- 43 -
124 12 5Sir William Gregory, the Governor, in 1873 > informed
the Legislative Council that in the view of* his adminis­
tration the Fidei Commissum was a bad institution for 
development. He said:
"It' so happens that in a series of years 
a miserable piece of land or a building 
devolves upon some 20 or 30 heirs. No 
one in particular is interested in looking 
after the property; permanent improvement 
is simply out of the question" *^26
He proposed to have legislation drafted not only to
127limit the Fidei Commissum to a single.generation
but also to make provisions for the termination of that
institution, contrary to the aims and aspirations of 
128the testator. To say at the same time, as Sir William
129did, that the Governor did not intend to interfere 
with the "essential particulars" of the Roman-Dutch Law 
pertaining to this institution, seems to be hypocritical* 
The Dutch institution of Fidei Commissum was a borrowing 
from the Roman law of property. The social importance 
of Fidei Commissum must be evaluated against the signifi­
cance given to family and family property among the 
ancient societies, both of Holland and of Rome. Some 
modification must necessarily occur to keep development 
abreast with the march of time, but to limit the 
institution to one generation, coupled with the provision 
of legal instrumentalities to breach the testatorfs aims 
and aspirations, may clearly amount to a total negation
of that institution. To do so, as the Government of 
130Sri Lanka did in 1975 > with a clean sweep in order 
to facilitate their land reform programme, was perhaps 
a little less dishonest than to do so to facilitate the 
expansion of the plantation industry under the guise of 
native development. Turning away from the Maritime 
Provinces and towards the Kandyan Provinces, Sir William, 
in 1876, lamented the way that the Buddhist temples were
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131flaunting and wasting their property. On the 13th
September of that year, in his address to the Legislative 
Council, the Governor told its members of a proposed 
Ordinance regarding ’settled and entailed property1 and 
its effect on the Kandyan provinces. He said:
"It will of course be prospective in 
its operation, but powers may be given 
in it to trustees to dispose of real 
property already held by temples and 
other religious institutions."
The Governor, with reference to future legislation 
regarding Buddhist institutions, had this to say:
"I have constituted a commission* to enquire 
into the manner in which the Buddhist tempo­
ralities are administered. I am not prepared 
at present to state, until this enquiry is 
terminated, whether legislation will be 
necessary; but if so, you may rest assured 
that it will be framed so as to maintain 
scrupulously two principles: that the
government shall in no way identify itself 
or have any concern whatever with the 
Buddhist religion, and that the principles 
of the Convention of 1815 will be upheld in the 
spirit and in the letter. " ^ 2
This passage refers directly to the Buddhist 
Temporalities Acts; the first of the series, enacted 
in I889, was replaced by another in 1905, which was in 
turn replaced by a third in 1931* Both the I889 enactment 
and the 1931 enactment resulted from Commissions of 
Enquiry, while the 1905 Ordinance was intended to be an 
improvement on the I889 Ordinance and was based on 
experience and advice. These will be considered later, 
but it is important to indicate at this stage that the 
policies and the goals of the Buddhist Temporalities 
Acts were conceived within a very different framework 
from that which guided the administration in drafting 
the foregoing Ordinances concerned with the control and 
re-distribution of property. Into this latter category 
will fall 'The Entail and Settlement Ordinance I8761
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(hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1876), which
has a particular relevance to the idea of 'cutting off the
dead hand1. That, in fact, was the last of the property-
oriented Ordinances which were to emerge at this particular
stage of colonial history in Ceylon.
133In announcing to the Legislative Assembly the
I3Z4.
Bill which became Ordinance No. 11 of I876,
Sir William Gregory said:
"I am satisfied by the experience of five 
years that the enormous and unimproved — 
and, as they now stand, unimprovable - 
territorial possessions of the Buddhist 
temples in the Kandyan districts are a 
bar to general advancement, that,they 
afford the means of malversation^ and 
should no longer be held in the dead 
Hand'."
1J5
It is important at this stage to examine the Ordinance 
of I876 with a view to assessing the extent to which 
its operation did in fact effect the release of land 
from the grasp of the 'dead hand'. By Section 2 of 
the Ordinance any restriction upon alienation of 
property for a period longer "than the lives of a person 
(or persons) who are in existence or eh ventre sa mere 
at the time" when such restriction was placed was 
declared null and void. By Section 3* the avoidance 
was restricted to the period exceeding the life span 
and not to the whole instrument. By Section 4, a 
District Judge was empowered to release the restriction 
on alienation, under certain conditions, even during a 
valid period of restriction or prohibition. Under 
Section 5 "any person entitled to the possession or to 
the receipt of the rents and profits of any immovable 
property now or which may hereafter become subject to 
such entail, Fidei Commissum. or settlement as aforesaid,
... may apply to the District Court by petition in a 
summary way"' to have the powers vested in a judge of that
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court under Section 4 exercised, for the purposes of* 
having the land released for sale or lease. Section 
5 applied, as did the entire Ordinance, to both Kandyan 
and Maritime Provinces. However, the Ordinance as a 
whole was subject to a limitation placed in Section 12. 
That section excluded the application of* the Ordinance 
"to any immovable property held or possessed ... f*or 
the benefit of any ... temple, or any charitable, 
religious or educational institution". Although this 
may at first sight appear to exclude temple property, 
contrary to that indication, the Ordinance in fact helped 
the priests, who were by now made impecunious, having 
been deprived of government grants since 1847, to rise 
to the temptation and sell their land. The legal twist 
was this. Under the Kandyan system, whether by pupillary
1 q>7 1 qQ
succession (S.S.P.) or by succession through blood
(S.P.), temple lands were the private property of the
incumbent. In a very careful judgment of the Supreme
Court, in 1882, in Ratnapala Unnanse v. Sego Seibu Sego 
139Abdul Cader, it was laid down that the ownership of
lands and other offerings vested in the 1 incumbent1, In
140Charles v. Appu the Divisional Court expressed the 
view that temple property was not 'Res Sacrae' and 
therefore could be sold in execution of a judgment debt
l4lincurred by the incumbent. These and other decisions
142were relied upon by Hayley when he wrote that:
"The practical ownership of the lands and 
offerings dedicated to various temples 
vested in the incumbent or body of priests 
resident in the temple; and any surplus 
of revenue, after needs of the temple and 
the resident priests had received provision, 
came to be regarded as the private property 
of the priests, whose capacity for ownership 
the civil law does not seem to have denied,
it
143
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The exclusion of* the application of the Ordinance of*
I876 to temple property was in fact of no real 
consequence. The goals earmarked by the British
144Administration in Ceylon in its policy statement
was in no way affected by the provisions of section 12
of the Ordinance. As to non-temple property, the
Ordinance offered a splendid escape route. In the words
145
of the Government, ^  the "restrictions upon alienation 
are found to be prejudicial both to individuals and the 
community, for such property is seldom improved by the
l46life tenant." The success of the Ordinance of 1876
147was significant. Reporting to the Legislative Council 
148
in 1880, Sir James Longden examined the land sales 
undertaken by the British Administration in Ceylon to 
the plantation industry over a period of 12 years.
Between I867 and 1876, the Governor stated that the 
Government had received an average annual revenue of 
Rupees 639»l45*00. But in 1877> alone the government was 
able to find sufficient land to the value of 1 ,550,983 
Rupees. In 1878 the value of land sold to the plantation 
industry was 1,282,403 Rupees while in 1879 the sales 
had fallen to Rupees 694,030 reaching a plateau. These 
figures represent the amount of land which the Government’s 
'Land Bank1 had acquired, each year, to sell to the 
plantation industry. The years 1877 and 1878 appear to 
have seen the early effects of the Ordinance of I876.
By 1879 t effect had begun to wane and the sales had
returned to normal. Even then, commenting on the 1879 
figure, Sir James remarked that it was:
"still amounting to a sum which may be 
favourably compared with the average 
of the 10 years preceeding 1877•”^4^
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Although the precise figures of the extent of the land
acquired by the Temple Land Commission are not avail-
1^98.able there is, however, some circumstantial evidence 
indicating the enormity of the Commission's success in 
obtaining land for the plantation industry. In a 
despatch from the Governor, Sir Henry Ward, in 1859, 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he reported 
on the success of the Temple Lands Commission over the 
preceeding two years of its life. In his report, Sir 
Henry submitted a breakdown of the expenses incurred 
by the Commission over the preceeding two years as pounds 
1,993., 12 shillings and eight pence and the total value 
of the land collected as pounds 20,990.8sh.5r pence.
The report further stated that out of a total extent of 
9,875 acres of Highland, the Commission had recognised 
the title to merely 1 ,70^ acres while absorbing into 
the Crown's 'Land Bank* 8,171 acres or nearly 80$ of 
the total land mass surveyed during that period. These 
figures should provide a good indication as to the 
percentage of land the Commission succeeded in confisca­
t i n g  for the 'Land Bank'.
Vi, The Shutting of the Stable Door ... The Buddhist
Temporalities Law
All the stratagems designed towards setting up a 
plantation economy, particularly, towards finding the 
land which, indeed, was a basic requirement, seem to 
have been clearly successful. In the process, the 
British Administration in Ceylon had in fact caused a 
considerable degree of concern and consternation to the 
Buddhist community. Conscious of this fact, the British 
Government attempted to placate the Buddhists and the 
priests by working towards the production of a comprehen­
sive code which could help towards protecting whatever 
remained of the original lands of the temples. The stable 
door was now to be closed, the horse having fled for 
greener pastures. No more was there the need for land to
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satisfy the requirements of the planting community. The
coffee plantations were put in some difficulties by the
onset of a leaf disease, but the tea, cocoa, cinnamon,
black pepper and cinchona industries were all enjoying
150an unprecedented boom in the Colony. Since the
refusal^^ of the Secretary of State for the Colonies
assent to Ordinance No. 2 of 1 8 4 6 , the
Administration's policy was one of complete disassocia-
tion from the affairs of the ’Buddhist Church’. In its
trail this included the cancellation of government
grants to priests as from 184-7 > and leaving the temple
property solely in the hands of the priests — the
153’incumbents’ — of the Vihares. This two-pronged
policy proved to be a most effective formula for under­
development of the temple lands and for the dismantling 
of the centres of Buddhist power in the Kandyan provinces. 
The monastic orders were faced with an acute crisis of 
discipline. The violators of monastic orders were no 
longer amenable to the disciplinary boards set up by 
their various sects. For there was no effective method
of summoning them before the boards,, and clearly none by
154which the disciplinary orders could be carried out.
Until 1815, the Kandyan Kings, and thereafter, the 
British Government, had helped monastic orders in the 
policing tasks attending the activities of the monastic 
disciplinary boards. After 1847 there was no such help 
forthcoming from the British Government. Indiscipline 
and misbehaviour diminished the morals and the nerve of 
the clergy to protect, not only their own rights, but 
also those of the Sinhalese people. In turn, the respect 
and devotion which the priesthood traditionally commanded 
from the people was also lost. Associated with these 
events was the malversation of temple property.
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Unable to structure a viable programme for the development
of temple property, by 1898, the British Government was
anxious about the extent to which the *Buddhist Church*
had been reduced both in its spiritual power and in its
economic power. The effective implementation of the
laws designed towards the control and re-distribution
of temple property' had taken its course with increasing
success and by 1888 a stable foundation for the launching
of a plantation economy had in fact been laid. Although,
Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, in his letter to the
Governor giving reasons why the British Government was
unwilling to approve the Ordinance No. 2 of 1846, had
promised to give the Buddhist community *'a sound working
constitution", for almost forty years; since 1847, there
had been no movement among the British Administration in
155that direction. In frequent addresses to the
Legislative Council, Governors had reminded themselves
of the implementation of Lord Grey's promise, but no
concrete steps had thus far been taken in that direction,
until 1889. Had the 1889 Ordinance been enacted before
the implementation of the Ordinances for the control and
re-distribution of temple property, much of the temple
lands could have been saved and indeed developed; and
that would accordingly have slowed the pace towards
creating a plantation economy in Ceylon. The Buddhists,
concerned with the rate of loss of temple property,
made several attempts to arrest that rate, but the
Supreme Court repeatedly ruled that the ordinary devotees
156had no legal interest in the property. For the
property was entirely in the ownership and possession of 
the incumbents. Temple property was their private 
property and they clearly had the power to do what they 
wished with it. Even in 1877 the Buddhists were 
agitating for that Constitution which Earl Grey had 
promised in 1847. Sir William Gregory informed the 
Legislative Council"*"^ on the 7th May 1877 that he:
11 ... thought, however, that it was advisable 
not to take any steps in the matter until the 
Buddhists themselves claimed the interferences 
of the government. Since then X have received 
constant complaints from influential members 
of that religion ... »"133
The year 1877 was the first complete year of operation 
of the Ordinance of I876. That was also a peak year 
for land sales, followed by another new record level 
in 1878.^^^ The Buddhist Temporalities Bill, however, 
did not appear until I889 - for another twelve years.
The horse, by that time, had truly fled. On the eve'*'^ 
of the presentation of the first Buddhist Temporalities 
Bill, in 1888, the then British Governor, Sir Hamilton 
Gordon, was somewhat apologetic in his lament:'*' ^
"Since the withdrawal, many years ago, of all 
control by the government over the temporal 
affairs of the Buddhist religious foundations 
in this colony, great and scandalous abuses 
have prevailed in their management. The well- 
disposed of that community are unable to check 
these abuses, owing to the want of any efficient 
machinery for exercising control in such matters.
It appears to have been ruled by the courts that 
incumbents of the different Vihares and Dewales 
are not, in the ordinary sense of the word, 
trustees, and that the Buddhist inhabitants of 
any locality have not that pecuniary interest 
in the temple property which alone would entitle 
them to call in question before a court of law 
the abuse of the property by the incumbent for 
the time being ... The monastic colleges, indeed, 
can administer discipline, and degrade and disrobe 
priests, but they can only do so in the case of 
priests personally attending before them; and as 
they have no means of compelling attendance, and 
no power of inflicting penalties for non-attendance, 
it may be presumed that delinquent incumbents do 
not pay much attention to any citation issued by 
those bodies. ... It is almost unnecessary for 
me to recall to mind the fact that, when the 
connection of the Government with the Buddhist 
Temporalities was severed, it was fully admitted 
by Her Majesty's Government that it became an 
obligation, at the same time, to give to the
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Buddhist religious community a sound working 
constitution, which was fully recognised more 
than forty years ago ... . Had it been
imagined possible that any serious delay would 
occur in providing it, measures would probably 
have been taken to prevent the plunder of 
movable and immovable property, and the waste 
of annual revenues, in the interval.
•I /T q
The first Buddhist Temporalities Law was enacted in
1889 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of I889).
As mentioned earlier, the main objective of the
Ordinance was to protect what little land was now left
for the Buddhist Temples and Dewales. The Ordinance
first divided the Island into Provinces, Districts and 
164Sub-Districts. Each District was given a Committee
165comprising members elected by each of its Sub-Districts.
Each of the Sub-Districts was required to return one 
166member. The Ordinance laid down in nine sections the
procedures involved in summoning a meeting of the voters
-• r y
who are qualified to vote,' the qualifications of such
voters'*-^  and the qualifications of the candidates'*’^
170and similar matters. The role played by the District
171Committee was supervisory. They were required to
compile a register by recording the names of the temples,
172their lands, their trustees, the nature of the Pangus,' 
the average annual rents and other incomes, the types
173of services due and such other accounting desiderata.
The District Committee had two principal tasks. First, 
it was required by section 17 to elect a trustee for 
each of the temples within that district. The qualifica­
tions for such trustees were co-terminous with the
174-qualifications for membership of a District Committee.
In addition, the trustee must be one who is a member of
175the particular sect of Buddhism to which the temple
1 7 6
in question belongs. Second, the District Committee
was required to superintend the activities of the trustee.
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The Committee could suspend the trustee for neglect
1 Kiv "i fyQ
or misconduct, and cause the Provincial Committee
179to prosecute or dismiss him. The Ordinance had
provisions to enable the Provincial Committees to order
IgO
the payment of* a remuneration to the trustees. By
section 20,
!,all property, movable and immovable, 
belonging or in any view appertaining 
to or appropriated to the use of any
temple, together with all the issues,
rents and profits of the same, and all 
offerings made for the use of such 
temples ... shall vest in the trustee 
of such temple, subject, however, to 
any leases and other tenancies, 
charges and incumberances affecting 
any such immovable property ... .M
101
In seven paragraphs attached to that section, the
Ordinance limited the purposes for which the temple
property so entrusted could be lawfully used. By
section 21 the trustees were required to maintain
detailed accounts, and other disbursements. Each half
year, the trustees were required to submit these
accounts to the District Committees and they could if
necessary forward the accounts to the Provincial
1 8 2Committees for further investigation. The Provincial
Committees had the power to apply to the District Court
1 O o
to have an auditor appointed. In order to maintain
the strict observance of these accounting procedures and 
other procedures that were required to insure that the 
aims and objects of this Ordinance were carried out, 
the Provincial Committee was authorised to order:
"the payment of such share of the expenses 
incurred in carrying out the provisions of 
this Ordinance ... .
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The trustees, , may, with the consent of* the Provincial
Committee, "demise for any term not exceeding twenty
years, all or any of the lands vested in him under
185the provisions of this Ordinance." Xt is, however,
important to stress that the Ordinance left no power 
in any of the persons or committees it mentions, to 
sell and dispose of temple land. Section 20(a)-(f) 
laid down a developmental strategy of a limited nature 
within which the temple property could, for the first 
time since 1846, he used exclusively for religious 
purposes. The personal element of ownership was 
abolished. A collective responsibility for the upkeep 
of the Buddhist temples and its lands was created.
The basic voting unit in this structure was at the 
sub-district level. Each sub—district elected one 
person to sit on the District Committee. Xt is the 
latter which elected and appointed the trustees. At 
the apex of the structure was the Provincial Committees 
for which the voting power was given to the District 
Committees and to the trustees of the temples in the 
whole province. By section 31 membership at the
Provincial level was limited to five persons and their 
qualifications were closely circumscribed. They must 
be of the male sex, must have completed their twenty- 
fifth year and must "not have been convicted of any
-| O ry
infamous crime". Three of the five members were
elected by the members of the District Committees•and
188the rest by the trustees of the whole province.
The Ordinance laid down elaborate procedures for these
elections,^^^ In eleven sections^^ the Ordinance
chartered the Rights and Powers, Duties and Liabilities
191of the Provincial Committees. In the last section 
any alienation of temple property, between the passing 
of this Ordinance and the appointment of the trustees 
for the temples under it was declared null and void.
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In forty nine sections, after forty three years, the
British Administration fulfilled their promise to give
the Buddhist community a viable constitution. This
framework has withstood many decades. The Buddhist
192Temporalities Ordinance of 1905 merely altered the
manner of electing the trustees. By section 17 of that
Ordinance, one or three (not more) trustees may be
elected for every temple, at a meeting called for that
purpose by the District Committee, at which all
residents in the village to which the temple is attached
193shall be entitled to.vote. The Buddhist Temporalities
19^Act of 1931 made it possible for the incumbent of a
temple to nominate a priest or a lay person to be a 
195trustee, but such nomination must be reported to the
196Public Trustee forthwith. Under this Ordinance, the
roles played by the District Committees and the
Provincial Committees were suppressed and were replaced
197by the Public Trustee.
By maintaining the general supervisory power in 
the hands of the Government, through the Public Trustee, 
the British Administration had unwittingly come full 
circle. At least nominally, the state participation in 
the development, care and control of the temple lands 
had by now become a reality. This law was maintained
throughout the colonial period and is still the law in
o • t i 8Sri Lanka.
Although an incumbent could move the courts to have
his incumbency legally recognised, any claim regarding
temple property must be made by the trustee of the temple
199in that capacity. A number of decisions of the
Supreme C o u r t , s t r e t c h i n g  from the time of the first 
Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance of I889 until the present 
day, have separated the priesthood from temple property.
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This naturally is different and distinct from what the
201Ordinance refers to as * pudgalika' (or personal)
property of the priests, which indeed was their own.
But this was of a very limited nature and as a problem
of development has little or no relevance.
It must be emphasised that the key to the
development of temple property was its transference
from the hands of the priests and into the hands of
lay trustees. This was also the key to its protection
and to its enhanced productivity. By 1889, the time had
elapsed for any meaningful development of the temples
which having now been denied government grants from
18^7, suffered an acute shortage of capital for investment.
The availability of capital was indeed a necessary prelude
to development. The temples were, therefore, placed
202wholly within a framework of what Frank would call,
the 'Development of under—development’. When these
strategies for under-development were compared with the
strategies for development of the Christian religious
203establishments, the Buddhists were placed in a
permanent state of conflict with institutions which were 
associated with the British Government. At least to 
some small measure this could explain both the nationali­
sation of s c h o o l s , t h e  sterling companies^^^ and their
2q £
estates, during the sixties and the seventies of this
century. The larger conflict in fact, which arose out of
the alleged treatment of the Buddhists was the language
issue. Sinhala language was not only the language of
the Sinhalese people, but was also the language of the
207religion. Although the Buddhist 'gathas' were in the 
ancient Pali language, unlike Sanskrit, Pali had no 
particularised script of its own. Therefore, the 
'gathas' were written in the Sinhala script. The religion 
was communicated in Sirihala. And the culture of the 
Sinhalese race was a Buddhist culture. In this sense,
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Christianity as a whole stood in sharp contrast, in that
it espoused a western oriented culture expressed in a
western language using the Roman script. In effect
Sinhala language and Buddhism were inseparable. This
fact underlines the language debate which will be
examined later. The aspect of Buddhism, which received
the closest attention here, was its relation to the
economic base of the Colonial Administration, the
creation of the plantation economy, and the legal
means used for the control and redistribution of Temple
Lands to provide for the planting fraternity. Leaving
208the language debate for a later chapter, it would be
relevant to examine next the use of education as an 
instrument for religious and cultural conversion. This 
necessarily formed an element in the composite plan 
towards bringing about cultural and religious colonisation 
of the Island. These two aspects of colonisation, as 
later events were to show, became central to the political 
stability of the Island during the colonial period, and 
thereafter to maintain and strengthen the social, 
economic and the legal institutions inherited from that 
period. These aspects may appear with some degree of 
clarity from the succeeding chapters of this work.
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CHAPTER 3 
Education and Aculturisation
X . An Introduction
Colonial education policy in Ceylon appears to
have had two basic objectives. First, it was declared
at the time of Lord North,^ that the colonial policy
was to use education as an instrument for the conversion
Of the whole Ceylonese nation into protestant Christianity.
This in fact resulted in placing the colonial education
policy along a collision course with the Buddhist and
the Hindu religious communities. Secondly, linked to
the colonial education policy was the aim to create a
new class of persons, about whom MacCaulay wrote in 
3
his minute on colonial education, with particular 
reference to India. He said:
"I feel ... it is impossible for us with 
our limited means, to attempt to educate 
the body of the people. We must at present 
do our best to form a class who may be 
interpreters between us and the millions 
we govern — a class of persons Indian in 
blood and colour, but English in taste, 
in opinions, in morals and in intellect.11^
It must be said at once that this two-pronged
5
education policy was in keeping with the colonial 
attitudes of the times and was no different to the 
education policies planned and executed by other 
colonial powers such as France, Holland, Portugal or 
Spain for their own overseas territories, during the 
late 18th and the early 19th centuries.
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The second objective of colonial policy was to a
large measure successful. By the time of independence,
in 19^8, Ceylon had witnessed the growth of a class of
persons, small in number, whose cultural and attitudinal
assumptions were borrowed from alien cultures. By
19^8, this small group had formed a class of power-
brokers in Ceylon akin to the Comparadore class which
Mao-tse-tung identified in pre 19^ -9 Chinese society.
Through such a class, the British Administration ruled
the native population of the Island. After X n(3ependence
it was hoped that this group of persons shall chart a
course for the country1s future, in which the English
language, and western cultural values and attitudes
shall have a place of prominence on the Island.
8 9Passe surveyed the place of English on the
Island. He found^ that those who spoke on the eve
of Independence against the prominent position in
which the English language was held in Ceylon, hailed
from a distinct and an identifiable group in the
Ceylonese society of the time. Passe attributed to
this opposition a sense of guilt which they had felt
by seeing in them as persons who have been singled
out by history to reap, and thus enjoy, the benefits
of their English education. He mentioned the
attitudes of the Ceylonese towards culture: f,Our
ballroom dances, the games we play, the music we hear,
12the films we see and the clubs and hotels we go,"
have all been absorbed easily by this class of persons.
"When the heat and dust of controversy have subsided,
it will be realised that more than a hundred years of
English education have left their ineradicable impress
13in our ways of thinking and feeling." Commenting on 
the lowering of the standards of English, Passe placed 
the blame squarely on the policy of the colonial 
government, particularly during the last decade, in
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providing opportunities to those who came from non-
14English speaking homes to learn English. He said: 
"Briefly, it is a lowering of the average attainment 
in English due to the spread of English education
15
among classes to whom it is a foreign tongue."
Passefs main contention was that English was then
coming to be used by all and sundry, and not being
regarded as the exclusive preserve of those who were
English in every aspect, except by birth and parentage.^
He was concerned with use of idioms, intonations,
"for speaking, and listening, reading and writing are
17parts of the same skill." In concluding his examina­
tion of the social attributes of English education in 
Ceylon, at the point of independence, he wrote:
"In Ceylon, with the exception of a small 
minority of priests and pundits, practically 
all those who have any claim to be called 
educated are ‘English educated1. Wealth 
and power are concentrated in the hands of 
this small percentage of the population.
Since Passe* s article was published in 19^-3> a 
process leading towards the de-stabilisation of this 
small minority together with a reduction of their
political power was commenced, by the implementation
19 20of the Official Language Act of 1936 and three
other supportive measures. These provisions and their
social consequences shall form the core of the next
chapter. The present chapter shall consider the social
and legal aspects of colonial education policy and
what has been aptly described by Rev. C.N.V. Fernando,
21O.M.I., as the "missionary enterprise." An
examination of the colonial policy on education and
its close association with the "missionary enterprise"
could explain the enactment of the Assisted Schools and
22Training Colleges (Special Provisions) Act of 1961, 
culminating in the nationalisation of the denominational 
schools on the Island. The present chapter shall deal
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in chronological order, the educational policies from 
1796, laying emphasis at each stage upon the two 
colonial objectives: of converting the population
into Christianity and creating a narrow class of power— 
brokers to keep the English language and culture both 
prominent and alive.
II• The Formative Period of Colonial Education Policy: 
Vacillation and Uncertainty of Objects and Goals.
(a) What did the British inherit from the Dutch 
Administration?
23Under the Treaty of Capitulation signed between 
the British and the Dutch on the 15th February, 1796, 
the Dutch clergy and other ecclesiastical servants
2 kwere permitted to continue their work "among the
2 5
public of the reformed faith" as they had done during 
the Dutch period. Although there are neither records 
nor writings about the way the Portuguese administration 
between I505-I656 A.D. conducted their educational
policy, some significant writings have emerged out of
26 27the Dutch period. Pridham in his writings on the
Dutch policy towards education has pointed out that
education under the Dutch was wholly conducted within
a religious framework. Pridham wrote:
"Each school had from two to four teachers 
in proportion to the number to be taught.
Every 10 scholars were at the same time 
under the care of a Superintendent, who 
examined alike their proficiency and the 
conduct of the teachers. There was like­
wise an annual visitation by the Dutch 
clergy, each of whom had the schools in 
a particular diocese committed to his 
charge. If2g
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The Dutch administration had established a Scholarchal 
Commission which was composed of inter alia, the
29
Dissave or The Collector of the Colombo District.
The latter was the highest ranking European functionary
who stood next, in line of precedent to the Dutch
Governor. The Commission had a number of subsidiary
tasks such as resolving problems concerning consanguity
and issuing marriage certificates. But the principal
task for which the Commission remained responsible was
the supervision of the educational establishment
established by the Dutch. In this sphere, the Commission
appointed one clergyman and a layman from each of the
diocese and mandated them with the authority of the State
to tour the schools within their diocese on behalf of the
Commission. Each such group was responsible for visiting
30between 30-^0 schools. Describing the organisational
31aspects of these visitations Rev. Palm wrote that
notice of these annual visits were given to each school
district by public announcements made through 1 tom-tom1
beaters and *village-criers*. The announcement required
all students (both past and present) teachers and parents
to assemble on the morning of the appointed day* During
the morning, Rev. Palm wrote, the two Commissioners —
now in the role of inspectors - examined the present
students: "in reading, in writing, in repeating their
catechism and the Ten Commandments, the creed, the
32Lord’s prayer and other prayers." In addition there 
were questions asked from the students about other 
subjects too.
During the afternoon sessions, Rev. Palm wrote, 
that the students who had left school during the past 
three years or less, known as Nieuwe Largeerden (newly 
discharged) were examined. These Nieuwe Largeerden 
were required during their first three years of 
discharge to attend the school twice a week for
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continued instructions in religion and have his 
Largeerden (the certificate) signed. During the 
latter part of the afternoon the Commission took time 
to examine the Oude Largeerden (old discharged).
These are students who had been discharged from the 
school during the* past 4-6 years. They too were 
required to continue their religious instructions but 
not as frequently as it was required of the Nieuwe
Although education was free, heavy fines were
imposed on parents whose children had missed school
33during the weekdays and church during the Sundays.
The Commissioners by the end of the afternoon engaged
in auditing these accounts, admonishing teachers and
dismissing them where necessary. The Commissioners
may during such a session appoint new teachers and
determine who among the students in the final year
34qualify to be discharged. These became the Nieuwe 
Largeerdens. Having completed these tasks by dusk, the 
clergyman among the Commissioners conducted a mass and 
preached to the congregation before departing for the 
next village where they began the same kind of routine 
the next morning. At the end of their tour of 30—40 
schools, the Commissioners were required to file a 
report with the Scholarchal Commission in Colombo, for 
submission to the Governor. These reports were 
eventually sent to Holland. This description suggests 
an organised educational system with a strong religious 
accent which the British Administration in Ceylon 
inherited from the previous Dutch Administration in 
1796. Although schools came to a standstill between 
the Capitulation in February, 1796 and the arrival of 
the first British Governor in October 1798, the 
educational infra-structure remained dormant but
35intact during those two years. The Administration
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which, ruled the Island between 1796 and 1798 was a 
Military Administration. Their mandate was to hold 
the newly conquered territory as best as they could 
for the British East India Company. The Company's 
administrators during these two years stopped the 
payment of salaries to the school teachers and had in
3 6addition stopped the grants-in-aid to the schools.
The Dutch educational system was wholly Government
37sponsored through grants-in-aid and was free. But
oQ
it was in a total sense religious. It was well 
organised but ran within a strict bureaucratic frame­
work created and held together by the State.
(b) The Pre-Colebrooke-Cameron Period: 1799—1832
In 1799 North appointed the Rev. James Cordiner,
the Church of England Chaplain to the British Armed
38ctForces, as the Superintendent of Schools. Fired
with an enthusiasm for converting the natives to the
Protestant faith, the Governor, in 1800, claimed from
the British Government a budget of £5,000 for scholastic
39and ecclesiastical purposes. By January 1800, three 
preparatory schools had been opened in Colombo and the 
Colombo Academy (which subsequently became the present 
Royal College) was established by 1802.^^ Schools for 
orphans and foundlings had been opened in Galle, Jaffna
4land Trincomalee in 1801. Several schools for the
children of the Roman Catholic faith, too, had begun in
4-2Colombo, by 1801. Alarmed by the growing expenditure
for education in their newest colony, the then Colonial
Secretary, by a despatch of 30th January, 1803, reduced
the Education and Ecclesiastical budget of the Island
43drastically, to £1,500. The result was that parochial 
schools lost their grants-in-aid with the consequent 
effect that education, particularly religious education,
44entered a lean period. Although by the personal
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Intervention of*. Cordiner, while on leave in England, 
the British Government agreed to re-consider the 
budget, leading Governor North*s administration 
swiftly into a severe financial crisis. However, by 
1805, due to strong representations from religious 
revivalists in England, the British Government instructed 
Governors Maitland (1805-1812) and Brownrigg (1812-1820) 
to take remedial steps towards promoting religious
46education yet again on the Island. The British Adminis­
tration in Ceylon while seeking support for the education 
and ecclesiastical budget, admitted the Baptists in 1812,
the Wesleyans in I8l4, the American Missionaries in I8l6,
47and the Church Missionary Society in 1818 into the
Island and encouraged them to establish schools on the
48Island. The government appointed a successor to
0-
Rev. Cordiner, as the Archdofcan for Ceylon, in 1818, and
placed all government (i.e. non—denominational) schools 
49under him. The years between 1818 and 1832 appear to
have been the difficult years for religious education.
Describing the education process introduced by the
50missionaries, Sir James Tennent. the then Colonial 
Secretary in Ceylon, wrote:
"The students reside uninterruptedly under 
the same roof with their instructors, and 
although no renunciation of idolatry and 
no formal declaration of Christian beliefs 
is insisted on as a preliminary to admission, 
still each inmate is required, as a matter of 
discipline, to be present at the morning and 
evening devotions of the school, to attend 
the Christian worship in the chapel of the 
college. To participate in their own 
religious observances ... is regarded in the 
student as a disciplinal offence; and so far* 
from this regulation being looked upon as a 
despotic interference with religious freedom, 
it is regarded by the students only as a well 
understood condition of their admission to a 
Christian institution, and one with which 
they voluntarily comply, in order to secure a 
participation in all the advantageous of the 
college."
52The success among the Tamils had been exceptional.
But the penetration into the Sinhalese community was
53
slow and was arduous. The missionaries found the 
Buddhists, who are, to a person, Sinhalese: "shielded
from interference, priesthood of Buddhism exerting an
54
undisputed influence over their minds ... ." As for
the Kandyans, the missionaries found an impenetrable
55
wall of myth, superstition and fear surrounding them.
Sir James Tennent Wrote:
"Ignorant and uninstructed themselves, the 
Kandyan peasantry, on the arrival of the 
Christian missionaries, were apparently 
insensible of any advantages to their 
children derivable from education; and 
so Christianity found no access to their 
villages, it became impracticable to 
establish schools with adequate hopes of 
success, as no Christian teachers could be 
found to officiate; and no stranger, how­
ever eligible, could have compassed the 
attendance of a single Kandyan class.
57
When comparing the missionary achievements among the 
Sinhalese Buddhist community with such achievements 
among the Tamil community, the missionaries were proud 
of their success in spreading the word of the gospel, 
dismantling caste barriers and educating Tamils in the 
English language. The Sinhalese-Buddhists found no 
immediate incentive to learn English from the only place 
they could, namely from the missionaries. Unless the 
potential converts had on their own sought conversion
eg
the missionaries found it difficult, if not impossible
to awaken the conscience of the Sinhalese—Buddhists to
seek conversion. It is in this light that the recommen- 
59
dation regarding the employment of natives and of 
education made by the Colebrooke—Cameron Commission in 
1 8 31^ required consideration.
-67-
Ill• The Colebrooke—Cameron Recommendations on Education
(a.) An Introduction
The Commissioners, having first taken note of the 
peculiar traits of the Kandyans generally and the 
Buddhists — who are Sinhalese - in particular, thought 
it necessary to ferret them out from their own social 
burrows, by inducements rather than by force.^ .They 
found in them a caste-conscious Buddhist group, in­
sensible to the developing opportunities surrounding 
62them. The Commissioners recommended the suppression
of certain types of public offices and the retention
of others which should be open to the native 
6 Tpopulation. Thereafter, they recommended that:
"The offices which may be retained should be 
adequately remunerated, and declared open to 
all classes of inhabitants, without reference 
to caste or to other qualifications than 
respectability and fitness for employment.
A competent knowledge of the English language 
should however be required in the principal 
native functionaries throughout the country.
The prospect of future advancement to 
situations now exclusively held by Europeans 
will constitute a most powerful inducement 
with the natives of high caste to relinquish 
many absurd prejudices, and to qualify them­
selves for general employment. With this view, 
it would be highly expedient that the intention 
of the government to open the civil service to 
His Majesty*s native subjects should be publicly 
declared."^
6 5 66Unlike the Donoughmore and the Soulbury Commission
reports, the Colebrooke—Cameron recommendations did not
result in legislation. The recommendations were in the
nature of advisory opinions influencing the formulation
of colonial policy applicable to the Island. The
Commissioners* recommendations regarding education were
intended to supplement their foregoing recommendations
on native employment. The substantial reliance which
they recommended the government should place upon
missionary educational enterprise marked the commencement
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of an era of state participation in schools not capable 
of providing an English education. The British 
Administration in Ceylon thereby commenced a programme 
leading towards isolating the majority Sinhalese- 
Buddhist community from the rest of the population.
The programme chartered for education led to the 
creation of two principal streams of education on the 
Island. These were the vernacular education which 
adopted one of the two vernacular languages (Sinhala 
or Tamil) as the medium of instruction and the anglo— 
vernacular education which used the English language 
as the medium of instruction. Accordingly, there 
began to appear two distinct categories of schools on 
the Island. Those that followed the vernacular stream 
provided the students with little or no knowledge of 
the English language. Those that adopted the anglo- 
vernacular stream conducted all their classes in 
every subject in English. In addition, they provided 
instructions in the English language and literature. 
Further, instructions were given in both vernacular 
languages too. Some vernacular schools did provide 
English language instructions, but those were limited 
to an hour a day at the most, while the medium of 
instructions on all other subjects was in the vernacular. 
This plan naturally made the knowledge of English of a 
student educated in an anglo-vernacular school, far 
superior, to one with a vernacular education. It is 
this factor which, in later years, gave rise to the 
formation of elite groups characterised by their close 
association with the English language and western 
culture.
The support which the government gave to the 
denominational schools, therefore, was limited to those 
organised by the Christian missionary societies. Because 
they alone, for some seventy years, at least until the
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end of the 19th century, held a monopoly over anglo- 
vernacular education on the Island. The government 
justified its decision to opt out of anglo-vernacular 
education, thus leaving it entirely in the hands of 
the missionaries, by relying on a passage from the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Report. It was this:
"As the English missionary societies have 
formed extensive establishments in various 
parts of Ceylon, it would be unnecessary 
to retain the government schools in 
situations where English instruction may 
already be afforded.
However, the missionaries had concentrated on providing
a vernacular education generally, with only a few
centres for anglo—vernacular education in: Colombo,
68Jaffna, Galle and Batticalo. Their immediate concern
69was mainly in the field of translating; namely,
translating the Bible and other scriptures into both
Tamil and Sinhala. It is somewhat curious that the
Commissioners, with full knowledge of the limited
interests of the missionaries, thought it necessary not
to recommend to the Government the strengthening and the
expansion of a state-sponsored system for anglo-vernacular
education, using the available state schools system as a
starting point, but to recommend a course of events which
led to State participation in the propagation of a
parochial system of anglo-vernacular education for Ceylon.
The counter thrust which resulted from these events,
ironically, were to produce an angry Sinhalese—Buddhist
group a hundred years later, in whose hands the hopes
and aspirations of the Christian missionaries were to
70end, somewhat abruptly, in i960. The ill-advised
passage in the Commission’s report was this:
"The English missionaries have not very 
generally appreciated the importance of 
diffusing a knowledge of the English 
language through the medium of their 
schools, but I entertain no doubt that 
they will co-operate in this object."
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Ill (b) Schools Commissions — a Response to 
Colebrooke—Cameron Reforms
The British Administration's response to these
recommendations was the appointment of a Schools 
72Commission in 1834 to support the missionary effort 
in the English educative process of the natives. This 
first Education Commission, by l84l, became seriously 
afflicted by "disagreement, confusion and mismanagement". 
. Sir William MacKenzie dissolved the first Commission in
l84l and replaced it with The Central School Commission
-------------------------- 7^------for the Instruction of the Population of Ceylon. This
second school Commission remained in effective existence
until 1869, spanning a period of relative economic boom
on the Island. By 1843, the Commission, as the agents
of the British Administration in Ceylon had planned an
7 5extensive aid programme for schools. Inevitably, much
of the aid appears to have gone towards aiding and
strengthening the English educational enterprise in the
Tamil—speaking areas of the North while the Kandyan-
Buddhist Sinhalese areas remained, in this sense,
, comparatively under-developed. The prime reason for
this deficiency could be traced to the second Kandyan
Rebellion, which took place in 1848, which, for the
77second time in thirty years, caused a souring of the 
relationship between the British Administration and the 
Kandyan people. By 1848, the economic boom on the Island 
was on the wane. The falling of coffee prices, as a 
result of sharp competition from Javanese and Brazilian 
coffee plantations, forced the British Administration
78to pause and re—assess its contributions to education.
This resulted in the appointment of a Committee in
1848 to study the ways and means by which government
could reduce expenditure on native education on the
Island. The recommendations made by this Committee came
79to be known as the 'Tennent Plan for Education1.
The author of this Plan was Sir James Tennent, the then 
Colonial Secretary on_ithe Island and the plan devised 
was to run the existing system of education "on a
80reduced scale of expense but with greater efficiency."
The Plan, therefore, left a greater margin for the use
of external support, which inevitably came from
missionary sources. By i860, even the vernacular schools
which the government had succeeded in keeping within the
secular educational stream, became absorbed into the
missionary educational enterprise, thus leaving the
whole field of education in the care and control of the
various missionary organisations on the Island. The
missionary programme for education was guided by the
81resolutions adopted at a conference of missionaries
held in South India, in 1858, The missionaries there
resolved that the taking over of vernacular education,
both in India and in Ceylon, were essential elements in
their programme for uplifting the whole mass of natives
82towards Christianity. The offer of vernacular
education made by the government was considered as an
important development in their programme, and the
missions accordingly accepted this gift, with gratitude
to the almighty. The result, therefore, was a classic
polarisation of the two competing contenders for the
spiritual emancipation of the natives of Ceylon — the
Christians and the Buddhists. Behind these protagonists
stood their supporters of whom the Tamils and the
Sinhalese were to fight the final battles after
independence.
The second Schools Commission of l84l began to
show signs of aging by I863. It was beginning to be
accused of "factionalism, sectarianism and denomina- 
8 8tional bias". Therefore, on the l4th October,
I865, as a result of a motion approved in the Legislative 
84Council, a Commission of Enquiry was appointed, and
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8 ^its report, clearly found that the second Education
86Commission, had outlived its usefulness. Accordingly,
in 1869, the Commission was dissolved and the government
appointed a single officer, who was also made the head
of a government.department and thereby made responsible
to the Governor, to run the educational system for 
87Ceylon, After a careful analysis of the attitude of 
the British Administration towards education after 
I869, Jayaweera concluded:
"In theory, the State and not the 
missionaries was in control of the 
provision of educational facilities; 
the latter seemingly had no hand in 
the shaping of a policy; and secular 
instruction was given priority over 
religious instruction. In practice, 
however, since the state found 
mission schools not only economical 
but also indispensable it gave them 
as much encouragement and as little 
interference as possible. It even 
withdrew its schools from areas whose 
needs were adequately supplied by 
missionary educational institutions."gg
In support of these conclusions, Jayaweera quotes from
89official sources that, while government schools had
increased from 64 in I869 to 474 in 1897f the mission
schools receiving aid had jumped from 21 in 1869 to
1172 by 1897» He finds^^ that "in 1880 there were
only 4 aided Buddhist schools in receipt of a grant
of Rs. 53,27.0 . compared with 805 schools run by Christian
communities with a government grant of Rs. 174,420.^
By 1873> the polarisation of the two religious
communities had resulted in enmity and in that year
the Protestants were drawn to a public debate with the
Buddhist community. This debate, known as "the
92great Panadura debate," helped to arouse the 
conscience of the Buddhists. The Ceylon Times reported
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this debate, which attracted the attention of* Colonel
Henry Steele Olcott, an American Civil War veteran.
His arrival on the Island on May 15th, 1880, commenced
94
a new chapter f*or Buddhism in Ceylon. Joined later
9 5by Madam Blavatsky, Olcott formed the first Buddhist
organisation ever to be formed in Ceylon: the Buddhist
Theosophical Society^ (B.T.S.) in 1880. Under the
banner of the B.T.S., the Buddhists managed to increase
their aided schools from 4 in 1880 to 249 by 1915*
The inspiration given by the B.T.S. resulted in a second
organisation, primarily concerned with the propogation
of Buddhism. That was the Young Men's Buddhist 
97Association of 1891.
Even by 1900, there were only 16 government schools
in the English medium and 484 vernacular schools. The
grant-aided mission schools for that year, however, were
98142 in the English medium and 1186 in the vernacular.
The mission schools were teaching a little less than
99of the school—going population of the Island. This 
by itself should provide no cause for complaint: after
all, the missionary educational enterprise had a longer 
history than the Buddhist attempt. But what caused 
the greatest consternation among the Buddhists was 
that schooling in the missionary schools involved the 
subjection of all students to the religious instructions 
of the Christian denomination to which the school 
belonged. The Buddhists were, therefore, asking for 
the enactment of a 'conscience clause1, as they feared 
that the influence of Christian religious instructions 
might lead to conversion of their children or at least 
in the dilution of their religious fervour for Buddhism. 
The traditional temple educators and their pirivenas 
were condemned. Even the Colebrooke-Cameron report 
refused to recognise them as educational^^ institutions 
and Sir James Tennent^^^ described temple education 
in this way:
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"In their hands education was of* the 
lowest description; and the priests 
themselves were hut a stage in advance 
of their pupils."^q2
103The openings promised in the Colebrooke-Cameron
Commission were tied to an English education and, as
such, the key to political and social power was held
104by the missionaries. The Buddhist. an organ of 
the Buddhist Theosophical Society, published in 1892 
a complaint that:
"When Buddhist and Hindus establish schools
of their own in their own centres and apply
for grants-in—aid fulfilling the requirement
... the missions opposed with might and main
and for the- most part successfully, the
registration of these schools,".IU5
By 1903, the Buddhists had cut many inroads into the
field of education, to the anger and dismay of the
missionaries. The latter had begun to refer to the
Buddhist schools, in their published annual reports,
106as "opposition schools". Even the government of the
day.was getting alarmed at the developing antagonism
107and, in the census report of 1901, it flatly
declared that unless there was, on the Island, an
education system which recognised the demands of nearly
108
8 5 °/° "the population, the pandering to the needs of 
a 1 0 ^ ^  could lead to conflicts of alarming proportions. 
The almost complete monopoly over English education 
held by the Christian missionaries at the dawn of the 
present century, enabled them to produce a ruling elite, 
drawn mostly from families of a non-representative 
nature. For those who supported the missionary cause 
came either from the very upper crust of the native 
society, who were eager to reach the centres of political 
and social power, correctly and securely, or from the
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under-privileged, usually of the lower castes, for whom
the only way out of their miserable social cul—de—sac
was to learn the language which could, provide them with
the means.of escape. The large middle' class was,
therefore, left to ponder by the wayside, and this
eventually formed the backbone of the Buddhist
revivalist movement which was to usher in the changes
that were conceived in the sixties and the seventies of
this century. This isolation of those who were educated
in English from the main stream of native society was
largely responsible for the creation of a counter
ideology against the denominational schools system.
By 1906 sufficient influence was found among the Buddhist
Sinhalese community, supported by the work of Sri Aramuga 
110Navalar, the founder of the Hindu Saiva Paripalana 
S a b h a i to force the government to enact a 'conscience 
clause’•
III (c) The Wace Commission: A new twist to
Colonial Education
Emulating the partnership of local authorities in 
112England and experiments successfully carried out
113between l86l and I87I in India, the British policy 
towards vernacular education as from I87I was concerned 
in drawing the Village Communities and other local
114bodies into a partnership with the British
Administration in Ceylon. The Village Communities
115Ordinance, of I87I empowered the inhabitants of
village communities "to make such rules as they may
deem expedient", inter alia:
"For construction and repairing school 
rooms for the education of boys and 
girls, and for securing their attendance 
at school".
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In addition, by 1882, the government proposed.an
117amendment to the Municipal Councils Ordinance, so
as to facilitate the provision of necessary funds by
these local government institutions "for the creation
118and repair of school buildings". The Administration*s
intention was to get the local government institutions 
to provide the physical facilities for the vernacular 
schools while.the government, directly, from the tax­
payers* money, would pay the school teachers their 
119salaries. The collapse of the coffee plantations
due to leaf diseases in 1880 forced the government to
120freeze the education budget, by 1882. It was,
however, pointed out by Mr. P. Ramanathan from inside.
121the Legislative Council and by the Catholic Church,
122on behalf of the missionaries, from outside that 
this would place an intolerable burden upon the tax­
payer, who in any case was generally quite poor. In 
its memorandum the Catholic Church, however, failed 
to hide its selfish motives. The memorandum read:
*' ... it would tax the supporters of 
denominational schools who were already 
paying for the educational facilities 
provided in their schools and which 
would finance a non-Christian education 
to which his co—religionists had 
conscientious objections•"^23
The missionary influence in the formulation of the
government policy appears ultimately to have prevailed.
12 4
The Ordinance which finally emerged in 1884 merely
empowered the local government institutions to run the
existing schools, but gave them no power to levy a
special education tax on the inhabitants. Except for
the Kandy municipality and the Muslim efforts in
Puttlam, government schools shut one by one, either to
be re-opened as mission schools or to be merely 
125abandoned. The Galle Central School was taken over
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by the Bishop of Colombo and was re-opened as the
1 26
"All Saints English School". The Galle Girls School
127was re-opened by the Wesleyans. The schools in
Badulla and Gampola were shared between the Church
128Missionary Society and the Wesleyans. It became
a field day for the missions, sharing the schools that
had remained non-denominational until 1884. Dr. Swarna
Jayaweera commenting on these activities wrote:
"The government closed its English schools 
(other than Royal College, the Agricultural 
School and the Railway Night School) on the 
31st December, 1884, and the Puttlam schools 
alone were opened by the local school board 
in January, I885. ... Ultimately, after
1884 neither the central government nor the 
local government bodies retained any 
connection with the provincial English 
Schools. The missionaries were quick to 
seize the opportunities and many of these 
schools were finally handed over to these 
agencies•"229
In the budget for the financial year of 1900—1901, the
Governor Sir West Ridgeway had set apart Rs. 869,837*
as compared to Rs. 474.387 in 1890.^*^ The lion's
share of this money, naturally, went towards the
financing of denominational schools. Those who had
either embraced Christianity or those who had preferred
to run the risk of their children being either converted
131or made into 'bad Buddhists', found the denominational
schools acceptable. The majority either received no
education or sent their children to Temple schools
with little or no hope of engaging in any kind of
132economic advancement within the framework set by the
Colonial Administration in Ceylon. The agitation
mounted by the combined efforts of the Sinhala-Buddhists
and the Tamil-Hindu communities had an impact on the
British Administration in Ceylon. On the 18th October,
1331900, the Governor proposed a new start towards a
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new policy of Government participation in education 
which resulted in the establishment of the Wace 
Commission, in 1904. The Commission primarily 
observed that three-fourths of the school going 
population between the age of 6-15 years stayed at 
home.. The Commission identified two reasons for this. 
First, the insufficiency of schools in the traditional 
Buddhist and Hindu areas. Second, the fear harboured 
by the parents of conversion of their children into 
Christianity. In the light of the fact that the
134education vote on the Island was steadily rising, 
the Commissioner found that good education was being 
given to a minority while no education was available 
to the majority.
135In 1905, the Commissioners reported to the 
government proposing a number of important changes:
(1) The Commissioners recommended compulsory 
education to those between the years of 
6 and 15 years of age, and
(2 ) They considered it absolutely essential
that some protection be given to the
Buddhists by enacting a 'conscience 
clause'.
(3 ) Village Committees created under the
Village Communities Ordinance of I87I
should be designated as District 
School Committees.
(4) Where there were no Village Committees., 
the Commissioners suggested that District 
School Committees be created, correspond­
ing to the District which had been carved 
out as administrative units for the Island.
(5) As for finance, the Commission recommended 
that in place of a special education tax,
■§■ of the Road Tax, which was a local tax, 
should be diverted for education.
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Ill (c) (i) The First Recommendation of the Wace
Commission: Financing Education
The first recommendation resulted in two significant 
pieces of legislation:
1 n/T
(a) The Town Schools Ordinance of 1906, and
(b) The Rural Schools Ordinance of 1907.
1 oQ
(a ) First, under the Ordinance of 1906 the Governor
was authorized to vest a power upon local authorities
139by Proclamation:
" ••• if they shall consider it expedient 
so to do, to make provision ... for the 
establishment and maintenance of one or 
more'schools within the limits of their 
jurisdiction for the instruction of 
children in the vernacular languages•
The Ordinance further empowered the local authorities
to make by-laws regarding the education of children
l4lwithin their own communities. These by-laws
inter alia, could make attendance at schools compulsory,
142for children of a specified age. Failure to see
143that their children attended the schools provided
under this Ordinance, made the parents liable to a
144fine, unless they were able to establish that
"other adequate and suitable” arrangements for their
145childfs education had in fact been made. The
geographical area of operating the Ordinance of 1906 
was tied to the areas demarcated by the Small Towns
146Sanitary Ordinance of I892. Under the latter
Ordinance, by section 2, the Government could by
proclamation bring any town or village mentioned in
147the schedule within the ambit of the Ordinance.
148The schedule defines an extensive geographical area, 
covered mostly by local Boards and Village Communities
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and in four instances covered by the existing
municipalities of Galle, Colombo, Kandy and Jaffna.
Past experience of failures in the State education
policy due to financial difficulties appear to have
received no attention in the Wace Committee Report.
The Ordinance of 1906 failed to provide any financial
support to the local authorities which were called
upon to run the vernacular schools. The Municipal
1^9Councils Ordinance of 1910 seemed a weak apology 
for this monumental omission on the part of the 
Colonial Administration. By section 45(l) of the 
Ordinance of 1910 the Government empowered the 
Municipalities to expend municipal funds for varying 
purposes including:
"(d) the maintenance of schools in 
accordance with the provisions of 
1 The Town Schools Ordinance , 1906 1 ”
Unhappily, the municipal funds were not available to
the various local authorities which were not 
151Municipalities but which in effect carried the
brunt of the task of providing vernacular education
for the bulk of the population on the Island. By
1916, the local authorities were avoiding their
responsibilities in a massive way. Their complaint
was money. The Municipal Councils, except the one in
Kandy, were avoiding their responsibilities upon the
grounds that the available educational facilities for
the vernacular stream were adequate and sufficient
and, therefore, they were arguing that any extra schools
opened and run by them could prove superfluous and
152therefore wasteful. Regarding this stance taken by
the Municipal Council of Galle, the Government had 
found that there were in fact grossly inadequate 
facilities for vernacular education, outside the mission
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schools, and therefore threatened to issue a writ of
Mandamus against the Council. Responding to an opinion
sought by the Government as to whether there were
sufficient grounds for seeking a writ of Mandamus, the
Attorney-General advised that such a step would prove
fruitless because the Ordinance of 1906 was merely
permissive, in that it created a Power coupled with a
Privilege and not a Power coupled with a Duty to
exercise it. The dead—lock thus created by the posture
153taken by the local authorities necessitated the
passing in 1916 of an Ordinance to amend 'The Town
,-154Schools Ordinance of 1906'. This amendment
155empowered the Government to take back those schools 
which were being abandoned^^ by the local authorities • 
Many such schools were continued as vernacular schools, 
particularly in Colombo, while many ceased to function 
as schools and were lost to the nation.
(b) Second, under the Rural Schools Ordinance of 
1581907 a more viable arrangement than the one found 
under Ordinance of 1906 was established. Under the
Ordinance of 1907 the government intended to provide
159 160 education to 'Rural and Planting Districts' of
the Island. For that purpose, 'every revenue district
and every province which was not divided into revenue 
l6ldistricts were, for the purposes of the Ordinance
declared to be school districts. Further divisions
were permitted in village communities where there were
l62clearly marked 'headmen's districts'. This sub­
division made administration of the schools possible
without much difficulty. Each division or sub-division
164
ZT o
was given a District School Committee comprising:
the Government Agent or his Assistant as the Chairman,
a representative of the Director of Public Instruction
165or the Director himself, one of the headmen nominated
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by the Government Agent, and one or more persons
interested in education, from the District nominated
1 6 7 l68by the Governor. By section 10 of the Ordinance
a fund for financing the schools of each district was 
created; a factor which was prominently absent from the 
Ordinance of 1906. The infra-structure thus provided 
gave the vernacular education enterprise of the 
government a significant head start. But as years went 
by, it was found, that the Wace Commission's recommen­
dation that two-thirds of the Road Tax which in fact
was a part of the revenues of the Local Bodies be 
169allotted for the schools under this Ordinance, was
scaled down to one-third by the Ordinance and did not
170in any event exceed Rs. 115,000. This proved to be
grossly inadequate and the government was called upon 
to support these institutions in a substantial way.
The government provided Rs. 50,000 (1917-1918),
Rs. 75,000 (1918-1919), Rs. 200,000 (1919-1920) and
l^lthe same.sum again for the financial year 1920-1921. 1
Suddenly, in 1921, there was a severe financial crisis
and the government's contribution dropped, from
Rs. 200,000 in 1920-1921 to Rs. 15,000 for the 1921-1922
172financial year. That effectively ended the vernacular
educational enterprise under the 1907 Ordinance. Both 
Ordinances quite clearly ended in frustrating the 
education and the future aspirations, both of the 
Sinhalese—Buddhist community and those of the Tamil- 
Hindus. Somehow the Tamil community seemed to have 
come to terms with the missionary educational enter­
prise more readily than did tlie Sinhalese Buddhists.
173For the Census Reports for the year 1921 show 
that, while 8.5^ of the Ceylon Tamils were literate 
in English, there were only 1.3°/° of the Kandyan 
Sinhalese who were literate in that language. The 
English ’literacy rate of the Tamils in fact had
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overtaken even the English literacy rate of the low- 
country Sinhalese by 2.6^. The low-country Sinhalese 
with a large Christian population were claiming a 
mere 5*9°/° literacy rate in 1921, despite the abundance 
of English mission schools in the Maritime Provinces.
The collapse of the particular educational programmes 
which commenced in 1906 and 19^7 effectively left the 
missionary educators with an open field. The 
Government's refusal to finance the Island's education 
as a national service, rather than considering it as a 
localised responsibility, appears quite clearly as the 
cause for this great tragedy. Summing up the social 
consequences of this giant step backwards,
Dr. Swarna Jayaweera commented:
"The decision to hand over the English
schools was also a development policy
of restricting English education to a
social elite which could pay for this
privilege, and as the extract from the
D.P.I.'S174 report indicates, it was
unlikely that the Administration would
expend its energies in fostering the
interest of the local authorities in
English Education".---
1 (D
XIX (c) (ii) The Second Recommendation of the Wace
Commission: The Conscience Clause.
The second recommendation of the Wace Commission 
was to protect the Sinhalese-Buddhists1 children from 
being exposed to the proselytising influences of the 
Christian, clergy. The Government accepted this recommen­
dation and in the Ordinance of 1906 and 1907 it enacted a 
well—structured 'conscience clause1 to carry it out.
It must be said at the outset that the 'conscience 
clause* was limited to government vernacular schools, 
thus leaving the mission schools, both of the English 
and of the vernacular streams, unaffected by it.
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Having said that, it must be emphasized, that the
introduction of tht^  ’conscience clause1 in 1906 (and
in 1907) served as a starting point for its extension
176into missionary schools in 1920, Although the
effect of the clause was clearly marginal within the
framework of the 1906 and th€! 1907 Ordinances, its
177enlargement by later legislation was to cause a 
profound change in the attitude thus far shown to 
English education by the majority - Sinhala Buddhists - 
on the Island, To this, reference will be made later, 
but the Clause itself requires some comment now,
1 78
The ’conscience clause’ in the two Ordinances 
were similarly drafted. In the Town Schools Ordinance 
of 1906, section 9(l) spelt out the prohibition in this 
way:
”No religious instruction shall be given _ 
in any school established under section 6 
of this Ordinance."
By sub-section (2 ) of that section certain exceptions
were formulated. Under those exceptions, government
vernacular schools were empowered to provide religious
instructions if to the satisfaction of the local
authorities, the schools' managements had made adequate
provision to ensure:
That religious instruction is given 
only during the times specified in 
the school time table.
That religious instruction is not 
given to pupils of other denominations 
than that to which the school belongs, 
if their parents do object to the 
giving of such instructions.
That pupils who do not attend religious 
instruction are employed in other studies 
during the hours allotted to religious 
instruction;
"(a)
(b)
(e)
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(d) That in the case of such pupils if their 
parents object to their being present in 
the room where religious instruction is 
given, are either allowed to study in 
some other part of the school premises 
during the hours when such instruction 
is given or their presence in the school 
during such hours is excused; and
(e) That a copy of sub-section (2) of this 
section in the English, Sinhalese, and 
Tamil languages is conspicuously posted 
up in the school."jgQ
III (d) The Steps Towards the First Education Reform Act
Despite these carefully-worded protections, the
Town Schools System and the Rural and Planting
Communities Schools Systems, for reasons explained
l8learlier, failed. The Controller of Census, in his
report for the year 1911, lamented that 60/£ of the male
population and ^ 0 0|o of the female population were still 
182illiterate. A very large number of the illiterates
hailed from the Kandyan provinces, therefore from among
1 0 0
the Sihhala-Buddhists. Commenting further, the
Controller of Census wrote that education in other
countries lead to religious controversies. In Ceylon
the problem was not that, but competition, one
denomination competing with another for the capture of
the educational system, with a monopolistic desire
for converting the natives into one or another of the
Christian view-points. At the centre of this scramble
was the colonial education system, which now began to
receive the blame from every side. The Bridge 
184Committee of 1912, reporting on the English Secondary 
Schools, cautioned the government that it was * time for 
the State to call a halt to the unplanned expansion of 
denominational schools* as that policy was *highly 
detrimental to the efficiency and entirely prejudicial
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185to the economy’ of the Island. Even the missionaries
were now beginning; to search their conscience. They 
had realised that the educational policy, in the name 
of Christianity, had left a very large portion of the 
native population illiterate. Their only success was
186to create a small elite, growing gradually unaccustomed 
to their own cultural heritage. The American mission, 
in 1905, perhaps stirred into action with developments
-» Q t~t
in negro education in the United States, expressed the 
view that:
,TWe shall never have thorough going steady 
progress until government takes absolute 
charge of the education of the children of 
this Island. Missionary bodies did in the 
earlier days serve a useful end in assisting 
government, but that time has quite gone by 
now. I am sure that the present grant-in—aid 
schools of our mission so far from being any 
real advantage are a great detriment•"jgg
189 190The Wesleyan Synod and the Anglican Mission
joined this new onslaught from an unexpected quarter,
against the educational policy of the British
Administration in Ceylon. The Buddhist, who had no
more than 25 years of existence as an organised group,
191concerned with education, were struggling in 1915
1 192to keep their 2 k 9  schools open. These were all
grants-in-aid schools, being devoid of any financial
sources outside the country to support them. The
founding of the Buddhist Theosophical Society in 1880
opened the way for the establishment of a Sinhala—
Buddhist lobby in support of their demands. This was
followed by the establishment of The Maha Bodhi Society
in I89I. Until 1906, the Buddhist revivalists lacked
a media for expression and in that year, The Baudhaya
was published as a weekly newspaper. This was
followed by The Dinamina in 1907 which was published daily,
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except on Sundays. A more radical Sinhalese nationalist 
newspaper, The Sinhala Jatiya was founded in 1910. The 
editor of that newspaper was Mr. Piyadasa Sirisena, a 
renowned author and a Sinhalese scholar, who managed
193to spark a new light through his writings among the 
Buddhist Sinhalese on the Island. That newspaper 
developed later into a beacon for socio-political 
changes on the Island. Pressed from all sides, the 
Governor Sir William Manning, decided to overhaul the 
entire educational policy in 1920. While addressing a 
deputation of school managers, who had sought an inter­
view with the Governor to protest the government’s 
educational p#olicy, Sir William said that: ’’Except 
in the case of such schools as those which had a 
majority of pupils of the particular denomination, it
was the policy of the government gradually to replace
19^denominational by government schools.” On the 20th
November, 1919* the government placed the Education 
Bill before the Legislative Council. Although the Bill 
received the Governor’s assent 011 the 19th February, 
1920, its commencement was delayed until 1st January, 
1924, due to unprecedented opposition which the 
government faced from the missionary societies on the 
Island. It is necessary to examine the structure and 
the contents of that Ordinance, before stating the 
objections raised by the missionaries against its 
implementation.
-88-
Ill (e) The Education Ordinance of 1920: Its Objectives
and Provisions 
19 5The Ordinance had six parts. Parts I and II
provided an infra-structure upon which the implementation
of the educational policy of the government would rest.
By section 3 of the Ordinance a Department of Education
presided over by a single Director of Education was
established for the first time. The department was
designated an organ of the government and the Director
was designated a functionary of the government. Besides
the Director, by section k ,  other government servants
196were appointed to be its officers. The Officers of
the Department were made responsible directly to the 
Governor, to the exclusion of all others. By section 
the Director was required to formulate regulations for 
approval by a Board of Education and to see that they 
were effectively implemented. The Director was further 
required, by the same section, to submit a report to the 
Governor, before the month of April in each year, 
reporting:
"On the state of every educational establishment 
supported or aided by public funds under the 
provisions of this Ordinance, and such report 
shall be printed and laid before the Legislative 
Council."
By section 6 a Board of Education was established which 
composed of:
" ... not less than sixteen or more than 
twenty members nominated by the Governor, 
of whom the Director and the Assistant 
Director and two Unofficial (i.e. elected) 
members of the Legislative Council shall 
be four."
By section J 9 it was clearly stated that the functions 
of the Board, "shall not be administrative or executive" 
but merely advisory. But by section 10, the Board was
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empowered to make regulations which when adopted would
result in what would be known as fa code'. Section
10(l) described in seventeen sub-sections the areas in
which the Board may make regulations, embracing every
important aspect of education on the Island.
The principal objection to the provisions of the
Ordinance was based on the fear that the Ordinance
marked the commencement of an attempt to nationalise
the denominational schools on the Island. In a pamphlet
under the innocent banner of "The New Education Policy
198of the Ceylon Government" the Roman Catholic Church
expressed its fears of a possible violation of human
rights. It said:
" ... our right to Catholic schools, staffed
by Catholic teachers under Catholic management,'
wherever the number of Catholics is sufficient
to enable us to open such schools; and our right
to such share in the funds of the colony which
are set apart for education as the number of
children attending our schools and the results
obtained in the examinations held by government
entitle us to are inalienable." 0
199
In fact, as it finally turned out, it was not the
Christians who needed to fear, but the Buddhists. For,
despite the fact that 60°/o of the population were Buddhists
with 25°/o Hindus and 10^ Christians, the Board which
ultimately formulated the government's policy into 
201'a code' had a very different representation. The 
first Board to be appointed under this Ordinance, 
composed of: one Hindu, one Muslim, three Buddhists
202and 15 Christians, including its four ex-officio members. 
Soon after its constitution, the Board began to function 
both in an advisory capacity, and (by virtue of its 
responsibility for formulating an education code) in an 
extensive policy making capacity.
-90-
\
Part III of the Ordinance concerned the religious 
aspect. By section 13 it was declared that no student 
shall be refused admission into any assisted school, 
which necessarily includes the denominational schools 
(as they all receive grants-in-aid):
n ... on account of the religion, nationality, 
race, caste, or language of such applicant or 
of either of his parents”.
By section l4, all religious instruction in every 
government school was prohibited unless it has been 
authorised by the Director of Education.
Section 15 contained a wide 1 conscience clause1.
Sub—section (l) of that section read:
”It shall not be required as a condition of 
any child being admitted into or continuing 
in an assisted school that he shall attend 
or abstain from attending any Sunday school 
or any place of religious worship, or that 
he shall attend any religious observance or 
any instruction in religious subjects in 
the school or elsewhere, from which observance 
or instruction he may be withdrawn by his 
parent or guardian, or that he shall attend 
the school on any day exclusively set apart 
for religious observance by the religious 
body to which the parent belongs.”203
The 'conscience clause' in the Ordinances of 1906 and
1907 did not affect the denominational schools. But
2 0 kthe Conscience Clause of the 1920 Ordinance did.
By sub-section (2 ) the Ordinance imposed a further 
limitation: it required denominational schools to
limit their religious observances either to the first 
period of the day or to the last period of instruction; 
so that the scholars of other religions may either 
arrive late or leave early, thus avoiding their presence 
during the times at which religious instruction of another 
faith was being conducted. The same sub—section required
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the schools to display prominently and at prominent 
places, the foregoing times so that it would be widely 
known at what times the scholar's of a different faith 
should withdraw from the school, if their parents so 
wished. The Christian missionaries were united in 
their opposition to the ’conscience clause1. Not only 
the Catholics but every missionary agency opposed the 
’conscience clause’. The Catholic based their opposition 
upon a broad argument based on fundamental human rights. 
Namely, the right to give a Christian education to all, 
equally, and without discrimination. The other 
Christian denominations based their opposition on the 
socio-religious effect on the native population. The 
Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society, articulated their* 
objections in this way:
"This is a serious matter for all missionary 
societies working in Ceylon, for the policy 
is quite revolutionary. It will utlimately 
lead to a closing of a large number of our 
schools.2^ .5 Conditions have changed.^06 
Government has entered more largely into 
direct vernacular education and sets aside 
increasing grants for it. The villagers are 
no longer dependent on the missions for their 
schools as once they were. Hence the feeling 
of indebtedness to the missions is not so of 
being the sole benefactors of the people ...
The main value of the mission village school 
today is that it gives us the opportunity of 
elementary Christian teaching on a large 
scale and so keeps active the leaven of 
Christian knowledge and ideas which have been 
so powerful an influence in the life of the 
people . "
Despite these protestations, the ’conscience clause’
208in this form passed into the 1939 Education Ordinance.
But the opposition mounted by'the Christian missionary
societies succeeded in delaying the promulgation of
209the 1920 Ordinance for more than four years.
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Part IV of the Ordinance appeals to have been
fashioned out of the Ordinance of 1907, the Rural and
210the Plantation Districts Schools Ordinance. Part
IV in effect provides the basic infra-structure for
the implementation of the Education Code and for the
disbursement of the grants-in-aid, provided by the
Department of Education. By section 17 Education
Districts are carved out and section 18 creates
Education District Committees to make by-laws, at the
community level, for the implementation of the general
educational policy formulated by the Board of 
211Education. By section 27:
"Such moneys as may from time to time be
granted by the Legislative Council from 
general revenue for the purpose shall be 
allocated by the Director amongst the 
Education District Commit tees . u  2 ] _ o
The Education District Committee was required to act
as a basic ’accounting unit' and as such was largely
responsible for the efficient running of the schools
in each area. The membership on the District Education
Committees had to be not less than six and not more
than eight. Two of the members were required to be
nominated by the local authorities at the community
level while the rest were nominated by the Governor.
This necessarily meant that the Board of Education
could, not in their rule—making capacity under section
10 but in their advisory capacity under section 7>
exert a considerable influence over the composition
of the District Educational Committees across the
Island. It must be emphasised, that the composition
of the Board, was therefore, an important concern
for the Buddhists, who felt cheated by the allocation
213to them of three only out of the twenty places 
recognised under the Ordinance. In Part V, the
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Ordinance.re-enacted those provisions from the 1907
Ordinance, which were central to the provisions of
education to Estate Schools. Part VI of the Ordinance
was concerned with matters of general concern, such as
214
* powers of inspection1 jurisdiction in respect of
215offences committed under the by-laws and the powers
216of the magistrates to enquire into them. The central
issue for the Sinhala-Buddhists was the fact that
Christians who comprised 10^ of the population, had yet
again ascended to a position of power and therefore
appeared to control the destinies of the 60°/o Buddhists
on the Island. Summing up this increasing hostility
217
between the two religious groups, Jayaweera wrote:
MThe cry in the country gradually tended to 
be Buddhist schools for Buddhist children 
and Hindu schools for the Tamils. The 
Christian missionary was no longer met by 
an apathetic indifference but by mounting 
hostility. Efforts were made to associate 
the national spirit with the old national 
faiths and loyalty to the ancestral religion 
was proclaimed necessary to true patriotism, 
conversion was declared an act of treachery".
IV. The Education Bill of 1939? Aftermath of the 
Donoughmore Reforms.
The Education Ordinance of 1920 came into force
under a cloud of suspicion and uncertainty. Governor
Manning, who piloted the Bill through the Legislative
Council was also concerned with having his proposals
for constitutional reforms considered by that same
219assembly, in 1923. The Manning Reforms, passed by 
the Legislative Council on the eve of the Promulgation 
of the Education Ordinance in 1924, were totally rejected 
by the Sinhala majority. In rejecting those reforms, the 
Sinhalese, who were to an extent divided along religious
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220lines. visa-vis the Education Bill, closed their 
ranks, against a common enemy, the British Administration. 
What angered the Sinhalese people most was the fact that 
Tamils who comprised of 12^ of the population, were given 
8 reserved seats in the Legislative Council while the
Sinhala majority who formed 6870 were left with sixteen 
221seats. Besides this tacit irritant, the Manning
Reforms created a special communal (Tamil) seat in
Colombo to represent a Tamil speaking population of
24,600, while ignoring the 51,000 Moors and Indians 
222living there. The government's failure to allocate
a special communal (Sinhalese) seat for the 27,000
Sinhalese living in the Eastern Province created an
unprecedented hostility against the Tamil population
223throughout the Island. Pushed to a posture of
political hostility from two sides, the Sinhala-
Buddhists mobilised themselves, virtually against three
fronts - the.missionaries, the Tamils and the British.
In this mood, the Sinhalese as a group met the
Donoughmore Commission in 1928, to express their
concerns. The Commission, with a Fabian socialist 
224bias, considered the Sinhalese demands with
understanding. While correcting some of the tendencies
shown in the Manning Reforms, the Donoughmore Commission
recommended a novel form of Government based on a
Committee system. It recommended the replacement of the
Legislative Council by an elected State Council and the
formation of Executive Committees out of its members.
Each of these Committees were made responsible for
executing the policies of the government as departments
225of State performing ministerial functions. So, on
the 9th of July, 1931, the Executive Committee on
Education was constituted under the Donoughmore 
226Constitution. By 1933 the State Council had realised
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some of the inequities of the education system and 
decided to divest the Board of Education of its rule- 
making powers and invest them on the Executive 
Committee for Education which in fact was now a 
representative body. The totally unrepresentative 
nature of the Board of Education by this time had 
become a source of embarrassment for the government 
and therefore a motion in the following form was 
introduced in 1933s
"That in view of the rights and powers 
enjoyed by the Executive Committee of 
Education, this House is of opinion 
that Ordinance No. 1 of 1920 should be 
so amended as to divest the present 
Board of Education of its rule making 
power."22?
Although the Board of Education.was subjected to
almost Island-wide condemnation, the supporters of
the denominational schools system mounted a massive
campaign to maintain the composition and the powers of
the Board intact. Despite the substantial points of
demerit the Board had accumulated over the years, the
changes envisaged in the motion of 1933 were effectively
delayed until 1939. Understandably, the Christians and
the Tamils had benefited from the system which had
prevailed under the Ordinance of 1920 and therefore it
was in their interest to strive towards maintaining it.
It was found that in one year the Board had granted
Rs. 1,283,000. for the schools in Jaffna, while the
rest of the Island, containing nearly 70^ o f  the total
228population, had received only Rs. 257,000* During
the course of the years, the Board had been responsible 
for maintaining an uneven policy of affording 
opportunities for schooling across the Island. In the 
Northern Province: 1 school per 45 students was provided,
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while in the Southern Province it was 1 in 130. In Uva
it was 1 in 300, in Sabaragamuwa 1 in 600, in the North
Western Province 1 in 400, in the Central Province 1 in
100 and in the Eastern Province 1 in 213. It was only
in the Western Province where the capital of Colombo
22 9was situated that the ratio was 1 in 50. While the
Northern Province was the bastion of Tamil culture and
the homeland of the Tamil people, Uva, Sabaragamuwa and
the Southern Provinces were the strongholds of the
Buddhists and the Sinhalese people of the Island.. The
main opposition came from the Roman Catholics and, as
a last desperate bid to delay the transfer of power
from the Board of Education to the Executive Committee
on Education, the opponents of this measure moved a
motion in 1938 to table the Bill until a Commission of
enquiry had an opportunity to investigate and report to
the government on the possible effect of this change on
education. That motion was defeated with 33 against and
23013 in support of the motion to table. The Bill was
thereafter passed and received the Governor's assent on
July 18th, 1939. As a concession to the fears expressed
by the denominational schools, the rule-making power of
the Executive Committee was excluded from such regulations
as those which: " ... shall be made under this section
in pursuance of any policy aimed against any particular
231assisted denominational school(s) . ..". By section 6
232of the Ordinance the powers of the Board were strictly 
circumscribed and were limited to the giving of advice to 
the Director of Education. Under section 3(l) of the 
Ordinance, the duties of the Department of Education 
were to execute the provisions of the Ordinance within 
a framework provided by the Executive Committee. For, 
under section 32 (l)> H  was the responsibility of the
poo
Executive Committee (and not the Board as previously 
ordained) to make Regulations, thus constituting an
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'Education Code1 for the Island. The central issue 
which differentiates the 1920 Ordinance from the 1939 
Ordinance is that, while the rule-making power and the 
financial control on Education was held by an un­
representative body - the Board of Education — under the 
former, the latter leaves these two key elements in the 
hands of a group of elected representatives of the 
people. This presented a major breakthrough for the 
majority group.
V. The 19^7 Ordinance
Although the Bill^'^*’ became Law in 1939 , the
clamour for a Commission of Enquiry continued to gain
235momentum. The Minister of Education at the time 
(a Sinhalese patriot, an Oriental Scholar, a Buddhist 
and a skilled.politician) informed the State Council 
on April l4th, 19^0 that a Commission of Enquiry under
o  o (L
his Chairmanship would be appointed. He named
twenty—three members for the Commission, including all
the members of the Executive Committee on Education.
The mandate given to the Committee was to 'investigate
the defects in the present education system and recommend
measures of reform necessitated by the changed conditions
237in the country." Certain sections of the public
complained that the very participation of the Executive 
Committee on the Commission was a prelude to staging 
a massive cover-up of the errors and omissions of the
poQ
Administration. The Commission's answer was that, on
the contrary, the Executive Committee was there to answer
charges and, with their "intimate knowledge of the
problems of educational policy and administration, could
greatly help in directing the investigations along
239useful channels." In 19^3, the Commission reported
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by a majority in favour of maintaining the dual system 
with the government schools system under direct State 
control and the denominational system under missionary
240 24lcontrol existing side by side. To many, the
decision.to maintain the status-quo—ante, came as no
surprise. In commenting on the dual system of
education, generally, Dr. Swarna Jayaweera wrote:
"Antagonism was openly manifested, but the 
political and economic needs of colonial 
rule ensured that the dual system could not 
be dislodged from its eminence in the 
educational field while the social values 
inculcated over decades of education 
guaranteed it the support of the local 
elite. Educational institutions were also 
structured to function as instruments of 
colonial policy but consumer demand often 
exerted new pressures for expansion at 
secondary and higher level during this 
period. A dualistic structure of schools 
based on linguistic differentiation had 
been created by nineteenth century policies 
directed towards creating a small western- 
oriented elite. ‘The same objectives as well 
as the social dynamics of prestigious 
educational institutions led to the perpetu­
ation of this dualism in the first half of 
the twentieth century,"^^
243The 1947 Ordinance, which resulted from this report 
on education, made no attempt to consider the social 
dimensions of the developing communal and religious 
conflicts on the Island. In a sense the 1947 Ordinance 
may have played a part in heightening the frustrations 
of the Sinhala—Buddhists on the Island. By section 3 
the assisted schools were given the right, perhaps for 
the first time, to refuse admission to a pupil, on the 
grounds that "there are no facilities at the school 
for teaching him in the medium of the language through 
which ... he is required to be taught". This provided 
a splendid escape route to shut out students from rural
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families whose knowledge of the English language was
poor or who did not speak the language with the ease
and confidence of those who spoke 'the English of the
Colombo schools'. This section provided a classic
recipe for social stratification. The future contest
was not merely between the vernacular—educated and the
Anglo—vernacular group, but between two factions drawn
from among the Anglo-vernacular group. This type of
social distillation inevitably led to the formation of
a small but powerful group of elitists, from which the
future political leaders of the country were drawn.
The substantial danger to this small but powerful
group of elitists came from the fact that, as each
day passed the majority opposing them tended to grow
in numbers - pushing the elite group into a cacoon of
isolation. It was this isolationism which the English-
educated elites enjoyed during the first eight years of
independence - until the passage of the Official
 ^244Language Act in 1956. The profound void which
separated them from the rest became un-bridgable without
cutting away the base of their support. That, indeed,
was the monopoly which the elite had Over the English
language, a matter which will be examined in a later
chapter. Returning again to the Ordinance of 1947,
while central control over the affairs of the
245denominational schools were strengthened and
246expanded, the Ordinance scaled down the former
247'conscience clause'. These, however, were not the
key issues. The fact that the Ordinance, in particular,
preserved the link between elitism and education became
the central argument for the abolishing of denominational 
248schools and the declaration of Sinhala as the Official 
Language of an Independent Ceylon. Less than a year 
after the passage of the Ordinance of 1947, which was 
merely intended to amend the Education Ordinance of 1939, 
Ceylon became Independent.
-100-
V I . Social Stratification and Elite Formation: 
A Product of the Colonial Education Policy
The success of the colonial policy on education 
must be measured with reference to the developmental 
goals pursued by succeeding Colonial Administrations, 
at least since the conquest of Kandy in 1815. The 
need to create a class of local representatives of 
the Colonial Government, with a commitment to upholding 
British traditions and a Judeo-Christian culture, was 
found to be a necessary element in the European approach 
to colonialism. The obvious result of this approach 
was the creation of an elite, which could be sufficiently 
powerful politically without being in any way represent­
ative of the native population, while at the same time 
having the ability to command the obedience of the 
masses by their very proximity to the centre of power.
It was recognised that such an elite could expect 
little or no acceptance or respect from the masses 
and would be a vulnerable class if the proper legal 
desiderata for their survival was not left behind by
a departing colonial regime. It is in this sense that
249the entrenched clauses of the Soulbury Constitution 
of 1948 become meaningful. While reserving an 
examination of those clauses for a later chapter, it 
is necessary to examine the formation of the elite in 
Ceylon at the point of Independence, in 1948. Elite 
formation in any society is related to a particular 
type of infra—structure which throws up a class which 
forms the elite at the level of its supra-structure.
The relationship of the elite to the bulk of the 
society rests on the simple relationship of the elite 
and the bulk to some specific source, particularised by 
its availability to the elite and its denial to the bulk.
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The social conflicts at the level of the infra­
structure of the society results in the identification 
and the isolation of a group ’that comes out on top1 
with the rest being arranged along a graduated social 
scale in terms of their class relationship to the
source of political power, at the supra-structure 
250level. The particular social conflicts could be
one of a series at the infra—structure level. It could
be a conflict of economic interests - between the 'haves’
2 51and the 'have-nots'. It could be a conflict of social,
political and caste interests as it was under the 
2 52Kandyan Kings - between the Nobility and the 'others'
arranged along a vertical stream of stratification
253dipping down to the Rodiyas. In some, it could be
254religious. But in Ceylon, at the time of Independence,
it was principally education which caused the social
conflicts at the 'infra-structure level'.
Other conflicts, such as 'economic', 'social*
and 'religious', were pushed to the local levels
255creating a local or an 'intermediate elite'. 
'Anglo-vernacular' vs. 'vernacular* education created 
a generalised conflict which involved the whole society 
at the infra-structural level of the nation, resulting 
in a small but powerful national elite at the supra- 
structure. Their source of power was 'political power* 
which was considered to be more potent than the 
'economic power' which the intermediate elite wielded.
The latter were subordinated to the former. It is the 
elite of the former category which inherited political 
power from the British government in 1948 and for 
eight years, thereafter, until 1956, remained protected 
by the laws and legal institutions which were left 
behind by the departing British Administration. It is 
against this back-drop that some of the changes 
associated with language become meaningful. While 
reserving the problems associated with the language
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change until the next chapter the steps taken by the 
Government of Ceylon in i960 to terminate the denomina­
tional system of education will be examined here. That 
would appear as a necessary prelude to language change, 
which was primarily conceived as a means towards 
negativing the 1language conflicts' lingering in the 
infra-structure level.of the Ceylonese society at the
point of Independence, and from being continued thereafter.
256The Official Language Act of 1956 merely ordained
that the official language of the Island shall herein-
257after be Sinhala, but left the implementation of that
258legislation to be worked out through Regulations, to 
be promulgated by the ministers, subject to parliamentary 
control. These matters require detailed treatment later, 
but it is important to mention here that the participa­
tion of the institutions engaged in educating the nation 
were regarded by the Government as an indispensable 
element for the success of the language change. Remember­
ing the fact.that English remained the key to power at 
Independence, one finds that while 4.1 °/o of the total 
population were able to speak Sinhala and English,
2.2$ of. the population were able to speak Tamil and 
259English. When these figures are superimposed against
260a population distribution of 70$ Sinhalese to 11$ Tamil,
the higher rate of English literacy among the Tamil
Community become evident. This factor had an impact on
the contribution of each community to the resulting elite
formation at the point of Independence. It is also
significant to note that, while 8.1$ of the people of
261
Jaffna spoke Tamil and English, only 9*85$ of the 
Sinhalese in Colombo spoke English. The significance 
of these figures is that Jaffna with a population of 
about one quarter of that of Colombo and which was pre­
dominantly Tamil had nearly an equal percentage of
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English educated persons among them, as Colombo had.
No other city on the Island had that kind of* advantage.
When these figures are viewed against the national
averages for English literacy of the two communities -
namely h  . l ° / o Sinhala and English proficiency and 2 . 2 ° / o
2 62Tamil and English proficiency a clear picture of the 
extent to which.the Tamil community had contributed, 
disportionately, to the composition of the national 
elite at Independence, become clear. The figures 
further indicate the way the language conflict had 
become transferred into a communal conflict, between 
the Sinhala and the Tamil speaking people on the Island.
The success of the Missionary enterprise in using 
English education as an instrument for conversion may 
be gauged from other data provided by the 1946 census 
report. According to that report, there were 121,333 
Ceylon Tamil Christians, as against 362,957 Sinhalese 
Christians. The Sinhalese Christians to the number
of Tamil Christians was, therefore, of the ratio 3-1*
The communal ratio, however, was 4,622,507 Sinhalese to 
733>731 Ceylon Tamils; a ratio of 6:1. These figures 
seemed to indicate that the missionary educators since 
their first appearance on the Island during the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century have had twice as 
much success among the Tamil speaking people than 
among the Sinhalese. Directly proportionate to the 
success of the missionaries in their ministration and 
conversion had been their success in educating the 
Tamil speaking people in the use of English as a second 
language. This knowledge of English was a key factor 
in the elite formation at the supra-structure of the 
Ceylonese society at Independence. Their dis­
proportionate representation at the elitist level, 
therefore, became closely associated with the missionary
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enterprise in educating the Tamil community. This
made the argument in favour of abolishing denominational
schools, which were considered as an impedement to the
effective implementation of the language change from
English to Sinhala increasingly attractive. The
cudgel against the missionary schools and the English
language was taken principally by the Sinhalese
Buddhists, of whom the majority were rural based. It
was found that 78.4^6 of the rural population were
Buddhists as against ^ 2 . 2 ° / o  of the urban population who
264were Buddhists. The total percentage of Buddhists
amounted to 6 6 u J°/o of the population while 9 • b°/o were
265Christians and 18.2^ were Hindus. When these
266figures are considered against the fact that 58 • 9°/° 
of the total population spoke exclusively Sinhala, the 
rising tide of the 'Sinhala only' lobby seemed truly 
formidable. The result, therefore, was the forging of 
a Sinhala-Buddhist axis against a Tamil-Christian 
compact, initially, and later developing it into a 
direct communal confrontation between the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils in a wholistic manner. An important element 
in this discussion is the fact that the Christian 
interest in providing a sound English education to the 
rural Sinhalese appeared to be minimal. Therefore, by 
i960, nearly four years after the passage of the 
Official Language Act, certain denominational schools 
in large towns, such as Colombo, Galle, Kandy and 
Jaffna were defying the avowed language policy of the 
Government and were in fact continuing to educate their
0  /T ry
pupils in the English medium. To a large measure
this scheme of events was a result of an antagonistic
posture taken by the denominational schools against the
2 68Official Language Act of 1956. This final confrontation
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with the State, in a long series of confrontations of 
which mention has previously been made, gave rise to 
the passage of The Assisted Schools and Training
Q  /  /\
Colleges (Special Provisions) Act of i960, herein­
after referred to as the Act of i960.
VII. Nationalisation of Schools.
By section 2 of the Act of i960 its Provisions were
made applicable to every Assisted School on the Island.
In denominational terms it applied to all religious
schools - Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Buddhist - which
were within the grants-in-aid scheme. By section 3*
the Minister of Education was empowered to declare the
Director of Education as the Manager of any Assisted
School. By a proviso to that section, the authorities
in charge of any school were empowered to decide to opt
out of the grant-in-aid system and remain as an unaided
school. But when such a choice was made by section 11(b) 
270of the Act, the school authorities must abide "by the
Provisions of this Act and by Regulations and Orders
made thereunder and abide by any ... written law applicable
in the case of such school". A failure to observe
section 11(b), enabled the Minister to acquire that school
and vest it in the Director of Education as its new
271Manager. Several sections of the Act provided for 
the holding of a poll to determine the views of the 
parents and of the teachers as to whether they wished to 
opt out of the grants-in-aid scheme and remain an unaided 
school. Elaborating extensively the responsibilities of 
a proprietor of an unaided school in section 6 of the 
Act, the Government clearly bound the unaided schools 
securely to its policy on education, and extended the 
same provisions to the aided schools after nationalisation, 
by installing the Director of Education as the new 
Manager of such schools. The Director, being a Government
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functionary was responsible to the Minister of Education
and finally to Parliament. By section 6(a) of the Act
a proprietor of any unaided school was required to
"educate and train the pupils in such school in accordance
with the general educational policy of the Government".
Recognising the fact that denominational education was
at an end, the Catholic church took active steps to
274oppose the implementation of the Act. The Church
expressed the fear that the Government might under 
section 6(a) make the teaching of Buddhism to all pupils 
compulsory, which in their minds would be totally 
unacceptable. They pointed out the danger they faced 
under sub-section (g) of section 6 , where specific 
regulations aimed at specific schools could be made, 
requiring the proprietors of those schools to carry out 
such directives. Section 6(g) read:
"The proprietors of unaided schools shall 
comply with the provisions of any written 
law applicable to such school and matters 
relating to education.
Section l4 empowered the Minister to make Regulations:
"(i) in respect of any matter for which 
Regulations are authorized or required to 
be made by this Act, and (ii) for the 
purpose of carrying out or giving effect 
to the principles and provisions of this 
Ac t. "
By section 15, the contravention of this Act or the 
failure to "comply with any provision of the Act or 
of any Order or Regulation made thereunder shall 
/constitute/ an offence," punishable by imprisonment 
"of either description for a term of three months with 
or without a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees".
The fact that imprisonment was made a fixed ingredient 
in the penalty shows the importance which the 
Government attached to, what came to be known as the 
"nationalisation of Schools" Act^^ of i960.
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The opposition at the political level was conducted by
persons professing the Catholic faith by seizing and
occupying some of the Catholic schools on the Island.
This was done for at least two reasons. First, it was
thought that such a move could deter the Government
from taking the schools over, by installing Government
appointees as Managers to operate the schools on
behalf of the Director of Education. Second, it was
hoped that their extra—legal moves could focus national
and international attention on their opposition to the
Act. An ugly situation of a very definite danger to
the harmony of the two leading communities on the Island
was averted by the timely arrival of the late Valarian
Cardinal Gracias at the behest of the late Pope,
Paul VI. By being able to assure the Roman Catholic
community that the Government intended merely to
implement the language change and never to take over
religious instructions, the late Cardinal Gracias
274successfully persuaded the Roman Catholic community
to hand over the schools in question to the Government
under section 3 o f  the Act. Although this eventual
settlement helped to avoid a serious religious conflict
on the Island, the Government passed, during the height
of the school occupancy, The Assisted Schools and
Training Colleges (Supplementary Provision) Act of 
2751961, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1961.
O Cy
The two Acts became law within a period of four months.
The Act of 1961 was intended to reinforce the provisions 
of the Act of i960. During the school occupancy the 
Government investigated several methods to evict the 
occupants of the Catholic schools but as the buildings 
and the premises upon which they stood were church 
property, the Government was advised that they lacked 
the power to evict them. Therefore, by section 3 o f  the
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1961 Act, the Minister was empowered to issue a notice 
declaring that certain property do vest in the Crown 
as being required "for the purpose of conducting and 
maintaining a school". Provided that the procedure 
enumerated under section 4 was carried out while making 
that declaration, the property was deemed to vest in 
the Crown without more. The Crown was absolved by 
section 11 from paying compensation for the loss of
such property.. Once a notice was issued to the owners
of such property and such notice was published in the 
Gazette, the Director may authorise any person to go 
upon the property and it was declared by section 3(2):
"(a) if that property is movable property, 
enter any land or building in which such 
property is kept and examine and take an 
inventory of such property; or (b) if that
property consists of any land, building,
or other structure and demarcate and set 
out the boundaries thereof."
By section 26 of the Act of 1961, the Minister was 
empowered to formulate Regulations concerning a number 
of areas. Apart from implementing the Act and the 
principles there contained, the Minister was authorised 
by Regulations to amend the schedules to the Act and:
"for the determination of any question, 
or the resolution of any doubts, which 
may arise as to any right, title or 
interest, in or over any property which 
is the subject of a Divesting Order."^^
By section 27, contravention or breach of this Act and 
Regulations made thereunder was made punishable by a 
term of imprisonment of six months of either description 
with or without a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees. 
Realising the difficulty in bringing the Catholic church, 
among other missionary institutions within the definition 
'of a person1 who can be imprisoned, as distinct from
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being punished by a fine, section 28 was drafted to 
threaten the individual members of the clergy with 
imprisonment. Fortunately, the need to enforce 
penalties under this Act never arose. Other Christian 
missions followed the line taken by the Catholic Church 
and peaceably permitted the Director of Education to 
assume control of their schools. The only significant 
change was that the Government required the denomina­
tional schools to abandon the English medium of 
instruction and adopt the Sinhala medium and, wherever 
necessary, the Tamil medium of instruction, under the
p 7Q
Tamil Language (Special Provis ion) Act of 1958.
The attempt to nationalise the Assisted Schools, and
thereby to snuff out the denominational educational
enterprise totally, did not pass without challenge.
279The two Acts together were intended to perform three
280separate functions. First, by section six of the
Act of i960, the unaided schools were required to
follow policy laid down by the Government on education.
This section was clearly central to the implementation
of the language policy of the government. Second, a
breach of section six enabled the Minister of Education
to transform the status of an unaided school into one
of Director-managed. This is tantamount to making
it a Government Assisted School controlled and governed
by the Minister of Education. This was under section 
28l11 of the Act of i960. In Vadamaradchy Hindu
282Educational Society Ltd. v. The Minister of Education 
(hereinafter referred to as the Hindu School Case) the 
dispute centered around the relationship between the 
first and the second functions chartered by the 
Government, The third function was to ensure 'that the 
Minister could take physical possession of the schools* and 
this was stated in sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1961.
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Section 3 dealt with a procedural requirement to give 
notice that the Minister intended to take over certain 
property "for the purpose of conducting and maintaining 
a school". The notice that was required was in the 
form of a Gazette Notification. Distinct from section 3,
and under section 4, of the Act of 1961 it was declared
that:
"Where the Minister considers it desirable 
so to do, the Minister may, by order 
published in the Gazette (in this Act 
referred to as a Vesting Order) declare that, 
with effect from such date as shall be specified 
in the order (not being a date earlier than 
fourteen days after the date of such publication), 
all property of the description specified in the
Order, being property liable to vesting, shall
vest in the Crown."283
In The Board of Trustees of Maradana Mosque v. Minister 
284of Education the inter-relationship between the two 
Acts was called into question. In each decision the 
Courts held against the Minister of Education, while 
pointing out a serious error in the way the two Acts 
were being used to achieve the three specific goals
285adumbrated above. As they were the only two disputes
28 6ever to reach the courts under the two Acts, they 
merit further examination.
In the Hindu School Case, the petitioner, an 
Educational Society, was informed by letter dated 11th 
January, 1961, that the Minister had reason to believe 
that section six of the Act of i960 had been violated.
The Minister enumerated five areas of contravention:
(l) The school hostel had been closed down; (2) the 
post-primary school latrines had been demolished;
(3 ) the school play ground had been converted into a 
timber depot and; (4) a section of the Primary School 
building which housed the Handicraft Laboratory had 
been fenced off. All these matters constituted a
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violation of section 6(b) of tbe Act of I960; because 
all these facilities, the Minister pointed out, were 
available to the pupils at all times before 21st July,
pOry
I960. ' Unde r section 6(b) all proprietors of unaided
schools were required:
1 ... to continue to maintain all such 
facilities and services as were maintained 
by such schools on the day immediately 
preceeding the 21st day of July, 1960."2gg
The Minister required the petitioner to show cause on 
or before the 25th January, 1961 as to why an Order
p O n
under section 11(b) should not be issued. The 
petitioner by a letter dated 23rd January wrote, 
requesting; an 1 on the spot enquiry' if the Director was 
not satisfied with the explanations given in his letter. 
By way of an explanation the petitioner wrote, as the 
Court later observed:
"That the hostel had been closed in December, 
but had re-opened when the new term commenced 
in January, some latrines had been demolished 
by the owner of the land on which they had 
stood, but new latrines were being provided 
and would be ready very soon; the former play­
ground on leased land had been taken back by 
its owner, but a new playground had been 
provided in anticipation some years before; the 
former handicraft laboratory was being put to a 
different purpose, but the laboratory was now 
housed in a new building."290
Notwithstanding the foregoing explanation, by letter 
dated 26th January 1961, three days later, the Director 
of Education informed the Principal of the school that 
the Minister of Education had ordered that the school 
be taken over for Director—management with effect from 
1st February, 1961, under section ll(b) of the Act.
By the present proceedings, the petitioner sought a 
writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court, to have the 
Minister's Order quashed. It is relevant to say that
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these events were a result of a complaint addressed by 
some teachers who had been discontinued by the petitioner 
in December of the previous year. It appears that, a 
letter addressed to the Director of Education, by a 
group of teachers on the 30th December, i960, had 
resulted in having their former school nationalised in 
less than six weeks. This was also the period during 
which the opposition to the schools take-over was at its 
zenith, moving the government steadily towards the enact­
ment of Act No. 8 of 1961, during the month of March, 
that year. Without casting any doubts on the merits of 
the case submitted by the teachers in their letter, 
against the petitioner, it is important to state that 
the two Acts were open to considerable abuse. This 
particularly merited the closest scrutiny on the Minister's 
part, before being driven to exercise his powers under 
the Act.
The Supreme Court after an elaborate exposition of
the nature of the Minister's power under*section ll(b),
ruled that a mere breach of section 6 did not per se
enable him to exercise that power under section 11. The
power granted by section 11, was found to be a 'quasi-
judicial' power, and therefore the nexus between sections
6 and 11 was the holding of at least a * quasi-judicial'
291enquiry to 'satisfy' himself that there has been a 
breach of section 6 warranting the transformation of an 
unaided school into one of 'Director-administrated' 
under the Act. The fact that the petitioner had submitted 
an explanation for the complaint levelled against him 
required the holding of an enquiry, in such a way that the 
requirements of 'natural justice', as defined and applied
bv the Privy Council in The University of Ceylon v.
292 ---293----- 1--------- ----Fernando, were observed. The failure to do so made
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the Order issued under section 11(b) null and void. While
issuing the writ of Certiorari. Fernando. C.J., wrote:
"The society had in its letter of 23rd 
January twice requested the Director to
hold an inquiry on the spot into the 
matters complained of.^ 4  When the
petitioner in the present case explained 
to the Director, as he virtually did,
'these buildings and facilities are in 
fact existing and available, come and 
see for yourself or send someone to 
see , would not an inspection on the spot 
have been the only just means of affording 
a 'fair opportunity' to the petitioner?"ork„
296As it were to close this gap, the Legislature, in
section 4 of the 1961 Act, set up a procedure which
the Minister was to adopt while issuing an order to
vest the school property in the Crown. But this
procedure did not include the holding of an enquiry.
The Act of 1961 was not intended only to alter the
297status of a school, but to alter the status and
298cause the vesting of the school's property in the
299Crown. In the Maradana Mosque Case, Zahira College
was owned by the Board of Trustees of the Maradana
Mosque. In the summer of 1961 the school, as distinct
from the Board, ran into financial difficulties and a
majority of the teaching staff remained unpaid with
respect to their July salaries until after the 10th
of August. That constituted a violation of section
6(i)*^^ of the Act of i960. On the 11th August, 1961,
the Minister received two letters from a group of teachers
complaining of this fact. On the same day the Director
of Education informed the appellants that there was a
violation of 6(i) and required the appellants to show
cause before 18th August, 1961, as to why Zahira
College should not be taken over for Director-management
301"in terms of the Special Provisions Act No. 8 of 1961."
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The Director's order avoided any mention of section
11(b)^°2 of the Act No. 5 of i960 under which the
Hindu Schools Case was brought. The appellants
replied on the 15th August that there had been a
misunderstanding between the Board and the College and
thereby the salaries of some of the teachers had not
been paid before August 10th; but this had now been
ractified and that the salaries would be paid before
August 18th. In fact salaries were tendered before
the 18th August but the teachers refused to accept
payment at that time. The Privy Council nonetheless
303considered 'tender as payment1 by that date. As for
304the ability to "satisfy the Director", the Board
offered to show their books. Notwithstanding these
305guarantees, and notwithstanding a shared ethnic and 
religious identity between the Board and the Minister, 
by a letter dated 21st August, 1961, the Minister 
informed the President of the Executive Committee of the 
Board, and also the Manager of the school, that Zahira 
College would become Director—managed from that very 
day. As representations began to come in, the Minister 
in a Broadcast to the Nation explained his decision to 
'take-over' Zahira College. A printed copy of that 
statement issued by the Ministry of Education was 
considered by the Privy Council as the basis for 
establishing that the Minister had mistakenly believed 
that he could without more 'take-over* the administra­
tion of a school under Act No. 8 of 1961 the moment any
307one of the twelve conditions laid down in section 6
of the Act of 1961 was broken by an unaided school.
The 'Director-managed' status of Zahira College was
308
challenged before the Supreme Court of Ceylon. The 
Board of Trustees sought a writ of Certiorari against
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the Minister to have his decision quashed. The Supreme 
Court refused the application on the grounds that the 
Minister's decision under Act No. 8 of 1961 was not the 
exercise of a quasi-judicial power but of a ministerial 
or executive power, which cannot be the subject of 
judicial review. Herat, J ., explained the distinction 
in the following way:
"The result of what I have read makes me 
come to the conclusion that the essence 
of a 'judicial act' is where the law 
predicates an enquiry by the judicial 
process before the reaching of the 
conclusion which results in the act. On 
the other hand, an 'executive act* is 
done by a process where the law predicates 
no prior judicial process before the 
arrival of a mental decision preceding the 
act. The exercise of judgment is not the
Taking a homely example, Herat, J .. explained:
"For instance an Administrator has to 
decide on which of two plots of land,
A or B, a housing scheme is to be 
erected. Before he decides to build 
in plot A rather than on plot B, he 
will consider many factors and un­
doubtedly exercise his powers of judg­
ment - but his decision in favour of 
plot A and not in favour of plot B is 
not a judicial act. The law does not 
require him to go through the judicial 
process."^1Q
Herat, J .. therefore, concluded that so long as the
Minister was acting intra vires the Act, which he was
311undoubtedly doing, there could not be a review of
his ministerial act. Herat, J .. added:
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"It is trite lav that remedy by way of 
Certiorari only lies to question and 
quash a judicial act. It does not lie 
to question or quash a ministerial or 
executive act, even if done illegally.
Such an act, even if illegal or ultra 
vires, must be canvassed by a different 
procedure „ 11 ^ 2
The Board appealed against that decision to the Privy
313Council. Allowing the appeal, the Privy Council
expressly held that a decision to take over a school
Linder section 11 (b)^*^ of the i960 Act, and a
decision to vest the school's property in the Crown
315under section 4 of the 1961 Act, were both functions 
requiring the due observance of Natural Justice.
Lord Pearce wrote:
"With all respect to the learned Judge, 
it is not correct to regard the Minister's 
act as purely ministerial. It was not 
contested below nor before their Lordships 
that the Minister was acting in a judicial 
or quasi judicial capacity in satisfying 
himself whether there had been a contraven­
tion. And until he was so satisfied he had 
no jurisdiction to make the order. He mtist, 
therefore, in satisfying himself on that 
point observe the rules of natural justice.
He must give the appellants notice of what 
was charged against them and allow them to 
make representations in answer."^^6
Relying on the report issued by the Minister of
01 rr qi Q
Information on the Minister's view of his 
rights under the two Acts, the Privy CoLincil 
concluded that it was clear that the Minister had 
misconceived his rights and therefore directed the 
Supreme Court of Ceylon to issue the writ of Certiorari 
prayed for.
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VIII. Conclusions
319The Maradana Mosque decision by itself raised
no cause for comment. Lord Pearce's judgment was in
line with what the Privy Council had said once before
320in Nakkuda All v. Jayartne. Where the dispute in
question is characterised as one involving a judicial 
or a quasi—judicial activity, then the requirement to 
observe the maxim audi a]teram partem becomes imperative. 
But where, as it was said in Nakkuda Ali1s case, that 
the act was neither judicial nor quasi—judicial, then the 
dispute is not amenable to review by the courts.
Lord Radcliffe made that distinction abundantly clear in 
the following passage:
*'It is a long step in the argument to say 
that because a man is enjoined that he 
must not take action unless he has reason­
able ground for believing something he can 
only arrive at that belief by a course of 
conduct analagous to the judicial process.
And yet, unless that proposition is valid, 
there is really no ground for holding that 
the Controller is acting judicially or 
quasi-judicially when he acts under this 
Regulation. If he is not under a duty so 
to act then it would not be according to 
law that his decision should be amenable 
to review and, if necessary, to avoidance
by the procedure of Certiorari• ?1-L
The distinction made by the Privy Council in Nakkuda 
Ali1s case became a useful method for successive 
administrations on the Island to protect governmental 
acts from judicial review by casting them outside the 
area of judicial and quasi-judicial acts. The Maradana 
Mosque decision was based on the supposition that there 
it was a judicial or a quasi-judicial act. The failure 
to comply with the requirements of natural justice, 
therefore, resulted in the issuance of the writ of 
Certiorari against the Minister of Education.
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Several months after the Privy Council had
delivered their opinion in The Maradana Mosque case,
322the Board had Puravanpah v. Fernando . yet another 
Appeal from Ceylon, before them. The Municipal Council 
of Jaffna had been dissolved by the Minister of Local 
Government. This was done under s. 277 of the Municipal 
Council Ordinance. Under that section, the Minister was 
empowered to dissolve a local government body if it 
appeared to him, "that a Municipal Council is not 
competent to perform, or persistently makes default in 
the performance of, any duty or duties imposed upon it
The Minister, before having the Municipal Council 
dissolved, did not provide the Council an opportunity 
to make representations in support of the view taken by 
the Council that it should not be dissolved.
Durayappah, who was the Mayor at the time commenced 
these proceedings seeking Certiorari to quash the 
Minister's order and for an interim injunction restraining 
the new appointees from replacing the functions of the 
Municipality. The Privy Council held that the failure to 
provide an opportunity to make representations constituted 
a violation of natural justice - the maxim audi alteram 
partem had not been observed and therefore the ministerial 
order was 'viodable*. But the Board found that the 
failure of the Council to take steps to have that order 
rescinded while the Council was still a legal person, 
deprived the appellant from a right to seek Certiorari 
on its own behalf or on behalf of the non-existing 
Council.
The decision raises two issues of some significance. 
First, it suggests that in disputes where there has been 
a violation of natural justice, the act done or the Order 
issued by the authority in question becomes 'voidable* 
and not 'void'. This distinction had arisen out of the
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speeches of their Lordships in the House of Lords in
923 324Ridge v, Baldwin. ^ There, while Lords Ever shed,
Morris and Devlin had declared a power exercised
in violation of natural justice to be 'voidable1, Lords
Reid and Hodson had considered such a power to be
'void'* As Van den Heever. J *, had once said with
reference to the distinction between 'void' and 'voidable*
that an attempt to sort that distinction would be like
an attempt by "blind men. looking in a dark room for a
329black cat which wasn't there". The difficulties
perceived by this kind of distinction has been noted by
330some commentators. Professor Vade who is one of them
had concluded that: .
"The Courts interfere with administrative 
action on two grounds only: that it is
ultra vires (void); and that it shows 
error on the face of the record (voidable).
Action which is quashed on grounds not 
appearing on the face of the record (such 
as mistake as a 1 jurd sdictional' subject- 
matter or procedural error or abuse of
discretion) must therefore be ultra vires
and void.
This type of distinction helps the Courts in its choice
of remedies. The view that the Act or the Order of the
Minister is 'voidable' provides the Court with a basis
inter alia for protecting the rights acquired during
the interim period and to order the applicant to seek
332alternative relief. This aspect of the judgment in
Ridge v. Baldwin has been incorporated into the Law of 
Sri Lanka through the Durayappah decision
The second aspect of the Durayappah case concerns 
the dichotomy between judicial and quasi—judicial acts 
and Ministerial acts which determine whether or not 
Certiorari would lie. This was an inheritance from 
Nakkuda Ali*s case. Some time before Durayappah was
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decided by the Privy Council, the House of* Lords had 
decided in Ridge v. Baldwin that the courts have an 
inherent power to strike down any act or order which 
had been done or issued in violation of 'natural 
justice*. This the House of Lords thought was avail­
able within the writ of Certiorari whether or not the 
act or order was ministerial or judicial or quasi- 
judicial. Lord Reid commenting on Nakkuda Ali's case 
wrote:
"This House is not bound by decisions of 
the Privy Council, and for my own part 
nothing short of a decision of this House 
directly in point would induce me to accept 
the position that, although .an enactment 
expressly requires an official to have 
reasonable grounds for his decision, our Law 
is so defective that a subject cannot bring 
up such a decision for a review however 
seriously he may be affected and however 
obvious it may be that the official acted 
in breach of his statutory obligation.
During the course of his advice, in Purayap pah v.
Fernando, Lord Upjohn, in the Privy Council, alluded
to this wider basis upon which judicial review was
made available by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin.
First, having rejected the idea that judicial review
was limited to any particular category of acts or
orders, Lord Upjohn said:
"These various formulae are introductory 
of the matter to be considered and are 
given little guidance upon the question 
of audi alteram partem. The statute can 
make itself clear upon this point and if 
it does cadit quaestio. If it does not 
then the principle stated by Byles J .. in 
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works334 
must be applied. He said: 'a long course
of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley*s 
case.335 and ending with some very recent 
cases, establish, that, although there are 
no positive words in the statute requiring 
that the party shall bo heard, yet the 
justice of the common law will supply the 
omission of the legislature•'"336
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The thrust of the Privy Council decision, therefore,
337was to broaden the rule in Nakkuda Ali. To that
extent the Durayappah decision brings the law of 
Sri Lanka into line with Ridge v. Baldwin. The effect 
on such decisions as The Maradana Mosque Case, now,
o o O
is to make it unnecessary for the courts as Herat. J » 
did, to characterise the power as one which would in 
its exercise involve a judicial or a quasi-judicial 
act. It would now suffice if the courts would keep in 
mind three matters when considering whether there should 
be an observance of the maxim audi alteram partem so as to 
satisfy the requirements of ‘natural justice'• These 
three matters are as follows:
"First, what is the nature of the property, 
the office held, status enjoyed or services 
to be performed by the complainant of injustice. 
Secondly, in what circumstances or upon what 
occasions is the person claiming to be entitled 
to exercise the measure of control entitled to 
intervene* Thirdly, when a right to intervene 
is proved, what sanctions in fact is the latter 
entitled to impose upon the other. It is only 
upon a consideration of all these matters that 
the question of application of the principle 
can properly be determined.’'
The Durayappah decision should to a large extent subject 
the activities of the state to the scrutiny of the Courts. 
In Sri Lanka, where Governments have, to a significant 
extent asserted powers which are by statute declared to 
be beyond scrutiny, by the Courts, it is somewhat 
reassuring that in areas where by a statute the State 
had failed to protect itself from the Courts’ scrutiny, 
Courts can now enquire into both the Ministerial acts 
and judicial or quasi-judicial acts done or orders 
issued by the State. This power of review is determined 
principally under the three guidelines stated above 
leaving the types or categories of acts and orders which 
may become subject to this kind of scrutiny somewhat 
open-ended and undefined.
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The thrust of the Durayappah case was to limit the 
State’s power to legitimise policy through the vehicle 
of* the law. To the extent to which the State may use 
the law to blend policy with expediency, the Durayappah 
decision adds a much needed proviso; namely that this 
process of* blending policy with expediency requires to 
be carried out in consultation with the people who 
comprises the society and who may have been the catalyst 
for that policy. In this curious way law in fact
3^1occupies "the interface between policy and implementation.” 
Implementation involves a process of blending policy with 
social change as an element in a strategy for development.
This aspect of the study shall receive a deeper analysis 
at a later stage. It is necessary, however, to complete 
these conclusions by examining the second component of 
the equation — the social change - that had resulted out 
of the colonial education policy, the first component 
being the laws and legal institutions which were available 
to the State for the purposes of legitimising its policy.
The progress of the various educational policies for 
Sri Lanka since the beginning of the 19th Century had 
resulted in the formation of a particular type of society 
which was best suited for a colonial type of Administration. 
With the advent of Independence the people’s demand for 
increased popular participation in the creation of the 
new society which was promised, was found to be impeded 
principally with a language barrier resulting in a very 
definite gap between a small powerful elite at the 
centre of political power and a large powerless mass at 
the periphery. Xt is this factor which compelled the 
legislature to breakdown the language barrier, so that 
popular participation of the masses became possible.
3k2The language change must, therefore, be viewed, as the 
commencement of a particular type of social movement, 
progressively moving towards the creation of a new 
society with new social dimensions; admittedly creating 
a new and a different type of elite in its own particular 
way. It is not difficult to assume that the change from
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dependence to independence, must, if that is to he 
meaningful, bring about an attitudinal change internal­
ising the political and legal changes which Independence 
brings about. This attitudinal change must necessarily 
alter the social dimensions from being manipulated from 
without to being controlled from within. It is this 
that calls for the need to facilitate popular participa­
tion after an era of ’agency rule’. Commencing from the 
colonial Governor right down to the most menial Government 
functionary, the role they play as an ’agent* of a 
source of unrepresentative power located outside, is a 
necessary hallmark of ’agency rule'. The de-stabilisation 
of this paradigm initially, and its replacement ultimately 
by a paradigm drawing in the masses from the periphery of 
the society and towards the centre of political power, 
may be considered as a meaningful element in the movement 
of any colonial society towards Independence. In some 
societies this process could commence at a point earlier
in time than the actual date of legal Independence. The
* 3 4 3  3h5
Dominion of Canada, New Zealand and Australia
may be typical examples. For, by the time the Statute
3k6of Westminster re-defined and re-established their 
relationship .with the Westminster Parliament, in 1931* 
these countries have had some considerable time to 
de-stabilise the initial ’agency-rule’ model in favour of 
developing an internal system model of government. In 
Ceylon, however, the point of Independence, in 19^ -8, 
marked the commencement of the process of de-stabilisation 
of the colonial model of 'agency-rule*. The principal 
road block which the Island exj^erienced during the 
early years of Independence, was the language barrier, 
separating the masses on the periphery from a small but 
powerful elite at the centre of political power.
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In this context the first eight years of Independence 
could be considered as wasted years for development 
and change; fox’ by maintaining the barriers which 
separated the nation the resulting 1 agency rule1 
of Government appears to have persisted. Like the 
colonial Administration, the Governments of Ceylon 
between 19^8-1956 were compelled to carry out an 
’agency-rule1 model. By 1956, it was recognised that 
a break from this model was necessary and to do so 
it was necessary to change the language of administration, 
from English to Sinhala. The choice of ’Sinhala' as the 
official language was determined by the fact that nearly 
70 percent of the population spoke that language. It 
was believed that such a change would render the 
’agency-model* redundant. It was also believed that the 
demotion of English to a tertiary if not secondary role 
could, by the passage of time, alter the social 
formations and elitism which had come down from colonial 
times. The General Elections of 1956 were fought on the 
language issue and the victory of the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party which formed the Government as a result, had a 
firm commitment to change the Island’s language of 
administration from English to Sinhala. The next 
chapter will deal with this event.
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CHAPTER 4 
Language and Development
X . An Introduction
f-
Although views recently expressed have traced 
the sources for the language problem into the 15th 
Century, the immediate causes ('or the problem could
2
be found four centuries later, In the 19th Century,
Two distinct but inter-dependent sources of discontent 
could be readily identified as the principal reasons 
for the language problem; namely education and
3
religion. Each of these have previously been discussed 
within the context of the British Colonial policy towards 
them. By abandoning education to the missionary enter— 
prise and by their attitude towards Buddhism, the 
religion of a very significant majority of the native 
population on the Island, the British Administration 
in Ceylon had set in motion a process which inevitably 
resulted in the polarisation of the religious forces on 
the Island. The fact that the missionary enterprise 
had resulted in the formation of a small national elite, 
whose ideological and intellectual framework was carved 
out of Christianity, Western civilization and a pro- 
British political policy, eventually resulted in 
generating its own opposition. This opposition came 
,;from a massive pro-nationalist, Sinhala educated,
Buddhist, group which, in time became more and more 
determined to neutralise the strength of their adversaries. 
As a culmination of this process of interplay ef opposing 
forces, the Government in 1956, enacted the Official 
Languages Act of that year* Various stages of this
conflict were marked by such temporary measures as the
(6) 7several Education and Buddhist Temporalities Acts
which spanned the 19 th and 20 th Centuries leading 
ultimately to the declaration of Sinhala in 19 56 as 
the only Official Language for the Island.
As an event that is central to the Language 
question in Ceylon was the grant of Independence, in 
19;bS, as an end product of a process of de-colonisation. 
That event becomes important because the method employed 
for de-colonisation of Ceylon did not involve a change 
of the socio-political institutions on the Island.
This unchanged nature of the socio-political organisa­
tions of the Ceylonese society required the retention 
of a Legal system and a legal tradition which had 
evo.l ved through over one and a half centuries of British 
rule. Tliis was necessary because the laws and legal 
institutions in 19^8 stood in complete harmony with the 
socio-political compact which the Island had inherited 
from British rule. Further, the Soulbury Constitution 
which served as a Grundnorm at Independence legitimised 
these Laws and the legal institutions upon which the 
stability of the Ceylonese society at the time was 
based. To make this stability a lasting event, the
g
Sou11)ai■ y Coustitut1on carr1 r>d a certaLn ntimber of
9
entrenched clauses concerning certain vital areas of 
this socio-political compact. These entrenched clauses, 
as later e v e n t s w e r e  to discover, were apparently 
meant to be unalterable under the Constitution. This 
apparent immutability by any future society was found 
by the Privy Council to have been necessary because they
" ... represent the solemn balance of rights
between the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental 
conditions on wh ich in Lor se they accepted the 
Constitution; and those are therefore unalterable 
under the Constitution."
11
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The granting of Independence was not, therefore, meant
to be considered as a point of departure from the
social, economic, political or the legal organisations
which had served to sustain colonial rule. By 1956,
eight years after Independence, the Ceylonese society,
however, had radically changed. An important basic
assumption that appeared to have under gone a change
by 1956 was the assumption that English should be
considered as the Official Language of the Island.
There was no preceding law that had declared the English
language to be the Official Language of the Island.
Particularly, after the Colebrooke—Cameron recommendations
of I833> where a knowledge of English was declared to be
12
a pre-reqaisite for native employment in Government, 
it was assumed that English would be the medium of
13
Administration. In 1895, in Cornelius v. Uluwitike,
the Supreme Court declared that English had always been
the Language of the courts, but gave no authority for
that statement. Therefore, when enacting tlie Official
1/4
Language Act, in 1956, the Government did not find it
necessary to repeal a proceeding enactment to declare
1Sinhala' the official language. The Act merely declared
for the first time an Official Language for Ceylon; and
that was to be 'Sinhala*. The 1956 Act was merely an
instance where the Government had utilised the instruments
of law to legitimise a particular change of policy within
the framework of society. The later enactments, such as
15
the Act passed to nationalise denominational schools,
the reasonable use of Tamil Act and the Language of 
17the Courts Act were several instances where the State 
considered it appropriate to regulate the ensuing social 
changes in the light of Government policy. This aspect 
of the role which the legal system plays, is vital to 
development.
X I . Towards a Change in Ceylon's Official Language
(a ) Language as an Instrument of Colonisation.
Inherent in every human society is an ability 
for change and growth. Its own social momentum may to 
a large extent determine the direction and the speed 
of its change. In that sense there will exist a 
particular relationship between the internalised forces 
for social change and the speed of that change. The 
former may be induced by external stimuli - such as 
colonisation or modernisation imposed from outside - 
or by the very processes for social change generated 
by the members of a given society. It is correct to 
say that the application of external stimuli of one 
sort or another could transform a given society suddenly 
and swiftly from one form into another. The trans­
format, ion of the Ceylonese society through the missionary 
enterprise was limited to a narrow segment of the society 
and as such had left a large mass of non—English educated 
persons behind. This had resulted in absorbing only a 
small number of persons characterised by education in 
the Eng 1 ish medium to consti tute the political centre, 
while leaving a large mass of vernacular educated persons 
on the periphery. The former, therefore, remained trapped 
at trie centre forming a new national elite. Embalmed by 
an over-lay of rules supported by the legal system, the 
new elite consequently formed the centre of both the 
legal and the political power of the society after 
Independence. The identification of such a national 
elite must now be pursued, using different criteria 
derived from the assumptions peculiar to the instru­
mentalities utilised to achieve that change. These 
criteria may be many and varied. Education, religious 
affiliations, caste affiliations, cultural adaptations, 
economic power and political affiliations may in one
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form or another contribute to the many assumptions 
peculiar to the instruments of change« For Sri Lanka, 
English education, clearly, was one of the main criteria 
to which the formation of the new elite may be linkedc 
Of the external stimuli, colonisation is not to be 
regarded as a normal or as a necessary stage in the 
development of human societies. But, as most of the 
present Third World countries have, at some stage in 
their social evolution, been subject to colonisation, 
the principal external stimulus considered as one being 
instrumental in modernising a Third World society is the 
do—colonisation process. Although social change is a 
continuing process, commencing from the very beginnings 
of social organisation, account must be taken of its 
effect at the point of a Nation’s re-entry into Statehood, 
as an end product of colonialism. It is this that makes 
the de-colonisation process relevant to the nature and 
the character of the social change; namely the nature and 
the character of the society that; results out of it. This 
must surely explain the differences between the modern 
societies of Vietnam, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola; 
and those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and of India0 
Similar to the broad anatomical regions of a human body - 
the Bead, Chest, Abdomen and the Limbs - a human society 
is characterised principally by four regions of development0 
These are the cultural or ethnic level, the political level, 
the legal level of social organisation and the economic 
level. The de-colonising process entails changes, in 
varying degrees of sophistication, at those four levels of 
an emergent society. The de—colonisation process will, 
therefore, determine the extent to which the changes shall 
occur at these four levels of social organisations and 
that in turn should condition the nature of the j^ost- 
colonial society which the country would inherit.
Broadly, there appears to be two models for de-colonisation.
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18
II ( a ) ( I ) Th e _ N o d g  1 of De-colonisation :
A Recipe for Conservatism
In a very general sense, this model for de­
colonisation represents a constitutional process 
leading to Independence. The end result would be the 
enactment of an Act of Independence, forming the 
Grundnorm for a newly Independent State. The Act of 
Independence which forms the new source of political 
and legal power for the now Independent former colony, 
will be recognised as the basis for the validity of 
the laws of that territory. Therefore, the Independent 
legal, system must effectively conform to the Act of 
Independence. As for Sri Lanka, the Act of Independence 
embodied the ideological and the societal commitments of 
the elite which occupied the centre of political and 
legislative power of the land in L9 38. The Constitution 
of 191 >8 merely provided the juridical framework for 
transforming policy into law. In this first model for 
de-colonisation, therefore, it is important to emphasise 
that the changes at each of the four levels of social 
organisation become minimal and, in this sense, Australia, 
Canada, India, Ceylon and a number of Third World countries 
illustrate this fact; namely, that the changes at the 
cultural, economic, political and legal levels of the newly 
Independent society remained much the same as they were 
during the colonial period. The changes brought about by 
Independence for them, were merely superficial and in no 
way could be characterised as being radical. In a 
transformation executed within a given constitutional 
framework, the Constitution itself could limit the extent 
to which that transformation was legally permissible.
The limits placed by the legal system through carefully 
worded entrenched clauses may not coincide with political 
expediency or with social needs. Therefore, within the 
first model for de-colonisation any change becomes a part
of a controlled, predetermined and deliberate constitu­
tional process. The constitutionality, both of the 
process and of the end result, becomes the principal 
determinent of social change. Experience predicates 
that it will be in the interest of the elite that assumes 
political and legislative power at the point of 
Independence to have some tangible legal guarantees: 
that most of the ideological underpinnings of the society 
to which they belonged shall be safeguarded, and indeed 
preserved despite the change of the territory from a 
Colony to Independence. It is in this sense that
Lord Pearce 1s much quoted dictum in Ranasinghe v.
19Br i be r y C o m m i s s :i. oner becomes meaningful. While comment­
ing on the entrenched clauses of the Ceylon Constitution 
of ip38, the Learned Law Lord after referring to the 
voting and legislative powers contained in sections 18 
and 29 said:
"There follows (b), (c) and (d),
(of section 29), which set out 
further entrenched religious and 
racial matters, which shall not be 
Ihe subject of 1egi51alion. They 
represent the solemn balance of rights 
between the citizens of Ceylon, the 
fundamental conditions on which inter se 
they accepted the Constitution; and 
these are therefore unalterable under 
the Constitut Lon."
While the changes at the four levels of social 
organisation become slight and often obscure, the 
present model for de-colonisation maintains the pre- 
independence relationship between the national elite 
and the mass of the people forming a native proletariat.
As for Ceylon, this relationship between the centre of 
power and the periphery, was largely dependent upon the 
question of literacy in the English language.
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As suggested earlier, once the Anglo—vernacular 
educated elite were placed at the centre of political 
power it became important that the criteria which 
identified them for that position received legal 
protection. This criteria being English education, it 
was thought necessary to provide some tangible constitu­
tional guarantees towards maintaining the English 
language as the Official Language of Ceylon even after 
Independence. The relationship between elitism and 
education is a common phenomena in former colonial 
territories. Commenting on this association of elitism
to education in a Third World society in Africa,
21Mi1 ter wrote:
" ... Education remains the pathway to
elite status, which in turn is usually 
followed by employment in government, 
the nature of the educational system 
of Africa will play a large role in 
determining whether the elite will 
solidify their position by becoming a 
ruling class. Education itself tends 
to set an individual apart, especially 
in a predominantly illiterate society.
To acquire education is also to be re- 
socLali.sed into a modern Western 
Or i.e n tat ion in which ach ievement, 
universal, rational criteria tend to 
displace ascriptive, particular and 
traditional norms." ^
In the Ceylonese context, therefore, the key to social 
transformation was the language change. But section
p o
29(2)(b) and (c), to which I jord Pearce makes reference, 
raised an effective legal impediment to enforcing a 
language change by legislation. It is necessary to note 
that section 29 of the Constitution contains the afore­
mentioned entrenched provisions. Sub-sections (b) and 
(c) of that section restrict the making of laws which 
would:
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"(b) make persons of any community or 
religion liable to disabilities or 
restrictions to which persons of other 
communities or religions are not made 
liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community 
or religion any privilege or advantage 
which is not conferred 011 persons of 
other communities or religions ..," ^
It could be argued that a language switch-over, making
Sinhala the only official language, would constitute a
breacli of the foregoing sub-sections. At least it was
so argued with success at first instance in Kodeswaran
2 5v . The A t, torney—Gone ra 1 .' These matters will be 
deal t wi th at a later point in this chapter. It is 
sufficient to state here that changes within the first 
model for de—colonisation must be constitutional, for 
such changes to bo legal and therefore valid. When 
this limitation is associated wi th the fact that the 
Constitution itself happens to be a law conceived by 
a national elite at the centre of power; it becomes 
obvious that this model for de—colonisation affords a 
limited area for effective social change. In addition, 
the tact that the national elite in question was a 
prod 101 of the colonial heritage, having evolved through 
a period of nearly one and a half centuries, this must 
suggest that the aims and purposes of the new Constitution 
may have been to conserve the socio-economic and political 
infra-structure of the colonial past, rather than to 
provide the constitutional means for social change. The 
first model for de-colonisation, therefore, provides for 
the perpetuation of the post-colonial institutions which 
hinder change, rather than being catalysts for change and 
movement along new social pathways.
XX*(a )(iX)’ The Second Model: Means for Radical Change
When considering the se 
colonisation one delects a c 
from the first model, both i 
result obtained. The basic 
the de-colonisation process 
juridical pathways. Indepen 
colonialism is not obtained 
through a method within the 
but by a process outside it. 
Independence thus achieved i 
document but on a preceding 
war of national liberation, 
war- of national liberation i 
a mass scale. In stages, th 
becomes dependent upon mass 
the masses becomes the langu 
march is from the periphery 
The success of this process 
when the centre of power of 
and becomes merged with the 
the native p rolotar i a t d ur1n 
The total success of a nati 
marked by the establishment 
administration backed by a 
policies, principles and go 
are formulated and derived 
commitments of the national 
with the necessity to base 
ideology of the masses for 
underpinnings of the result 
largely traceable to the po
cond model, for de­
le ar distinction here 
n the method and in the 
difference here is that 
does not follow any defined 
donee as an end-result of 
under the present model 
contemplation of the law 
The legality of 
s not found on a preceding 
fact, such as a victorious 
Underlying the success of a 
s popular participation upon 
e progress towards victory 
support. The language of 
age of the movement. The 
towards the centre of power, 
of de-colonisation is achieved 
the colonial period collapses 
periphery, which comprises of 
g the post-liberation period, 
onal liberation movement is 
of a new system of civil 
new system of laws. The 
als of such a system of laws 
from the ideological 
liberation movement. Coupled 
such a movement upon the 
its own success, the ideological 
ing legal system become 
pular views of the masses.
-135-
Thus a harmony is struck between the source of law, 
together with all its varying appurtenances and the 
masses who are called upon to observe it. Obedience to 
the law becomes a social commitment. In contrast, the 
policies, the principles and the goals of a legal system 
inherited from the colonial power under our first model, 
may be derived largely from colonial institutions. 
Therefore, the congruence required for its effective 
enforcement may well be lacking.
besides re-structuring the legal system of the 
new social organisation along ideological lines shared 
with the masses, the changes at the cultural, political 
and economic levels of the new social unit too, will be 
differently conceived to what one finds under the first 
model. It is, however, important to distinguish a 
national liberation movement from a coup d'etat. A 
princi pal difference between the two lie in the fact 
that while a coup d ’etat may lack popular participation 
national liberation movement as a rule thrives on mass 
support. A coup d ’etat often changes the Head of State 
and the highest level of government, while in a national 
liberation movement the changes are directed towards a 
total integration of the masses at every level of 
social change. Describing a typical conp, one writer 
s aid :
"it is relatively easy to stage a coup in 
most African countries. The capture of 
the Radio Station, the occupation of the 
centre cf the national communications 
network, and a fow key arrests are usually 
sufficient to paralyse any counter-moves.
Untrained in the use of weapons and lacking 
in arms anyway, the people are mere spectators 
who cannot intervene in any meaningful way.
Hence a group of officers can simply decide 
with minimum preparations to seize the 
government as redress for whatever grievances 
they may harbour, without bothering their heads 
too much on how the people will react. If 
government leaders have had a rough night or 
have beer careless and have slept with both 
eyes shut, the group succeeds, It has some­
times been that easy."
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This second model for de-colonisation does not include 
a coup d'etat. It is limited to a change brought 
about by a national liberation movement as an mani­
festation of a mass movement.
Ceylon's Independence fell under the first model
for de-colonisation. The initial difficulty perceived
in any attempt to bring about radical social, changes
was the Independence Constitution of 19^8, and the
entrenched clauses therein. In a later chapter the
political input in the enactment of the Constitution of
1972 will bo explored. The validity of that Constitution
was based upon a political fact rather than upon a
28preceding Act. As the Kodoswaran Case will show, had 
the .1.972 Constitution not been enacted, the possibility 
woul I have remained that the Official Language Act of 
.1956 might well have b 'Cii declared unconstitutional.
That would undoubtedly have led to socio-political 
problems of a considerable magnitude. The point must, 
therefore, be made, again, that section 29(2 )(b) and 
(c) of the Independence Constitution appear to have 
been desi gned to preserve the s t.a tus quo ante of the 
national elite, intact. Considering the pluralist 
society which Ceylon is, and the political fragmentations 
kept together with shaky alliances, in 19^6 , in 19^+8 and 
thereafter, it would have been Inconceivable that any 
government could have obtained the j majority to make a 
constitutional amendment out of a language change. This 
is aside from the fact that, in the opinion of the Privy 
Council, section 29 as a whole was "unalterable under 
the Constitution". It is, lierefore, important to view 
the Ceylonese path to social change as a possible 
alternative to both models for de-colonisation. Having 
first obtained Independence as an end result of de­
colonisation through constitutional means, the people of
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Ceylon proceeded to generate a new Constitution in 1972,
resting its validity upon the well known doctrine of 
30autochthony. The making of the 1972 Constitution will
be described in a later chapter. It must, however, be 
emphasised that autochthony in some respects resembles 
this second model for de-colonisation, namely it strives 
towards drawing in the masses from the periphery, into 
the whole process of constitution making.
II (b) The Language Legislation
The policy considerations which made the language 
charge necessary, must be first explained by way of a 
statistical analysis. Such an explanation must 
take into consideration the racial composition of the 
population and its relevance to English education in 
Sri Lanka. This should provide a useful back drop to 
a discussion of the social consequences of the Language 
leg i. s 1 at ion
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31TABLE X J
The Proportion of Slnlialosc and Tamils who wore 
able to speak 1.ho English Laiip.'ua^o in 19 33 •
Total Population 
of the two races
Persons who could 
speak English from 
each race,.^
Percentage of 
Persons who could 
speak English
Sinhalese: 5,616,705 
Tamil 884,703
307,570 
14 6,549
5.5 °/°
X 6.6 cJo
Note : 1*, The communal proportion between the Sinhalese
and the Tamils was 8 y/o Sinhalese to 11 °/o Tamil.
34
2 „ It is noted that 233,567 persons could
speak all three languages; namely Sinhala, 
English and Tamil. Taking the extreme 
assumption that this group of persons cculd 
be divided into Sinhalese and Tamils according 
to their respective numbers in the population, 
19^,531, more Sinhalese and 35,03b more Tamils 
could be considered as being able to sjjeak 
English. Adding; these estimates to the; figures 
in Table I, Table II is constructed.
TABLE II
Total Population Persons who could Percentage of
of the two races speak English from Persons who could
each race speak English
Sinhalese: 5,6.16,705 506,L01 9.0 °/o
Tamil: 884,703 181,585 20.5°/o
Note: I . The population of the Tamil speaking people in
these figures is limited to the Ceylon Tamils, 
thus excluding the Indian Tamil speaking 
people from these calculations.
2. Such ai; exclusion :i s justified upon the grounds 
that, the Indian Tamils being considered
'Stateless' at the time in question (in 1953) 
their participation in the Government and in the 
administration of Sri Lanka was denied to them. 
From their ranks, due to a clear lack of any 
formal education, no contribution was made to 
the formation of the national elite.
3. However, if the 974,098^ J Indian Tamils 
were taken into consideration then the 
figures in Table III would become relevant.
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TABLE III
Total Population 
of the two races
Persons who could 
speak English from 
each race
Percentage of 
Persons who could 
speak English
Sinhalese: 3 > 6l6 ,705 506,101 9.0 °/o
TamiIs: 1 ,838,801 181,585 9.7 c/o
(Indian TamiIs +
Ceylon Tan 1 i 1 s )
.. i______ ■ , - ...... ...  ■■■ 1...  -
Note: 1. The communal proportion between the
Sinhalese and Tam.ids, taking the Indian 
Tamils into consideration, in 19 53 > was 
66§-% Sinhalese is to 3 3yr% Tamil.
2. But the percentage of English education 
holds a 0 .7c/° increase in favour of the 
Tamil population, notwithstarding the fact 
that they are, in numbers, y  that of the 
S i 11] la. 1 e s e p e o p 1 e .
The foregoing statistics merely indicate the complexity 
of the economic issues underlying the language problem.
In simplistic terms while 309,101 Sinhalese speaking 
persons out of 5 > 6l6 ,705 were employable by the 
Government and in the professions, over 3 million 
Sinhalese remained 011 the periphery of the society in 
1953 • As for the Tamils there were .18.1,385 English 
speaking persons available for professional and other 
government employment out of a total Ceylon Tamil Population 
of 88^,703* Although the Government had, for obvious 
political reasons, stopped reporting the ethnic composition 
in Government, para—government and professional employments, 
the above figures indicate the contribution made by each 
ethnic group to the elite formation at the supra-struetu.ro 
of the Ceylonese society by the time the 1955 General 
Elect! ons were he3c .
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At Independence, on 4th February 1948, the
political skills of the first Prime Minister, Mr.
D . S. Senanayake, succeeded in attracting the somewhat
outspoken leader of the Tamil Congress Mr. G. G.
Ponnambalam, Q.C., into the Cabinet. At the time, Mr.
Ponnambalam was considered as one who could represent
the whole of the Tamil masses in the country. Therefore,
his acceptance of a ministerial appointment was regarded
cis a step towards bringing the two communities together.
However, this apparent point of amity lasted for no more
than a few months after Independence. On the 21st of
September, 1948, Parliament of Ceylon enacted The
3 6Ci t izonship Ac t . By sec11on 2 of that Ac t , Cey1on
citizenship was limited to two categories of persons. 
First, those by 'descent' and second by 'registration'.
By section 4 of the Act.
" ... a person born in Ceylon before the appointed
date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon 
by descent if —
(a) his father was born in Ceylon, or
(b) liis paternal grandfather and paternal „„ 
great grandfather were born in Ceylon."
Regarding those who were born outside Ceylon, the Act
required those who seek citizenship by descent to 
prove that:
(a) his father and paternal grandfather 
were born in Ceylon, or
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal q 
great grandfather were born in Ceylon."
The appointed day was the date of assent of the Act, 
which was 21st September 1948. The purpose of the Act 
seems clear. It was designed to dis-enfranchise nearly 
780,589^^ Indian Tamils on the Island. By 1948, the 
employment of Indian indentured labour had taken place
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for a period of nearly 70 years and some had actually 
been born in Ceylon. But f e w  among them were able to
establish, as required by the new Citizenship Act, that
40 4ltheir fathers, their paternal grandfathers or their
42paternal great-grandfathers had been born in Ceylon.
As for acquiring citizenship by registration, the Act 
gave a limited discretion to the Minister of Home 
Affairs to nominate no more than 25 persons each year
43for citizenship by registration. Such nominees were
required to be persons who had rendered distinguished
44
services in various spheres of public life or had been
"granted a Certificate of Naturalisation under the British
4 5Nationality Act" of 19-14. Into none of these categories
would the Indian Tamil - the Estate Coolie - fall. The
result, therefore, was, die isolation of the Indian
coolie population from the main stream of Ceylonese
society. Supportive of these policies was The Ceylon
(Parliamentary Elections) Amendment A c t ^  of 1949* By
section 3 of that Act, no person who was not a citizen
of Ceylon was qualified to have his name entered upon
the register of voters and this effectively disenfranchised
the Indian Tamil population of Ceylon. By 1953) therefore,
the battle lines were drawn between 1 ,858,801 Tamil
speaking persons comprising of both Indian Tamils and
Ceylon Tamils and 5»6l6,705 Sinhalese. Of these figures
974,098 Indi an Tamils had been rendered ’Stateless’ by
the Citizenship Act. The census report for 1953 indicated 
a 47that while 506,101 Sinhalese were literate in English 
48
181,585 Tamils were literate in English. When this 
49nearly 2:1 ratio of English literacy was matched 
50against a 6:1 ratio of the population distribution in 
favour of Sinhalese, the disproportionate representation 
by the Tamils at the centre of political and economic power 
became clearer to the mass of the Sinhalese people.
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The period leading up to the 1956 General Election was 
charged with emotional appeals for a 'Sinhala only1 policy 
and therefore one of the earlier legislations which emerged
51from that Administration was The Official Language Act" 
of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1956).
Section 2 of that Act declared, that "the Sinhala language 
shall he the one official language of Ceylon". A proviso 
to that section nominated the 31st day of December, i960, 
as the date up to which a minister may if he "considers 
it impracticable to commence the use of only the Sinhala 
language for any official purpose .
immediately on 
the coming into force of this Act, may continue the 
language or languages hitherto used for that purpose."
By sub-section (l) of' section 3 the minister was empowered 
to give "effect to the principles and provisions of this 
Act" through Regulations properly promulgated. Sub-section 
(2 ) ot that section subjected the Regulations to parliamentary 
control by defining a valid regulation as one which had 
received the approval of both " (die Senate and the House of 
Representatives", notification of such approval having 
been published in the Gazette. ft was left to each 
minif;'try to implement "the principles and the provisions 
of this Act".
The thrust of the 1956 Act was to bring about a 
change of the official language, within a period of time, 
through Regulations approved by Parliament. The change 
of the official language, therefore, in Sri Lanka, was a 
controlled one. ft was left to the Government of the
day to determine the extent to which the official language
change should occur. The Sinhalese community produced 
dissidents who thought that the Government of the day was
proceeding too tenderly and was therefore showing an
inadequate commitment to the language policy. The Tamil 
community saw in the language change the end to their
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culture and to their language. For there was no real
protection extended to them. These sharp political
controversies and extensive social unheavels culminated
52in the race riots of 1958. ~ The fears thrown up by
the Tamil minority were largely attributed to their
possible cultural demise. Such a view of the Official
Language Act helped the Tamil minority to evolve along
two lines. First, it bx-cught into focus a strong
cultural link with their comrades in Tamilnad, in
South India. Politically, this strengthened the hand of
the Federal Party, the political party which at the time
represented the interests of the Tamil speaking people
in Parliament. They were the pr:i ncipouL- and, at times,
the only opponents of the Act of 1958, in Parliament
and outside it* The Federal Party was. not only modelled
upon the Dravida Munnethra Kazhagam - (D.M.K.) - the
party that was in power at the time in the State of
Tam i 1 n.ad, in India, but also preached the universality
and the antiquity of the Tamil culture, thus furging a
strong cultural link with India. In a sense tire
Federal Party drew a large measure of support and
r> 3inspiration from the D.M.K.' ’ Secondly, by pushing 
forward the cultural argument , the Federal Party 
successfully downgraded the economic argument which 
may have been to their clear disadvantage. For in no 
sense could they have sustained their argument 
"for parity of status" with the Sinhalese, when the 
population distribution of 6:1 in the favour of the 
Sinhalese in 1953 had produced an English literacy 
ratio of 1:2 against them. It was, therefore, assumed 
to be sound policy to push the cultural argument 
forwards while leaving the economic argument in the 
background. The key political argument, during the 
Parliamentary debate of the Act of 1956 was summed up by 
Dr. Colvin P. DeSilva, from the Tamil point of view, 
when he said:
~ l h h ~
"They do not want to feo'l that their
language and through their language,
themselves are looked down upon as
an inferior section of the people of
this connt.ry. " „ .54
Replying at the cultural level of the debate, the 
Prlrne Minister said:
"Really this desire for making Sinhala 
alone the official language stems, believe 
me, from the fear that not merely would 
the Sinhalese, in fact, be reduced to a 
position of inferiority - the Sinhalese 
people - but their language and themselves 
be pressed back almost to a point of 
e 1 inri na tion. "
55
In fact the official language change was not only a 
change effected at the economic level or the cultural 
level of Ceylonese social organisation but also at 
the legal and at the political levels of the society. 
It is 011 these two levels of change that the emphasis 
was largely placed during the period following 1956. 
That in fact was the period during which the Ceylonese 
society underwent a profound social change.
111. Use of Language in the Judicial Administration 
oa the island.
(a ) The Consequences of the 1.956 Ac t
During the period immediately succeeding the
enactment of the Act of 1956, the judiciary found an
unprecedented freedom to utilise Dieir own understanding
of the Sinhala. language in judicial work, contributing
significantly to the administration of Justice at
that period of time. Until Panditha. Watugedera Amaraseoha
56Thero v. Tittagalle SasanatilLeko There came before the
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Court of Appeal in 1958, the Ceylon judiciary considered
themselves bound by a statement made by Bonser, C.J., in
.1895) declaring that English was the language of the law
and that Sinhala in Ceylon was an alien language. In
57Cornelius v. IJluwi tike , Do user, C.J. , delivering his
judgment in 1895 wrote:
"X notice that there is put up in the paper- 
book what purports to be a warrant of arrest, 
in what seems to be the Sinhalese language.
I do not understand under what authority 
process is issued in a foreign language, and 
the Solicitor—General who was in court at 
the argument professed himself unable to 
explain how this process came to be issued.
The language of our Courts is the English 
language, and it appears to me that serious 
doubts might arise as to the legality of an 
arrest upon a warrant in such for in. " r
This view of the Sinhala language had persisted well 
into the post—independence era, in its original 
stringent form. In as late as in 195t, the Court of
59Appeal in Francisco v. Swadeshi Industrial Worts Ltd., 
when invited to examine the correctness of a translation 
of a deed from the Sinhala language into English, 
refused to do so, relying on the view that English vas 
the language of the Courts, and Sinhala would bo 
considered as a foreign language requiring the aid of 
expert witnesses. In that dispute, the deed creating a 
Fidoicommis 1 un was in the Sinhala language. The Courts 
were relying on a certified English translation of the 
original deed to determine whether the owner had intended 
to create a Fideiconirnissum. Central to the issue, 
therefore, was the correctness of the translation. 
Notwithstanding this fact, Basnayake, J ., said:
--IA6-
"Learned Counsel invited us very earnestly 
to read the original Sinhalese deed which 
the learned judge appears to have examined.
He submitted that the word "Pradanakota" 
therein had not been properly rendered in 
... translation. We refused to accede to 
learned Counsel’s invitation as we were of 
opinion that it was not our proper function 
to attempt to translate the Sinhalese 
document. English is the language of Courts 
(Cornelius v . Uluwitike ( 189 5) 1 N .L .R . 248).
Whether a document in a language other than 
English has been correctly rendered into 
English is a question of fact."^
The learned judge, thereafter, advised the Counsel that 
the best way to proceed was to call in aid of expert 
witnesses to challenge tire translation. Noticeable 
hero is the sense of remoteness, which the use of a 
non-i indigenous language as the language of the law', 
could create in the minds of the body politic of a nation. 
Documents such as receipts, memoranda, wills, deeds and 
a whole list of writings required by the procedural or 
by the substantive law of the land would, undoubtedly, 
to a very large extent, be couched in the language of the 
masses. That very language, at least until 1956, be it 
Sinhala or Tamil, was regarded as a foreign language, 
requiring the submission to Court of an accurate trans­
lation of the document in question into the English 
language. In such an event the persons engaged in 
producing the translation would be considered as expert 
witnesses, thus making them liable for cross-examination. 
This method was followed in every case until 1956, when 
a document was not in the English language. However, in 
the Amaraseelia Case/'*- the Court of Appeal re-opened the 
two foregoing decisions in the light of the 1956 Act.
In the present dispute, the ’Vi h a rad 1~j i p a t h i 1 of 
Sangatissa-arama having died, his three pupils 
Aggawansa, Gnanawansa and the plaintiff were left 
behind as possible successors to the chief incumbency.
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Succession was according to the Sisyanu-Sissya rule.
in the meantime, the defendant Sasanatilleke too had
ingratiated himself into the temple. Having arrived
as a stranger, he had remained with the leave and
licence of the deceased * Vlharadhipathi. ' Subsequent
o 3
to the latter's death a meeting of the Dayal-:a -Sablia 
was held and at that meeting a 1 Resolution1 was 
proposed by Aggawansa and seconded by Gnariawansa, 
appointing the much junior Arnaraseeha to succeed the 
deceased priest as the Viliaradipathi. in these 
proceedings, concerning the plaintiffs* right of 
succession, a ccpy of the aforesaid 'Resolution1, 
duely translated into English and certified by an 
official translator was submitted to court. During the 
hearing of the appeal, the judges found a serious error 
in the translation. Similar to the deed creating the
6kF;i(I e ic«>11nn i ssum in Fran c i s c o * s Ca s e the 'Resolution' 
here was central to the decision. in the course of 
his learned judgment De Silva, J ., said:
"1 have examined the original 'Resolution' 
very carefully and I find that its English 
translation submitted to Court is clearly 
wrong. In Francisco v . Swedoshl Industrial 
Works, which was decided in the year 1951 
it was held that it was i. roug for a judge, 
in the case of a document in a language 
otiier than English, to import his own 
knowledge of the language in construing 
the document ... the passing of the 
Official Language Act, No. 33 of 195b has 
completely altered the position. Section 
2 of that Act provides that the Sinhala 
language shall be the one Official 
Language of Ceylon. Therefore now it is 
quite open to a Judge to construe a 
document drawn up in Sinhalese."^r
Thus substantial change of the views of the judiciary 
is to be welcomed. Within the first decade of the 
application of the Act of 19 5^ the judiciary found 
some procedural problems xn its implementation. in 
The Queen v . IlemapaLa, the accused, Hernapa.La, was 
tried before an English-speaking jury and was convicted 
of murder in i960. The mandatory sentence of death was 
passed upon him. At the commencement of the trial, the
presiding judge had asked the foreman of the jury
whether he and his colleagues understood Sinhala. The 
answer was that they did understand Sinhala, Then with 
the concurrence of the lawyers appearing both for the 
defence and for the prosecution, the trial was conducted 
in Sinhala; in that the addresses to the jury - by the 
two counsels - were delivered in Sinhala. The cross- 
examination was conducted in Sinhala, but an English
translation was made for the purposes of the Court's
record. The judges summing—up was, however, in English.
In his appeal against his conviction, Hemapala, took 
the point that the aforementioned procedure adopted at 
the trial was so irregular that his conviction constituted 
a miscarriage of justice. A ful1 bench of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal upheld that argument. basnayake, C .J ., 
observed:
"In regard to the argument of learned Counsel
for appellant based on the Official Language
Act 33 of 1956 it is sufficient to observe
that it is common ground that at the time of
the enactment of the Official Language Act
No. 33 of 1956 English was the language of
the Courts and at the relevant time — 15th
to 20th December i960 - it was lawful to use
English as the language of the Courts by
virtue of the notification published in
Gazette No. 10,9^9 of 7th July 1956. The
procedure adopted in the instant case gains
110 support from the Official Language Act.
The Language of the Courts Act No. 3 of 1961,
section 8 which proc eds on the assumption
that after 1st January, 1961, English is not
the language of the Courts, has no application
to the instant case as it was enacted after
the trial.'V- o (
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By a split decision^ the Court, while recognising the
irregularity of the procedure adopted at the trial
concluded that, that irregularity had not caused a
"substantial miscarriage of justice". The appeal, there-
69fore, was dismissed and the sentence of death was
70affirmed. Hemapala, appealed from that decision to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Privy 
Council agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeal of 
Ceylon that there had been a grave procedural error in 
the way that the trial was conducted. But their Lordships 
disagreed with that court in its finding that there had 
not been "a substantial miscarriage of justice".
Sbr K(?nrietly Gresson who tendered the advice of the Board 
wro te :
"The assurances given by the foreman of 
the Jury to which the other members of the 
Jury gave no more than a mute assent does 
not, in their Lordships opinion provide a 
sufficiently solid foundation on which to 
assume that all the members of the jury 
were in fact ab 1 e to undorstand and 
appreciate evidence not given in English 
and the addresses of the defence counsel.
Accordingly, their Lordships hold that, 
there having been a departure from the 
provisions of the code with no certainty 
that such a departure did not operate to 
the disadvantage of the appellant, the 
case must be regarded as one in which 
there lias been a miscarriage of justice 
necessitating the quashing of the 
c onvi c t i 011. " ^
Hemapala1 s tx’ial was held in December i960. Therefore, 
whether or not his conviction should stand depended on 
the application of the Official Languages Act to the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Ceylon. As the Privy Council 
obsex'ved:
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"The Criminal Procedure Code provides
(SI65B) that an accused person having
elected, he 'shall he bound by and may
*7 ? "be tried according to his election, 1 
subject however in all cases to the 
provisions of s. 224’. Section 224(l) 
enacts (2 ) that 'the jury shall be 
taken from the panel elected by the 
accused unless the Court otherwise 
directs.' There was no direction 
otherwise."
Both the Court of Criminal Appeal a n d  the Privy Council
were ad idem in their view I;hat the Official Language
Act had not altered the pro-vis ions of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The Court in Ceylon founded that
belief upon a Gazette notification. The Privy Council
rested Iheir decision on the seriousness of the procedural
error as evidenced from the aforementioned passage from
Sir Kenneth's judgment. Subsequently in 1964, at the
74} 1 ear 111 g o f The Queen v . l/iyamrgo and Others , three
judges at a Trial-at-the—Bar were invited to rule on 
the vaI Ldity of an Act of Parliament drafted in the 
English 1anguage and passed into law in 1961.
Eornruido, J . , in the course of his judgment said:
"if then it is decided that laws must bo 
enacted in Sinhala it may well be that a 
Constitutional amendment passed in 
accordance with section 29(4) will be 
necessary. ... And even if it can be
s aid tha t section 2 o f the 0 f i c i a 1 
Language Act manifests some intention 
that Acts of Parliament must bo written 
in Sinhala, Parliament has the undoubted 
power to legislate inconsistently with 
the provisions of pre-existing legislation.
We must hold therefore that at the very 
least in the case of all Acts enacted after 
1st January 1961 in English, Parliament has 
merely exercised its right to override any 
such intention as to the language of the 
law which may have been entertained at the 
time of the passing of the Official 
Language Ac t ."  ^^
-151-
Not until 1972 did the legislations concerned with 
effecting a change in the Official Language become 
a Constitutional provision. That was under the
75Constitution of 1972. However, until then, the
Official Language Act required some further legislative
buttressing. Soon after Hemapala1s trial was concluded
in 1960,^ the legislature passed the Language of the
77Courts Act, of 1961. By section 2 of the Act, the
Minister of Justice was empowered to determine and
declare the Courts in which Sinhala shall be used for
the purposes of pleadings and of records. Section 3
required that such pleadings or records shall be
translated into English; "where a judge of a court to
which an Order under section 2 applies is unable to
read and understand any pleadings in Sinhala which are
7 8filed on record." Section h deals with certain changes
in the procedure applicable in courts ivhere a language 
change had occurred. Of particular significance is 
section 4(l)(a). By that sub-section, "every judgment, 
decree, order or direction of a Court shall be written 
in Sinhala or English, and, if written in English, 
shall be accompanied by a Sinhala translation thereof". 
The rest of section h, together with sections 6 and 7> 
make certain functional changes in the Civil Procedure, 
in the Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Codes of the 
Island. Section 5 gives the Minister of Justice a power 
to make by order published in the Gazette such amendments 
or modifications of any written Law as may be necessary 
for the implementation of the language change in the
79Courts. Under this Act, once the Minister of Justice 
directs that a particular court shall, under section 2, 
conduct its pleadings and maintain its records in the 
Sinhala language, the amendments to the Criminal
S 0Procedure Code and the Evidence Code made by this Act, 
shall enable such proceedings to be conducted in that 
language. By section 2, the Minister of Justice is
required to satisfy himself that: "the court is
provided with the necessary staff and equipment for
recording in Sinhala, the proceedings in that court and
that it is practicable so to do", before he may
designate a court as one in which the proceedings should
be carried out in Sinhala. After' 1961, an uncertain
situation as the one that occurred in the Heruapala Case
is unlikely to arise. However, in certain proceedings
the court may adopt the Sinhala language, in others the
court may still be compelled to carry on in English,
which might create a situation somewhat analogous to
that which occurred in the trial of Hemapala.
However, in 1963, Fawzia Begum v. The Officer in
SiCharge of the Slave Island Pol .Ice Station, the
Supreme Court was invited to quash an order for the 
deportation of an Alien made under the Immigrants and 
Emmigrants Act, in the English language. Pronouncing
O OO  iihis judgment a few days after the decision at the
8 3Trial-at- the-Bar in Liya n ago , Sri Skaoda Pa.jaSi, J. ,
expressed the view that:
"The Immigrants and Emmi gran t;s Act is in the 
English language. It is an Act anterior in 
time to the Official Language Act. Tire latter 
Act does not purport to amend any of the 
provisions of the former. The problem is in 
reality one of interpreting an enactment which 
is in English. Therefore, I find it difficult 
to accept the proposition that an order under 
an Act in the English language would be invalid 
if made in that language. Besides, it cannot 
be said that the corpus lias been prejudiced in 
any manner by an order made in English, a 
universal language, with which he is more 
likely to be acquainted than Sinhala. In my 
view, therefore, the last objection fails.
85The fact that the Official Language Act did not 
constitute a constitutional amendment left its
validity in doubt. The Courts, therefore, were showing
a degree of reluctance to recognise the social and 
political significance of the enactment. The Courts 
were uncertain as to the constitutional validity of 
the enactment. Wherever possible the judges were 
attempting to avoid the implications of the Act and 
the foregoing case law appear to support that view. 
However, in Ivodeswaran v. A-G the constitutional 
validity of the Act of 1956 was raised, for the first 
time, in 1967.
Ivodeswaran, was appointed an officer of the
General Clerical Service on 1st November, 1952. He
was promoted on 1st October, 1959 to the Executive
clerical class according to the results obtained at
a competitive examination. At that examination the
choice of Sinhala or Tamil, as a subject for the
language paper was made compulsory. Ivodeswaran,
being a Tamil, sat for the Tamil language examination
paper and passed in it. On the 4th November, 196.1, a
new Treasury Circular No. 56O provided, that all
officers of the Executive Clerical Class must pass a
proficiency test in Sinhala. It was declared that
failure to pass in such an examination would result
in the suspension of all salary incre S . Ivodeswaran
failed to sit for the examination which fell due on
1st April, 1962. His salary incre VY|<u\t were, therefore
suspended. Ivodeswaran, sought in the present action a
declaration that the Treasury Circular No. 560 of 4th
November, 1961 was unreasonable and/or illegal and was
not binding upon him. It was argued that the directives
of the Treasury Circular were based upon the provisions
of the Official Language Act of 1956. It was further
argued that the Official Language Act was ultra vires 
8 7section 29 of the Constitution and therefore the
Treasury Circular was in itself null and void and of no
effect. The central issue therefore, was the Constitutional
validity of the Official Language Act. The District 
8 8Judge of Colombo, at first instance gave judgment for 
Kodosvaran. He was clearly of opinion that the Official 
Language Act, not being in itself a Constitutional 
amendment was invalid. For, it was ultra vires the powers 
of the Ceylon Parliament under section 29 of the
89Constitution. The Attorney General appealed against
that decision. Being an Appeal from the District Court,
the appeal was heard before two judges. Avoiding the
90issue of constitutionality of the Act of 1956, the 
Court; proceeded to give judgment against Ivodeswaran on 
the grounds that, he being a servant of the Crown, had no 
locus standi in judicium in an action against his employer 
for his wages. Allowing the Crown's appeal, Fernando,
C . J . , s a i d :
"I have already reached the conclusion that 
under our Lawr a public servant lias 110 right 
to sue for his wages." _
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Xt was evident that the Court had taken a deliberate
decision to avoid deciding the question of constitutionality 
92of the Act. Relying on American and Indian authorities, 
the learned Chief Justice declared that if it is at all 
possible to avoid making decisions on the constitutional 
validity of legislations, without broaching the official
93oath of a judge, judges must avoid making such decisions. 
After restating the Court's reluctance to rule on the 
constitutionality of the Act, it declared that the
94learned District Judge's decision on that point, at
95first instance, was not binding. It is lamentable
that the court should take such a negative position in
this matter, particularly, in view of the socio-political
implications of the legislation in question. The fact
96that the issue of constitutionality was argued fully
before the court should have been considered as a 
sufficient reason to require the court to make a 
decision on that ground. If the Bench felt inadequate 
to make such a decision as constituted, 'the fallibility 
of the human judgment' could well have been supplanted 
by inviting three of their learn d Brothers to constitute 
a full Bench of the Supreme Court. It is tempting to 
suggest, with respect, that the Bench was equally 
threatened with the changes indicated, as a consequence 
of the Official Language Act of 1956 and therefore felt 
that tiro best deci. ion in the circumstances was to make 
no decision, upon the constitutional validity of the change, 
thus leaving the matter* by and large, unresolved.
97ivodeswaran appealed to the Privy Council. The
Privy Council decided to hear the case on a preliminary 
point of law as to whether a servant of the Crown has a 
right of action against his employer, the Crown, for 
wages. LimitLng the hearing to this issue, Lord Diplock 
wrote :
"The appellant's action, if it lies at all, 
thus raises issues of the highest Constitu­
tional importance, all of which wore argued 
before the District Judge. There is however 
a preliminary issue, viz. whether a civil 
servant has any right of action against the 
Crown for salary due in respect of services 
which tie has rendered. If, as the Attorney- 
General contends, there is no such right of 
action, the broader constitutional issues as 
to the validity of the Official Language 
Act ... fails in limine". n---------- 98
Thus limiting the hearing to the point decided by the 
Divisional Court in Ceylon, the Privy Council allowed 
the appeal 011 the grounds that; in Ceylon there was 
the Roman-Dutch Common Law which - unlike the English 
Law - recognised a right in a servant of the Crown 
to sue for his wages. With reference to the 
Constitutional matter, Lord Diplock wrote:
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"There are the other important constitutional 
issues to be decided upon which neither the 
Supreme Court nor their Lordships have heard
argument. As already indicated, their Lord­
ships would think it inappropriate to enter 
upon any of these matters without the benefits 
of the considered opinion of the Supreme Court 
of Ceylon thereon. They accordingly express 
no opinion upon any of the other issues as to 
the constitutionality of the Official Language 
Act ... The case should be remitted to the 
Supreme Court for further consideration of 
these other issues ... ." q Cj
It is incorrect to say that the constitutionality of
the Act was not argued before the Supreme Court of
Ceylon. The learned Chief Justice who gave the judgment
of that Court made some reference to that aspect of the
Counsel's argument«. However, it is correct that the
Supreme Court did not express a view on that aspect of
the case. Tha Privy Council rendered their advice to
Her Majesty on the 11th December, 1 9 6 9 , and five months
later, the Government, at the time of the decision
was defeated at the General Elections of 1970. The new 
102Government assumed office in June, 1970, with a 
mandate to change the 19^+8 Constitution. As early as 
in July, 1970, a Constituent Assembly was created for 
that purpose and a new Constitution emerged in 1972.
101These matters shall be considered in a later chapter.
The Supreme Court to which the Privy Council remitted 
the Ivodeswaran dispute for further consideration, delayed 
their hearings until the new Constitution became effective, 
in May, 1972. Uncertain as to the provisions of the 
proposed Constitution the Supreme Court initially began 
postponing the hearing of the dispute. Later, when it 
became clearer that the new Constitution was likely to 
declare Sinhala as the Official Language, the interest 
in hearing the central issue in the dispute began to dissipate.
It is interesting to note that the very thoughts behind 
the f ramers of the Constitution of 19^8 was to render a 
substantial constitutional protection to the minorities. 
The ambit of section 29 may be determined in that light. 
But the end result of Kodeswarati appears to have been 
such that the initial hopes and aspirations of the 
Soulbury Commissioners must now appear to have been 
frustrated, by overwhelming political and sociological 
considerations. The 1972 Constitution, by Article 7> 
de c1a re d , that:
"The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall
be Sinhala as provided by the Official
Language Act, No. 33 of 1956."
By Article 9(l) o f the Cons 111 ut i on, a11 1aws were 
required to be enacted in Sinhala. But by sub-section 
(2 ) of that Article, the Government was required to 
produce a Tamil translation of every law made under that 
Constitution. Article 10 made provisions to have laws 
and subordinate legislations existing immediately before 
the commencement of the 1972 Constitution translated 
into Sinhala. When such translations were laid before 
the National State Assembly and were gazetted, the 
Sinhala version of the law was deemed to have superceded
104the corresponding law in the Lnglish language.
Article 11(l) of the Constitution declared 'Sinhala' 
as the language of the Courts throughout the Island, 
thus requiring such Courts to keep: "their records,
including pleadings, proceedings, judgments, orders 
and records of all judicial and ministerial Acts" in 
Sinhala. These provisions resolved the problems raised 
in Hemapala v. The Queen,  ^ The Queen v. Liyanage^ ^  
and F; 1 wzia Begum v . The Officer in Charge of Slave Island 
Police Statlon^ ^  to 
made. However, by a 
Consti tut ion:
which reference has previously been 
proviso to Article l.l(l), the
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"Provided that the National State Assembly 
may, by or under its law, provide otherwise 
in the case of institutions exercising 
original jurisdiction in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces ...
It is for the provision of special rules particularly 
for the Courts in the Tamil speaking areas, that the 
Legislature passed The Language of the Courts (Special
1 a O
Provisions) Law of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
the 1973 Law). The application of the 1973 Law was
limited to the Northern and Eastern administrative 
109provinces. By section 3» tho Minister of Justice
may "direct the Court, tribunal, institution or Board
... that their records including pleadings, proceedings,
judgments, orders and records of all judicial and
ministerial Acts shall be in Tamil". The Act, however,
makes provisions to have such matters as those that
are dealt with in Tamil translated and recorded in
Sinhala.' *^  The Act does not prohibit or deny the right
to "submit their pleadings, applications, motions and
petitions in Sinhala and participate in the proceedings 
111in Sinhala." In such an event, however, a Tamil
translation was required to hi? made and recorded in the 
L L2Court. Notwithstanding these concessions made to
the Tamil language, the Act required a record to be 
prepared in Sinhala for the purposes of providing a
113basis for an Appeal to a higher Court. Under the
11AAdministration of Justice Law of 1973> appellate
115jurisdiction was left exclusively to the Supreme Court 
which was required to sit in the Capital City of Colombo,
1 -| ^  1 ~| rj
in the Western Province. The 1973 Law has no
application to courts sitting in the Western Province 
and therefore, the absolute need to have a record of 
the trial court proceedings in Sinhala as the basis for 
the appeal became implicit. Again, under the 1973 Law, 
section k, required that a translation of the proceedings
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in a court to 'oJhich the Law'*' * ^  applies, should be made
available 'in Sinhala' so that "every party, applicant
judge, juryman or member of a tribunal not conversant
with the language used in the Court", namely Tamil,
could understand and follow the proceedings. This
particular provision makes it possible to have 'Sinhala'
speaking judges preside over cases in the North and
Eastern provinces. However, the absence of similar
provisions requiring that pleadings etc., which may be
in Sinhala are translated into Tamil in Courts situated
outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces, indicate
that all judges must principally have a working knowledge
of Sinhala. Courts situated outside the Northern and
Eastern Provinces fall under the principal provisions of
Article 1 I (.1 ) * *  ^ and as such fall under the rule that
'Sinhala is the language of the Courts'. In such courts,
as a practical measure, the Tamil judges rely largely on
translations provided by the Official interpreters of
the Courts. This unnecessarily slows down the proceedings
causing great delays and considerable expense to the
1 1 1 igati is . The prac tica 1 d i f f i.cul t; Les which these
complicated arrangements necessarily raised have been
I 20well documented. The cost of litigation has accordingly
increased. In addition, administrative delays, inconvenience 
to the litigants and many uncertainties have affected the 
administration of Justice. For decisions have often been 
rendered upon technical points of procedure; e.g., the 
absence of a proper translation or the fact that the 
pleadings are in the wrong language. Decisions on the 
questions of substance have thus been pushed aside.
Adopting the enabling provisions similar to those 
found in the Official Language Act of 1956, the Law 
of 1973 has empowered the Minister to give "effect to
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the principles and provisions of the law" through 
121Regulations. These Regulations are required to he
approved by the National State Assembly and notification
of such approval was required to be published in the
122Government Gazette before they became effective.
The Northern and the Eastern Provinces of Sri 
Lanka are inhabited by nearly 85 per cent of the total 
Tamil population 011 the Island. Being a fairly inhospi­
table terrain calling for hard and sustained work, a 
large percentage of Tamils have received no more than 
a vernacular education. The time and the opportunity 
required for the learning of a second language, such as 
Sinhala, with a distinctly different script to that of 
Tarn!1., was recognised as a very difficult task. The 
social upheaval and the gross injustice that the 
inhabitants may suffer was thought to exceed the 
importance of implementing the language policy of a 
government representing largely the interests of the 
majority ethnic group — the Sinhalese. Besides, some
kind of palliation was thought necessary to bring about
123some quantum of* harmony between the two races that
inhabited the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the 
Island. It must, however, be emphasised that throughout 
the British Colonial period and right up to 1956 
(and even thereafter), the language of the courts across 
the Island was English. But neither the Colonial 
Administration nor the post-independent governments at 
any time recognise the difficulties that may have 
resulted in using the English language as the language 
of the Courts in the Northern and in the Eastern Provinces. 
The Tamil speaking people were content on having their 
legal disputes handled by the English speaking lawyering 
class, as their agents. However, the present problem 
appears to be, to a large measure, political. And the 
government, therefore, proposed to introduce a political
1 2 5solution. The Law of 1973 was thus conceived.
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I IX (b ) 'The Reasonable Use of Tamil 1 Legislation.
As a deliberate policy of government the 
12 5
Administration committed itself at the time of
passing the Official Language Act in 1956 to effectuate
1 p
"the reasonable use of Tamil". Sections 3 and 4 of
the 119’73 Law* was designed partly to achieve that end 
within the 'Sinhala only' framework, which represented 
the overall language policy for the nation. The policy 
concerning the reasonable use of Tamil was somewhat 
hastily conceived. Although the government had, at the 
time of passing the Official Language Act in 1956, 
given assurances that an Act providing for the reasonable 
use of Tamil would be enacted, very soon, nothing along 
these lines had been introduced even as late as the 
middle of 1958. After the prorogation of the second 
session of the third Parliament of independent Ceylon, 
on 15th May, 1958, the members of Parliament went back 
to their respective constituencies. Some time between 
that date and 2nd June, emotive reasons appear to have 
arisen sparking off a communal conflagration between 
the two ethnic communities - the Sinhalese and the Tamils. 
These language riots of June, 1958, were the first such 
communal conflicts on the Island that evolved into
hostili ties, ever since the Buddhist—Muslim riots of
T_ P 71915* That was almost a generation ago and the
present amity between those two races^^ had helped to
erase those unhappy memories from their collective minds.
Therefore, the language riots of 1958 left the politicians
and the people shocked, saddened and split. The rioting
had reached such a level by 4th June, 1958, that the
government was compelled to declare a State of Emergency
and call out the Army to restore order. Nearly 2,000 
129lives are reported to have been lost during that
brief but sharp crisis. Historians, Journalists and
1 30political analysts have all pointed their finger
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at the government1s failure to carry out the assurances
it had given to the Tamil people during the debate of
The Official Language Bill, that provision would be
made for the 'reasonable use of Tamil'. The failure
to articulate these uses in legislative terms had
fanned the fires of communal discord, in an atmosphere
of deepening suspicion and a feeling of acute hopelessness
among the Tamil-speaking people. It is against this
background and with a feeling of guilt that the government
proposed the Tamil language (Special Provisions) Bill of 
1311958. The government moved the second reading of this
Bill on 5 tli August, 1958 (almost two months after the 
commencement of the communal riots). This was during 
the continuation of the State of Emergency under which 
the members of Parliament representing the Tamil speaking 
areas were in detention. Recognising these conditions 
under which the Bill was being introduced, the opposition 
made a decision to boycott the proceedings and take no 
part in the vote, by absenting themselves from Parliament.
132Speaking on behalf of the opposition, Mr. M. P. Banda 
of the United National Party declared, that:
"The United National Party protests against 
the lion. Prime Minister's move to rush 
through Parliament the Bill for the reason­
able use of Tamil in the existing State of 
Emergency, under which members of the public 
are detained in custody end important sections 
of Hon. Members of both Houses are prevented 
from attending Parliament and the public as 
well as political parties are precluded from 
expressing their views. Under these circum­
stances which would be tantamount to a 
travesty of democracy, the U.N.P. refuse to 
participate in this debate which involves 
issues so vita] to the ration."
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leaders of the Lanka Samasam-a ja Party, 
•ress1^  and cf the Janatha Samaji Pera
the Tamil
136 each
repeated their decision not to participate in the detate
The members of the Communist Party made no appearance
during the debate. The Bill was passed on the 6th
August, 1958 with •’46 in favour and three against. The
foregoing circumstances induced the government to do
what it cculd to provide- the best possible terms for
the Tamils within the framework of a Sinhala only policy
In a sense, had the circumstances been different, the
1 37concessions, if any, made to the Tamils in 1938 ' would
have had a more limited ambit. Principally, the .1938
Act, clarifies the position of Tamil, within the frame- 
L 3 3work of the 1956 legislation, in four specific areas.
First, Education . By sub-sec tion (1.) of section 2
of the Act, Tamil pupils in government schools or
government assisted schools were given the right to
bo instructed in Tamil. This provision was restricted
to government or government assisted schools. The
provisions of this sub—section did not apply to
unaided schools. But af ter 1 96J , as it was shown.
13 c)
earlier, the government acquired the necessary legal
L k  0machinery to introduce the intent and effect of the
foregoing sub-section into those schools^ 1 as well. 
Provision was made in the 1958 Act, for a limited forrc
section 2 of the Act:
"When the Sinhala language is made a medium 
of instruction in the University of Ceylon; 
the Tamil Language shod 1 . be made a
medium of instruction for those students 
who have, prior to their admission to the 
University, received their education, through 
the medium of the Tamil Language."
of University education in Tamil, By sub-section
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Those provisions appeared to strike at the foundations 
of' the language policy. For the; ' Sinhala-only1 policy 
was conceived as an answer to the Tamil representation 
in the clite-.formation at the centre. By making it 
possible now for the Tamil-speaking people to compete 
in their own language, the government was in fact 
chartering a different route to the; top. Further, it 
could be contended that, while the Tamils were formerly 
competing with the Sinhalese for a proficiency in 
English as a means towards achieving a position among 
the country's elite, now they were competing with none 
ex c ept th emseives.
lit a survey undertaken by the Sri Lanka Ministry
1 7 2 - 17 3of Foreign Affairs in 197b, the government
com nonted on the particular effect of its language
policy after (.wo decades. The government's White Paper
first introduced the racial composition of the two
major races in this way:
"In this connection it will be relevant to
examine the statistics . keeping in
mind that the Sinhalese constitute 71 «9°i° 
of the population and the Tamils 20.3d 
(the Sri Lanka Tamils constitute 11,1 °/c 
and the Indian Tamils 9*7^) .|/(
Having made that point, the White Paper proceeded to
3 7 5present some important statistical data. It is
important to realise that the ratio of Sinhalese to 
Tamils, in 1976 was one of 6.5:1. With this communal 
composition in mind, it. is necessary to peruse the 
foil owlng statis11c s :
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1 4 GTABLE IV
Admissions to the University
Faculty
Total
Admission
1970/71
Sinhala Percentage Tamil Percentage
En^Lneering 152 S3 55.9 62 40.7
Medicine 247 132 53a 101 40.8
Sciences 556 362 65.3 174 31.1
Faculty
To t a 1 
Admission
1971/72 
Si nil. a la Percentage Tamil Percentage
Engine c* ri jig 274 171 61.7 95 31
Medicine 221 124 56 87 39 -4
Sciences 6o4 385 63.9 207 34.2
Faculty
Total
Admission
1972/73
Sinhala Percentage Tami 1 Percen fcage
Enginee ring 2 75 201 76.7 67 33.3
Medicine 255 130 58*8 94 37.6
Sciences 6;4 7 hi12 68.3 186 28.7
Faculty
Total 
Admissjon
1973/7't
Sinhala Percentage Tamil Percentage
Engince ning 2S3 223 78.7 46 16.1
Medicine 263 184 70 68 25.8
Sciences 857 631 75.5 180 21
197^/75
Faculty
Total
.Admission Sinhala Percentage Ta mil Percentage
Engineering 289 271 83.7 77 17.1
Medicine 277 193 78.9 73 17.7
Sciences 882 663 73 187 21
From those statistics, it can be noticed that until the
academic year 1973/77 the Tamil percentage Intake into
the University had Far exceeded their communal representation
oF 20. y/o „ Since 1977/73 the intake appears to have begun
to approach their communal composition. This is a result
i 7 7oF a policy of ’Standardisation' which the government
intx’oduced in 1977 to prevent the over-representation oF
the Tamil, speaking people in the country's aFfairs. Since
17 Sthe change of government in 1977? the ’Standardisation'
17 9prrnciplo has now been replaced by a direct entry method.
The Figures for the academic )ear 1977/78 have not. yet
been made available. However, the government lias detected
some diff i.cu Lties in the present system of admission due
to over1—marking oF Tamil language papers by Tamil 
3 90examiners. Aside From those technical diFficulties,
it is conceivable that the admission pattern shown in 
the years leading up to and including 1973/77 may now 
have again begun to re—emerge„ The government's White 
Paper Further observed that:
"Prior to the granting of Independence in 
197 8 , the Tamils had an advantage over the 
Sinhalese in securing admissions to the State 
Services, because educational facilities were 
more readily available to them, as a result 
oF a number of' missionary schools being set 
up in the Northern Province. With the 
granting oF Independence and developing oF 
educational Facilities in the non—Tamil areas, 
it was to 1)0 expected that this advantageous 
position that they' occupied would steadily erode.
Over the years the intake of Sinhalese into the 
State-; sector lias been comparatively increasing.
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In spite of this reversal of trends tie 
proportion of Tamils to Sinhalese in the 
State sector is still high. Statistics 
of the number of Sinhalese and Tamils in 
the larger Government departments will 
bear this out.1'1 3 del
The White Papier thereafter presented some further
1 33statistical data which concerned employment. It
is necessary to comment that the reason for the
disparity noted in the White Paper may rest upon the
1 5?
provisions of the 1938 Act. As it has been said
earlier, the Tamil population can now compete with 
the Sinhalese in their own language, which necessarily 
provides a. larger horizon for the development of the 
Tarrtl J—speaking people than ever before . The White 
Paper produces the following figures, which must be 
road against the background that the Tamil, Sinhalese 
rat j o i s one of 1 : 6 .3 -
.Employment Sta t i s ties
Ratio of
Employment Sinhalese Tamils Tamils to
Sinhalese
Gov e:inment Ole ric a 1 Servi c o 18,477 2,634 1:7
Sri Lanka Administrative
Service 1,039 192 1:6
Posts and Telecommunications
Staff Officers: 124 63 1:2
C1ori ca1 Grades: 1,031 173 1:6
Railway
Staff Officers: 416 193 1 :2
Clerical Grades: 838 173 1:4-1
Labour
Staff Officers: 61 31 1:2
Labour Officers; 163 32 1:3
Accoiin t an t s Sorvi c o 198 179 1:1
Co rporation Sector 1,269 363 1 • 3l-
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o J 5^A further* analysis of the 195° legislation "' should
support the view that the aims and purposes of the
Official Language Act of 1.956 have been thwarted by
the provisions of the 1958 Act. The second aspect
of the .1.958 Act was to declare the Tamil Language as
a medium of examination for admission to (he Public 
1 55Senv:i ce . Under this provision a person educated
through the medium of the Tamil language became 
entitled to be examined in Tamil, provided that he 
possessed a sufficient knowledge in the Sinhala language
J 56at the time of the examination. If he v;as unable to
satisfy this latter requirement, then, as In 
Kodcswa ro:i * s Laso, it would be sufficlent if he could 
acquire a knowledge in Sinhala, within a reasonable
1 C"7
time after his appointment. By Regulations made
under section 6 of the Act, Sinhala—sopaking public 
servants were required to acquire a proficiency i.n 
Tamil, within a reasonable time after their appointment.
In both cases, the Kegulat Lons empowered the Treasury 
Board to suspend salary incre r p ± q , in the event where 
a public servant had failed to gain this proficiency.
Those pruvisi ons again require the same comment 
as the one made under education. The statistical 
data"''*' provide a graphic picture of the results 
achieved through the implementation of those provisions.
A Tamil speaking person could now have his entire 
education - Primary, Secondary and University Education — 
in Tamil and finally enter the government service by 
passing the examination also in Tamil. The only effective 
point of contact he has wit]' a Sinhalese is when the 
marks obtained are considered for selection. Recent 
recriminations and ministerial complaints have been 
voiced in the way the Tamil examination papers are marked.
The complaint is voiced that the Tamil candidates have,
unfairly obtained, very high grades, thus subverting
the opportunities of the Sinhalese student to achieve
1 59a competitive success. ' This again appears to be
the resultant of sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1958.
Third, the Act of 1958, prescribed the use of
The Tamil language for Corrospondorioo. The wording of 
160section four originally resulted in considerable
confusion. However, by Regulations subsequently
promulgated, the government recognised the right of a
citizen to correspond in Tamil both at the local level
and at the level cf the Central Government, The right
to correspond at the local level was limited to the
Northern and the Eastern Provinces of the Island where
the majority of the population were Tamils. Those
Regulations clarifying the rather confused phraseology
of section 5 has helped, to lessen the adverse impact
of the Official Language Act, considerably.
Fo in * 111 , th o Ac t ponni is the- use of tin* Tamil
Language for prescribed adnitii sir.-tt.Lve purposes in the
Northern and in the Sas torji frov i re.es . ^ Again, by
Regulations subsequently promulgated, Tamil became
the language of the local government in the Northern
and in the Eastern provinces of Ceylon.
The total effect of the Id58 Act; was to provide
a new basis for elite formation while keeping the two
ethnic groups linguistically apart. This has
considerably helped the minority Tamil community, as
lofthe figures now indicate; because the yard stick
for development used by the system was no longer that
i 6 3of an alien language, but that of the mother tongue 
of each community, in each case. The 1958 Act was 
intended to supplement the effective implementation 
of the 1956 Act, But in fact what it did was to
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negate the social directions which wore earmarked, as 
tlio goals to be achieved by the "Sinhala only" policy' 
under that Act. As it has been Mentioned earlier, 
the Act was debated in the total absence of an opposition 
and in great haste*. The only point of controversy 
raised during the debate was by a Muslim member of
164Parliament. His anxiety was based on the fear that
Muslims, who traditionally stood between the two 
communities, some learning Tamil and others learning 
Sinhala - depending on their geographic location - 
would now be compelled to take a position in this 
language debate. The Prime Minister explained the 
position of' the Muslims under the Act of 1 9 1  n this 
w ayr:
"This is a matter we can look into, if 
necessary, at the Committee' stage. The 
real position is that we are dealing in 
t his 13ill with the TamiIs. As f ar as 
the Muslims are concerned, they have the 
right ilow to^bp educated in any of the 
three media. :J It is my sincere hope 
that the Muslims in future would mostly 
prefer to be educated in the language 
medium of the majority of the people, 
which is the official language ... 
although the position of the Muslims is 
not particularly dealt with by this Bill, 
they will not be prejudiced by this Bill." ^
The position of the Muslins was never determined with
any precision. They continued to gain their education
in the English medium as did those whose mother tongue
1 67was neither Sinhala nor Tamil.
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Ill (c ) The Consequences — Social, Political and Legal
The relevance of a change in the official language
in a Third i/or.ld country must be seen as a catalyst for
massive social changes. The cultural underpinnings of
a language together with its emotive embodiment subscribes
in no small way to a modulated societal movement. In
Ceylon, associated with the language change is the culture
of a particular ethnic group - the Sinhalese — and
therefore, the changes in the Island's social formations
were controlled and directed towards achieving goals and
aspirations peculiar to that ethnic group. The process
of modulated change is an jnternaliaed fact and is
independent of other recognised social stimuli. In
Ceylon, the resulting changes in the existing social
formations made it necessary to introduce changes at the
institutional level of the legal system, so that out of
the new language policy would evolve a new legal tradition
Towards this end, since 197 0, a number of changes were
introduced to legal Institutions: the Language of the
1 68Courts Act, the introduction of the n e w  court
. , 169 P ,, , p  . .I7Ostructure, the merger 01 the Legal profession and
17 Lthe Introduction of a new system of criminal and
1 72civil procedures.
Particularly, relevant to language and its 
relationship with low is the problem of communication 
of rules. In every human society there is a centre and 
a periphery. The centre denotes the location of the 
source of legislative, executive and judicial power, 
while the periphery denotes those who are governed by' 
the rules made at the centre. The relat Loosliip between 
the centre and the periphery prophesies the nature and 
the character of the government :i n any given human society'
Where the gap between the centre and the periphery is 
bridged, in a way that the periphery as a whole is 
drawn into the process cf government, upon a 
participatory role, political scientists predict good 
government and therefore peace and tranquility for 
that territorial ur.it. But many territorial units 
adopt the view that links between the centre and the 
periphery should remain remote end restricted, A 
most effective way of maintaining the gap between the 
two is by' having the language of the law and of 
administration different from the one used by those 
who languish at the periphery. As a corollary to that 
view the suggestion is made that the governed need know 
no more than that there are laws, that there are special 
groups of persons whose expertise is to interpret them 
for a fee and that they could be found in special places 
recognised by the State apparatus, However, in recent 
times, much has boon written* ^  on the need for 
communicating- more extensively I o the periphery, with a 
view to drawing them in, as participants in the whole 
process of government. Accordj ig to this view, it is 
suggested, that the mobilisation of the periphery is a 
pre-requisite not only to the narrow vision of good 
government, but to the broader resultant of development. 
Emphasising this pro—requisite, Soidmar wrole:
"Norms of development are, by definition, 
rules prescribing new way of doing things.
They pia inly do not match the myth that law 
merely embalms the customs of the people, 
if the norms of development did no more 
than that, law and the State could not 
affirmatively direct change. As a result, 
it is not enough for government to make the 
Lav; cognoscible. Government must ensure 
that role—occupants know the Law7 and know 
what is expected of them. The rules 
received ... however, purport to do no 
more thar make the law available to those 
who search, for it." .
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Against the background tliat a legal language change 
was principally designed to bridge the centre with 
tlie periphery it may be suggested that the changes 
described in this chapter facilitated the evolution 
of a society with a commitment to upholding nationalist 
aspirations rather than emulating the culture arid the 
tradi tior.s of a foreign race. The l anguage change by 
itself did not alter the existing social formations, 
but it merely provided the momentum arid the direction 
for that change. The relevance of the legal system 
to this process is that it provides the necessary 
Institutional support to regulate and direct the 
momentum of the change. In other words, to modulate 
the change. The legal system could therefore be 
considered as supplying the State with the instruments 
necessary to modulate the change„ This makes it 
possible for the State apparatus to relate change to 
policy, an element which is considered to bo vital to 
Development. The Tamil language (Special Provisions)
| yy r0
Act of J95& 1 ' and the Language of the Courts Act of
J[ 7 f > *
19ol are two instances of the State’s use of Law
to modulate and thus relate the social change resulting
out of the implementation of the Official Language Act,
L 7 7to policy. The enactments 1 ! passed to nationalise the
denominational schools was another instance of relating
the social change to policy. In each such attempt the
State presupposed that its use of the legal system in
the way it does is legitimate. This means that the
State must assume each time it uses the legal system
as a means to relate policy to change, that there
exists a particular constitutional provision to make
this activity lawful. For tlie process of relating
policy to change may involve a whole set of activities
which may include the deprivation of property rights
378
(as in the case of national Isa I.ion of schools) or the
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derial of the right to be treated equally (as in the
» I 7 9Ivor)cswaran Case ) ♦ Unless there is this assumption
of constitutionality of the Laws passed in order to 
relate policy to change, the State would stand
1 go
defenceless before its courts. The Rodeswaran Case' 
raised this kind of problem. Had the Privy Council 
decided against the Constitutionality of the Official 
Language Act of 1936, then the State’s attempt in 1936 
to relate social change to policy would have been 
frustrated. The Act itself was no more than an attempt 
to lend recognition to the fact that a bulk of the 
Ceylonese society had found that an official language 
change was necessary. This the people of Ceylon had 
expressed through their ballot by electing into power 
a particular political party committed to use the legal 
system to bring about that change. What tlie Act was 
intended to do was to recognise that the' Ceylonese 
socle by had changed by 1936 and to relate that change 
to tlie policy of the State, Had the courts in 
JLoclc> 12 found that the then existing constitution 
would not legitimise the language change then the 
Government would be compelled to change the Constitution 
so as to seek that legitimacy. This would suggest that 
any attempt by the State to relate policy to social 
change should commence at the level of the Grundnorm. 
This kind of problem arose in Sri Lanka in 1978.
During the course of the 7 th Parliameni extending 
for an unusually lengthy period of time, from 1970 to 
1977, the full thrust of the official language change 
was felt by every sector of the population. The 
Administration, headed by the Sr:i Lanka Freedom Party, 
was committed to the' enforcement of the official 
language change. The only legislation which they 
enacted in this area was the language of the Courts 
(Specia.l Provisions) Law of 1973- * During; the seven
years of their rule the society appeared to have moved 
towards realising the practical limits of the change.
The Tamil minority in particular were adversely affected 
by the Official Language Act. A separatist movement 
had begun to gain momentum leading to the formation of 
the Tamil United Liberation Front as its main representative. 
The General Elections of 1977 showed these new dimensions 
of the Sri Lankan society. The Sri Lanlva. Freedom Party 
that headed the Government was defeated in an unprecedented 
manner. Its 91 seats in the seventh Parliament were 
reduced to 8 while the United National Party received a 
landslide victory, winning L’iO seats out of a total 
membership in Parliament of 1.68 seats. The Tamil United 
Liberation Front won all the constituencies in the Tamil 
speaking areas totalling to 18 seats. They in fact formed 
the opposition for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history.
All other political parties including the Marxists were 
defeated. The United National Party which formed the 
Government sensed tlie mood of the society and decided as 
a mat ter of policy to introduce certain changes to the 
language legislations so that tin: society as a whole
could move towards some kind of an accommodation between 
the two principal communities. The existing Constitution 
was the 1.972 Constitution and the Government found that 
it would not legitimise a number of reforms to which it 
was committed. One of the areas in which the new 
Government had planned reforms was in the area of language.
As a result of these limitations the Government which 
had more than a two-thirds majority thought that the 
enactment of a new Constitution must be a prelude to 
reform. Therefore, a new Constitution was enacted on 
the l6th August, 1978 and was promulgated on the 7th
I Qp
September of that year. The Constitution of 1978 
replaced tlie 1972 Constitution upon its promulgation.
Both the 1978 Constitution and the 1972 Constitution 
will receive close scrutiny later. For the present 
it will be sufficient to examine the extent to which 
the Language legislations dating from 1956-1973 have 
now been re-cast so as to embrace areas hitherto 
uncovered by the previous laws which had been 
legitimised by the Soulbury Constitution and by the 
Constitution of 1972.
The 1978 Constitution primarily declared Sinhala 
to be the Official Language of Sri Lanka but at the 
same time recognised both Sinhala and Tamil to be the
184National Languages of the Island. In the next six
sections, the Constitution amplified various aspects 
in which the national character of the two languages 
b e c o m -' rn a. 11 i fest, These are:
(i ) Languages of Pari 1; 1 men t and of Lo c a 1 Bodles
The L978 Constitution declared that a Member 
of Parliament or of a local body has a constitutional
1 o r
right to speak in either language. ' ) Under the 1972
Constitution the right to speak in Tamil in Parliament 
was given under the * Standing Orders' which could be 
changed at any time by a simple majority. The right 
to speak in Sinhala, however, was a constitutional 
right under the 1972 Constitution. Now the right to 
speak in either language in Parliament or in any local 
body has become a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Consti tution .
(ii) Language of Legislation
The 1978 Constitution requires all legislations
3 86to be published in both languages. Previously, the
legislations were produced in Sinhala because that was 
the Official Language and in Tamil under a directive 
issued by the Treasury. The 1978 Constitution made 
it a constitutional requirement that:
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"All laws and subordinate legislation 
shall be enacted or made, and published, 
in both National Languages together with 
a translation in the English language •
In addition, the 1978 Constitution made it a 
constitutional requirement to have:
" ... all Orders, Proclamations, Rules,
by-laws, Regulations, Notifications,
made or issued under any written law,
111 e Ga ze 11e a nd at 1 o ther o f fi c i a1
documents including circulars and forms
issued or used by any public institution
or local authority . . . , " . Cr?lo (a
t.o bo. in both National Languages. The 197*2 Constitution 
did no I include these matters and had left them within 
t -e ambit of ministerial discretion to be exercised
under authority derived from any one of the four
"L S 7language legislations effective at the time. The
creation of a constitutional guarantee in this respect 
appeared important in tlie stage in which the Sr.i Lankan 
society was in 1978, when the two communities seemed to 
be in a state of isolation poised for some form of 
inter-action. The need to draw the two communities 
closer to one another became a delLberate policy of the 
new Administration and towards this end the Government 
used the new fundamental law which it helped in 
es tabl i si ling.
(iii) Education
The 1978 Constitution declared that every person is
entitled to be educated through the medium of either
l88Sinhala or Tamil. It also declared that where one
national language is the medium of instruction for any 
course in any University, then the other language too 
shall be made a medium of instruction for the other
189national language. Previously, under both the
Soulbury Constitution and under the 1972 Constitution 
those two rights did not form constitutional guarantees 
but were declared in Regulations enacted under the 1958
( iv ) Ad m ;i. n istr a t: i o n
The 1978 Constitution enacted that the Official
Language, namely Sinhala, shall be the language of
191Administration throughout Sri Lanka. ' But this
general rule has now been subjected to a constitutional
proviso that the Tamil language shall now be used in
1 92the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The 1972
Constitution failed to make the use of Tamil Language
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces a constitutional
matter, but authorised its use by Regulations made under 
191the 1958 Act. ^
In addition, tlie 1978 Constitution declared that
a 11 persoils , irrespec tive of' where theyr may resi de
have a constitutional right to communicate with and
receive communications from any official of the State
19^in either of the two National Languages. Previously,
these rights too were subject to Regulations made by the 
respective Ministers by virtue of their authority derived 
from the 19 58 Act.195
So as to avoid the problem raised in the Kodeswaran 
196Case the 1978 Constitution provided the applicants
who propose to enter the Public Service a right to be
197examined through the medium of either language. But
they were required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of
the official language within a specified period of time
"where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the
198discharge of his duties". Commenting on this aspect,
199a Commentator wrote:
-179-
"This section represents an attempt to achieve 
a pragmatic solution to the problem of public 
servants acquiring proficiency in the Official 
Language in tlie context of the circumstances 
that more than 70 percent of the people served 
by such public servants belong to the Sinhala 
community ... ."
(v ) Courts
The 1978 Constitution declared that the Official
201Language shall be the language of the courts.
However, by a proviso the Constitution declared that
both Sinhala and Tamil will be tlie language of the
202
Courts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
1)esp i te this appa.ront Limi tat:i on , tho Constitution 
provided for the right of any party or any Attorney— 
at-Law to initiate proceedings and submit to any court 
proceed ings in either 1 anguage, even outside tlie 
Northern and Eastern Provinces. ^  With this goes the 
right to have the proceedings in any Court situated 
anywhere on the Island translated into the other national 
language where a party or his Attorney, Judge or Juror 
finds it difficult to understand the national language
20 hin which the proceedings are conducted. All these
matters now become fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Previously, these were regulated by
Regulations made under the Language of the Courts Act
20 206 
of 1981 and under the Law of 1973*
( Vl ) The Duties of tlic S ta te towards the two National 
Languages
By section 25, a constitutional obligation is placed 
upon the State "to provide adequate facilities for the 
use of the languages provided for in this chapter". This 
places a responsibility on the State to protect and
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propogate the two national languages. This may recpiire 
the State to allocate funds adequate to serve these two 
ends rather than in proportion to tlie population that 
consider the two national languages as their mother 
tongue. This is a unique basis for drawing the 
communities together as equal partners, a matter that 
had not been considered by those who drafted the 1972 
Cons titution.
It. is essential to emphasise the extent to which
207
the State had moved from the first enactment in 1956 
declaring 'Sinhala' to be the Official Language of the 
Island, to the extensive and detailed list of shared 
rights now found to be enshrined in the 1978 Constitution. 
What this signifies is what has been said earlier; that 
the Stale ait various stages of social change has utilised 
the Legal system to blend policy with change in a way 
that the State is able to control the direction of the 
social change. This line of thinking appears to be 
moving towards a realisation that an exposition of the 
nature and functions of .a Constitution and the Courts 
established thereunder may be the starting point of an 
enquiry into the role of law as an instrument for 
control ling and directing social change. It seems to 
be evident that, unless the legal system is bottomed 
by a Constitution (or a Or midnorm) which legitimises 
the laws which the State may enact to implement its 
policy towards effecting social change, the State is 
liable to remain powerless. The momentum and the 
direction of the social, change could thereby become 
uncontrollable, leaving the society as a whole in danger 
of slipping slowly into a condition of anarchy. It is 
this realisation that makes it necessary to examine 
constitutional and judicial development next, within 
a historical perspective. It is necessary to examine
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both these aspects - Constitutionalism and Judicial! srn 
- historically, because Ceylon’s social, political and 
economic development received different emphasis and 
different directions during different periods of time. 
The emphasis and the direction mentioned here being 
conveyed through the rules of law legitimised by the 
relevant Grundnorm or the Constitution operative 
during the particular historical period in question.
The next five chapters will therefore be devoted to a 
study of both the institutions that made the enforcement 
of law possible and the Constitutions which in the 
nature of Gru minor ms that made tlie whole enterprise 
leg! Lima to. This study will be conducted from a 
historical standpoint spreading over a period beginning 
in 1796 and ending in 1978.
Part C
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Chapter 
Chap ter 
Chapter 
Chap ter 
Chap ter
Constitutionalism and Judicial Evolution
5: Constitutionalism (1): The period of Restrictive Franchise.
Pages 183-236.
6: Constitutionalism (2): The Donoughmore Reforms - The Begin­
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7: Constitutionalsim (3): Aspects of the Soulbury Constitution.
Pages 269-308.
8: Autochthony and New Constitutions of 1972 and 1978. Pages
309-348.
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349-378.
10: From Adjudication to Conciliation. Pages 379-417.
CHAPTER 5
Constitutionalism (i):
The Period of Restrictive Franchise
I. The Colebrooke Reforms (1833-1912),
X, (a) An Introduction
One part of the Colebrooke-Cameron Report
provided a system for the administration of justice:
that was the Cameron Report.'*' The other part of the
same Report marked the commencement of a process for
constitutional development which was ultimately to
result in the gaining of Independence in 1948. That
2
was the Colebrooke Report. The model instituted for 
constitutional development as a result of the Colebrooke 
Report formed a continuum through the Crewe-MeCallum 
Reforms of 1912, The Manning Reforms of 1922, The 
Donoughmore Reforms of 1926 and into Soulbury Reforms 
of 1945. The Donoughmore Reforms, however, did not 
fall within the model set by the Colebrooke Report.
There was a definite incongruity in the Donoughmore 
model when compared strictly with the rest. In the 
next chapter an attempt will be made to show how the 
Donoughmore model proved an effective means for 
reversing the social consequences of the Manning 
Reforms, making the Soulbury Reforms a prelude to 
Independence. The Donoughmore model could, therefore, 
be explained as providing a necessary stage in the 
constitutional development of the Colony in its 
movement from dependence to Independence.
3A number of scholars have provided a number of
analyses and expositions of the aforementioned Reforms.
These Reforms have been viewed from several standpoints.
Their political implications and their constitutional 
5
effects have been well exposed. The approach here 
will be to combine these several viewpoints with a 
view to evaluating the socio-political implications of 
these Reforms; considered as a deliberate attempt by 
the British Government to translate colonial policy into 
colonial constitutional development.
The life-span of the Colebrooke Reforms was, 
undoubtedly, the longest in the colonial history of 
Ceylon. It lasted for three-quarters of a century and 
in that sense it spread over a whole period of transition 
from tradition to modernity. The fact that the Colonial 
Secretary of the time of the Colebrooke Reforms was able 
to obtain a reply from London, within hours, by cable, 
transformed the very basis of government, radically, 
from the pre-1833 days. In a sense, the Colebrooke 
Reforms introduced a modernized system of government, 
not only for Ceylon but also for the Cape Colony and 
Mauritius. The structure which resulted from the 
report provided a flexible framework in the form of a 
model for good government. Built into it, was a 
facility for change and growth of political institutions. 
As Sir Ivor Jennings had commented.
"If we ignore the dormant commissions, there 
were between 1833 and 1872, inclusive, ten 
'Constitutions for the Island, namely, the 
Commissions and Instructions issued to 
Governors Horton (l835), Stuart Mackenzie 
(l837 and 1838), Campbell (l84l), Torrington 
(1847), Anderson (1850), Ward (1855),
McCarthy (i860), Robinson (1865) and Gregory 
(1872)."7
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The point is that after its inaugurations by 
Instructions sent to Governor Horton on 20th March,
g
1833, the structures so introduced were used to 
support all the changes that were deemed necessary 
with the march of time. The necessary changes were 
communicated to the Governor and he was able to 
accommodate them within the existing constitutional 
framework. This in-built flexibility characterised 
its uniqueness in its ability to provide a constitutional 
foundation for Colonial Administration in Ceylon.
I. (b) The Model
Although at different times during the period
between 1833 and 1912 the composite structure of the
Colebrooke model for government changed, two basic
9
structures - the Executive Council and the Legislative
Council^ — were always retained as a part of the
legislative process for the Colonial Administration of
Ceylon. The Colebrooke model, therefore, was built on
the Executive Council and the Legislative Council as two
corner stones, the other two being provided by the
Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Transposing this blue-print rather crudely upon the
Soulbury Reforms, one finds that while the Executive
Council took the place of the Cabinet the Legislative
Council became a bicameral Parliament comprising a
Senate and a House of Representatives. After Independence
the position of the Secretary of State for the Colonies
having become redunant - the Colonial Laws Validity Act"*’'*'
12having ceased to apply and the Colonial Governor 
having become the Governor-General, representing the 
King of Ceylon, the composite model presented by the 
Colebrooke Reforms underwent the necessary changes. The 
structural continuity between the Colebrooke Reforms and 
the Soulbury Reforms, although over a. century apart, 
therefore, appears to be clear.
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I. (b)(i): The Executive Council
13The membership of the Executive Council
established under the Colebrooke dispensation was
limited to six: The Governor (as the Chairman), the
Officer Commanding the Troops, the Colonial Secretary
the Chief Justice, the Colonial Treasurer and the
Government Agent for the Central Province. During the
years this composition underwent several changes. By
1840 the Chief Justice was replaced by the Queen's 
14-Advocate and the Government Agent for the Central
15
Province was replaced by the Auditor—General. By
1890, the Executive Council had evolved an Inner Council,
comprised of: the Governor, the Colonial Secretary and
16the Attorney-General. One of the reasons advanced for
this was that the advancement of the Colony required
more and complex legislation. It was thought best that
a small committee of the Executive Council should plan
such legislation and present it to the whole Council in
a way that it would be easily comprehended and discussed.
Although the reason put forward for an Inner Council
was one of a strategy for good government, it must be
mentioned that legislation introduced by the Inner
Council arrived before the Council with the initial
backing of at least three members. The Governor, who
17had both the initiating vote and a casting vote, 
could, carry the legislation through, even when a solid 
block of the three remaining members of the Council 
may stand against it. Provided that the Governor could 
rely on the support of the Colonial Secretary and of 
the Attorney General, the government could hope with 
optimism to get the proposals passed in the Executive 
Council. That was the way in which the Executive 
Council was ultimately manipulated into service 
without altering its original constitutional structure. 
The Inner Council took the form of an ad hoc Committee 
within the Executive Council.
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I. (b)(ii): The Legislative Council
The second corner-stone of the Colebrooke—Cameron
18
Reforms was the Legislative Council. All six.
members of the Executive Council automatically became
members of the Legislative Council. Xn addition, the
Governor was empowered to incorporate four ex—officio
members and in addition to appoint six unofficial members,
making a total of sixteen. The four ex-officio members
involved: the Government Agent for the Western Province,
the Surveyor General, the Principal Collector of Customs;
the fourth officer at the beginning was the Auditor—
General but after I89O, the Auditor-General, having been
elevated to membership of the Executive Council, was
replaced as a member of the Legislative Council by the
19Government Agent for the Central Province. The
Government Agent for the Central Province therefore,
was brought down from the Executive Council and was made
20a member of the Legislative Council. Xt is essential
to point out that the six members of the Executive
Council who became members of the Legislative Council,
by virtue of that fact, may be considered as supporters
of the British Administration in Ceylon. These were
the Chief Justice, the officer commanding the troops,
the Colonial Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer and the
Auditor-General. ^To this solid block of support the
Governor was able to add the four ex-officio members that
the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms authorised him to appoint.
This necessarily gave the Governor the almost certain
support of ten out of sixteen members within the
Legislative Council.
The character of the unofficial members — who were
initially appointed in 1840, for life, but later for a
21period of five years with a possibility of re-nomination 
- was as follows: Sinhalese (l), Tamil (l), Burgher (l),
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General European Community (.l)> Planting Community (l),
22Mercantile Community (l). The General European
Community, the Planting Community and the.Mercantile
Community were each represented by Europeans throughout
the Colebrooke period. It is not always that the
latter three members were found in opposition to the
policies proposed by the government. To a large extent,
their interests were centred around Health and
Communications. Their particular concern was the 
23
health of the Indian Coolies whom they had recruited 
to work on the plantations. Legislation concerning 
this aspect became their particular concern. Commu­
nication was another of their concerns. They asked for 
better roads and for an extensive railways system.
Once these pressing needs were satisfied, the Governors 
found the three European Unofficial members willing to
support the government's legislative programme. In a 
Z kdespatch of Governor Sir Hercules Robinson, to which 
25
Wilson refers, the European Unofficial member was 
described in this way:
"He is generally a merchant or planter 
with little or no knowledge of the Island 
beyond the capital and the coffee district.
He is merely a temporary resident, whose 
sole aim and object is to acquire competency 
in the shortest possible time, so as to 
escape from the Island forever. He is a 
small but dominant class, whose interests 
often conflict with those of the majority 
of the inhabi taints, who are life settlers.
He has, in the appropriation of the revenue 
of the colony, objects to advance in which 
either he himself personally or his class 
are directly interested.
27
Although Wilson doubts the accuracy of this 
description it is correct to say that this in effect 
was the attitude of the Governors towards the European 
Unofficial members.
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I. (b)(iii): The Colonial Governor
The third corner-stone of the Colebrooke Reforms
was the position of the Colonial Governor, When he
presided over the Legislative Council he performed
the functions of the modern Speaker. Xn that capacity
he had the casting vote. When he initiated government
business he functioned as the present day Prime Minister.
Then he had the initiating vote. His position in the
Executive Council was that of a Prime Minister, presiding
over a Cabinet meeting. Unlike the modern Prime Minister
the Governor was entitled to both a casting vote and to
28an initiating vote. Unlike the Colonial Governors of 
the pre-1833 period, the 1Colebrooke-Governor? laboured 
under a number of limitations. Namely:
(1) The Governor was instructed to refrain from
proposing or assenting "to any Ordinance
whatever respecting the Constitution,
proceedings, numbers, or mode of appointing
or electing any of the members of the
29
Legislative Council."
(2) The Governor was instructed to refrain from
proposing or assenting "to any Ordinance
whatever, whereby any person may be impeded
or hindered from celebrating or attending
the worship of Almighty God in a peaceable
and orderly manner, although such worship
may not be conducted according to the rites
30and ceremonies of the Church of England."
(3 ) The Governor was instructed to refrain from
proposing or assenting to bills which may
alter the taxation system so as to diminish
31
the revenues of the Crown.
-189-
(4) The Governor was instructed to refrain 
from proposing or assenting to laws that 
may change the established currency of 
the Island.
(5 ) The Governor was instructed to refrain
from proposing or assenting to laws which
may cause "persons, not being of European
birth or descent, - subjected or made
liable to any disabilities or restrictions
to which persons of European birth or
descent would not be also subjected or 
33made liable."
(6) The Governor was instructed to refrain
from proposing or assenting to laws which
have once been refused by the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, without his
3 hfresh instructions.
In addition to the above list of limitations of
a substantive nature, the Governor was precluded from
proposing or assenting to laws designed for the raising
35of funds by lotteries, the naturalization of aliens,
establishing titles, marrying those who are already 
36
married. Further, the list of prohibitions extended
37to include laws for the taxing of transient traders,
the grant of money to the Governor or members of the
38Legislative Council and laws affecting the ownership
39of private property.
The foregoing catalogue of limitations was aimed 
towards producing an integrated society within a
horacially harmonious and tranquil framework. It is 
important to note that these measures were particularly 
helpful in preventing friction between the European
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and the native population on the Island. The absence 
of laws discriminating within and thus dividing the 
society along racial and religious lines was a hall­
mark of the British Administration of Ceylon. Within 
the foregoing framework, the Governor was authorised,
"to make, enact, ordain and establish laws", with the
4l"advice and consent of the Legislative Council." By 
a separate paragraph in the Instructions it was 
declared that:
" ... no law shall be made or enacted by 
the said Legislative Council, unless the 
same shall have been previously proposed 
by yourself i.e., the Governor, and no 
question shall be debated at the said 
Council, unless the same shall first have 
been proposed for that purpose by you."^
It is important to note that the Governor had an
absolute control of the proceedings of the Legislative
Council. The Instructions provided for members of the
Legislative Council to make suggestions to the Governor
in writing regarding: "any law fit to be enacted by
the said Council, or any question proper to be there 
43debated." But the ultimate decisions as to what 
should be the concern of the Legislative Council lay 
squarely within the inherent powers of the 'Colebrooke 
Governor 1•
I. (b)(iv): The Secretary of State for the Colonies
The Secretary of State for the Colonies formed the 
fourth corner-stone of the Colebrooke Reforms. In him 
lay the ultimate political authority, exercised on behalf 
of the Sovereign; to whom the Governor remained responsible 
for his actions in the Colony. Previous to the Colebrooke 
Reforms this was a political fact. The Colebrooke Reforms 
founded this relationship upon a constitutional basis.
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X. (c): The Socio-Political Implications of
the Colebrooke Reforms
Fundamental to the Colebrooke Reforms* was the 
introduction of the Legislative Council. In embryo 
it represented the future legislature of independent 
Ceylon — the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
Although the path to Independence took nearly twelve 
further decades, the model constructed by the•Colebrooke 
report stood the test of times. But the model was not 
completely free from defects.
First, the absolute control left in the hands of 
the Governor to determine the role of the Legislative 
Council proved to be unsatisfactory and inhibitory of 
popular participation in the Government of the Colony.
When this fact is considered in conjunction with the 
non-representative character of the membership of the 
Council, the efforts and the industry of the Commissioners 
appear to be counter-productive in effecting any real 
Reforms. The Legislative Council, in a total sense, 
was a forum for debate on topics selected by the Governor. 
It was not a forum to bring the natives and the Europeans
into a partnership for development. In a despatch of the
17th July, 1848, to which Wilson refers, Earl Grey, the 
then Colonial Secretary informed the Governor:
" ... In the present social condition of
Ceylon with a large native population, but
partially educated and imperfectly informed, 
unacquainted with any but a despotic form of 
civil policy and unfitted for self-government 
because unaccustomed to self-control, it 
would be obviously impracticable to introduce 
at present the principle of direct representa­
tion into the legislative body of the Colony.
But as there exists, and probably continue to 
increase, a body of European proprietors, 
capitalists and merchants in the very centre 
of native population, as on their influence
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and example, their industry and their
wealth, the prosperity of* the Colony
must mainly depend, it must naturally
be the desire of the British Government
to recognise, in this class at least,
the nucleus of a future population of
freemen, around which native intelligence
and education may cluster, and which may
hereafter be the basis of a more extended
representation." . _4 D
The policy which forms the basis for the 
implementation of these reforms appear to be 
crystal clear. The British Government planned to 
create a small English-speaking elite emulating the 
ideals, manners and ways of life of the European 
community who may at some distant point in time be 
elected to represent the masses in the Legislative 
Council. Until that stage of Ceylonese social 
development is reached, the principle of Appointment1 
or fnon-elected representation* appears to have been 
the chosen method for membership in the Legislative 
Council, This leads to the second observation.
Second, the sociaf formations resulting out of 
this method of 1 appointment * appears to have led to the 
creation of a ruling oligarchy at a ‘family* or *clan* 
level during the ‘Colebrooke period*. A careful ^
analysis of the membership of the Legislative Council 
over a period of nearly sixty years out of the total 
period of seventy five years appear to have been 
dominated by a single family unit.
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46♦ TABLE VI
Sinhala Representation in Legislative Councils Established
Under The Colebrooke Reforms: 1833-1911
Name of4 
Appointee
Relationship 
to the 
Previous 
Appointee(s)
Name of 
Family 
or 
Clan
Caste Period
of
Membership
Hon. J. G-.
Phillipsz
Panditharatne
1st
Appointee
Bandaranaike 
Obeysekera
Goygama 15,12.1835 
16.10.1841
-
Hon. J. G. 
Dias
Nephew of*
1st Appointee
n  it it it it 10.08.1843
19.12.1859
—
Hon. Sir Harry 
Dias
Nephew of* - 
1st Appointee
ii ii it it it 17.07.1861
13.01.1864
—
Hon. E. J. 
Dehigama Stranger Stranger it it
27.09.l865
01.07.1875
-
Hon. Janes 
de Alwis
Related to 
Sir Harry Dias 
by blood
Bandaranaike 
Obeysekera
it ii 17.08.1864
2i.lO.l877
-
Hon. Sir J. P. 
Obeysekera
Related to Sir 
James de Alwis 
by blood
It If IT it it 11.09.1878 
15.12.1880
-
Hon. Albert Louis 
de Alwis
h  i» ii it it ii it it 20.09.1882
18.01.1888
-
Hon. A. de A. 
Seneviratne
Stranger Stranger ti it 31.10.1888
10.01.1900
-
Hon. Panabokke 
Tikiri Banda
Related to 
Sir J. P. 
Obeysekera 
by blood
Bandaranaike- 
Obeysekera
ii ii 29.10.1889
07.11.1894
Hon. S . C . 
Obeysekera
Related to 
Albert de 
Alwi s by 
blood
ti it it ii it ll.O6.l897
i5.ll.i9il
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Name of 
Appointee
Relationship 
to the 
Previous 
Appointee(s)
Name of
Family
or
Clan
Caste Period
of
Membership
Hon. William 
Ellawala Ekanayake 
Rajapakse Basnayake 
Mudiyanse
Related to 
Sir J. P. 
Obeysekera 
by blood
Bandaranaike
Obeysekera
Goygama 09 . O h . 1895  -  
21 . 02.1900
Hon. S. N.
W anninayake
Related to 
the
Obeysekera * s 
by affinity
f> it tt n  ii 21 . 03*1900 -  
2 5 . 0 7 .1 9 0 5
Hon. T .B .L . 
Moonemalle
Related to 
Sir J. P. 
Obeysekera 
by blood
ti ti ti ii ii 18 . 07.1906 -  
1 5 .1 1 .1 9 1 1
The appointment of a stranger to the clan - Hon. James
Dehigama could be explained. In 186^ -, the Government
proposed an increase of the military budget from £100,000
to £135>000 . The unofficial members as a block opposed
this increase. The Government however had this military
expenditure passed by using the votes of: six members
of the Executive Council and the four official members
voting as a block of 10 to defeat the opposition mounted
by the six unofficials. The latter, led by Sir Harry
Dias resigned en block. The Governor*s appointee to
the Sinhalese seat was, therefore, drawn from outside
h ithe Bandaranaike group to which Sir Harry belonged.
That explains the appointment of Mr. Dehigama to succeed 
Sir Harry. The appointment of Mr. A. de A. Seneviratne, 
the second * stranger* to the Bandaranaike - Obeysekera 
clan has a different explanation. This will be 
considered later.
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48TABLE VII
Tamil Representation in Legislative Councils Established 
Under The Colebrooke Reforms; 1833-1911
Name of 
Appointee
Relationship 
to the 
Previous 
Appointee(s)
Name of
Family
or
Clan
Caste Period
of
Membership
Hon. A. 
Coomaraswamy
/Pulle^
1st
Appointee
Coomaraswamy Vellala 14.12.1835 •
21.12.1835
Hon. Simon 
Casiechetty
Stranger Stranger *non-
Vellala
14.08.1843 ■
18.12.1844
Hon. S. Edirimana 
- Singham
1st
Appointee 1s 
son-in-law
Coomaraswamy Vellala 07.08.1845 • 
19.06.1860
Sir Muttu 
Coomaraswamy
Son of 1st 
Appointee
n  it n  n 17.07.1861 ■ 
19.12.1878
Hon. Philip 
de Melho J. 
Ondaatjie
Stranger Stranger Vellala 02.06.1873 • 
09.04.1875
Sir Ponnambalam 
Ramanathan
Grandson of 
1st Appointee
Coomaraswamy Vellala 27.08.I879 - 
09.04.1895
Sir Ponnambalam 
C 0 omaraswamy
Grandson of 
1st Appointee
Coomaraswamy Vellala 13.09.1893 ■ 
22.12.1897
Dr. ¥. G. 
Rockwood^
Stranger Stranger** Vellala 16.03.1898 • 
25.07.1905
Sir A. 
Kanagasabai
Stranger Stranger Vellala 01.02.1906 • 
i5 .ll.i9il
(Colombo-Chetty)
(But subsequently married into the Coomaraswamy family).
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Hon. A. Coomaraswamy died within three months after 
his appointment. Sir Muttu, who was the obvious 
choice to succeed him was too young for appointment.
Hon. Simon Cassie—Chetty, an urban newspaper editor 
from Colombo, was chosen to replace the late j
Coomaraswamy. Thereafter, the four successive
50appointments came from the Coomaraswamy family.
The Burgher appointment created a different type 
of social formation. It traditionally went to the 
lawyering class. But Sir Arthur Gordon's traditional 
dislike for the lawyers, particularly those at 
Hulftsdrop who criticised his legislative attempts, had. 
their knuckles rapped when he chose a colonial surgeon, 
Dr. Anthonisz, to succeed James Van Langenberg, a lawyer 
of great eminence. After Sir Arthur's departure from 
the Island, the lawyers were returned to their former 
position. Dr. Anthonisz was succeeded by H. L. Wendt 
as the Burgher representative. Upon his elevation to 
the bench, F. C. Loos, a Proctor and Notary succeeded 
Wendt.^
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TABLE VIII
Burgher Representation in Legislative Councils Established 
Under The Colebrooke Reforms: 1833—1911 ‘
Name of Appointee Profession Period of 
Membership
Hon. R. F . Morgan Lawyer 02.10.1851
24.09.1856
Hon. C. A. Lorensz Lawyer l6 .lO.l856
30.12.1863
Hon. J. A. Martensz Lawyer 27.09.1865
16.10.1872
Hon. C. A. Ferdinands Lawyer 02.06.1873 - 
29.11.1875
Hon. J. Van Langenberg Lawyer 13.09.1876
13.01.1886
Hon. P. D. Anthonisz Colonial
Surgeon
05.10.1886 - 
12.12.1894
Hon. H. L. Wendt Lawyer 09.04.1895 - 
31.10.1900
Hon. F. C. Loos Lawyer 13.06.1900-
07.06.1911
Hon. J. Van Langenberg Lawyer 30.08.1911
i5 .ll.i9il
It is important to emphasise that the Colebrooke
period gave rise to certain types of social formations 
which were to a large measure responsible for the 
creation of a centre-periphery schism in Ceylon, The 
concentration at the periphery of power of a large 
mass of the population, characterised by the 'absence of 
links with the ruling oligarchy progressively expanded 
the gap between the two groups. This provided a classic 
recipe for 'elite formation' on the Island.
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The largeness of the periphery made it necessary
that any kind of social movement in the future should
commence there; and therefore it is important to
realise that future policies originating from the
periphery were destined to have the greatest impact
on social change in Sri Lanka. Not until 1889 were the
Kandyans and the Muslims given separate representation
52
on the Legislative Council. These appointments did
not, like those of the low—country Sinhalese and the
53Tamils, follow a pre-ordained family line. The
Governor chose the best persons to represent these
communities and therefore the aforementioned social
formations had no relevance to the way in which the
Kandyan and the Muslim representatives were selected
for appointment by the Governor.
Third, the period of governance of Sir Arthur
Gordon records the only instance during the whole of
the Colebrooke period during which an attempt was made
by the British Government to alter the social formation
at the centre of poweh. It is sociologically significant
to note that the Governor, strongly motivated by reasons
of dislike or distrust, did alter the family and
professional lines of succession to the unofficial
seats. By bowing to ecclesiastical pressure as to the
corruptness of the system, Sir Arthur appointed
Mr. A. de A. Seneviratne to succeed to the Sinhala
54unofficial seat vacated by Mr. Albert de Alwis.
Mr. Seneviratne was not a member of the Bandaranaike— 
Obeysekera clan. After Sir Arthur's departure, the seat 
returned to the established family clan by the appoint­
ment of Sir S. C. Obeysekera as the successor to Mr. 
Seneviratne. Similarly, Sir Arthur's appointment of 
Dr. Rockwood, to succeed Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam,
c e
broke the line of succession of the Coomaraswamy family.
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That departure from the traditional line of appointment
appeared to have taken a permanent form for the rest of
the Colebrooke period. The control of the lawyering
class over the Burgher unofficial seat, too was broken
by Sir Arthur by the appointment of a Colonial Surgeon,
Dr. Anthonisz, to succeed Van Langenberg. As in the
case of the Sinhalese seat, the departure of Sir Arthur
heralded the return of the lawyering class to the
Burgher seat. Mr. H. L. Wendt (later Mr. Justice Wendt)
56succeeded Dr. Anthonisz.
Despite these momentary digressions the social
formations at the centre during the Colebrooke period
took a regular and a consistent pattern. The eclipse
of families — among the Sinhalese and the Tamils — over
all others did not produce a healthy social atmosphere.
Besides this, the members of these two significant
communities chosen to represent their peers were drawn
exclusively from two caste configurations, namely, the
'Vellala' (Tamils) and the 1Goygama' (Sinhalese) Castes.
The unrepresentative character of the "representation”,
therefore, must appear to be compounding itself,
leading to the emergence of considerable social tensions
57towards the end of the 19th Century.
Fourthly, the political grip of the Governor over 
both the Executive and the Legislative Councils proved 
to be self-defeating as an exercise in constitutional 
reform. Reforms should be evolutionary and progressive. 
What the Colebrooke era produced was an institutional­
isation and regularisation of rule by the Governor. 
Particularly, the Governor's ability, commencing from the
eg
Inner Executive Council of three to the Legislative
59Council of sixteen, to come 'on top', each time; made 
participatory government a figment of one's imagination.
-200-
To enable the Governor to use his block vote of t e n ^
61against the six unofficials in the Legislative
Council, the Secretary of State introduced, in 1841,
the Melbournian principle of cabinet responsibility to
62the Executive Council. This bound the six members 
of the Executive Council, together with the Governor's 
casting vote, to form a block basically. Together 
with the support of.the four official members of the 
Legislative Council, the Governor could thereafter
63 64rely upon a two-third majority against a theoretically
united opposition of the six unofficials. By the end of
the 19th century, a clamour for more power was being
heard from the unofficial quarter of the Legislative
Council. As a reply to these demands, Sir Henry MacCallum
65in 1907 created what was called 'a Finance Committee'.
The Finance Committee was composed of two groups of 
members. The first group consisted of: the Colonial
Secretary, the Controller of Revenue and the Colonial 
Treasurer, as ex-officio members. The second group was 
formed by the six un-official members. The Colonial 
Secretary was made its Chairman and the latter, with 
three un-official members, formed the quorum for their 
meetings. The Committee met when the Legislative Council 
was not in session or when it had adjourned for a period 
exceeding twenty days and when it became necessary to 
vote funds out of the Colonial Treasury for emergencies 
or such other unforseen circumstances. The Colonial 
Secretary, as the Chairman of the Committee, was required 
to present a report to the Legislative Council, at its 
next meeting. It was required that the Committee should 
seek a ratification of the report by the Legislative 
Council, approving the moneys voted during its recess.
It was further required that the Chairman should inform 
the Council as to what moneys were refused by the Committee.
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Although the six un-officials in the Finance Committee 
could out—vote the three ex-officio members, in the 
second round the Government could ensure its victory 
by having the money voted down at the committee stage 
before the Legislative Council by using the Government's 
block vote.^ The Finance Committee was a strategy 
devised by the Administration to pacify the demands of 
the un-officials. But its weakness as an instrument of 
Budgetary control was apparent to the un-officials.
For the next five years, until 1912, the Finance Committee 
functioned with declining interest.
Fifthly, it must be conceded that the Colebrooke 
Reforms provided a step towards open government.. It is
/Try
this that the Reforms must be noted for. Wilson. in
his general assessment of the Colebrooke Reforms, wrote:
"Hitherto laws could be hatched in secret 
by a Governor and put into operation with 
or without the advice of the Council of 
Government. Henceforth laws had to be 
enacted 'with the advice and consent of 
the Legislative Council'. This meant two 
things. First, before a measure reached
the Statute book, it had to pass through
the complicated sieve of two critical 
bodies, the Executive Council and the 
Legislative Council. Second, it was 
ensured that legislation will be enacted 
in the blaze of publicity and public 
opinion will be given an opportunity of 
expressing itself. In effect a legisla­
tive measure would from now onwards have 
to run the gauntlet of criticism before 
it could find its way into the Statute 
book. Needless to say, the benediction 
of the Secretary of State would be 
essential in all these matters. But it 
may be noticed that under the new 
dispensation the area of action allowed 
to the Governor was considerably 
circumscribed and he could now no 
longer be the Alexander Selkirk he 
might have been under the previous 
Constitution. "x-Q
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That passage presents a fair assessment of the 
total effect of the Colebrooke Reforms, It was the 
resulting social formations which made the next two 
steps necessary as a part of the overall colonial 
strategy for Constitutional reform in Ceylon, The 
next two steps were the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms 
(1912—1920) and the Manning Reforms (1924-1931)* • The 
gap between the two sets of Reforms was filled by 
what has come to be known as The Temporary Constitution 
of 1921.
69II• The Crewe—MacCallum Reforms 
(a) An Introduction
The Crewe—MacCallum Reforms were conceived within 
the framework of four principles. These principles 
were culled from the principal inadequacies highlighted 
by the Colebrooke model of government. It is against 
this backdrop that the Reforms become meaningful.
First, the Colebrooke model produced an over­
whelming voting strength in the Government's favour 
in the Legislative Council, This was a matter of very 
real concern for the 'un-officials' and their respective 
lobbyists in the country. The new Reforms, therefore, 
while leaving the structure and the composition of the 
Executive Council intact, expanded the Legislative 
Council in such a way that the difference between the 
block vote available to the Governor and the un-official 
group put together was reduced to a minimum of two and a
maximum of three votes. The new Legislative Council was
70comprised of eleven official members and in addition 
had the Governor as its President.
In his capacity as the Governor he had an initiating 
vote and as the President of the Council he had a casting 
vote. As for the un-official numbers, there were ten. 
Excluding the Governor's Casting vote, the government 
was two votes ahead of the un—official group. As a 
matter of policy the government's need to be ahead of the
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un—official group was conceded, Althpugh the 
government had a block vote of twelve,.of the twelve 
there were only ten ex-offic'io members, the other 
two being nominated by the Governor for appointment 
in pursuance of Instructions received from time to 
time from the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
There was, therefore, the theoretical possibility of 
a parity of numbers between the un-official group and 
the official group under the new Reforms, This fact 
alone was profoundly conciliatory towards local demands.
Second, the Colebrooke Reforms were viewed as 
subscribing to social stratification at the centre.
The membership of the Legislative Council was family- 
oriented with a caste bias. The Bandaranaike-Obeysekera 
family among the Sinhalese and the Coomaraswamy family 
among the Tamils had dominated the local representation 
in the Legislative Councils formed under the Colebrooke 
Reforms. The Vellala caste from the Tamils and the 
Goygama caste from the Sinhalese formed the Council's 
caste configuration. These two groupings appeared to 
produce the social formation at the centre. The 
argument was heard that tKxs kind of social stratification 
should be destabilised.
In.response to this demand the Crewe-MacCallum 
Reforms, while increasing the number of un-officials 
from eight under the Colebrooke arrangement to ten, 
reduced the number of European seats from three to two.
The resulting configuration of three extra seats were 
allotted with one extra seat each to the Sinhala and to 
the Tamil communities, bringing their number of seats to 
two each; and relegating the third seat to a nebulous 
group of persons called the 'Educated Ceylonese'.
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The latter group will be discussed later. Having
created one.extra seat for each of the two large 
71communities, the Governor proceeded to appoint a
member of the Goygama and of the Karawe castes to the
Sinhalese seats while a Hindu Vellala and a Christian
Tamil were nominated for the two Tamil seats. The
rest of the six seats were occupied by a Kandyan (l),
Muslim (l), Burgher (l)> European (2), and an 'Educated
Ceylonese' (l). Bringing in the Karawe caste pacified
some of the demands of the low-country Sinhalese.
Third, the seventy-five years of government under
the Colebrooke arrangements produced a group of persons
whose.tastes, manners and attributes were so clearly
alien, because they were western-educated and oriented,
that Governor MacCallum showed a distinct partiality
towards them, identifying them as a class from which
72future rulers of Ceylon were fit to be extracted.
Towards perpetuating their cause and adding a new 
dimension to the existing social formations at the 
centre, the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms created a new seat 
for them — the 'Educated Ceylonese seat'.
Fourth, a major complaint against the Colebrooke 
arrangement was the 'non-elective' but 'selective' 
nature of the representation at the Legislative Council 
level. The present Reforms recognised the need to 
introduce the 'elective' principle as a means for 
achieving representative government, but decided to delay 
that event for the present. However, as a sign of the 
government's commitment to the 'elective* principle, the 
Crewe-MacCallum Reforms isolated four of the ten un­
official seats for election. The two European seats,
7^ 7k
styled European (rural) and European (urban), were
subjected to a European vote while the Burgher seat was
75left to a Burgher vote. The identification of both 
these groups posed no practical problem. But in case of
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doubt the government created an administrative machinery
7 6
to decide and resolve any such problems. As for those 
who were eligible to vote for the 1Educated Ceylonese’s
77seat1, special machinery was set up by legislation.
By making the qualifications for candidates for the
78
’Educated Ceylonese’s seat1, generally, co-terminous 
with the qualifications of those who were eligible to 
be registered as voters for that seat, the government, 
by three sets of criteria isolated these privileged.
79persons from the rest of their peers by legislation*
The first criteria was a professional criteria. Members
gO g i
of the legal and medical professions, the engineers
82and members of the Armed Forces fell within this first
category of privilege. The second criteria for selection
was service to the government. Those who had served as
88members of a Municipal or Local Board, bhose who were 
’Government pensioners’ in receipt at the time of 
retirement payments of an annual salary of not less than
84one thousand five hundred rupees, and persons who were
8 ^or who had been jurors. The last criteria included
those who were under-graduates or graduates of a British,
86Indian or Colonial university and those who had passed 
either the Junior or the Senior Cambridge Local
o 7
Examination. As statistics for each of these categories, 
particularly those for the last two, are not available, 
and therefore making the extravagant assumption that all 
those who were able to read and write English would fall 
within the class of those who were qualified to vote, 
one sees a very narrow slice of the non—European and non—
Burgher society benefiting from this limited franchise.
,90
88 go
The Europeans and the Burghers were relegated to
their own special seats and they were expressly excluded' 
from the ’Educated Ceylonese’ vote.
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TABLE IX91
Table of those who were able to read and vrite English 
In 1911 — excluding the European and Burgher population
Buddhist Muslims Christians Others
Total Males Females M F M F M F M F
*37729 29353 8376 I67O8 2826 - - 12633 55^7 10 2
**3880 3320 560 2629 289 3 - 686 271 2 -
***14839 12195 2698 63 3 3 - 4900 1959 2 -
****2077 1948 93 _  —  — 1983 92 1 1
M=Males
F=Females
92
By disqualifying females and those who were not born in
Ceylon9"^ (unless their parents had been born in Ceylon)9^
and limiting the franchise to those who had attained.the
95age of 25 a large number of females, Indian Tamils,
Indian Moors and Malays were automatically excluded. The
last three groups may be excluded upon grounds of birth,
particularly when the age requirement was added to the
birth requirement. Assuming the males represented in
Table IX were all aged twenty-five, again an extravagant
96assumption, then 46,952 persons out of a population 
of 4,106,350*^ namely 1.1$ of the total population, 
became eligible to vote. On the other hand, while
98limiting the percentage figures to the four communities
in question, with reference to Table X, then the 
percentage of voters under the 1Educated Ceylonese" 
category would be 2.5$ of the society to which they 
belong. These figures should indicate the pattern of 
the resulting social formations at the level of the 
supra-structure. The decisive nature of the new Reform 
should therefore become clearly visible.
*
Low-country Sinhalese 
**
Kandyan Sinhalese 
***
Ceylon Tamils 
* * * *
Ceylon Moors
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TABLE X99
Population Figures for 1911? Sinhalese (Kandyan and 
Low Country). Ceylon Tamils and Ceylon Moors
TOTAL MALE FEMALE
Low Country Sinhalese 1,716,859 894,078 822,781
Kandyan Sinhalese 998,561 525,483 473,078
Ceylon Tamils 528,024 268,649 259,375
Ceylon Moors 233,901 122,114 111,787
Total of all four 
Categories 3,^77,305 1,810,324 1 ,667,021
During the succeeding years the new elite succeeded
in grouping together, first under the banners of the
•Ceylon Reform L e a g u e * a n d  the * Ceylon National
Association*^ and later by amalgamating to form
102the Ceylon National Congress by 1919* A fundamental 
basis upon which both the Sinhalese and the Tamil 
components of the ’New Elite r got together was to resist 
communal and class representation in the Legislative 
Council. It is, therefore, somewhat ironical that the 
Congress was to break apart, two years later, in 1921, 
upon the very grounds that had brought them together. 
This will be examined later. The socio-political 
consequences of the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms were to move 
the Colony towards further reform by 1921. In order to 
understand the next set of reforms it is necessary to 
expose the implications of these Crewe—MacCallum 
Reforms, which had acted as a catalyst for future 
constitutional development on the Island.
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II. (b) The Socio-Political Implications of 
the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms
Admittedly, the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms were a step 
towards representative government. The errors of the 
policy adopted were founded not so much in what it was 
intended to achieve but in what it was not designed to 
achieve. The Sinhalese lobby ^ iad by 1921 grown voci­
ferous in its demands for proportional representation
103and universal adult franchise. As was pointed out
earlier, the creation of an 'Educated Ceylonese' seat, 
proved a halter around the Colonial government's neck. 
It was construed as a slap on the face for the large 
majority of the native population and, therefore, the 
clamour for universal adult franchise became loud and 
clear. Among a number of demands, there were three 
emerging areas in which the government appeared to 
have erred.
First, the government's distribution.of the
communal seats received severe criticism. It was
asked why a total Sinhalese population of 2,715,^20^^
105were given three seats while 528,024 Tamils were 
given two seats. The publication of the census 
figures for 1911 caused the Sinhalese population very 
real concern. They were able to recognise how badly 
they had fared under the Colebrooke Reforms.
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TABLE XI106
Occupation determined along Communal lines at the 1911 Census
Position All Sinhalese Ceylon °/o °/o
Held Races Low Country Tamils Tamils Sinhalese
Kandyan
\
*#
107 5 ,375108 2 ,862109 960110 17.8 53.2
*
**a 854111 48l112 205119 24.0 56.3
**b l,370llZf 348115 625116 45.6 25.4
**c 6,959117 3,932118 1 ,868119 26.8 56.5
*
Public Administration
**
Professions & Liberal Arts:
* * £ Ulawyers
**
1^
Medical Practitioners
Q
School Teachers
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120TABLE XII u
Occupation Determined Along Communal Lines 1921 Census
Position
Held
All
Races
Sinhalese
Low
Country
Kandyan
Ceylon
Tajnils
c/o
Tamils
°/o
Sinha­
lese
Public 121 12 5 
Administration 7 >851 4.481129 1,827133 23.2 57.
Professions & 
Liberal Arts:
122Lawyers 1.099126 620130 52l13^ 47.4 5 6.4
Medical 2 
Practitioners 968127 363131
135 390 ^ 40.2 y t . 5
School -2r 
Teachers 1 1 , 1 2 2 1 2 8 7,317132 2,399136 21.0 65.7
TABLE XIII
Population Figures for the Tear 1911 &  1 9 2 1
1 9 H 137 1921139
Total Population: 4,107,350 4,498,605
Sinhalese (Low 
Country & Kandyan): 2,715,420138 3,Ol6,1541^°
Ceylon Tamils: 528,024 517,324
°/o Sinhalese to the 
whole population: 66.1 °/o 67.02°/o
°/o Tamils to the 
whole population: 12.8# 11 . 5 ° / o
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As the foregoing tables show, while the Tamil 
population had decreased from 12.8°/o to 11.4% during 
the period of the Crewe-MacCallum dispensations, their 
contribution in the fields of Public Administration and 
the various professions had significantly increased. 
Looking at the figure for 1911, the Sinhalese saw that 
the economic advancement of the Tamils during the 
Colebrooke period had outstripped their population ratio 
of 12.8%. The figures for 1921 showed an increase in 
their contribution, to the established professions 
leaving the Sinhalese behind and on the periphery of. 
colonial development. In the light of these figures, 
the provision of two seats for the 12.8% of the population,
l4l
leaving.the 66.1% with three seats in the Legislative 
Council, became a cause for additional Complaints. The 
fear among'the Sinhalese was that economic advancement, 
coupled with political power of a disproportionate 
nature, could result in the emergence of a minority 
ethnic group in control of the centre of power. This, 
it was feared could lead to dangerous social conflicts 
of great magnitude. It was, therefore, time the 
Sinhalese argued, to reverse these trends.
This leads to the second area which the colonial
government was accused of violating, namely, the
franchise. The fact that the communal seats were still
Selective1 and not 'elective* caused some concern,
generally, to both communal groups. The Governor’s
choices were always suspected of patronage. Therefore,
it was argued that membership of the Legislative Council
lacked the political muscle and the will to represent
the popular causes of the day. As a response to these
developing fears, the Governor, Sir John Anderson,
142
informed the Legislative Council in 1916 that
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un-official members would not as a rule be re-nominated 
after the expiry of their period in office: i.e.
nomination would rather be the exception than the rule.
A nomination for a third period would be very unlikely 
unless the Governor was unable to find a suitable 
candidate who was also willing to shoulder the 
responsibilities of membership. This statement of policy 
proved a weak response to the growing fears among the 
Ceylonese that the Legislative Council was increasingly 
becoming a tool in the hands of the British Governors, 
merely to legalise an institutionalised form of 
unrepresentative government.
The third area which the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms 
violated was the isolation of a group of citizens as 
being 'educated', thereby bestowing upon them the 
privilege of having a special representative in the 
Legislative Council. The creation of a seat for the 
'Educated Ceylonese' meant, at least, two things. First, 
it equated education with English literacy - an 
opportunity which was open to few in 1912. That willy- 
nilly reduced the importance of native languages (both 
Sihhala and Tamil) to nought. Second, by subjecting
143that privileged seat to a franchise of a limited nature, 
the government appeared to have conceded that persons 
who were not educated in the English language were 
unsuitable or were deemed to be unable, to use the vote 
wisely and correctly. The unfortunate effect of being 
elected as 'An Educated Ceylonese* member in the 
Legislative Council was to subject that person to the 
ridicule of the large mass of the native populatiQn. 
Inevitably, this led to a polarisation of two social groups, 
characterised by literacy in English. The social formation 
at the centre of power was to bear that imprint, intro- '
ducing a new dimension to the existing social stratification\ 
on the Island. \
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The three aforementioned principles which the
Crewe-MacCallum Reforms violated led to the next stage
of constitutional reforms on the Island. .These were
the Manning Reforms of 1924. Realising the dangers
inherent in the Crewe-MacCallum model of government,
the British Administration terminated this model and
introduced the "Temporary Constitution" of 1921, until a
comprehensive re—structuring of a proper model for
colonial government could be undertaken for Ceylon. By
144an Order-in-Council of 1920, the Crewe-MacCallum model 
was dissolved and a "Temporary Constitution" was 
introduced.
II. (c ) Historical Antecedents Leading to the
Temporary Constitution
■Whatever else the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms failed 
to achieve it must be said that they succeeded in 
creating a new elite who seized their new position of 
political power to ask for extensive political reforms.
145Commenting on this aspect, Mendis wrote:
"On the whole the Reforms helped to perpetuate 
the divisions in society, the special interests 
of which the British system of Administration 
for over a century had tended to obliterate.
Though the educated Ceylonese electorate brought 
together the English educated classes among the 
Sinhalese, the Tamils and the Muslims, the grant 
of a special electorate to the Europeans and the 
Burghers helped these communities to consider 
themselves as separate rather than citizens of 
Ceylon.»l46
Although the communal divisions and rivalries were 
latent and explosive, the new elite succeeded in 
creating a front for constitutional reform, incorpora­
ting the Sinhala, Tamil, Burgher, Muslim and European
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elements of their own social level. As early as in 1917»
under the leadership of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, the
Ceylon Reform League and its sister association, the
147Ceylon National Association was formed. In his
Presidential address to the Association, Sir Ponnambalam
148laid a foundation for future political demands. By
1919 the activities of these two elitists groups had had
such an impact upon the new elite and the government,
that they formed a more permanent organisation - the
149Ceylon National Congress. Although the ambit of their
membership excluded the large majority of 1uneducated 
Ceylonese1, its access to the centre of power spurred it 
into action, by telegraphing the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Lord Milner. The telegram succinctly 
stated their demands:
’’Enlarge Legislative Council about fifty 
members, four fifths elected territorially, 
wide male franchise, restricted female 
franchise, remaining one fifth officials 
and unofficials representing important 
minorities; secondly elected speaker,
Legislative Council; thirdly, continuance 
full control budget, no diarchy; fourthly,
Executive Council at least half Ceylonese, 
chosen from elected members Legislative 
Council; fifthly, Governor should possess 
English Parliamentary experience; sixthly, 
complete popular control local self- 
government,’’.
It is very important to note that the demands did 
not include communal representation. In fact the Ceylon 
National Congress was a non-communal body espousing an 
all—Ceylon cause. Notwithstanding the fact that it 
represented a small minority of the Ceylonese who had 
had an English education, it was determined to project 
a non—sectarian political stance in an emerging Ceylon.
-215-
151Sir John Anderson having died in 1918, the new 
Governor, Sir William Manning, was only a few months 
at the head of the government when these qlemands were 
addressed to Lord Milner. Manning, however, had his 
own views on Constitutional reforms. Lord Milner, 
accepting Manning’s views, issued an Order—in—Council 
in 1920 as a response to the aforementioned demands.
By the same Order, the Crewe-MacCallum period was 
brought to an end. The Constitutional provisions 
chartered in the Order-in-Council caused a political 
uproar in Ceylon. The Ceylon National Congress rejected 
them and declared its intention to wreck the proposals. 
They made it clear that they planned to put forward 
candidates who would maintain a programme of passive 
resistance through non-cooperation, from within the 
Legislative Council. To avoid such a confrontation 
Manning bargained with the Ceylon National Congress for 
a respite. There was a negotiated settlement along the 
lines that while the Ceylon National Congress would 
co-operate in putting the proposals into effect, the 
Governor would give careful consideration to the 
suggestions made by the Congress in their telegram to 
Lord Milner. The present proposals were recognised as 
mere temporary provisions and by changes affected to 
them in due course the ultimate constitutional model 
for Ceylon was expected to emerge. Thus the constitu­
tional proposals contained in the Order—in—Council of 
1920 began their life as temporary provisions.
Therefore, the Constitutional Provisions were referred 
to as the "Temporary Constitution of 1920", which became 
effective after the elections of 1921.
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Before examining the provisions of the Temporary 
Constitution it must be clearly stated that the mass 
of the people, who lay outside the Ceylon National 
Congress, were not consulted. In reaching this arrange­
ment the fEducated Ceylonese1, the new elite, and the 
Governor were the only participants. This is not to 
say that the native population were unconcerned about 
the matters which were being decided on their behalf, 
and without their participation. Their latent opposition 
was growing and was to erupt at some time after 1924, 
leading up to the Donoughmore Commission in 1927* on 
further constitutional reforms. It is now proper to 
examine the provisions of the Temporary Constitution 
from a socio-political standpoint.
III. The Temporary Constitution of 1921
The Ceylon Order-in-Council of 1920,'*''^ which
brought into being the Temporary Constitution of 1921,
153and the changes introduced in 1923> in accordance
with the agreement between the Governor and the Ceylon
National Congress, have been subjected to a penetrating
154analysis by Wilson, from the standpoint of a political
scientist. It is, therefore, intended in this section
155of this chapter and the next to examine the two sets 
of reforms from a socio-legal standpoint.
156The Order-in-Council of August 13th, 1920 dealt
exclusively with the structure of the Legislative
Council, while the Instructions contained in Letters
157Patent issued on September 11th, 1920 dealt inter-alia
with the Executive Council. The position of the Governor
under the new Reforms was referred to in both these
documents. The model thus emerging appeared similar to
158the Crewe-MacCallum Reforms of 1912 and the Colebrooke 
Reforms of 5-833
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First, the Governor, He was regarded both as the 
political representative of the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and as a member of the Legislative body 
created under the new Constitution. In his political 
capacity he had the advice of an Executive Council.
By the aforementioned Instructions it was clearly laid 
down that:
"For the purpose of advising the Governor 
there shall be in and for the Island an 
Executive Council which shall be constituted 
in such manner and consist of such persons 
as may be directed by any Instructions under 
Our Sign Manual and Signet, and all such 
persons shall hold their places in the said 
Executive Council during our pleasure•
The demand of the Ceylon National Congress was 
that at least half the members of the Executive Council 
should be Ceylonese drawn from the Legislative Council. 
The Instructions, by leaving the composition of that 
body open, disappointed the Ceylon National Congress, 
initially. It certainly enraged the Congress when they 
subsequently discovered the Governorfs choice. After 
the promulgation of the Constitution and the holding 
of the elections and the nomination of the un-official 
members, the Governor announced the appointment of the 
following members to the Executive Councils
III. (a) The Ex-Officio Members
These were, in order of precedence: the Colonial
Secretary, the Attorney General and the Government Agent 
for the Western Province.
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III. (b) The Appointed Members
These were, in order of precedence: the Colonial
Treasurer and a so called representative each from the
three communities - the British, the Sinhalese and the
Tamil. Had the Governor chosen three of the communal
representatives from the Legislative Council, then, with
a four to three representation, the Ceylon National
Congress could have detected a conciliatory mood in the
l6lGovernor. Instead, he chose the British and the 
l62Tamil from outside the Legislative Council and the 
16
Sinhalese representative from within it but one who
■j
had been nominated (and not elected) to that Council.
That the Governor was deliberately set on a collision
165course appeared clear to many. This then was the
second structure of the new model. The third structure 
- the Legislative Council — included four types of 
representation.
1 661. The Ex-Officio Members
There were six members in this category: the
Governor, the Officer Commanding H. M. Troops, the 
Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the 
Controller of Revenue and the Colonial Treasurer.
The Governor performed the functions of a
1 /Tw
Presiding Officer and was given both an originating
l68vote and a casting vote. This group of members,
therefore, commanded seven votes in the new Council.
2. The Nominated Official Members
The Order-in-Council read:
"Such other persons holding Public Office under 
the Crown in the Island not exceeding nine in 
number (herein referred to as Nominated Official 
M e m b e r s ) 1^9 ... appointed according to the 
Instructions of His Majesty or by warrant or 
warrants under his Sign Manual and Signet or, 
provisionally, by the Governor in pursuance of 
the power hereby vested in him."^Q
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1713• The Nominated Un-Official Members
Persons not holding public office under the Crown 
on the Island were eligible for nomination by' the 
Governor. The number of such members was limited to 
three.
4. A ’nebulous1 group of Un-Official Members
The Governor was authorized either to nominate or 
to subject to the elective process, four seats
•I r y p
representing; Muslims (l), Kandyans (2) and Indians
1 70
(l). Where the Governor in the Executive Council so
decided, the Order-in-Council laid down the procedures
174to be adopted in preparing for such an election.
Ill. (c) The Elected Un-Official Members^^
Ceylon was divided into sixteen constituencies 
each one returning one member. Of the sixteen there
1 1 7 1 7  1 7 0
were two 'interest seats' and three 'communal seats'.
Each category was subjected to separate voting registers
compiled in such a way as to represent the respective
category of voters those elected would represent in the
179Legislative Council. The eleven remaining seats were
.
distributed among the nine Provinces, one seat for
each Province except the Western Province, which was
given two seats. The eleventh seat was given to the
l8lTown of Colombo - the capital city.
The immediate reaction to this composition of the 
Legislative Council was that the creation of communal 
seats diverged from the non-sectarian aspirations of 
the Ceylon National Congress. While reserving the 
discussion of the impact of this divergence upon the 
Ceylonese society for a later stage in this chapter,
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it must be said at once that Sir William Manning, the
Governor, harboured a cunning reason lor this grand
design. Relying on a secret communication from Manning
to Lord Devonshire, the then Secretary of State’ for the
182Colonies, dated l4th August 1922, Fernando wrote:
"This package of reform was, to say the least, 
surprising. The principle of communal represent­
ation had been extended and a new communal 
principle - balance of power — introduced into 
the Constitution. Though the ostensible reason 
for the measures was safeguarding the minorities, 
they had actually been introduced unasked for; 
when no single recognised body of minority elites 
had requested them; and indeed, when the organiza­
tion of the united elite groups - the Ceylon 
National Congress - had actually agitated for the 
abolition of such measures. The Governor himself, 
in a later secret despatch, provided a reason that 
must have been obvious to the elites: that
communal representation and the balance of power 
were essential and territorial electorates 
intolerable, as otherwise the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils could unite against the Government, a 
situation which to the Governor would have been 
a ’very unsatisfactory state of affairs and one 
which would be greatly resented*
The practicality of the well known principle of
’Divide et Xmpera1 appears to have governed the
184articulation of these new Reforms. Wilson has worked 
^ ~ " I85
out four possible ways by which a legislative measure 
could be carried out under the new arrangement. From a 
purely practical standpoint, considering Wilson’s 
combinations,ibseems somewhat difficult for the government 
to lose in the Legislative Council. However, in that 
unlikely event, the Order-in-Council provided the 
Governor, by paragraph 52, with a clear remedy; namely 
he could declare ”a Bill, a clause, an amendment, a 
resolution or a vote to be of paramount importance.’’
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If* he does so, then such a provision:
” ••. shall be deemed to have been passed 
by the Council if a majority of the votes 
of such ex-officio members and nominated 
official members are recorded in favour of 
any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution 
or vote.»l86
The Governor now could give assent to such a provision, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was in fact adopted by
1 O rj
no more than eight votes in a Council of thirty- 
188eight. At a basic level of analysis the Reforms were
to produce a veil of democracy hiding a monumental
strategy for non-participatory rule. It was to create
communal power blocks which, like the pawns upon a chess
board, were to be utilised to play a game of moves and
counter moves calculated in a way that * the King1 could
189never be 1 checked1. Wilson has further indicated 
the communal composition of the Legislative Council:
(l) Indian (3 ) Ceylon Tamils
(1) Muhammaden (3 ) Europeans
(2 ) Burghers (ll) Low-country Sinhalese
(2) Kandyans
A total of 23*
These twenty-three members could be further divided into 
four categories:
1• The Nominated Un-Official Members 
In this group were: Indian (l), Muslim (l), Burgher (l),
Ceylon Tamil (l), Low-country Sinhalese (l), Kandyan 
Sinhalese (2 ). (A total of seven).
2. Those Elected to Represent Special Interests 
In this group were: European (l),^^ Low-country Sinhalese
(l)."*"^ (A total of two).
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3. Those Elected As Representatives of Communal
Electorates
In this group belonged: Burgher (l); European (2).
(A total of three),
h . Those Elected Along Provincial Lines
192
In this group belonged: Low-country Sinhalese (9)
and Ceylon Tamils (2).^^^ (A total of eleven).
This gives the break-down of the twenty-three 
un-official members of the Council. The complexities 
arising out of the various interests and groups they 
represented were sufficient to keep the un-official 
members constantly divided. In addition the power given 
to the Governor to re—nominate the seven un—officials, 
together with the power to remove them, affected their 
independence considerably. Paragraph 8 of the Order—in- 
Council read:
"The Nominated Members of the Council shall 
hold their seats until the next dissolution 
of the Council after their appointment, 
unless previously removed ... or suspended 
by the Governor under the power for that 
purpose hereby vested in him, but may be 
re-appointed . v
It is unnecessary to emphasise the outcry which these 
new reforms generated, both inside and outside the
I95
Legislative Council. These have been well documented.
The demand was made of the Governor by 19^3 asking him 
to carry out his promise to review these 'temporary 
provisions1 at an early date. The Ceylon (Legislative
-I Q /T
Council) Order-in-Council of 1923, which came into 
effect on February l6th, 1924 was the government's 
response to these demands.
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IV. The Manning Reforms (1924-1931)
(a) The Reforms
Sir William Manning*s tenure of office w a s •an
unusually long one. It lasted for seven years,
1918-1925. The major event of his period in office was
constitutional reform. His 'Temporary Constitution* of
1921 had been calamitous. The changes which he recommended
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1923 also
proved disastrous. The disaster was to cause a rift
between the two communities - Sinhalese and the Tamils —
to such an extent that it reversed and frustrated the
efforts taken by the Ceylon National Congress to forge a
unified nation with a cohesive society. As later events
were to show, had the British Government acted in support
of the position taken by the Ceylon National Congress,
the next quarter century leading up to Independence could
have brought the two communities to a position of amity.
But the whole purpose of these Reforms, as secretly 
197conceded by Manning, was to divide the nation and rule 
thereby. The Order-in— Coi ju ?il of 1923 > which introduced 
the 'Manning Reforms*, succeeded in reforming the provisions 
of the Temporary Constitution to divide the nation further.
The 1923 provisions basically preserved the existing 
constitutional model with the Governor, the Executive 
Council and the Legislative Council. The Reforms merely 
enlarged the membership of the Legislative Council and 
in so doing shifted the balance of communal representa­
tion in a manner in which new social dimensions became 
added to the existing social formations. Until these 
could be considered later what is necessary at this 
stage is to state the nature of the Reforms introduced 
by Manning.
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First: The new Legislative Council was enlarged
to 50, from the previous 38 members. Of the 
fifty there were to be twelve official members, 
with the Governor making a total of thirteen. In 
addition there were to be thirty seven un-official 
members .-*-99
Second; As under the previous model, there were
to be two categories of official members — the
ex-officio members^^ and the nominated official
m e m b e r s . ^ O l  While the ex-officio members remained
the same in number as those granted under the
1920 model, the number of nominated official 
o c % omembers'-^ suffered a reduction of two, from nine, 
resulting in seven.
Third: The thirty seven un-official members, as
before belonged to several categories. There 
were three persons whom the Governor could nominate 
as before, and under similar conditions, ^ 3  from 
the Muslim faith.204 The Governor could either 
appoint them or have them elected from among the 
Muslim community. Further, there were two
persons from the Indian Community, whom the Governor^^ 
could either appoint or have elected to the Council. 
There were three European representations representing 
European Urban, Rural and Commercial interests.
Further, there were three un—official members 
nominated by the Governor. There were two representa­
tives from the Eurgher community and one from the 
Ceylon Tamils in the Western Province. A total of 
fourteen representatives drawn from special interest 
groups. And lastly, there were the twenty-three 
persons to be elected frcm defined constituencies.
This third Reform suppressed the appointment of two Kandyan 
Sinhalese members as was recognised under the 1920 model.
In its place the number of Muslim representations had 
been increased from one to three and the Indian representa­
tion from one to two. The elected membership had gone up 
from sixteen to twenty-nine.
Fourth: While enlarging the elected membership
on the Council, the Manning Reforms increased 
the former Northern Provincial seat from one to 
f i v e , 2 0 o  thus enlarging the Tamil membership on 
the Council. In addition the Reforms created a 
reserved Tamil seat in the Western Province,
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to represent those Tamil persons who may 
be "resident in that Province". Further
the former Eastern Provincial seat which 
returned a Tamil member was split into two,*' 
so that it could now return two Tamil members. 
These divisions became serious concerns for 
the Sinhalese majority during the years 
following the introduction of this new 
arrangement.
211Fifth: The North Western Province. the—■■ ' ■ ' 212
Central Province ^ and the Southern 
Province^l3 were each divided into two. A 
seat each for the Negombo District,2l4 
Kalutara District,^15 Kegalle District, 
and Ratnapura District^!? were added, thus 
increasing the Sinhalese representation, too.
The Low Country Produce Association, however, 
lost their representation, a preserve of the 
Sinhalese majority* But the Colombo town seat 
was split into three seats.218 There was no 
change in the European,219 Burgher220 and 
commercial221 representation. The commercial 
representation was drawn222 from the Ceylon 
Chamber of Commerce, which was dominated by 
the European Mercantalists. Their representative 
accordingly came from the European population on 
the Island.
223Sixth: The former clause concerning "questions
of paramount importance" was widely drafted. In 
the present arrangement, paragraph LIV (l) read:
"If the Governor is of opinion that 
the passing of any Bill ... is of 
paramount importance he may declare such 
Bill ... to be of paramount importance 
... either before or after the votes of 
the members are taken.u 2 2 k
Where such a declaration was made, then
"Any such Bill ... shall be deemed to 
have been passed by the Council if a 
majority of the votes of such ex—officio 
members and nominated official members 
are recorded in favour of any such Bill
»f
# 225
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The effect of this provision is clear. Whenever 
a measure proposed by the Governor is voted down by 
the Council, he could thereafter declare that measure 
to be fa question of paramount importance*. There­
after, no further vote is required, if it appears that
/ 226a majority of the ex-officio members (six including
the Governor) together with the nominated unofficial
227
members (seven ) had supported the measure. Seven 
affirmative votes from these two quarters would, there­
fore, suffice to override a decision made by the rest 
of the membership of forty?-three members. Under the
228Temporary Constitution the Government required eight,
but now, under the Reforms, the Government required only
seven. This, notwithstanding the fact that the total
membership of the Legislative Council had been enlarged
from 38 to 30 under the new Dispensations. The reduction
229of the number of nominated Unofficial Members from nine 
230to seven was not in fact a concession to the demands of 
the Ceylon National Congress for more representative 
membership, but a further strengthening of the Government1s 
position in getting legislative measures passed through 
the Council*
The basic criticism made about the previous model 
being a veil for non-participatory government appears to 
hold for these subsequent Reforms too. These Reforms 
remained in force until the promulgation of the Donoughmore 
Constitution in 19319 spanning a period of seven years. 
These seven years may be regarded as some of the more 
momentous years in the history of Ceylon, and have had a 
deep influence on the path taken towards Independence and 
beyond. The nature of the social formations during, and 
as a result of, the "Manning Reforms" requires a whole 
new programme of investigation. The attempt made in the
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next section is merely to outline the social consequences 
of the Manning Reforms in so far as they could be regarded 
as having a bearing on later constitutional development.
It is within that limited framework that the next section 
is approached.
IV. (b) The Social Consequences of the 
Manning Reforms
Historically, the 1920 Temporary Constitution of 
Manning and his 1923 Reforms could be treated as two 
distinct steps towards constitutional development. But 
in effect they were both an integral part of an overall 
strategy for colonial development through effective 
government. In that sense the social consequences 
arising out of both the 1920 and the 1923 Dispensations 
form a part of a continuous social movement towards 
increasing polarisation of the society along communal 
and linguistic lines. The fact that these kinds of 
divisions were to arise as early as in 1920, nearly 
three decades before Independence, and to continue 
unabated for the next 30 years bode ill for the nation* 
Concomitantly, this type of social formation should 
explain the post-Independence, thrust of the nationalist 
forces for fundamental social changes in Ceylon. There 
are a number of strategies which appear to be emerging 
from the two dispensations in the form of distant ripples 
but capable of turning, in time, into tidal waves. It is 
to these that the present section will be devoted.
231The formation of the Ceylon National Congress in 
1919, by the amalgamation of the Ceylon Reform League and 
the Ceylon National Association may have appeared as a 
frightening spectacle for Manning, • particularly with 
Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam at its helm. As President of 
the Association, he had brought together the progressive
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forces of the Jaffna Association and the Sinhalese
Members of the 'new elite* into a common front. This
necessarily meant a potential block of nearly 80^ o of
the population lined up t o g e t h e - r  against the Government.
232Manning, by creating two communal seats' for the 
Kandyans in the 1920 Dispensations, to be nominated by 
him, drove a wedge through the Sinhalese ranks. Between 
1920 and 1923, by a series of swift but skilful moves, 
he succeeded in neutralising the Kandyan lobby. He 
thereby limited the scope of the National Congress to 
the Low—Country., Having succeeded by using the carrot — 
their two seats in the 1920 Legislative Council - in 
alienating Kandyans from their Low—Country brethren, he 
thereafter proceeded to abandon them in the 1923 
Dispensations by suppressing these two communal seats. 
Therefore, by 1923;the Kandyans were compelled to seek 
an alliance with the Congress, whose members were un­
willing to make any permanent arrangements with them.
At the ensuing elections in 1923> nearly half of
the Kandyan seats were captured by the Low-country
Sinhalese; despite a hastily-drawn agreement with the
Congress that the seats in the Kandyan provinces should
233not be contested by their members. By 1924 Manning's
skill had brought the Kandyans to the point of asking
for separate representation and by 1927 to a claim for
23 hregional autonomy. This was Divide et Impera
carried to the point of success.
As for the Tamils, Manning's approach was differently 
conceived. He pushed to the extreme two conflicting 
principles of constitutionalism. On the one hand he 
pushed for territorial electorates. This was fundamental 
to the Congress policy. On the other hand he subscribed 
to a policy of balancing power through specially created
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communal seats, so that the majority could not dominate
the minorities by the sheer weight of numbers. This not
only attracted the Tamil's both within and. without the
Congress but other minorities as well — the Muslims and
the Indian Tamils. However, the latter policy was
clearly against the policies of the National Congress.
Pulled from the direction of the Jaffna Association,
Sir Arunachalam and his Tamil colleagues within the
Congress demanded that the Congress hierachy supported
the creation of a Tamil Communal Seat in the Western
Province. This was a via media which could keep the
Tamil members in the Congress together and without any
loss of face with their brethren in Jaffna. As a
question of principle, the majority of the Congress was
unwilling to make this concession. Sir Arunachalam and
his Tamil colleagues accusing their Sinhalese colleagues
235of a breach of faith left the Congress to form the 
Tamil Mahajana Sabhai in August 1921. Commenting on the 
gravity of this breach, Professor de Silva wrotes
"It is no exaggeration to state that Arunachalam1s 
break with the Congress inflicted on it a blow 
from which it never recovered. The Ceylon National 
Congress had prided itself on the fact that the 
twin principles of communal harmony and national 
unity were the foundations on which it bad been 
built. But within two years of its establishment 
the Congress was torn apart ... and was soon 
reduced to a hard core of low—country Sinhalese 
activists."237
To complete this polarisation of the two major communities
on the Island, Manning gave the Tamils a communal seat
2
in the Western Province in 1923. The resulting anger
239among the Sinhalese became self-perpetuating leading, 
as it has happened today, to regrettable ethnic conflicts. 
The question was asked how the government justified the 
creation of a special communal seat for the Tamils in 
the Western Province, when their population in that
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Province was only 2 k , 6 0 0 ,  while ignoring the 51,900
240Moors and the Indians who lived there. A special
Sinhalese communal seat for the 27,000 Sinhalese
24lliving in the Eastern Province was not even considered.
The polarisation of the two communities and the policies
of both Manning and his successor Sir Hugh Clifford
helped to fan the fires of communal discord during the
242succeeding years. Sir Hugh, the historians have
found to be patent in his attitude of favour towards the
243Tamils. Fernando has quoted one of Sir Hugh's 
Despatches to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
in which he described the Tamils as:
"among the most thrifty, diligent, enterprising 
and intelligent of Oriental peoples. In their 
own country (Jaffna) they devote unremitting 
labour to the intensive cultivation of land 
that is none too fertile and of which Sinhalese 
peasants would be able to make very little." 2 k k
The National Congress being in disarray, the
Sinhalese forces found a hard core of Sinhala-educated
nationalists as their rallying point; particularly during
the years leading up to the arrival of the Donoughmore
Commission on the Island in 1927. The Sinhala Jatiya
(the Sinhalese Race) newspaper, edited by Mr. Piyadasa
Sirisena, a Sinhalese scholar, formed the centre for
Sinhalese protests. Once the leadership of the protest
group passed from the leaders of the Ceylon National
Congress, communal battle lines began to take a different
form. It became crude, direct and irreversible. There
was thereafter nothing of the sophistication of the 'new
elite'. The battles were less subtle, less discrete and
less indirect. As a poignant example; Sirisena brought
245out his literary classic, the novel Maheswari.
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In it he devoted a whole chapter to a comparison between 
the racial characteristics of the Aryans and of the 
Dravidians - the Aryans always coming on top. In a 
telling conclusion, written in verse, Sirisena. moving 
swiftly from a condemnation of the Dravidians to a 
devastating attack on the Tamils, warned his readers:
OSa <§cfx2)c3 £ 8>
c2>80 Qg jjj
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(The ancient pundits have declared that no Tamil except the dead 
Tamil, the- Tamil yet to be born and the Tamil on a mural should ever 
be trusted.)
It is important to note that the protest group was 
no longer using the medium of English, as the Congress 
did, but the vernacular. This necessarily helped in the 
succeeding years to draw in the mass of the people on 
the periphery into the mass nationalist movement. Once 
mobilised in the twenties, the movement, as a significant 
social consequence of the policies inaugurated by Governor 
Manning, was to steer the country through various stages 
of reform into a total transformation of Sri Lankan 
society in the seventies. Their success with the 
Donoughmore Commission was to strengthen their resolve 
and surely their ranks. The polarisation of the two 
communities, as years went by, became institutionalised, 
both by political policies and legislative enactments*
This in fact is the core of the post-Independence portion 
of this writing. What has been said above forms the 
centre of the social problem created by Manning. But 
there were others too.
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The property qualifications coupled with the
literacy qualifications which Manning introduced in
247 248both the 1920 and in the 1923 Dispensations
restricted the franchise to a very small portion of
24Qthe population. Professor Mills ' fixed the number
of those qualified to vote under the 1923 Dispensations
at 204,997 out of a population of 4,498,605, a mere
4.5^ of the population. Where, inter alia. the
property qualification was satisfied, the potential
voter needed merely the ability to read in one of the
languages English, Sinhalese or Tamil, to have his name
included in the voters list. Females and those under
21 were excluded. But a further qualification was
required from those who aspired to represent the
204,997 persons in the Legislature. This was the
250ability to read and write English. This was justified
upon the grounds that English was the official language. 
For practical purposes, such an additional requirement 
could clearly be justified. But it must be said that 
the result was to isolate a group of persons who could 
form a ruling elite for independent Ceylon. If the 
Order-in—Council had limited the membership in the 
Legislative Council to those with an ability to read 
and write English, purely as a practical measure, no 
real criticism could be made against this aspect of the 
Reforms. For it would have drawn in some from the 
country's economic periphery who through conversion or 
otherwise had obtained an Anglo-vernacular missionary 
education, and therefore, would be proficient in the 
English Language. But by linking literacy in English 
with a property qualification, the Government was making 
membership in the Legislative Council a very restrictive 
one* Not only was the Government, according to Professor 
Mills, restricting the franchise to 4.5^ of the population, 
but was also restricting further the eligibility to stand 
for elections to a smaller group of elitists who were 
earmarked to become the future rulers of Ceylon.
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Xt is to this aspect that the Donoughmore 
Commissioners paid particular attention. The combined 
effect of these two provisions was to leave at least 
9 C>°/o of the population frustrated and angry. Xt is from 
their ranks that the future collaborators for social 
change were in fact recruited.
As a strategy for colonial development the 1923 
Reforms were effective. The communal representation 
in the new Legislative Council took the following form:
Number of Seats
(16)251 
( 8 f - 2  
( a)253
( 3 ) 2 5 k  
( 3)255'
( I)256
257In addition there were six ex-officio members,
258seven nominated official members and three nominated
259un-official members. By Article X of the Dispensation
the nominated member of either category held office until 
the 'next dissolution of the Legislative Council*, 
resignation, death or suspension by the Governor. He 
could, however, be re-appointed without restriction, at 
the absolute discretion of the Governor. This necessarily 
meant that the Governor could rely on the votes of the ten 
nominated members to support him, for their re—appointment 
depended on the Governor*s patronage.
According to the above configuration two interesting 
patterns emerge. Upon the "balance of power" principle, 
which was designed to protect minorities from majorities, 
the sheer weight of 6 j ° / o  of the Sinhalese was effectively 
checked by the 17 seats held by the five minority groups,
Community
Sinhalese
Tamil
Indians
Mohammad ens
Europeans
Burgher
- 2 3 k -
the Sinhalese in fact holding one less. This would be 
an effective means of drawing the Tamils away from the 
Sinhalese. For, if the Sinhalese and the Tamils had 
succeeded in forging a voting axis in the Legislative 
Council, then, together with their combined strength 
of 2k , they could have drawn in the support of the three 
Mohammadens and the two Indians to swell their ranks to 
29, giving the ’Native block’ an overwhelming majority.
It is this that Manning and his successors feared most.
The Muslims, with the Buddhist-Muslim riots of 1915 fresh 
in their minds, considered the Tamils their allies and 
the Sinhalese their enemies. The Indians, with their 
cultural and linguistic affiliations, took the Tamils 
into their confidence. The Tamils, therefore, knew 
that they held the key to the hearts and the minds of 
the Governors. With the spectre of the Rebellions of 
1818 and 18^8 the Governors were reluctant to trust the 
Sinhalese. Moreover, the Sinhalese nationalists were 
clear as to what they wanted: they wanted Independence*
The Tamils, however, remained aloof from the Independence 
struggle, for they felt secure under British rule. This 
indeed was a favourable trend, politically, from the 
British standpoint. Another is that, if, by some miracle, 
the ’native vote got crystallised into a single axis 
against the British’, then Article LIV gave the Governor 
the means to push legislation through as "questions of 
paramount importance". The enlarged provisions of 
Article LIV, to which reference has been made before, 
would give the British government the ability to have 
measures passed into law, provided that a majority of 
the ex—officio members and the nominated official members 
had voted in favour of these measures — a total of seven 
votes in the Government’s favour sufficed.
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It is important to recall that in 1833> when 
the common.Reforms of Judicial administration were 
introduced, the judicial powers hitherto exercised 
by the British Governors were suppressed and they 
were transferred totally to the judiciary headed by 
the Chief Justice. It appears now that as a not too 
insufficient quid-pro—quo the Governors1 executive 
powers in fact enlarged and had steadily continued 
to enlarge, commencing from the Colebrooke Reforms 
of 1833* The Manning Reforms represented the highest 
point achieved in constitutional development in 
Ceylon within a restrictive franchise. The next 
logical step was the introduction of the principle 
of Universal adult suffrage which marked a new 
chapter in colonial constitutional development.
This grand step was taken in 1931 by the introduction 
of what has become to be known as the Donoughmore 
Constitution.
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CHAPTER 6
Constitutionalism ( 2 )  z 
The Donoughmore Reforms - The Beginnings 
of Universal Adult Suffrage in Ceylon
I • Towards the Donoughmore Reforms
The Donoughmore Reforms became a necessary next
step in Constitutional development, after Manning.
The next step must be conceived within three broad
categories of development. First, the social
consequences resulting by 1 9 2 7 *’*’ and certainly by 
2
1 9 3 1 9 out of the creation of communal representation,
had left an indelible impression on the inter-communal
relations on the Island. The Donoughmore Reforms,
therefore, were necessarily aimed towards reversing
this trend. The abolition of communal seats and the
introduction of a territorial principle of representa-
tion was their first step. Besides this, the Reforms
inaugurated a form of government which required communal
inter-dependence for its effective implementation. The
system.of Executive Committees was therefore introduced.
Second, the social formations resulting out of the elitism
3
generated by the Manning Reforms needed changing. The 
exclusion of females from voting was considered 
retrogressive. The Donoughmore Commission, therefore, 
recommended universal adult franchise, a privilege which 
was unknown to any other Third-World British dependency 
in 1931* Third, none of the Reforms between Colebrooke 
and Manning afforded the un-official members of 
legislature an opportunity to govern; they held no 
Executive positions. They were advisory, consultative
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or legislative in their functions. It was thought
that unless the un-official members, who were in 1931
territorially elected by a non-communal voting system
were given Executive or Ministerial powers the reforms
which the Commissioners recommended would stop short
of reaching a fundamental point of constitutional
development; namely advancing participation in the
governmental process as a step towards Statehood.
After all, universal adult suffrage which the
Commissioners recommended, would.have increased the
electorate from 204,997 to 2 ,1 7 5 > 0 0 0 , a more represent—
k
ative a figure. Therefore, every indicia for 
representative government was at hand. The Donoughmore 
Constitution passed through this gateway and in doing 
so resulted in leaving seven portfolios in the hands erf 
the un-official members of the State Council, which 
in fact was the equivalent of the former Legislative 
Council. The portfolios of Finance, Justice and Foreign 
Affairs were left in the hands of the ex-officio members. 
To make the issue of inter-communal dependence more 
concrete the Donoughmore Commissioners introduced a form 
of secret balloting to select the members who would form 
the seven Executive Committees, leaving it to the.members 
of each Committee to select their, own Chairperson, who 
would be the Minister in charge of that portfolio. The 
Governor was kept entirely out of this process. Within 
these three broad parameters the Donoughmore Constitution 
was introduced in 1 9 3 1 *
5
II. The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931
Basic to the recommendations made by the Donoughmore 
Commission was the atmosphere which the Commissioners 
found in Ceylon in 1927. Sir Charles Jeffries, the last 
Colonial Secretary of Ceylon, wrote:
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"The Donoughmore Commission testified with 
affecting sincerity to the warmth of the 
welcome which it received oh all hands from 
the kindly people of Ceylon. But the political 
atmosphere in which its investigations were 
conducted was one of frustration and tension.
Basic to all the rest was the tension between 
official government and representatives of the 
electorate. In an ideal world, populated by 
angels, the 1 9 2 k  Constitution might have worked; 
but the people of Ceylon were, after all, human 
beings, and so indeed were the British Officials, 
even if they were sometimes described as "heaven 
born". Though this was far from the intention of 
the designers, the Constitution was in fact framed 
in such a way as to exacerbate rather than to 
alleviate differences of outlook and interest",^
O
By an Order-in-Council of the 20th March,.1931*
which became effective on the 15th April, 1931> The
Donoughmore Constitution replaced the Manning Reforms of
1923. The Constitution itself.had been the.subject of
9
many comments by other writers. Therefore, it is not 
intended to discuss the Reforms in detail here, but to 
show their relevance .to the social problems created by the 
previous Constitution.
One of the key elements in the previous Constitution
was the number of ex-officio and nominated official
m e m b e r s . T h e  Donoughmore Commissioners recommended,
and the British government accepted, that this government
group should be to a large measure reduced. The Constitu-
11tion of 1931 reduced that number to three, allowing
representation for the Colonial Secretary, the Legal
Secretary and the Financial Secretary as the three
official members in the new State Council. The change of
name of the legislative body from 'Legislative Council' to
12the 'State Council' was not merely a matter of 
nomenclature but of psychological significance. For one 
thing the 'Legislative Council', a term used from the
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’Colebrooke1 to the 'Manning' Dispensations, was
associated with systems which had not proved conducive
to social cohesion. For another, the framework within
which the Reforms were conceived was meant to be the
last step before 'Statehood', and therefore, this would
be, as indeed it was, the body that would negotiate the
next stage of Constitutional advance which would
transform Ceylon from a dependent Colony to an Independent
State. A point of some discontent over the previous
Dispensations was the Governor's position in the
13Legislative Council as its President, having both an
14originating vote and a.casting vote. The Donoughmore 
Commission recommended, and the government accepted, 
that the.Governor should be removed from the legislative 
assembly. This separation was significant in at least 
two respects. It indicated his position as the represent­
ative of the.Sovereign and it also indicated the proximity 
to Statehood, in which the legislature would include the 
Governor-General acting in the role of the Sovereign, 
constitutionally, with all powers, legislative and 
executive, left in substance to the elected representatives 
of the people. Therefore, it seemed necessary to remove 
the Governor from the forum of the elected representatives, 
leaving the government's representation to the three 
ex-officio members mentioned above, at this penultimate 
stage before Independence. This necessarily required two 
adjustments. First, by Article 30(l) of the 1931* 
Order-in-Council, it was required that a speaker be elected 
at the first meeting of the State Council, who would preside 
at its meetings. Provision was made by Article 3 0 (2 ) to 
have a Deputy-Speaker, a Chairman of Committees and a 
Deputy Chairman elected. Article 30 further laid down 
that each of these offices could be held by elected members
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of the Council only, thus excluding the ex-officio 
members from holding such offices. Second, by the
1 5
Second Schedule to the Order-in-Council, all matters
regarding the maintenance of the Colonial status of
the country, for which the Governor was responsible,
was distributed among the three ex—officio members.
Schedule One, however, laid down matters which were
of local content for which the elected representatives
of the people, and ministers drawn from their ranks,
were made responsible. By Article 33(2) the Governor,
with the.approval of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, was empowered to expand the ambit of the
Second Schedule, provided that in doing so he does not
alter the matters left to the elected representatives
16under Schedule One of the Order-in-Council. The latter 
powers were, in a sense, 'entrenched1 in the Order.
The total effect of these provisions, clearly, was
to reduce considerably the powers which the Governors
had under the Manning Reforms. Under both.the 1921 and
the 1923 Dispensations the Governors could, by declaring
a matter 'to be a question of Paramount Importance* have
his measures passed into Law with a fictitious 
17"majority". By denying the Governor a position in the 
State Council, that facility was taken away from him, 
under the new Reforms. The three ex-officio members 
might, without the support of the elected members, find 
it impossible to carry out the policies necessary to 
maintain the colonial status. The result, therefore, 
could be a dead-lock which could even lead to the 
suspension of the Constitution, thus reversing the 
progression towards Statehood. The Commissioners were 
clearly concerned about this difficulty. They said:
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"The position of the Governor must be 
consistent with the type of constitution 
which we contemplate. If the new 
Constitution is effectively to transfer 
to the elected representatives a large 
measure of responsibility the retention 
unaltered of the Governor's powers would 
be inappropriate; if on the other hand the 
Constitution will not be equivalent to the 
grant of full responsible government it 
would be illogical to place the Governor in 
the position of the constitutional head of 
such a government. The change then in the 
position of the Governor must accord with 
the degree to which responsibility is to 
be transferred, and his executive powers 
must be diminished in direct ratio to the 
advance made towards responsible government.
... It follows then that the executive 
responsibility of the Governor must be 
pro tanto diminished. But here we are faced 
with a paradox. For with every transference 
of responsibility to representative organs 
the Governor must be given such additional 
reserve powers as will enable him to see 
that this responsibility is not wrongly 
exercised. These reserve powers will 
represent one form of safeguard, which will 
operate if and when the principles of the 
Constitution should be infringed ... *"18
The government needed an alternative to suspension
of the Constitution if and when the elected representatives
overlooked the fact that the country was still a Colony.
In case they were inclined to use their block vote to
frustrate the Colonial Administration of the Island, then
the Governor needed alternative means to pass essential
legislations into Law. As an exception to the general
provision laid down in Article 72 of the Order-in-Council,
that "it shall be lawful for the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Council, to make laws for the peace,
19
order, and good government of the Island", the government 
introduced in.Article 22 an alternative method for 
enacting Laws. It reads:
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"If the Governor shall consider that it 
is of paramount importance to the public 
interest, or essential to give effect to 
any of the provisions of the Order, that 
any Bill, motion, resolution, or vote which 
the Council is empowered to pass, in the 
exercise of either its legislative or 
executive functions, should have effect, 
then in such case, notwithstanding any of 
the provisions of this Order or of any 
Standing Orders under this Order:
(a) it shall be lawful for any 
officer of State acting by the authority 
and under the instructions of the Governor, 
to propose any such Bill, motion, resolution, 
or vote to the Council and the same shall 
have priority over all other business of the 
Council;
(b) the Governor may declare that any 
such Bill or any such motion, resolution, or 
vote is of paramount importance or is essential 
to give effect to the provisions of this Order, 
and there upon such Bill, part of a Bill, motion, 
resolution, or vote shall have effect as if it 
had been passed by the Council. Such declaration 
may be made by the Governor by message addressed 
to the Speaker or by an Officer of State, acting 
by the authority and on the instructions of the 
Governor, either before or after the votes of
the members have been taken."20
The transcribing of this section in full is 
justified by its importance as a means for avoiding a 
deadlock between the elected representatives of the people 
and the Colonial Administration. While removing the 
Governor from the State Council under the new reforms, his 
lines of access to it were preserved in case of need. The 
three ex-officio members or the Speaker provided him with 
access to the new Council. Measures required to preserve 
the effectiveness of the Order-in-Council could now be 
assured of a clear and swift passage into Law, without even 
having to be put to a vote. This appears to have followed 
the Commission's recommendation that in the event of having:
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"a council in which the elected element 
has been enlarged and the official element 
reduced to the three officers of State . .. 
we consider that the power to enact * essential 
legislation should rest absolutely in the 
Governor himself and that no voting on the 
Bill should be required,1^
The elected members, however, had seven days after the
Governor's declaration under Article 22, to make their
22opposition known. This was required to be in writing
23and was required to be lodged with the Governor. The 
Governor was required to forward both the declaration and 
the submissions made in opposition, thereof, to the
2k
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Xt is the latter
25who had the ultimate authority to decide on this issue 
as on all other matters concerning legislation. Patently^ 
this would be an ineffective means of opposing the policies 
of the government. The provisions appear to fall in line 
with the pragmatism shown by the Commissioners, who conceded
The Commissioners found that the Reforms would place 
Ceylon at an intermediate stage between a Colony in the 
full sense of the word and a fully Independent State
The importance of these constitutional changes 
regarding the position of the Governor is that they placed 
on record that the next stage of constitutional development 
for Ceylon must bring about Independence and Statehood.
that:
"As a country ascends the scale of self- 
government it is inevitable that the 
powers of the Governor should be gradually 
restricted ... . " 0 r
and therefore "the assignment
27an intermediate status is ... justifiable."© • •
It was this that provided both the need, and the 
framework of reference, for the Soulbury Commission 
of 1946. Communal representation and its social 
consequences were indeed the principal causes for 
discontent under the Manning Reforms too. Alluding 
to this issue the Commissioners wrote:
"It was generally admitted, even by many 
Communal representatives themselves that 
the communal form of appointment to the 
Legislative Council was a necessary evil 
and should only continue until conditions 
of friendliness and acknowledgement of 
common aims were developed among the 
different communities. It is our opinion, 
however, that the very existence of 
communal representation tends to prevent 
the development of these relations, and 
that only by its abolition will it be 
possible for the various diverse communities 
to develop together a true national unity.'^g
Having thus structured a framework for their
recommendations, the Commission set out a plan which
could, in theory, have brought the varying communities
on the Island together in a more effective way than by
stopping at the mere refutation of the principle of
Communal representation. In theory their plan, borrowed
29from the London County Council Constitution, was a
method of government through Executive Committees, which
could have effectively erased the type of communal
friction which was an inevitable consequence of the
Manning Constitution. In practice, the influence
exerted by various nationalist groups which had erupted
during the Manning Reforms continued to function as
powerful influences for the Sinhalese nationalist cause,
thus keeping the communal fires burning until Independence
30and even beyond. It is this single factor which to a 
large extent contributed towards frustrating the efforts 
made by the Donoughmore Commission towards a genuine 
reconciliation of communal conflicts.
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III. Government by Executive Committees — The 
Donoughmore Model
The system of government through Executive '
31Committees proposed by the Commission introduced a 
new model of constitutionalism for Ceylon. At no 
stage, from Colebrooke to Manning had such a system 
been practised.on the Island. The later constitutional 
models of 19^6 , 1972 and 1978 had no reference to the 
Executive Committee system of government. In that sense 
what the Donoughmore Commissioners introduced was a 
short-lived instrument which fulfilled a need within the 
socio-political context prevailing at the time in 
question. The need was to break away from the past 
constitutional models, which had been associated with 
retrogression and regression. The purpose was to work 
out a modus operandi by which the varying communities 
could be brought together by a process of interdependence.
The method was this. Soon after the elections to.
the State Council were completed, at its first meeting,
op oo
the members, (50 elected, 8 nominated and 3 ex—
34 \officio members ; sixty-one in all met to elect a 
35speaker. Having done that,
"the Council shall elect by secret ballot 
from among its members seven Executive 
Committees each of which shall be charged 
... with the administration ... of such 
one of the seven groups of subjects and 
functions specified in the first schedule 
hereto as the Council when electing the 
Committee shall determine«"
The fact that "no member of the Council shall be
og
elected to more than one" Committee necessarily 
excluded the possibility of the Ex-Officio members 
becoming members of Committees other than in those
39that have been delegated to them by the Second Schedule  ^
of the Order-in-Council. In any event their disqualifi­
cations from the seven Committees was expressed in
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Article 34(2) of the Order. It is also provided that 
if any of the members of the seven Committees under the 
first schedule became elected to the posts of Speaker
/ 4lV in succession to the first Speaker of each State
Council), Deputy Speaker or Deputy Chairman of Committees,
then he must vacate his membership in the Committee to
42which he belongs. The aforementioned.offices were
43reserved for the elected members, and, therefore, any 
elections to those offices would affect the composition 
only of the seven Committees carrying the responsibilities
44given to them under the First Schedule. It is important 
to note that the election of "a Deputy Speaker and 
Chairman of Committees (herein called the Deputy Speaker)
45and the Deputy Chairman of Committees” was to take 
place after the election of the Executive Committees.
This made it possible for the largest number of State 
Council members to participate in this elective process.
As the composition of the State Council was such that an 
equal distribution of members on each of the seven 
Committees was rendered impossible, Article 34(2) says:
"Each Committee shall contain as nearly as 
possible an equal number of members and every 
member of the Council, except the Speaker and 
the Officers of State, shall be elected to one 
of such Committees.”^
As soon as the Executive Committees were formed,
each Committee, voting separately and by secret ballot,
47
selected a Chairman from among its members. The 
Chairman of each Committee was thereafter appointed 
a Minister in charge of the particular subjects and 
functions given to that Committee by the First Schedule. 
The appointment of Ministers from Chairman of Committees 
was a power left to the Governor in his capacity as the
48Soveriegn's representative. The Governor, in addition,
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had a residual power to refuse such an appointment, in 
which case the Committee in question was required to
49select another Chairman for the Governor1s approval.
In outline this was the model introduced by the 
Donoughmore Reforms.
It is important to recognise that from the moment 
the State Councillors met to elect their Speaker and 
until the dissolution of the Council, cooperation and 
inter-dependence became a basic necessity for the 
effective implementation of their individual legislative 
programmes. This cooperation and inter-dependence was 
not limited to the passage of legislation in the State 
Council but extended to keeping the Executive Committees 
together as functional organs of government. All these 
facets of the model necessarily nursed the hope that 
communal positions would become obliterated in time as 
an inevitable element in Ceylon politics. To that *
extent, the manipulative aspects of politics, based « }
more upon foresight and judgment rather than on group 
affiliations and communalism, it was believed, would 
emerge as a result of the Donoughmore Dispensations.
IV. Universal Adult Suffrage: The Franchise under
the Donoughmore Model
The Donoughmore Commission did not restrict their
recommendations to the restructuring of the legislative
and the executive arms of the government. They also
looked down and away from the edifice and at its foundations.
Their recommendations for the reform of the electorate
were radical. They recommended universal adult suffrage
50with one real limitation. They limited the franchise
for males to those who were above the age of 21, and
51for females, to those above 30. Convicts, lunatics, 
non-British subjects and those who had resided on the
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Island for a period of less than five years were
recommended to be disqualified from voting. Besides
the five year qualification, the Commission recommended
a period of six months residence in any electoral
district, during a period of eighteen months immediately
preceding the commencement of the preparation of the
voters1 register, as a pre-requisite for registration as
52
a voter of that electoral district. The Commission,
despite the strong representations made by both the
Ceylon National Congress and the Tamil Maha Sabhai, in
support of the retention of a limited 1 property, income
and literacy* qualification, recommended the complete
53abolition of such tests. This indeed became of great
significance, for universal adult franchise in England,
at the time, in 1925, was still a thoroughly contentious 
54issue. Membership in the State Council required an
additional qualification. Because the English language
was the official language of the country, the Commission
recommended the retention of literacy in English — the
ability to read and write that language — as a basic
additional qualification for membership of the State 
5 5Council. The Donoughmore Report, dated 26th June, 1925 
was published in July of the same year.
The Tamil reaction to the Report resulted in a
massive eruption of passionate disapproval. These have
been described by historians and political scientists.
However, it is important to state that the abolition of
communal representation and the approval of universal
adult franchise were the twin elements which gave rise
to the massive Tamil opposition to the Reforms. In a
58careful analysis of the franchise issue, De Silva has
drawn attention to the fact that the delegations from
59both the Ceylon National Congress and the Tamil
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6 oMahajana Sabhai had opposed universal adult suffrage
for two very different reasons. The Congress had
opposed it on the grounds that a vote given to those
below a particular economic level could lead to
corruption. In their view, such a vote would be freely
available for sale to the highest bidder. The Congress
suggested an income of fifty rupees a month as a proper
yard-stick for the vote. The Tamil delegation, led by
6lSir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, considered universal adult 
suffrage as a guarantee of a permanent position of 
Sinhalese domination in Ceylon politics. The Trade Union 
leader, Mr. A. E. Goonesinha was alone in asserting 
* the need for universal adult suffrage now.1 It is his 
persuasion and that of Dr. Drummond Sheils, the 
representative of the British Labour Party on the 
Commission, which persuaded the Commissioners to recommend 
the introduction of universal adult suffrage in un­
mistakable terms and without any pre-conditions.
The British electorate returned a Labour Administra­
tion in 1929, under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. The liberal- 
minded Sidney Webb, as Lord Passfield, assumed control of 
the Colonial Office. Dr. Sheils became his Under­
secretary of State. There had been changes in the
Colonial Administration in Ceylon too. Sir Hugh Clifford, 
during whose administration the hearings of the Donoughmore
Commission were held, had been replaced by Sir Herbert
62Stanley, an experienced Colonial Administrator.
Clifford*s partiality towards the Tamils and his antipathy 
to the Sinhalese had. become legendary. His departure
deprived the Tamil community of a friend at a time of need.
After a considerable number of exchanges by way of secret
£213
communications between the Colonial Office in London 
and Sir Herbert Stanley, a new constitution based upon 
the Donoughmore recommendations was promulgated by
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Order-in-Council in 1931* The structure of the 
Constitutional model has been previously discussed, except 
the question of the Franchise. The British Government 
accepted the recommendations on the franchise with some 
alterations. On the question of the enfranchisement of 
women, the Commissioners had suggested an age restriction, 
restricting the vote to females of thirty and over. On 
this issue the British Government decided to introduce 
parity between males and females, granting a right to 
vote to both sexes at the age of 21, a provision which the 
women in the United Kingdom had won, after a long and
64sustained struggle, no earlier than 1928. In The Cevlon
6 ^
State Council Elections (Qualification of Voters) Order- 
in-Council of 19319 by Section 6, it was declared that:
”(l) No person shall be qualified to have his 
name entered or retained in any register of 
voters in any year if such person -
!a) is not a British subject; orb) was less than 21 years of age on thefirst day of August in that year; or
(c) has not for a continuous period of six
months in the eighteen months immediately 
prior to the first day of August in that 
year resided in the electoral district to 
which the register relates; or 
d)— (this sub-section excludes convic 
)— (this sub—section excludes lunat: 
f)— (this sub-section excludes those who 
have been convicted of a corrupt or
illegal practice or by reason of the
report of an election judge)-11^
The British Government had made two significant 
departures from the Donoughmore recommendations. They 
had first widened the franchise by making both the men 
and the women eligible to vote at the age of 21. Second, 
the government had abandoned the recommendation of a basic 
residential requirement of five years generally for all.
In its place the Order-in-Council introduced a general 
requirement of domicile:
ts)- 
tics ) —
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"Any person not otherwise disqualified 
/namely under section shall be 
qualified to have his name entered in 
a register of voters if he is domiciled 
in Ceylon."^
While recognizing a domicile of origin in Ceylon, section
7 proceeded to define domicile in terms of a five-year 
68residence. In a sense this amounted to acquisition of
a domicile of choice. For those who might fall outside
either of these two requirements, the Order introduced
two further alternative methods, under which the franchise
could be sought. These were the special * literacy
property, income* qualifications borrowed from the Manning 
69Reforms and a special qualification to vote given by
70’a certificate of permanent settlement*. In the latter
case, subject to certain procedures, a Government Agent
and an Assistant Government Agent were authorized to
grant a certificate of permanent settlement, entitling
the holder of such a certificate to seek registration as
a voter in the electorate in which he resided. By 1941,
it was found that only 2°/o of the total number of Indian
voters had sought the 'Certificate* avenue *to the voter's
register, while the rest had proceeded to have themselves
enrolled by satisfying one or the other of the domicile
71requirements. The Soulbury Commission in 1945 after a 
careful scrutiny of the franchise under the Donoughmore 
Dispensations, recommended their retention. Therefore,
the whole of the franchise qualifications of the
72 73
Order-in-Council of 1931 were re-enacted as the
franchise qualifications for the General Election of
1947# The Election of 1947 was a prelude to Independence
under the Soulbury Constitution, in 1948.
The Donoughmore Constitution had a rough passage 
through the Legislative Council which was sitting under 
the Manning Reforms. As Sir Charles Jeffries remarks:
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"It was touch and go; but, on December 12, 1929, 
the Legislative Council voted by nineteen to 
seventeen in favour of acceptance. The Secretary 
of State had not made any stipulation about the 
strength of the majority, and this vote was accepted 
as decisive. Some members who had opposed the 
scheme protested against it being introduced on so 
slender a margin of acceptance, but the die was 
cast."^
V. The Socio-Political Significance of the Donoughmore 
Constitution
The abolition of communal seats and the introduction
of universal adult suffrage were the two key elements in
the new Constitution. Unfortunately, both these elements
were rejected totally by the Tamil community. The
introduction of universal adult suffrage was clearly a
step in the right direction, increasing the electorate
from 204,997^ under the Manning Reforms to 1,200,539^
under the Donoughmore Reforms. This five-fold expansion
of the electorate must, however, be casted within a
population increase from 4,498,605 in 1921 to 5 ,125,000 
77in 1931.' In the light of the population figures of 
1931, 23.4^ of the population formed the electorate at 
the General Election of that year; which was held to 
elect the members of the first State Council.
TABLE XIV78
Communal Representation in the State Councils 
Elected Under the Donoughmore Constitution
The First 
State Council 
(1931-1936)
The Second 
State Council
(1936-1939)
Community
28 31 Sinhalese 
(Low—country)
10 8 Sinhalese (Kandyan)
3 8 Tamils ( Ceylon)
2 2 Tamils (Indians)
2 1 Europeans
1 0 Mohammadens
46 50 TOTAL
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At the 1931 elections, the Tamil community staged an
effective boycott of the electoral process. Four.seats
in the predominantly Tamil regions of the country, in
79the Jaffna Peninsular, had no contestants*. The first 
State Council, therefore, commenced with a total membership 
of k 6 .  But, by 1936, the Tamil community had decided to 
abandon their passive resistance to the new Constitution 
and participate in the General Election for the second 
State Council of that year. At that election they 
increased their representation from three to eight members. 
The Europeans and the Mohamm^dens lost a seat each; the 
latter sing their only representative. The Sinhalese 
representation too, was increased by one, the Kandyans 
Arsing two of their seats to Low—Country contestants.
Universal adult franchise had the effect of steadily 
enlarging the electorate. In 1936, the electorate was 
nearly two and a half million. By 19^ -0, there were
gO
2,635,000 electors on the register. Complaints began 
to mount, particularly from 193& and from the Sinhalese 
quarter, that the registration of Indian voters was done
g 2
without scrutiny. It was alleged, in a memorandum to
Governor Caldecott, that the officials in charge of
registration were accepting the word of the declarant
without investigating the grounds upon which domicile was
82being claimed. Remembering the fact that 9% >°/o of the 
Indians had sought the domicilary pathway to voter-rights, 
leaving a mere 2 °/o to take the more arduous method of 
seeking a certificate of permanent settlement, the 
government, in 19 *^0 , directed that no applicant was to 
be registered as a voter upon grounds of domicile unless 
the basis upon which such domicile was claimed had been 
verified by an oral examination. In effect a viva-voce 
was made compulsory for every applicant. The following 
Table reveals the effect of the 19^0 directive, which 
in turn should indicate the abuses to which the franchise 
under the Donoughmore Constitution had been subjected.
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TABLE XV83
The total number of Indians registered as voters, 
the number and percentage submitting for oral 
examination as required under the 1940 procedure 
and the number and percentage qualifying * to vote
Ye ar Total Number 
of Indians 
provisionally 
registered as 
voters
Number
who
had
submitted 
for an 
oral ex­
amination
$ sub­
mitting 
for an 
oral ex­
amination
number 
re­
cognised 
as of 
Ceylon 
domicile
$ of 
re­
gistered 
voters 
who 
have 
been 
declared 
as being 
domiciled 
in Ceylon
1943 39,600 11,088 28 $ 7,000 17.6$
1942 3^,782 8,000 z y / o 4,400 12.6$
1941 34,000 17,500 51.4$ 12,000 35.2$
1941-
1943
108,382
. ______ — ..........  , i
36,588 34.1$ 23,400 21.8$
Proceeding from a registration procedure which involved 
little or no scrutiny, to one requiring a standard of 
proof required to be established through a viva-voce, 
the numbers of registrants for the 1941-43 period who 
actually passed the oral examination averaged only 21.8$ 
The more interesting result is that out of 108,382 Indians 
who had registered, a fraction over l/3 reported for the 
oral examination. This is indicative of the fact that 
prior to 1940, during the preceding nine years, the 
expanded franchise had been open to some considerable 
abuse. Governor Caldecott’s instructions in 1940 were 
prospective and therefore those who had already been 
registered as voters remained unaffected by these new 
procedures. The Sinhalese in particular were anxious
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to reverse this process and the affirmation in its 
entirety of the franchise adopted by the Donoughmore
84Dispensations, by the Soulbury Commission, and its
later adoption by the British Government in The Ceylon
o c;
(Parliamentary Elections) Order-in-Council, 1946 
left the Sinhalese majority angry and frustrated. At 
the 19^7 Elections, held under the 1946 Order-in-Council, 
the following success pattern of the parties emerged:
TABLE XVI86 
Party Positions at General Elections, 1947
Parties
’No. of ' 
candi­
dates 
put
forward
1 No. of 
candi­
dates 
elected
t °k1 success
°/o votes
received
of the
total
votes
cast
°/o
seats
won
by
each
party
Communal 
represen­
tation in 
political 
parties
The Ceylon
Indian
Congress
7 6 85.7 2.3 6.3 Indians
The Tamil 
Congress
9 7 77.7 2.7 7.3 (Ceylon 
(Tamils
The
Bolshevik- 
Leninist 
Party of 
India
10 5 50.0 3.7 5.2 Mixed
The United
National
Party
98 k 2 42.8 24.6 44.2 (Sinhales* 
( (Low 
(country < 
(Kandyan)
The Lanka 
Samasamaja 
Party
28 10 35*7 6.6 10.3 Mixed
The
Communist
Party
13 3 23.0 2.3 3.1 Mixed
Independents 181 21 21.6 17.9 22.1 Mixed
The Labour 
Party
9 1 11.0 1.2 1.0 Mixed
NOTE: 1. The total electorate was 3>052,8l4.
2. The total number of elected representatives were 95
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The 83.7°/o success of* The Ceylon Indian Congress
could be explained by the fact that their members were
drawn from the plantation areas on the Island. The
indication was clear that the Indian Labour Community,
created by the British Government as an adjunct to the
plantation industry, appears now to have assumed control
of parliamentary representation for these areas; so
vital to the economy of an Independent Ceylon. There
was also another matter of some concern. The communal
nature of the politics of the Ceylon Indian Congress
raised the spectre of a return to communal representation.
This finger could be pointed at the Tamil Congress too.
The United National Party, however, drew support from
both Muslim and Tamil communities, although their
majority support and representation was drawn from the
Sinhala-speaking areas. The new Government was, indeed,
powerless to punish the Tamil Congress for their
communalism, but possessed both the power and the will
to move against the Indians. Particularly, in view of
their abuse of the franchise during 1931-1940, the
Government considered most of the Indian electorate as
interlopers whose rightful location was in India and not
in Ceylon. It is in this light that the Citizenship Act
of 1948^^ and The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections)
88Amendment Act of 1949 must be considered. By Section 4 
of the 1948 Act, the Status of citizenship by descent was
89limited to those whose 1 fathers were born in Ceylon1,
or ’whose paternal grandfathers and paternal great
90grandfathers were born in Ceylon’. Viewed against the
fact that Indian immigration had spanned no more than 
91seventy years, Indians were hard put to establish that 
their fathers were born in Ceylon, let alone paternal 
grand-fathers and paternal great grand-fathers. The 
emphasis on the paternal as against the maternal side of
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the lineage may be explained on the grounds that the
Government was determined to prevent Indians claiming
citizenship through inter—marriage with Ceylon Tamil
92women. By sub-section two of section four, persons 
who had been born outside Ceylon, were required to
93establish that their ffathers and paternal grand—fathers1
or their 'paternal grand—fathers and paternal great
grand-fathers1 were born in Ceylon before citizenship
by descent was granted to them. There were provisions
95laid down for citizenship by Registration, but this 
was left to the absolute discretion of the Minister 
"to disallow such application on grounds of public 
p o l i c y . T h e  Act carried a whole charter of citizenship 
rights, but the foregoing alone were effective in 
excluding the Indians from the ranks of Ceylon citizenship.
9 6The 19^9 Act mentioned above, amended the 19^6 
Order-in-Council, principally by abandoning domicile as a
9test for voting and substituting citizenship in its place.
Having done that, the alternative qualifications of
1literacy-Property-Inccme formula1 and the 'certificate
98of permanent settlement' were repealed. The result,
therefore, was effectively to exclude nearly a million
Indians, almost l/l2 of the population, at the commencement
of the 501s , from the ranks of citizens and thereby from
being placed upon an electoral register in Ceylon. The
Ceylon Indian Congress, which had polled 72,230 votes in
1947, representing 2.39^ of the total electorate and
99attaining a 85.7% success, was unable to contest the 
1952 elections. The new citizenship laws dealt a 
devastating blow to the membership of the Ceylon Indian 
Congress. The 19^9 Act excluded many of its members 
from the voters' register. Domicile henceforth had no 
relevance to the franchise, but only citizenship, as 
defined in the 19^ +8 Act. Looking back at the philosophical
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foundation of the Donoughmore Constitution, namely 
communal integration, the rules concerning the franchise 
appear to have had a damaging socio-political effect on 
a sizable community on the Island. The defect lies in the 
fact that neither the Donoughmore Commissioners nor the 
Soulbury Commissioners appear, from their reports, to 
have paid much attention to the concept of citizenship.
Had they considered the principles upon which the concept 
of 'a Ceylon citizenship1 could be formulated, and if 
they had tied that concept to the franchise, nearly a 
million of the Indians who were suddenly left on the way 
side, abandoned and therefore hostile, could have either 
been forewarned or could have negotiated some modus operandi. 
a via media, with both the Indian and the Ceylonese 
Administrations. In 19^8, neither the British Government 
nor the Indian Government had any say in the manner in 
which the Independent Government of Ceylon was poised to 
act and therefore, the Indians were left to the tender 
mercies of a much prejudiced Sinhalese electorate.
VI. What the Donoughmore Reforms left behind for
the Soulbury Commission
Although the second State Council should have come 
to an end in 1939» no elections were held, thereafter, 
until the 19^7 elections, which were held under the 
Soulbury Constitution. There were at least two reasons 
for this prolongation of the life of the second State 
Council. First, there was the need for fresh reforms and 
secondly the need to fight a World War for the survival 
of the British Empire, of which Ceylon was considered to 
be an integral part. The importance of the latter 
compelled the British Government to postpone both 
Constitutional reforms and elections. The entry of Japan 
into the war in 19^1 persuaded the Board of Ministers 
under the Donoughmore Constitution to form a War Council, 
consisting of the Governor, The Commander-in-Chief,
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all the Ministers, the Service Commanders and the Civil 
Defence Commissioner. The life span of the Donoughmore 
Dispensations, therefore, became extended until the 
introduction of the Soulbury Constitution in 19^7 > as a 
prelude to Independence in 19^8.
The Donoughmore Commissioners made it clear from 
the outset that their recommendations were merely to 
introduce an interim Constitution as a pen-ultimate 
arrangement before Independence was granted. The 
necessity for this pen-ultimate arrangement, too, was 
clearly spelt out. The Commissioners wrote:
"Had the inhabitants of Ceylon presented greater 
appearance of unity and corporate spirit, one 
obstacle to the grant of full responsible 
government would have been removed. Not only is 
the population not homogeneous, but the diverse 
elements of which it is composed distrust and 
suspect each other. It is almost true to say 
that the conception of patriotism in Ceylon is 
as much racial as national, and that the best 
interests of the country are at times regarded 
as synonymous with the welfare of a particular 
section of its people. If the claim for full 
responsible government be subjected to examination 
from this standpoint it will be found that its 
advocates are always to be numbered among those 
who form the larger communities and who, if 
freed from external control, would be able to 
impose their will on all who dissented from them. 
Those on the other hand who form the minority 
communities, though united in no other respect, 
are solid in their opposition to the proposal.
A condition precedent to the grant of full 
responsible government must be the growth of a 
public opinion which will make that grant 
acceptable, not only to one section, but to all 
sections of the people; such a development will 
only be possible if under a new constitution the 
members of the larger communities so conduct 
themselves in the reformed Council as to inspire 
universal confidence in their desire to harmonise 
conflicting interests, and to act justly, even at 
a sacrifice to themselves."202
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It has been emphasised earlier that the Executive 
Committee system of government was specifically 
introduced to create a sense of harmony among the 
communities through a process of enforced inter­
dependence with one another, for the achievement of 
efficient government. The belief of the British 
Government was that over a period of time the conditions 
necessary for the grant of Independence, admittedly with 
the dominance of the majority Sinhalese community, would 
eventually become possible. The Soulbury Commission was, 
therefore, primarily called upon to work out a particular 
formula for Independence, in which the communal composition 
of the country as a whole could be conveniently 
accommodated.
VII. The Soulbury Constitution - Its Social Implications
The social consequences of several decades of 
government stretching as far back as to 1833> when the 
Colebrooke Dispensations founded the first Constitutional 
model for Ceylon, had by 19 -^5> successfully, created a 
small but powerful Western-educated elite. Their 
ideological commitments and their philosophical attitudes 
were rooted in alien cultures. In a line, the social 
configuration in 19^5 left a small elite at the centre 
and a large mass at the periphery with a widening gap 
between them. The concern of the Donoughmore Constitution 
was to bring about communal harmony. The harmony that 
was pursued was harmony among the elites of the two 
largest communities but not harmony between the elitist 
centre and the masses at the periphery. There were no 
constitutional desiderata in the Donoughmore Constitution 
which could have bridged this gap. On the contrary, the 
ability to read and write in English was made essential 
for membership in the State Council. The first step ever
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to be taken towards bridging this gap was by the Soulbury
Commissioners, who made the qualifications for the electors
103and for the elected, co-terminous. Neither of these two
104groups at the 19^7 Election were required to pass a
literary test in English; or for that matter in Sinhala or
in Tamil. But this measure was found to have been
introduced at a historical point of time which appeared to
have been far too late in the day to reverse the elite
formation at the centre and bridge the widening social gap
between the centre and the periphery. The isolation of
the mass at the periphery had created a danger to minority
rights after Independence. The Soulbury Constitution has
105been the subject of a number of erudite desertations.
The key issue of concern here is the examination of the
social consequences of the Donoughmore Reforms and the
way the Soulbury Commissioners had attempted to respond
to them. The Soulbury Commission commenced their 
106
chapter on 'The Minorities' with an. apt quotation 
from Bryce;
"Institutions must represent or be suited to 
the particular phenomena they have to deal 
with in a particular Country. It is through 
history that these phenomena are known.
History shows whether they are the result of 
tendencies still increasing or of tendencies 
already beginning to decline."^07
This passage from Bryce justifies the historical approach 
adopted here, as much as it had justified the Commissioners' 
resort to history in some of the chapters in their Report. 
The population distribution according to the 19^-6 
Census'*’^  was as fallows:
Sinhalese: 70.8%
Tamils: 21.6^
Low Country: k 2 ° / o
Kandyan: 28 c
Ceylon Tamils: 11.0^6
Indian Tamils: 10. 696
Burghers & Eurasians: 0.5^
Others: 6.1 °/o (includes Europeans, Malays ...)etc.
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The disenfranchisement of the Indian vote when it
occurred in 19^9 > to which reference was made earlier,
109effectively cut the Tamil vote by half. This could
have appeared to the Commissioners as a possible danger 
to the Indian minority in the hands of an overwhelming 
Sinhalese majority. Besides, the protections, if any 
that might be given to the Indian voters, the Commissioners 
may have assumed, could be important for the particular 
question of minority protection. For other minorities, 
together with the Ceylon Tamils, did form nearly a quarter 
of the total population.
The distribution of Religious Communities was along 
communal lines: the 19^6 Census'*’^ ^ gave the following
configuration:
TABLE XVII
The Percentage of those Persons who Professed the 
Four Leading Religions in Ceylon in 19^ -6 Tabulated 
Along Communal Lines
Community Buddhists Hindus Muslims j Christians
Sinhalese 91.9
H•O H•O 7.9
Ceylon
Tamils 2.6 80.6 0.2 16.5
Indian
Tamils 2.3 89.3 0.3
H•00
Ceylon
Moors 0.7 0.3 97.7 0.3
While nine out of ten Sinhalese were Buddhists:nine out of 
ten Tamils were Hindus. With a Sinhalese population nearly 
three and a half times that of the Tamils, the Buddhists- 
Sinhalese would appear to hold the key to the freedoms
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and the rights of the others. The attitude of the 
Sinhalese-Buddhists, therefore, became the main factor 
to reckon with, when constitutional reforms were being 
framed for an Independent Ceylon. Mindful of the 
centre-periphery conflict, it is necessary to examine 
the distribution of religions across three geographical 
areas on the Island, indicated by the following Table
TABLE XVIII
The Percentage Representation of Religions in Urban, 
Rural and Plantation Districts of the Island in 1946
Religion
Urban
Population
Rural
Population
Plantation
Population Total
Buddhi s t s 52.2 78.4 11.8 66.7
Hindus 17.7 10.3 80.7 18.2
Christians 19.2 7.3 6.4 9  A
Mohammadens 15.2 4.0 1.1 5.6
Others — — —
H•O
The figures showed that 78.4/ of the rural population 
were mainly Buddhists. Willing allies of the rural 
Buddhists are the Buddhists of the Kandyan region - the 
area of the plantation industry. This combination could set 
up a formidable political force against all minority 
religions. This assumption has historically proved 
correct. Another interesting feature is that while we 
have earlier found that nine out of ten Tamils were Hindus, 
over 80'/' of the Hindus are to be found among the plantation 
districts while not more than an average of 1 4/ of the 
total Hindu population is to be found in the Northern, 
Eastern and in the Western regions, forming the urban 
and rural areas of the Island. The Northern and Eastern 
regions are the traditional homelands of the Tamils.
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1This indicates two separate factors. First, the Northern 
Tamil and the Eastern Tamil had been exposed to conversion. 
In the chapter on Education, the point was made as to the 
importance of missionary education in the 'Colonial 
educational strategy as a means for conversion. Secondly, 
the socio-economic advancement of the Tamil plantation 
population had remained static while the Tamils of the 
Northern and Eastern provinces have been dynamic. It is 
this that makes the almost equal distribution between the 
urban and the rural Hindu population, while the Tamils in 
the plantation areas had stagnated in one geographical area. 
The nature of the economic potential made available to the 
plantation workers is additional data for the conclusion 
that they have been static when compared with the overall 
development of the country. A factor which the Soulbury  ^ ^
Commissioners had to consider was this complex socio­
political amalgam related to an amorphous economic base. '
The language distribution and its implications was
another factor that forms the socio-economic compact.
112
In 1946, the following communal representation was 
found among four selected professions:
TABLE XIX
Communal Representation in Four Selected
Professions in 1946
Community SupremeCourt
Judicial
Service
Engineers:
Civil
Listed
Medical
Profession
Sinhalese 5(41.66$) 21(46.66%) 35(52.23$) 205(61.19$)
Burghers 3(25-0$) 11(24.44$) 15(22.38$) 25(7.46$)
Tamils 1(8.33$) 13(28.80%) 17(25.37$) 115(43.32$)
Europeans .. 3(25*0$)
Total* 12(100$) 45(100%) 67(100$) 335(100$)
*The numbers stated in this column represents 100% of the 
establishment for each of the four selected profession©
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What is noticeable from the foregoing data is that, 
while the Tamil and the Burgher minorities were 
over-represented, the Sinhalese majority appears to 
be under-represented in the four professions therein 
considered.
The explanation must, therefore, be found in
the literacy configuration among the communities. It
was found that while the k . 2 ° / o  of the population who
spoke English were those who could also speak Sinhala,
2 °/o of those who spoke English, likewise, spoke Tamil
too. This necessarily indicated that while the
Sinhalese:Tamil population ratio was one of 3»5sl> the
113English literacy ratio was 2:1, respectively. Therefore,
the data suggest the presence of a higher proportion of 
the Tamils to their population who were literate in 
English than that of the Sinhalese to their population.
That should explain to some extent the disparity shown in 
the communal representation in the four professions, 
selected, a year after the reforms were announced, in 
19^5. Against this background, the Commissioners 
recommended that:
’’The Parliament of Ceylon shall not make any 
Law rendering persons of any community or 
religion liable to disabilities or restrictions 
to which persons of other communities or 
religions are not made liable or confer upon 
persons of any community or religion any 
privileges or advantages which are not conferred 
on persons of other communities or religions.
Section 29 of The Ceylon (Constitution) Order-in- 
115Council of 1946, entrenched four areas in which the
competence of the Ceylon Parliament was limited by the 
requirement to obtain the votes of "two—thirds of the 
whole number of members of the House (including those 
not present) " . The four areas comprised in such 
laws as shall:
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"(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise 
of any religion; or
(b) make persons of any community or religion 
liable to disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of other communities or religions are 
not made liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or 
religion any privilege or advantage which is 
not conferred on persons of other communities, 
or religions; or
(d) alter the constitution of any religious 
body except with the consent of the governing 
authority of that body ... ‘"yiY
It was the belief of the British Government that 
these provisions would be the correct answer to the 
problem ”of the relations of the minorities — Ceylon
Tamils, Indian Tamils, Muslims, Burghers and Europeans —
• 118 
with the Sinhalese majority.” Yet again the British
Government had been guilty of a serious error of judgment.
119As later events proved, the total unwillingness to 
deal with a sociological problem by sociological means, 
and by resorting to the instrumentalities of the law, 
has in later years proved to have been the source of a 
number of inter-communal conflicts. By placing conditions 
and limitations upon a parliament which was dominated by 
the majority and deemed to be Sovereign, the tendency 
gathered momentum to break loose from these constraints 
and thereafter assert that freedom, by legislating with 
particular emphasis in those areas which had hitherto 
been closed to them. It is this kind of mob-psychology 
which Section 29 generated. If constraints as those 
which were found in Section 29 were not placed upon 
Parliament, psychologically the minorities and the 
majority would have felt free to share a given area of 
land and come to terms with one another, thus finding a 
way of living together. The false security resulting from 
the entrenched clauses tempted the minorities, as the case
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law indicates, to litigate their rights rather than 
negotiate arrangements. It is this psychology which 
determined the progress of history in Ceylon, until 
the Soulbury Constitution and the principles within 
which it was spun were cast aside in 1972 by what was 
expressly claimed to be 'a political Revolution1. This 
will be the core of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
Constitutionalism (3)
Aspects of the Soulbury Constitution; 19^8-1972
I. An Introduction
The second State Council under the Donoughmore 
Constitution which was elected in 1936, continued to 
function as a legislative body beyond its mandated 
period of four years. The second World War which had 
by then begun was considered by the British Government 
as a compelling reason to postpone the political 
process under the Donoughmore Constitution. The 
formation of a National Government in the United Kingdom 
itself, with the postponement of National elections there, 
provided a healthy precedent. During the currency of the 
War Ceylon provided the British Government with a useful 
base for housing the headquarters of the Southeast Asia 
Command under the late Lord Mountbatten of Burma. The 
usefulness of Ceylon for the war effort became evident to 
both the British and the local politicians. As a 
'pacifier* for the local politicians, the British 
Government on May 26th, 19^3 promised the Island *full 
internal self government* under a new Constitution. In 
that declaration Whitehall gave the Ceylonese Board of 
Ministers an undertaking that there will be a new 
Constitution which would be examined by **a suitable 
Commission or Conference” as soon as victory over the 
axis powers was achieyed. In the light of this 
declaration, the Ceylonese Board of Ministers drew up a 
new Constitution under the supervision of the Leader of 
the State Council, Mr. D. S. Senanayake. This was a 
draft which the Ceylonese Board of Ministers intended to
-269-
present as a basis for ffull internal self-government1
to the aforementioned Commission, or Conference, after
the end of the war with the axis powers'} However,
on July 5th, 19^, Col, Oliver Stanley, the Secretary
of State for the Colonies announced in the House of
Commons the appointment of the Soulbury Commission, In
his announcement Stanley declared that the Commission
shall be mandated not only to examine the draft
Constitution prepared by the Ceylonese Board of Ministers
but also to seek out the views of the Minority groups on 
2the Island, The Ministers took exception to that part
of the Declaration which said that the Commission shall
consult with ‘various interests, including the minority
communities, concerned with the subject of Constitutional
Reform in Ceylon1• The Ministers argued that the
Commission should be limited to the examination of the
draft Constitution made by them, and the rights of the
minority groups, according to the Board of Ministers,
will be protected by the requirement that the passage of
any Constitution that may eventually result shall require
a vote of three-fourths of the total membership of the 
3
Council. The British Government, however, did not alter
the mandate of the Commission, and therefore the Ceylon
National Congress decided by August, 19^ - ,^ to stage a
boycott of the Soulbury Commission, However, the British
Administration in Ceylon left the arrangements, regarding
internal travel and the provision of the required physical
facilities in the hands of the Civil Defence Commissioner,
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, - who was known to have been a
close friend of the Ceylon National Congress and its
members, on the Board of Ministers. Aside from informal
briefings that the Commissioners received from Sir Oliver,
and a copy of the draft Constitution produced by the
Board of Ministers in 19^ 9 the Commission was denied
every access to the Board of Ministers in their official
k
capacity and to the Ceylon National Congress.
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V
Col. Oliver Stanley, however, invited the leader of* 
the State Council, D. S. Senanayake to London for talks 
and he was clearly anxious to be there at the time of 
the publication of the Commission's Report. As fate 
would have it, Senanayake left Ceylon in early July,
19^5, and arrived in London, in time to see the 
electoral defeat of the Conservative Party, whose 
government was responsible both for the Declaration of
K
19^3 and for the Soulbury Commission.
Senanayake had an advance copy of the Commissioners' 
Report and to his amazement and satisfaction he found 
the basic principles contained in the original Ministerial 
draft of 19^4 adopted with approval. There were few 
minor adjustments made to the original draft but these 
were not of any real substance. The only point of 
disagreement was that the Commissioners had not recom­
mended^ the immediate grant of Dominion Status. They 
preferred to see how the Constitution worked within the 
framework of 'full internal self-government', first.
The fact that the main pre-occupation of the new Labour 
administration at the time was not Ceylon but the 
Independence of the sub-continent of India (including 
Burma)and the Palestine question, reconciled Senanayake 
to the view that Ceylon's achievement of Dominion Status 
could wait a while. After all he had won a concession 
to have the question of citizenship kept out of the 
Constitution so that it could be left within the ambit 
of the first Independent Parliament of Ceylon. On the 
9th November, 19^-5» after a two day debate, the State 
Council voted 51 to 3 to accept the 'White Paper on
Constitutional Reform' based on the recommendations of
7the Soulbury Commission.
The Soulbury Constitution fundamentally proposed 
'a Westminster model1 of government. Some of the more 
distinct features of this model have permeated through 
all Independence Acts of former British colonies and 
into their new Independent Legislatures. But few, if at 
all have retained them for any great length of time.
The Westminster model have several noticeable features:
First, the model provided for a bi-cameral 
legislature, of which the fUpper House* as 
it is called is characterized by the non­
elective nature of its membership while the 
'Lower House* is characterized by an elected 
membership by universal adult suffrage. The 
*Upper House* is deemed to represent those 
* interests' which are important to the 
achievement of a cohesive society but cannot 
or may not be able to successfully win a 
seat through the elective process. The 
parallels in Ceylon under the Soulbury 
Dispensations, to the British House of Lords 
and the House of Commons, were the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, respectively.
Second, though the 'Upper House* in the 
Westminster Model was expected to play a 
consultative role to a large measure, from a 
politically mature standpoint, free from a 
continuing responsibility to constituents; the 
House of Lords had a veto power over Legislations 
being an equal partner in the legislative process 
with the House of Commons. Although this power 
has recently been somewhat limited, the two 
Houses constitutionally are the two halves of 
the legislative process. The same idea was 
introduced into Ceylon by the Soulbury 
Dispensations.
Third, while recognising a distinction between 
the Head of State and the Head of Government, the 
Westminster Model subjected the Head of Government 
to the elective process while recognising the Head 
of State more as a symbolic figure; symbolising 
the nation rather than as a repository of executive 
power. The Soulbury Dispensation introduced this 
notion to Ceylon by recognising The Governor- 
General as the representative of The Head of State. 
The Head of State for Ceylon under the Soulbury 
Dispensation was recognised as the person who 
Heads the State of The United Kingdom.
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Fourth, the Westminster Model provided for a 
clear separation of powers and as an obvious 
result of this it separated the judiciary in 
every way from the Legislative and the 
Executive branches of Government. Concommitant 
with the idea of the separation of powers is 
the idea of independence of the judiciary and 
therefore the independence of the Courts as 
ordinarily established. The Soulbury 
Dispensations introduced this idea into Ceylon.
Fifth, the Westminster Model recognised a 
tripartite legislative process in which the 
House of Lords, the House of Commons and The 
Monarch in his or her constitutional capacity 
shall participate. The Soulbury Dispensation 
found the legislative process in the Senate, 
the House of Representatives and in the 
Governor-General as the representative of 
Ceylon's Head of State.
Constitutional reform must to a large measure take 
into consideration the laws and legal institutions it 
must necessarily incorporate. The legal system as a 
whole, is a reflection, at the supra-structure of a 
given society, of its own peculiar economic underpinnings. 
It is important, therefore, to structure a constitution 
in the light of the economic base of a given society 
and therefore, it must be assumed that the Soulbury 
Constitution had taken into consideration the 
'free-market' economic model. This in fact provided 
the foundation for the colonial economic programme, at 
least from the middle of the 19th Century. It is, 
therefore, necessary at this stage to postulate the broad 
assumptions upon which the laws and the legal institutions 
existing in Ceylon during the 40's of this century were 
based. For those assumptions did determine the types of 
laws and institutions which could promote development 
within the framework of a 'free-market1 economy. The 
principal aim of the Soulbury Commission was to preserve 
the existing economic base. Therefore, the Commissioners 
intended to provide a constitutional framework within which
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an Independent Ceylon could evolve its own economic 
growth utilising the 'free-market* economy as her 
guiding principle. As a model for development the 
Constitution was clearly conservative. Neither the 
British Government nor the Ceylonese Board of Ministers 
did plan any radical changes either to the economic base 
or to the legal system of a Ceylon emerging out of a 
colonial past.
Colonialism is generally considered to rest upon 
a capitalist base espousing, both a legal and an economic 
system rooted in a 'free-market economy*. At the core 
of this colonial arrangement were a number of assumptions 
which the Soulbury Commissioners adopted as fundamental 
to the laws and legal institutions of an Independent 
Ceylon. The new Constitution was not intended to 
disturb these sealed assumptions. First, there was the 
assumption that as a general rule the laws recognised 
the right to Private Ownership of both movables and 
immovables. The State may, however, acquire such 
property as an exception to the general rule, under 
defined conditions and only under particular laws passed 
to give that exceptional power. The chapters on the 
economy will deal with this type of power. Second, 
there was the assumption (arising out of the first), 
that an individual owner of property enjoyed a freedom 
to utilise the corpus. primarily, to his maximum economic 
advantage. Here too, the interest of the State in 
restricting this freedom in any given circumstance was 
strictly circumscribed. Third, the assumption that the 
rights arising out of ownership was a right superior in 
law to all other rights such as those arising out of the 
status of a 'cultivator or a tenant'. This assumption 
was considered to be basic. Any restriction of these 
rights, it was assumed, should not strike at the core
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elements of the law.which makes the concept of ownership 
meaningful. Fourth, the assumption that the utilisation 
of the Law of Contract must be free; and as an aspect of 
the notion of 'freedom of contract' the owner of the 
corpus should be free to enter into any type of contract 
limited only by the Common Law rules regarding Illegality. 
Fifth, the assumption that legislation was the exclusive 
source of new law and that any changes of such law should 
only take effect as a result of amending legislation.
Sixth, the assumption that rights and duties between 
citizens inter se and their rights and duties visa vis 
the State were subject to the exclusive cognizance of the 
courts of law located within a hierarchical system of 
Courts. Seventh, the assumption that the Courts at all 
times shall remain independent and free from the political 
process and to that extent the judges shall enjoy every 
right that would.establish their independence from the 
political system. Eighth, that at all times the assumption 
shall prevail that no rights of a person shall be taken 
away except by due process of law. Ninth, the assumption 
that at all times the Courts shall have the power to 
subject every law to Judicial Review so as to determine 
their validity. This catalogue of nine assumptions were 
considered to be basic to the colonial laws and legal 
institutions inherited from the British Colonial 
Administration at Independence, on the 4th February, 1948. 
They were in no way intended to be exhaustive. They 
supplied a framework for the 'free market economy* which 
in effect provided the base for the colonial economy.
The Soulbury Constitution merely provided a new framework 
within which the legal, economic and the social elements 
of the new nation could be held together.
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I I . The Soulbury Constitution:
II, (a) An Introduction
The historical and political events which heralded 
the introduction of the Soulbury Constitution by an
g
Order-in-Council in 1946 and the Grant of Independence
on 4th February, 1948, under an Order-in-Council of
9 10 December 1947* have been well documented. The purpose
of this section is to examine the constitutional model
under which Ceylon gained her Independence, so as to
expose the principal weaknesses which eventually led to
radical constitutional reforms in 1972,
The Soulbury Constitution introduced a bi-cameral
legislature with a House of Representatives and a Senate.^
In the House of Representatives there were 101 seats, of
which 95 were to be filled by elections on the basis of
12universal adult suffrage. Six members were appointed 
by the Governor-General upon the advice of the Prime 
Minister after each election under Article ll(2) of 
the Constitutions
"Where after any election the Governor-General 
is satisfied that any important interest in the 
Island is not represented, he may appoint any 
persons not exceeding six in number, to be 
members of the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives had a life span of five years
15but could be dissolved earlier. The Parliamentary and 
constitutional conventions of the United Kingdom were 
introduced, together with their procedures, creating a 
"Westminster Model” of Government for Ceylon.^
The Upper House, the Senate, comprised of thirty 
17members, fifteen of whom were elected by the House of
Representatives, sitting as an electoral college, by
18proportional representation. The^ r proportional 
representation of the political parties in the House of
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Representatives influenced the party composition of the
Senate. The other fifteen members were appointed b y .the
19Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister.
This gave the Government an opportunity to strengthen its 
hand in the Senate and at the same time to provide 
positions in the legislature for minorities by race or 
caste. The Burghers, Europeans, Indians, Malays and 
other minorities could thus be given a vote in one or 
both of the Houses of Parliament. In addition, the 
minority castes, both of the Tamils and of the Sinhalese, 
were also represented in one or both of these two chambers
The life span of the Senate was independent of that of
20 21 the House of Representatives. "By lot", the Senators
were required to divide themselves into three categories,
of two, four and six year terms of office. One—third of
the Senators, therefore, were returned every two years.
The Senate was thus unaffected by a dissolution of
Parliament. The Soulbury Constitution prescribed a
detailed list of disqualifications for membership of the 
22Senate, the most basic was the disqualifying of any
23member of the House of Representatives.
II. (b) The Soulbury Constitution; Legislative 
Powers
The Soulbury Constitution succinctly laid down the 
legislative powers in section 32, in this manner:
"(l) A Bill shall not be deemed to have 
been passed by both chambers unless it 
has been agreed to by both chambers, 
either without amendment or with such 
amendments only as are agreed to by both 
chambers."
"(2) A Bill which has been passed by the 
Senate with any amendment which is 
subsequently rejected by the House of 
Representatives shall be deemed not to 
have been passed by the Senate."-.
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25The Senate like the British House of Lords, had 
the power to delay the passage of Money Bills for up 
to one month; thereafter such a Bill was deemed to have 
been passed notwithstanding the fact that it had not 
been passed by the Senate. In the case of the other 
Bills, section 3h  of the Constitution laid down:
"If a Bill, other than a Money Bill, is 
passed by the House of Representatives 
in two successive sessions, whether of 
the same parliament or not, and,
(a) having been sent to the Senate in 
the first of those sessions at 
least one month before the end of 
that session, is not passed by the 
Senate in that session, and,
(b) having been sent to the Senate in 
the second of those sessions, is not 
passed by the Senate within one month 
after it has been so sent, or within 
six months after the commencement of 
that session, whichever is the later, 
the Bill may, notwithstanding that it 
has not been passed by the Senate ... 
shall take effect as an Act of 
Parliament ... .
27These two provisions brought the Senate into line with 
the British House of Lords and were considered to provide 
methods by which a recalcitrant or obstinate Upper House 
could be neutralised, thus avoiding legislative paralysis. 
This institutional means of bypassing the Upper House has 
no doubt contributed to the preservation of the House of 
Lords as an incident of English Constitutional History. 
However, its introduction to Ceylon, as events were later 
to prove, suffered the lack of a comparable sentimental 
or historical value and constituted a hinderance to the 
legislative process. The arguments against the retention 
of an Upper House were spun within a framework of 
expediency and the need for democratic representation.
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The fact that the Senators were not directly elected by 
the citizens of Ceylon left them free of any local 
constituency pressures. They were, therefore, considered 
as a mature body which could rise above the localised 
perspectives of party politics to a generalised vision 
of the national good in their activities. By 1971» it 
had become clear that the gap between the perspectives 
of the peoples1 representatives and the Senate had come
28to a dangerous and unbridgable divide. By an amendment 
to the Soulbury Constitution, Parliament in 1971 abolished 
the Senate. The Senate Abolition Act merits particular 
emphasis as a socio-political consequence of the Soulbury 
model of Government.
The abolition of the Senate was a result of a political 
controversy concerning membership of the House of 
Representatives.' One of the members of Parliament who 
belonged to The Sri Lanka Freedom Party — the party that
was the principal partner of the coalition of three
;
political parties which formed the Government in 1970,
was unseated by the Supreme Court. The Court found that
the member in question was disqualified for membership in
the House of Representatives as a result of a previous
conviction which had resulted in a sentence of imprisonment
exceeding three months being passed upon him. The Soulbury
Constitution disqualified such persons from membership of
the House of Representatives for a period of seven years
from the date of completion of such sentence of 
29imprisonment. In 1971 > the House of Representatives 
passed an amendment to the aforementioned constitutional 
provision, so as to enable the member in question to 
continue as a member of Parliament; notwithstanding the 
constitutional disability. The Senate voted against that 
Bill and thereby precipitated its own demise. Although 
the abolition of the Senate did facilitate the unhindered
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passage of the 1972 Constitution into Law, the motive 
behind its abolition was more of a general feeling in 
favour of ridding an unnecessary hinderance, a political 
anachronism, rather than a particular motive associated 
with the need to procure a swift passage into law of the 
1972 Constitution,.which was at the time in question 
nearing completion.
II. (c) The Soulbury Constitution; The Indian 
Question as an aspect of Citizenship
In most Constitutions in the Third World countries, 
the question of citizenship becomes a central issue for 
a detailed statement. The Soulbury Constitution was 
remarkable in that aspect, for it left that issue out 
of its ambit. In doing so the Soulbury Commission 
recognised that the- issue of citizenship was a matter to 
be determined by an Independent Parliament of Ceylon. 
Therefore, the British Government decided to leave that 
question out of the Constitution, thus recognising the 
fact that it was a matter on which the departing colonial 
power ought not to shackle a future legislature of an 
Independent Ceylon. The question of citizenship, therefore, 
became, as far as the Constitution of Ceylon was concerned, 
a matter to be determined by a simple majority in parliament 
and not by the special procedure declared by the 
Constitution for its amendment.
Although the major constitutional amendment was
brought about by the 1 Senate Abolition Act*, the twenty- 
30four years of the Soulbury Constitution were punctuated
31by several legislations of singular importance. These 
were concerned with what the political parties of a 
Marxist persuasion have maintained, as legislation 
designed to disenfranchise the Tamils of Indian origin, 
i.e. the plantation labourers brought in, from India, 
by the British Government. Associated with the Citizenship
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Act of 19^ +8 and The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections)
OO
Amendment Act of 19^ -9 was The Ceylon (Constitution)
Amendment Act of 195^* The cumulative effect of the
35first two Acts, which have previously been discussed, 
was to deny the Indian Tamil a vote. During a debate in 
the House of Representatives concerning the passage of 
the Citizenship Act, the Marxist opposition described the 
policy of the Government towards the Indian Tamils in 
this way:
!lDr. Perera”^
I feel certain that the Prime Minister would 
gladly build a great Chinese Wall around this 
Island, if he could do it, to ensure that 
nobody from outside even peeped ... .37
Here in this Bill is Embodied the principle of 
racialism and exclusiveness ... • This Bill
provides for no naturalization at all ... .38
The naturalization provision in Clause 12 ... 
is in fact a joke. It provides for the 
registration of not more than 25 people a year, 
and such registration is entirely at his 
discretion. The clause is. very narrowly worded 
and it applies to a person who has rendered 
distinguished public service or is eminent in 
the professional, commercial, industrial or 
agricultural life of the country. The claims 
of the workers are left out - they are not 
eminent men. The Hon. D. S. Senanayake: Yes,
they are not eminent men. They are only doing 
or have done useful service. Dr. Perera:
That is what I am saying ... that they have 
rendered very useful service to the country ... •
This is not intended for them, although they 
have rendered useful service to the country.
This is intended only for the elite, chosen by 
the Hon. Prime Minister, such as the Mamjees 
or Adamalys ... a mere handful of people and 
also perhaps the few Europeans ... Q
The foregoing comment in Parliament on the citizenship 
issue projected the socio-political dimensions of the 
problem. That the principal aim of the legislation was 
to disenfranchise, inter alia, the plantation workers 
of Indian origin was undisguised. This aspect was 
mentioned at a previous stage of this work.
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The constitutionality of the Citizenship Act of 19^8 and 
of the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 19^9 
was litigated in 1951- In Mudanayake v. Sivag-n anas under am. 
the respondent contended that the combined effect of the 
two Acts constituted a violation of Section 29(2 ) (b) and 
(c) of the Constitution, which declares that Parliament 
may not legislate in a manner which:
"(b) make persons of any community or religion 
liable to disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of other communities or religions are 
not made liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or 
religion any privilege or advantage, which is 
not conferred on persons of other communities 
or religions ... *”41
The Court of Appeal thought that legislative 
limitations placed upon Sovereign states ought not to 
be construed too strictly, because that could without 
more, stifle good government, which indeed, they thought, 
was a paramount consideration. Basnayake, J .. wrote:
"If the effects of a controversial piece of 
legislation are weighed in a fine balance 
not much ingenuity would be needed to 
demonstrate how, in its administration, one 
community may suffer more disadvantages than 
another. To embark on an enquiry, every time 
the validity of an enactment is in question, 
into the extent of its incidence, whether for 
evil or for good, would be mischievous in the 
extreme and throw the administration of Acts of 
the legislature into confusion."^
With reference to the limits of the discrimination 
envisaged by section 29, the court said:
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"The Parliament of Ceylon has the power to 
alter the electoral law in any manner it 
Pi eases if it thinks it necessary to do so 
for the good government of the country 
subject to the narrow limitation in section 
29. It has the power to widen or to narrow 
the franchise. If it widens the franchise 
the more advanced communities may feel that 
they are affected, on the other hand if it 
narrows the franchise the less advanced 
communities may also feel they are adversely 
affected. If it is open to a person to say 
that as a result of the alteration the voting 
strength of his community has been reduced 
..• then Parliament will only have the power 
to pass legislation as to what the polling 
hours or the polling colours should b e . " ^
The Court of Appeal found that the two Statutes were 
valid and were not in conflict with the constitutional 
provisions of section 29. The respondent appealed to
k kthe Privy Council. Giving the opinion of their 
Lordships while rejecting the appeal, Lord Oaksey said
"Standards of literacy, of property, of birth 
or of residence are as it seems to their 
Lordships, standards which a legislature may 
think it right to adopt in legislation on 
citizenship and it is clear that such 
standards, though they may operate to exclude 
the illiterate, the poor and the immigrant to 
a greater degree than they exclude other people, 
they do not create disabilities in a community 
as such since the community is not bound 
together as a community by its illiteracy, its 
poverty or its migratory character but by its 
race or its religion. The migratory habits of 
the Indian Tamils (see paragraphs 123 and 203 
Soulbury Report) are facts which in their 
Lordships* opinion are directly relevant to the 
question of their suitability as citizens of 
Ceylon and have nothing to do with them as a 
community."^
It may be recalled that a fundamental concern of the 
Soulbury Commission was to protect the rights acquired 
by the minorities under the Donoughmore Constitution.
Particularly, in their report, on the Franchise they
were satisfied with the progress enjoyed by the minorities
under the Donoughmore Reforms and therefore recommended
47their retention. In so far as the Sinhalese majority 
was concerned, the rights acquired by the minorities 
under the Donoughmore Dispensations were rights given to 
the minorities without the consent or concurrence of the 
majority. The position taken by the Privy Council and 
the Court of Appeal avoided a somewhat difficult crisis 
which the country might otherwise have faced. The claim 
of the Indian Community, now almost stranded in the 
Kandyan provinces, was transposed into a question of the 
status of 'Kandyan Tamils'; a term with clear historical 
undertones. For such a claim was only a stone's throw 
away from a distinct hereditory claim to Kandyan rights 
arising from the Tamil kings of Kandy and their Nayakar 
lineage. The following passage from a debate in the 
House of Representatives in 1950 is a clear exposition of 
their claim:
"Mr. S. Thondaman: But we of the Ceylon Indian
Congress do not ask for any concessions. We 
do not want any mercies to be vouchsafed to us.
We ask for it as a right and we will have it as 
a right, not as a concession. I might also add 
that when I say that I want to be here i.e., in 
Parliament as a matter of right, I demand that 
right not as an Indian but as a Kandyan Tamil.
As a Kandyan Tamil I have the right to associate 
myself on an equal footing with the rest of the 
Ceylonese. The Hon. J. R. Jayawardene: Indian
Tamil. Mr. Thondaman: That is the trouble.
The claim for recognition of a new status of 'Kandyan 
Tamils' had never before been raised. It was not argued 
before the Donoughmore Commission or before the Soulbury 
Commission. The Ceylon Indian Congress decided not to 
contest the 1952 Elections. The combined effect of the 
1948 and 1949 Acts were to snuff the Congress out, as an 
effective political party.
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Although the courts did overcome the Indian Tamil 
issue without denting the legislative limitations 
described in section 29, the rigidity of the section as 
construed by the Privy Council in 1964, seems to have 
provided the scenario, which compelled the coalition of 
three political parties led by the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party to.replace the Soulbury Constitution, in its
totality, in 1972, The constitutional amendment of
49 501954 and other supportive legislation followed the
Mudanayake decision
II. (d) The Soulbury Constitution; The Entrenchment 
of Section 29(2)^ ~ '
When the members of the Judicial Committee of Her
Majesty's Privy Council wrote their opinion in The
52Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe. they may
not have realised that they were in fact delivering the
death warrant of the Soulbury Constitution. The
central issue in the Ranasinghe case was a comparatively
innocuous one. It merely questioned the right of the
minister of Justice to appoint a Bribery Commissioner
53under the Bribery Amendment Act, giving the appointee
a status and rank similar to that of any member of the
country's judiciary. Section 55 of the Soulbury
Constitution left:
"(l) The appointment, transfer, dismissal 
and disciplinary control of judicial officers
ir
••• 9 54
in the hands of a Judicial Service Commission appointed 
by the Governor-General. To stress the political 
neutrality of this Commission, section 53 ordained that 
its members shall b e :
"The Chief Justice, who shall be the Chairman, 
a judge of the Supreme Court, and one other 
person who shall be, or shall have been a 
judge of the Supreme Court•"
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The basic issue before the Privy Council was whether the 
Bribery Amendment Act — which was passed with a simple 
majority - was constitutional and was therefore valid, 
in the light of sections 53 and 55 of the Constitution.
The Soulbury Constitution required a special procedure 
to be adopted where a proposed piece of legislation 
appeared to be in conflict with a Constitutional 
provision. All other legislation:
" ... proposed for decision by either chamber
shall be determined by a majority of votes of
the Senators or Members, as the case may be,
present and voting.--,
55
The special procedure laid down for legislation which 
appear to conflict with any provision of the Constitution 
was stated in section 29(4). Under that provision all 
legislation found to be in conflict with the Constitution 
was regarded as a:
" ... Bill for the amendment or repeal of any 
of the provisions of this Order and shall be 
presented for the Royal Assent provided it 
has endorsed on it a certificate under the 
hand of the Speaker that the number of votes 
cast in favour thereof in the House of 
Representatives amounted to not less than two- 
thirds of the whole number of members of the 
House (including those not present)
The aforementioned Bribery Amendment Act was passed with 
a simple majority. The question before the Privy Council 
was whether it was valid; notwithstanding the fact that 
it purported to give The Bribery Commissioner who was 
to be appointed by the Minister of Justice (and not by 
the Judicial Service Commission), the status and ranking 
of a member of the Island's Judiciary. To that question 
the Privy Council gave a negative answer. They found that 
the provisions of the Act were in conflict with sections 
53 and 55 of the Constitution. Therefore, the failure
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to follow the special provisions laid down in section 
5729(4) of the Constitution was considered to be fatal 
to the question of constitutional validity of the Act. 
With reference to the special provisions, Lord Pearce 
said:
" ... in the case of amendment and repeal of 
the Constitution the Speaker’s certificate 
is a necessary part of the Legislative process 
and any Bill which does not comply with the 
condition precedent of the proviso, is and 
remains, even though it receives the Royal 
Assent, invalid and ultra vires.
Having said that, His Lordship, as it were to assure the 
Ceylon Parliament of its sovereignty, pointed out that:
"The limitation thus imposed on some lesser 
majority of members does not limit the 
sovereign powers of Parliament itself, which
can always, whenever it chooses, pass the 
amendment with the requisite majority.
Thus far the reasoning of the learned Lord raises no 
cause for comment. His line of reasoning falls squarely 
within the lines drawn by previous authorities, both 
from the Privy Council^ and from other commonwealth 
courts.^ But the area of his judgment which caused 
the greatest single difficulty, and, indeed later led
to a general resentment of what was seen as a challenge
to the sovereignty of the Ceylon Parliament, is contained 
in another passage from the judgment:
"The voting and legislative power of the 
Ceylon Parliament are dealt with in 
sections 18 and 29 of the Constitution.
18. Save as otherwise provided in subsection 
(4) of se ction 29, any question proposed 
for decision by either Chamber shall be 
determined by a majority of votes of the 
Senators of Members, as the case may be, 
present and voting ... ."
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29 (l) Subject to the provisions of this Order, 
Parliament shall have power to make Laws for 
the peace, order and good government of the 
Island.
(2) No such Law shall — (a) prohibit or 
restrict the free exercise of any religion:
There follows (b), (c) and (d) which set out
further entrenched religious and racial 
matters, which shall not be the subject of 
legislation. They represent the solemn 
balance of rights between the citizens of 
Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on which 
inter se they accepted the Constitution; and these 
are therefore unalterable under the Constitution.
The superior Courts in Ceylon have had no opportunity to 
examine the precise effect of those words. In so far 
as The Bribery Commissioner case was concerned, they were 
not regarded as necessary or in any way relevant to the 
issues there concerned. In that sense this was an ' 
obiter dictum. Notwithstanding that fact, the judgment 
itself raised a real concern among the legislators, for 
what it really spelt out was the inability of the 
Parliament of Ceylon to legislate in those areas concerning 
communal and religious matters, detailed in Article 29(2 ), 
even if the members were unanimous•
III• Was Lord Pearce correct in The Bribery 
Commissioner v. Ranasinghe?
It would be fruitless to argue at this stage that the 
Privy Council1s view on the nature and the extent of the 
entrenchment in section 29(2 ) was misconceived. It must 
be conceded that, in their Lordships’ view (as expressed 
by Lord Pearce), the special provisions laid down in 
section 29(4) of the Constitution, requiring a two-thirds 
majority for constitutional amendment, were applicable to 
any legislation which came into conflict with any article
64in the Constitution, except section 29(2) Where the 
conflict occurs with section 29 (2 ), no amount of affirmative 
votes could impress the stamp of validity upon an offending 
statute. This peculiar constitutional significance of
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section 29(2 ) could be explained from a socio-political 
standpoint spun within a historical framework.
The.British Government, by a declaration made on 
6 5May 26th, 19^3, invited the Ministers functioning under 
the Donoughmore Constitution to make proposals for the 
drafting of a new constitutional arrangement. If such 
proposals were acceptable to His Majesty1s Government, 
as being:
" ... in full compliance with the preceding 
portions of this statement and secondly, 
upon their subsequent approval by three- 
quarters of all members of the State Council 
of Ceylon, excluding the Officers—of-State 
and the speaker or other presiding officer,”
then the British Government would proceed to examine them,
at a conference or by a commission, as the basis for a
Constitution,, "directed towards the grant to Ceylon by
Order of His Majesty-in—Council of full responsible
Government under the Crown in all matters of internal
67civil administration." The British Government,
however, cautioned the Ministers in Ceylon that no
conference or commission could be organised or held before
the end of hostilities in the war they were fighting,
68both in Europe and in Asia. With remarkable speed the
Ceylonese.Ministers completed the structuring of the
proposals, and presented them to the British Government
69by the beginning of 19^. The Ceylon Minorities and
the Indian Government made representations to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, upon the communal 
70question. They urged the Secretary of State to
proceed with caution in accepting the Ceylonese draft.
On July 5th, 19^, the Secretary of State for the 
71Colonies announced to the House of Commons that a 
Commission would soon visit Ceylon to consult the views 
of the minorities and would also refer to the Ministers* 
draft and any other proposals for constitutional reform.
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The Government was clearly of* the view that it could not 
overlook the representations made by the minorities and, 
therefore, the proposal was tantamount to a fresh look
at the process of constitutional development of Ceylon.
72As Sir Charles Jeffries says:
"The Ceylon Ministers took strong objection 
to these terms of reference, which in their 
view put the clock right back. They accused 
the British Government of breach of faith, 
withdrew their draft scheme, and refused to 
collaborate with the Commission. The British 
Government, while regretting this, were not 
going to be turned from their course. They 
went ahead with their plan, and the Commission, 
consisting of Lord Soulbury as Chairman, Sir 
Fredrick Rees and Sir Fredrick Burrows, with 
Mr. Tafford Smith of the Colonial Office, as 
Secretary arrived in the Island in December,
19^4."?3
The Commission was provided with no formal opportunity
to hear the views of the Ceylonese Board of Ministers,
74due to their decision to boycott the hearings. There 
were, however, a number of informal opportunities afforded 
to the Commission, at several social gatherings, to seek 
out their views upon an individual basis. Aside from 
this voluntary absence from the hearings the Marxist 
political groupings (except the Communist party) were 
involuntarily absent. For they were, during the 
hearings, incarcerated under the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations. The British Government had made no attempt 
to provide them with an opportunity to present their 
views to the Commission. The Tamil Congress, therefore, 
became the only organised political party to present an 
articulated Brief. Their Brief was in support of the 
demands of the Tamil Community claiming what they called 
a "50-50" interest in the new arrangement. This included 
a right to equal representation in the new legislature.
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The Commissioners left the Island on April 7th,
19^5 t and their Report was presented to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies on the 11th July, 19^5
7 ft
In their Report the Commissioners recommended that
Bills relating inter alia to defence, external affairs,
immigration, franchise, the selective imposition of import
duties, currency, British property, racial and communal
matters and any changes to the Constitution itself should
be reserved for "the signification of His Majesty’s 
77pleasure." The thrust of these recommendations was to 
delay the grant of 'Dominion Status* or ’fully responsible 
government’ until a future date.
78By a White Paper issued on the 31st October, 19^5* 
the British Government accepted these recommendations.
The White Paper made particular mention of the representa­
tions made to the Commission by the minorities and of the 
absence of any representation from the Ceylonese Board of 
Ministers. The British Government declared its sympathy 
for the desire of the Ceylonese Ministers to achieve 
Dominion Status. It further declared that the Soulbury 
Constitution could be considered as a basis for the 
future achievement of that Status and expressed the hope 
to have a new Constitution structured along the lines 
of the recommendations. The British Government concluded:
"Xt is therefore the hope of His Majesty’s 
Government that the new Constitution will 
be accepted by the people of Ceylon with a 
determination so to work it that in a 
comparatively short space of time such 
Dominion Status will be evolved. The actual 
length of time occupied by this evolutionary 
process must depend upon the experience gained 
under the new Constitution by the people of 
Ceylon."79
History has strange ways of plotting the destinies of man 
and his society. Just as the Donoughmore Constitution 
was drafted under a Labour Administration in England, 
so too the succeeding Soulbury Constitution was drafted
-291-
V
under a similar Administration. In both instances, the
Commissioners were the creations of Conservative
Administrations which suffered electoral defeats between
the investigations and the Reports. The Leader of the
State Council, the Hon. D. S. Senanayake was, in fact, in
London to see the electoral defeat of the Conservatives
in 19^5. He had responded to an invitation by the
Conservative Administration for talks regarding the
impending Report. It is apparent from later events that
certain assurances were exchanged by the Leader of the
Ceylon State Council and the Colonial Secretary -
Rt. Hon. Creech Jones - of the new Labour Administration.
These assurances appear to have become transformed into
basic commitments under which Section 29(2) of the
Constitution was drafted. These commitments provided the
basis upon which the Soulbury Dispensations were pushed
towards full Independence by 19^8. Senanayake came back
reconciled to work under the new constitutional arrangements
and the new Secretary of State for the Colonies had
assured him of the Government’s interest in pushing the
constitutional position of Ceylon towards Dominion Status.
80After a two day debate in the State Council, a 
conciliatory motion was passed with 51 for and 3 against.
In an emotional speech Senanayake urged the Council
8l
"not to refuse bread merely because it is not cake."
The foregoing historical sketch provides the back­
ground against which the Soulbury Constitution, containing 
section 29(2 ), was drafted. By 15th May, 19^-6, six and 
a half months after the White Paper was first published,
82The Ceylon (Constitution) Order-in-Council was proclaimed.
It must be emphasised that, apart from a few insignificant 
changes, the whole of this constitution became the basis 
for Independence in 19^-8. At the time of drafting, as 
the preceding history suggests, the 19^6 Order-in-Council
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was to usher in a pen-ultimate stage of constitutional 
development before the actual grant of Dominion Status. 
Therefore, matters concerning communal and religious 
affairs of the nation were put in 'cast-iron’ terms, 
which was not irreconcilable with the stage of 
constitutional development in which Ceylon was, in 19^6; 
that is one of internal self government. It was still a 
Crown Colony, and therefore, a total prohibition placed 
in those areas that are contained in section 29(2 ),
(a)-(c) was in harmony with that particular stage of 
constitutional development.
The British Government's decision to leave the 
structure of section 29(2 ) intact while taking the Colony 
into its next stage of constitutional development — 
namely that of Dominion Status — appears to have had at 
least the tacit agreement of the Ceylonese Board of 
Ministers. There are, in addition, clear indicators that 
the Board of Ministers may have assumed a tacit commitment 
to consider that the provisions of section 29(2) of the 
Soulbury Constitution, as Lord Pearce were to say in 
The Bribery Commissioner case: "unalterable under the
Constitution." It is significant that, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones, during a debate 
on the Ceylon Independence Bill, in the House of Commons, 
on the 21st November, 19^7 had said:
"I should perhaps also mention that the
Government of Ceylon, while able in the
future to amend their own Constitution,
have felt that the provisions of the
existing Constitution safeguarding
minorities should be retained. They
would obviously not wish to provoke any
controversy on these issues in Ceylon.
Thus the provision of an Upper House and
the provision barring discriminatory
legislation will be retained by the Ceylon
Government #"00 
oj
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The validity of* the Senate Abolition Act of 1971 was 
never tested before the Courts. The Privy Council has 
historically departed from the view generally adopted 
by the British Courts, that they will not examine 
extraneous material which may have provided the basis 
for legislation. While applying a statute the British 
Courts prefer to sit with ’blinkers1 and look exclusively 
to the legislation in question. The members of the
84Privy Council, however, have frequently abandoned
that posture and have roamed over a wide variety of
preparatory, historical and legislative material which
may appear to have a relevance to the provision that they
have been called upon to interpret and apply. It is
therefore, possible that Lord Pearce in The Bribery
Commissioner case did examine a number of extraneous
data so as to feel confident that section 29(2 ) was
intended to be unalterable, although the rest of the
Constitution may, by using the special procedure, be
amended. Marshall. in his book on Parliamentary
8 *5Sovereignty and the Commonwealth observed that:
"In the case of Ceylon, it was suggested 
during the debates of 19^7 that she was 
getting (a) more than Canada and (b) less 
than India or Pakistan."g^
87During the course of the House of Commons debate,
reference was made that Canada had no power to amend
the British North America Act of I867, which was in
the nature of a Constitution, while both India and
Pakistan had possessed a power to change their
Constitutions. Mr. Gammans at one stage of the debate
pointed out that the Ceylon Independence Bill had
88"no strings attached", for the Government of Ceylon 
could at any time revoke the Defence and External 
Affairs Agreements or even go outside the Empire. He 
added:
-294-
"Ceylon, as the right Hon. Gentleman, namely 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies has 
said, has the right to amend her own 
constitution - a right not even possessed by 
Canada. 1
The assertion that the Soulbury Constitution falls between 
the Canadian Constitution at one end and the Indian and 
Pakistani Constitutions at the other end does become clear 
from the view that the Dominion of Ceylon had only a 
limited power to amend its Constitution. That limitation 
is deemed to have been placed on the Ceylonese legislature 
by excluding section 29(2) from the ambit of the power to 
amend.
Besides these views, arising out of the House of 
Commons debate on the Independence Bill, there are other
indicators too, to support Lord Pearce*s contention.
90Sir Charles Jeffries, who had led the British
Government1s negotiating team at the talks leading to
the grant of Dominion Status, later referred to the
problem of minorities which had troubled the British
Government during these meetings. With reference to
Sir Oliver Goonetilleke1s contention, on behalf Of the
Ceylonese Ministers, that Ceylon was a rock of stability,
91Sir Charles Jeffries wrote:
"While admitting the force of these arguments,
British Ministers could not lightly set aside 
the claims of the minorities, which lay heavily 
on their consciences. After all, Ceylon was 
only now in the embryonic stage of forming 
political parties, and her people had not yet 
shown much sign of ability to sink their 
internal differences and live together as one 
nation. It was a difficult point, but Sir 
Oliver could reasonably contend that on a 
realistic view it did not affect the issue of 
Dominion Status. The Soulbury Constitution, 
which had been accepted, had entrenched in it 
all the protective provisions for minorities 
that the wit of man could devise. These 
provisions would remain in force after the 
grant of Dominion Status." Q
-^ 295-
The granting of Dominion Status involved two short
steps. By section l(l) of The Ceylon Independence 
. 93Act, 1947, the British Parliament declared that:
"No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom 
passed on or after the appointed day shall 
extend, or be deemed to extend, to Ceylon 
as part of the Law."
The second step was the naming of the date for the grant
of Dominion Status. The Ceylon Independence (commencement)
qZl
Order-in-Council, of 1947, named 4th February, 1948 
as the day on which Ceylon shall acquire that status.
The thrust of Sir Charles* narration of what he
95calls *The Decisive Negotiations* is that the guarantees 
* that the wit of man could devise* were intended to stay.
It seems clear from the speech of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies that the Ceylonese negotiators had, on 
behalf of the Government of Ceylon, agreed to accept a 
constitutional position more Independent than that of 
Canada, but less Independent than that of the sub­
continent of India. Their acceptance of such a limited 
freedom to amend the Soulbury Constitution may have 
helped in removing a stumbling-block of some significance. 
That fact may have helped to calm the ruffled consciences 
of the members of the British Houses of Parliament.
Mr. Gammans expressed his concerns in this way:
"The second danger which Ceylon faces is one 
which the right Hon. Gentleman, The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies has not mentioned 
except very shortly today. It is that Ceylon 
is not a single racial unit. There are two 
races in Ceylon, the Sinhalese and the Jaffna 
Tamils, who are in the northern part of the 
Island, and number 1,500,000, out of a total 
of 6,500,000* They differ from the Sinhalese 
in race, language, religion, and, to a large 
extent, in background. They are extremely 
capable and intelligent people. I  have had a 
lot to do with them because they played a 
very large part in the development of Malaya.
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It was the Jaffna Tamils who came over in
large numbers and started the railways
and Government services. “Where there is a
racial minority in the country the danger
is that it may become a permanent political
minority, and if it does become a permanent
political minority, Ceylon's evolution on
democratic basis is bound to fail.1' r96
Section 29(2 ) could, to a large measure, have prevented 
the Tamil speaking people from becoming a permanent 
minority. Therefore, it was evident that the British 
Government was interested in giving the provisions of 
that section a durability approaching permanancy. All 
these indicators, forming a voluminous collection of 
extraneous materials, may have been available to the 
members of the Privy Council during the hearing of 
The Bribery Commissioner*s case. Freed from the 
limitation placed on English Courts, tying them down to
the terms of the legislation itself, the Privy Council
could have roamed over a vast area of historical, 
political, sociological and legislative materials so as 
to lay down the view that the provisions of section
29(2 ):
"represents the solemn balance of rights 
between the citizens of Ceylon, the
fundamental conditions on which inter se
they accepted the constitution; and these
are therefore unalterable under the
Constitution." „
y  I
The obiter dictum could, therefore, be supported. The 
Soulbury Constitution, was accepted by the House of 
Representatives by 59 votes to 11 and by The Senate by 
21 votes to 5* Within the historical context in which 
the Constitution was conceived, Lord Pearce's gratuitous 
obiter dictum was, with respect, correct. However, it 
marked the commencement of a process towards replacing the
Soulbury Constitutional model with an autochthonous model 
produ 
1972.
98ced out of a unique constitutional exercise, in
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IV. Towards a New Constitution; (a) A Political 
Assessment of the Bribery Commissioner 
Decision.
The thrust of Lord Pearce*s dictum was to bring
into question the sovereignty of Ceylon*s Parliament.
During a debate in the House of Representatives,
99Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, who subsequently became the 
Minister in charge of dismantling the Soulbury 
Constitution and structuring its substitute, the 1972 
Constitution, arguing in 19^9 from the opposition ranks, 
explained the position in this way:
MIh respect of the powers of this House, 
from the point of view of section 29* our 
Constitution may be said to fall into 
three parts. There are those matters in 
which we have no power to legislate at all.
Those are the matters referred to in 
section 29(2). There are the matters we 
can legislate upon only by a two—thirds 
majority of the actual membership of the 
House. Those are what are covered by 
section 29(^0# Then there is the rest of 
that wide field of matters on which we can 
legislate by a simple majority. Those are 
the three divisions of the Constitution 
which are vital from this point of view.”^QQ
101The debate revealed a feeling of anxiety over the
question of sovereignty from every quarter of the House.
102The Government of the day, however, appeared content 
to limit the word ‘unalterable* to section 29(2) of the
Constitution and not to the whole of the Constitution.
103They argued that, in the words of Lord Pearce, the
concern of section 29 being religious and racial matters,
10^"they should not be the subject of legislation,11 and
105are "therefore unalterable under the Constitution.”
The Constitution itself, the Government thought, was
alterable in its entirety, and therefore the solution
which they suggested was the introduction of a new 
106Constitution. In their view, the Privy Council was
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not referring to the legislative competence of the 
Ceylon Parliament to enact a new Constitution, but 
its competence to change a particular section of the 
existing Constitution, and therefore in the Government’s 
view, Parliament was competent to enact a new 
Constitution which would derive its validity from the 
present one. Its de.jure validity thus assured, it would 
then be a successor to the present Constitution. The 
Government of the day was led by The United National 
Party (U.N.P.) which was responsible for negotiating 
the grant of Dominion Status in 19^8.
107The opposition, at the time led by The Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (S.L.F.P.), too, agreed that a new
Constitution was the solution, but they were unwilling
to accept the legislative competence of Parliament to
108enact one. Their interpretation of Lord Pearcefs dictum 
denied Parliament the competence, either to alter or to 
amend section 29 of the present Constitution, or to enact 
a new Constitution which did not carry the provisions of 
that section. This necessarily indicates a total 
inability to get rid of the present Constitution as a 
whole, and substituting for it a new one without having 
to carry into the new one the provisions contained in 
section 29# Viewed in that light, the opposition 
argued that, short of inviting the Westminster Parliament 
(which is the source of the legal validity of the Soulbury 
Constitution) to enact a new Constitution for Ceylon, a 
political revolution was the only alternative. The 
authority for such a revolution, the opposition thought, 
should be sought from the people. The mandate of the 
people should be sought to constitute a constituent assembly 
charged with the duty of drafting a new Constitution.
Such a Constitution, the opposition pointed out, when 
enacted by Parliament, would derive its validity not from 
any narrow juridical source, such as a constitution, but 
from a broad popular source, the people.
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It is important to appreciate the implication of 
the divergence in the respective views held by the 
two principal parties in Parliament. As for the 
opposition, The Bribery Commissioner case had con­
clusively shown that the Ceylon Parliament was not and
109had never been sovereign. The Government, on the 
other hand, thought that Parliament was sovereign, and 
had the power to enact a whole new constitution, but
was clearly powerless to alter or amend section 29 under
. 110 the present one.
The absence of a clear statement from the courts as 
to the true import of Lord Pearce*s view, together with 
the irreconcilable positions taken by the Government and 
the opposition in Parliament, left the whole issue of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in a state of suspended animation. 
The Privy Council, however, only five months previously,'*''*''*' 
had in an appeal from Ceylon, expressed a view which 
appeared to strengthen the view taken by Lord Pearce in 
The Bribery Commissioner case. With reference to section 
29, Viscount Radcliffe had said on that occasion:
"Apart from the fundamental reservations 
specified in section 29, the Order 
contained only two qualifications on the 
full legislative authority of Parliament.
The opposition derived further strength in support of
113their position from this view of Viscount Radcliffe.
I l kAfter quoting the above passage, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva 
during a debate in the House of Representatives, proceded 
to say this:
115"Then they speak of the qualifications - of 
the two-thirds majority and the Speaker's 
certificate. Apart from the fundamental 
reservations specified in section 29 - that is 
fundamental. That cannot be touched. That is 
entrenched.
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That is why I said to you, sir, in 
answer to your question, that I agree 
with the decision. i dQ not agree
with every observation in the judgment, 
but I agree with the decision because 
it is a correct interpretation of the 
Law, whether we like it or not.
And, sir, please remember, as things are, 
any effort to act otherwise is subject to 
decision by the same authority, and it is 
only a set of fools who will think that 
the Privy Council will adopt another 
interpretation on the matter of the meaning 
of the Constitution under this Constitution.
Therefore, if we try to legislate in the 
face of, or in defiance of, this decision 
under the Constitution, then any citizen 
can take the matter to the Privy Council.
In fact he need not go all the way to the 
Privy Council. The local courts are under 
an obligation to apply this decision. That 
is the position.”
Although The Bribery Commissioner case was decided in
1964, its effect did not come up for evaluation until
1969. The S.L.F.P. was defeated at the 19^5 General
Elections and the U.N.P. that took office in that year at
118the head of a seven party political coalition had 
other pressing political problems to resolve. The 
maintenance of communal harmony, the propogation of the 
•National Food Drive1 and the sheer effort of keeping a 
seven party political coalition together, consumed a large 
measure of parliamentary time. However, by 19^9, Loth the 
Government and the opposition were on the look out for new 
and attractive election issues for their respective 
manifestos, and it is then that The Bribery Commissioner 
case became a boiling political issue. With anxieties 
about parliamentary sovereignty heading the list of 
other controversial issues, the sixth Parliament after 
Independence was dissolved in April, and elections 
were called for May 27, 1970*
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IV. (b) The Creation of a Constituent Assembly
The divergent views held over The Bribery Commissioner 
case by the two political groups in the sixth Parliament 
were cleanly reflected in their respective pre-election 
manifestos/. The political groups that comprised the 
Government of the previous Parliament pledged, if returned 
to power, to implement constitutional reforms through 
Parliament. That was in line with the stand that they had 
taken on The Bribery Commissioner case. The opposition, 
however, sought a mandate from the people for the next 
Parliament, to sit as a constituent assembly "to draft, 
adopt and operate a new Constitution which will declare 
Ceylon to be a free sovereign and Independent Republic
119
... . " Poised in that manner, The Bribery
Commissioner case went up, as it were on a further appeal, 
to the electorate.
On May 27, 1970, the opposition of the last 
Parliament, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party with their two 
Marxist partners, was swept into power, and His Excellency 
the Governor-General called upon Mrs. Bandaranaike to form 
the next Government. On June l4, the first session of the 
Seventh Parliament was declared open by the Governor- 
General on behalf of the Queen, and included the following 
paragraph in his speech from the throne. Lt read:
"By their vote democratically cast the 
people have given you a clear mandate 
to function as a Constituent Assembly 
to draft, adopt, and operate a new 
Constitution which will declare Ceylon 
to be a free sovereign and Independent 
Republic ... ."
120
The procedures thereafter set forth by the Government 
towards creating a Constituent Assembly laid emphasis 
on two factors. First, the Government made it clear 
that the authority to create a Constituent Assembly was
- 302-
derived neither from the British Crown and Parliament of 
the United Kingdom nor from the present Constitution of 
the country, but exclusively from the mandate given by 
the people at the General Election. Emphasis on both 
these matters appeared to the Government as important, 
for one of the options which were open to Parliament in 
the light of Lord Pearce*s dictum was to invite the 
Westminster Parliament to legislate for a new constitution, 
ostensibly, to make the Ceylon Parliament a supreme 
legislative body, by deleting the restrictions which Lord 
Pearce found in the present Constitution. This was viewed 
by both sides of the House as an admission of dependence, 
and therefore to adopt such a course was thought to be 
humiliating and fraught with a great many political and 
legal difficulties. The second option was the one 
suggested by the United National Party, which was the 
principal partner of the Government between 1965-1970•
That was to legislate for a new constitution, relying 
on the legislative competence of the Ceylon Parliament 
to do so. That would necessarily have founded the 
juridical validity for the new constitution on the one 
it was designed to replace.
The Government of Mrs. Bandaranaike, therefore, felt 
it important that it made clear from the very outset, in 
the procedures which were set in motion, that the basis 
for the validity of the new constitution would ultimately 
rest exclusively on the will of the people. The 
Constituent Assembly was deemed to be a creation of the 
House of Representatives under a mandate given to that 
body by the people of Ceylon. The legality of the 
Constituent Assembly together with the legality of the 
Constitution which it was mandated to form was founded, 
ultimately, on the will of the people expressed through 
the electoral process of May 27th, 1970. Xt was, therefore, 
thought that the resolution creating the Constituent Assembly 
should reflect all these legal and political factors.
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The resolution read:
"We the members of the House of Representatives, 
in pursuance of the mandate given by the people 
of Sri Lanka (i.e., Ceylon)^ ^ at the General 
Election held on the 27th day of May, 1970, do 
hereby resolve to constitute, declare and 
proclaim ourselves the Constituent Assembly 
of the People of Sri Lanka for the purpose of 
adopting, enacting and establishing a Constitution 
for Sri Lanka which will declare Sri Lanka to be 
a free, sovereign and Independent Republic pledged 
to realise the objectives of a socialist democracy 
including the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
all citizens and which will become the fundamental 
law of Sri Lanka deriving its authority from the 
people of Sri Lanka and not from the power and 
authority assumed and exercised by the British 
Crown and the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
in the grant of the present Constitution of Ceylon 
nor from the said Constitution and do accordingly 
constitute declare and proclaim ourselves the 
Constituent Assembly of the people of Sri Lanka
it
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The second factor upon which the Government laid
emphasis when creating the Constituent Assembly was this:
although it was the members of the Seventh Parliament
that received the mandate to draft a new Constitution,
the Government, in the procedures it adopted, laid
emphasis on the distinction between members sitting as
Parliament, and members sitting as a Constituent Assembly.
To make this distinction clear, the first meeting of
members sitting not as a Parliament, but as a body of
citizens bent on creating a Constituent Assembly was held
in a premises several miles away from the House of
Representatives. That was held in response to a personal 
123invitation sent out by the Prime Minister, and
addressed to each member by name, requesting his or her
presence at a meeting to consider and adopt a resolution
124to create a Constituent Assembly. The meeting was
held on July 19> 1970* Having symbolised the separateness 
of the two bodies - the Parliament and the Constituent 
Assembly - the members who were members of both bodies
-304-
resolved that henceforth they should sit, when sitting
as a Constituent Assembly - in the Chamber of4 the House
125of* Representatives. The Resolution, which was moved
by the Prime Minister, Hon. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and
126seconded by Dr. N. M. Perera on July 19th, was
127adopted, unanimously, on the 21st of that month. That
marked the creation of the Constituent Assembly. When 
giving the opinion of the Privy Council in The Bribery 
Commissioner case, Lord Pearce1s view of the Ceylon 
Constitution may have had the appearance of a distant 
ripple. But as events have revealed, it turned into an 
enormous tidal wave•
IV. (c ) The Drafting of a New Constitution: How
The Constituent Assembly Worked.
The resolution to establish the Constituent Assembly
and to authorize it to adopt, enact and establish a
Constitution for Sri Lanka was unanimously approved on
129the 21st July, 1970> by the elected representatives of
the Seventh Parliament sitting as an assembly of persons
who had been mandated to do that. Their mandate sprang
from the votes cast in their favour by a majority of
the voters at the General Elections held on May 27th,
1970. Eight days later, on the 29th of July, The Minister
in charge of Constitutional Affairs, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva
130outlined the procedure the Assembly should adopt in its 
work towards producing a new Constitution. The procedure 
was designed in a way that a series of Basic Resolutions 
would be drafted first, embodying the principles upon 
which the new Constitution would rest. The Minister laid 
down two sources from which these Resolutions would emerge. 
He said:
"These Resolutions will come from two sources:
(^ a) the Steering and Subjects Committee acting 
through the Minister of Constitutional Affairs;
■(b) Members of the Assembly who have obtained 
either the concurrence of the Steering and 
Subjects Committee or of the Assembly to bring 
any specific Resolution of basic principle 
before the^Assembly."231
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The first source provided the Government - namely the
Cabinet of Ministers - the means of transforming
Government1s own views into 1Basic Resolutions'. The
second source provided the Members of the Constituent
Assembly, in their individual capacities to move basic
principles which they may desire to have the Constituent
Assembly adopt as 'Basic Resolutions*. Both streams of
ideas, views and suggestions of the basic principles
would, according to this procedure, ultimately germinate
within the Steering and Subjects Committee. The latter
in fact was a Committee of experts chosen to function as
a drafting body, directly under the Minister of
Constitutional Affairs. They sat as a group of experts
under the chairmanship of the Minister and carried the
collective responsibility of transforming lengthy memoranda
containing views, suggestions and opinions at various
stages of maturity. These memoranda contained the suggested
'basic principles'. Each 'Basic Resolution' was in the
form of a constitutional provision. Upon a decision being
made by the Steering and Subjects Committee that any
particular 'basic principle' proposed by a member of the
Assembly merits adoption, the Committee would then draft a
'Basic Resolution' out of that 'principle'. If on the other
hand the Committee were to reject such a 'principle* the
member or members concerned could move its adoption by
132way of a simple resolution before the Assembly. If
such a resolution were to receive a simple majority, the
Steering and Subjects Committee should thereby be required
to adopt such 'principle* and re—state it in the form of
a 'Basic Resolution* which would have the potential of
being incorporated as a provision of the new Constitution.
In addition, the Assembly was empowered to reject or
amend any 'Basic Resolution' that the Minister of
Constitutional Affairs may himself move under the first
133of the two aforesaid sources. The supremacy of the
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Assembly is thus established at every stage of the
drafting procedure. Aside from the two aforementioned
sources, there was a third source too from which a 'basic
principle* may arise. The 'public* in the widest sense
of the word may individually or by groups suggest
'basic principles' that they wish the Constitution to
incorporate. Within this category fell both citizens,
non-citizens, residents and non-residents who may have
134an interest in submitting memoranda to the Committee.
If the Committee were to decide that their memoranda 
should be adopted, the resulting 'Basic Resolution’ should 
have the status of a Resolution put forward by the 
Committee acting through the Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs. The first stage of the procedure was therefore, 
the collection of memoranda from these three sources 
containing an elaboration of the 'basic principles* that 
should go into the 'Basic Resolutions'.
The second stage involved the adoption of the
135several *Basic Resolutions' by the Constituent Assembly. 
Each 'Basic Resolution* was separately debated and was 
individually voted. At that stage the Constituent Assembly 
had the power to reject or amend any of the 'Resolutions', 
if the members had so wished. Once the Assembly had 
adopted all the relevant 'Resolutions', which in fact by 
now were potential constitutional provisions, the Minister 
of Constitutional Affairs was required to move:
"That the draft Constitution is in accordance 
with the basic principles adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly•"236
The adoption of that resolution by a simple majority 
commenced the third stage of Constitution making.
During this stage the Assembly was required to divide:
-307-
• • • into a suitable number of Committees 
to each, of which an appropriate portion of 
the draft Constitution will be referred for 
amendment if necessary. Each Committee will 
be empowered to receive memoranda from the 
public and, if the Committee considers it 
necessary, to receive evidence on such 
memoranda. The Committee shall report to 
the Steering and Subjects Committee on any 
amendments proposed together with a summary 
of their reasons for proposing the amendments."
137
At the end of this stage the Steering and Subjects 
Commmittee should have before it several reports from the 
mini—committees of the whole Assembly. The Steering and 
Subjects Committee was then required to consider those 
reports and produce what should be the second draft of the 
Constitution.
The fourth stage of the process was to place before .
the Assembly the second draft of the Constitution. At that
stage the Assembly as a whole sitting as a committee
embarked Upon a detailed consideration of the revised 
139second draft. During that process the Assembly, now
in the guise of a Committee was empowered:
11 ... to amend the draft in accordance 
with the Standing Orders”
This eventually produced the third or the final draft of 
the Constitution. The fifth or the final stage of this 
process was a relatively short one. It was the adoption 
of the final draft by a simple majority by the members of
l4lthe Constituent Assembly. That step culminated m  the
promulgation of the draft Constitution on the 22nd May,
1972. By 'Schedule A* of the 1972 Constitution, the
Ceylon (Constitution and Independence) Orders-in-Council
14-2 i4q
of 1946 and 1947 were repealed. This effectively
replaced the Soulbury Constitution with the 1972 Constitution,
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CHAPTER 8
Autochthoiry and New Constitutions: Of 1972 and 1978
1• An Introduction
The legal aspects of the 1972 Constitution have been
the subject of an authoritative study'*" by Dr. Cooray. No
useful purpose could be achieved by adding to his most
valuable exposition. But, considering the 1972
Constitutional model as the commencement of a process of
breaking away from the colonial model - the Soulbury
Constitution, — the 1972 model could be usefully examined
by indicating the additional changes which have been
brought about by the 1978 model. The 1978 Constitution
represents a new stage in the continuing process of
modernization of the Constitutional structure in Sri Lanka.
The 1972 Constitution, inaugurated on the 22nd May, 1972,
2formed the basis for the 1978 Constitution introduced
on the 7th September, 1978. Just as the 1972 Constitution
3was formed under an electoral mandate given to the United 
Left Front Government led by Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1970, 
the 1978 Constitution was a result of a mandate given by 
the electorate to the United National Party in 1977• The 
two Constitutions can be conveniently examined under a 
series of headings.
II• Sovereignty and the Separation of Powers
The central issue debated in The House of 
Representatives in 19^9 over Lord Pearce*s obiter dictum 
was the question of Parliamentary Sovereignty under the 
Soulbury Constitution. The first basic resolution moved 
before the Constituent Assembly on the l4th March, 1971 was 
that:
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"Sri Lanka shall be free, sovereign and 
independent Republic."
D
6The second basic resolution which was moved two 
days later was that the Constitutional structure of*
Sri Lanka shall be that of a Unitary State, thus 
rejecting the idea of Federalism. Surrounding these 
two broad propositions, the 1972 Constitution contained 
five articles in the first chapter which established the 
principle of a Sovereign Unitary State. Three of these 
five articles merit comment:
"Article 3 s the Republic of Sri Lanka,
sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. 
Article h i The sovereignty of the people is 
exercised through a National State Assembly ... ." 
Article 5 s The National State Assembly is the 
supreme instrument of State power of the Republic.
The National State Assembly exercises - (a) the 
legislative power of the people; (b) the executive 
power of the people, including the defence of Sri 
Lanka, through the President and the Cabinet of 
Ministers. (c) the judicial power of the people 
through the Courts ... ."^
What Article 4 indicated was that the National State 
Assembly was the agency through which the people exercised 
their sovereignty. Article 3 declared that the sovereignty 
of Sri Lanka lay in its people. The Agent, the National 
State Assembly, exercised legislative power, while the 
executive and judicial powers were sub-delegated, not by 
the people, but by the National State Assembly, to the 
Cabinet and to the Judiciary, respectively. Phrased in 
that way, the Judiciary, like the cabinet became agents 
of state power, the National State Assembly being its 
supreme instrument. The Constitution did not bring about 
separation of powers but the subordination of all agencies 
of state power to the National State Assembly. In this 
way the Judiciary became in Law subordinated to the 
National State Assembly. Accompanying this change was
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the abandonment of the principle of separating the 
judiciary from the legislature and the executive, as 
found in section 55(l) of* the Soulbury Constitution; 
which formed the basis for the dispute in The Bribery
g
Commissioner case. Section 55(l) of the Soulbury 
Constitution provided:
"The appointment, transfer, dismissal and 
disciplinary control of judicial officers 
is hereby vested in the Judicial Service 
Commission."
Section 53 of the Soulbury Constitution made the 
Judicial Service Commission an independent entity and 
entrusted to them the task of appointing the Island1s 
Judiciary. The 1972 Constitution, however, left that 
task to the Cabinet of Ministers emphasising the sub­
ordination of the Judiciary to the National State 
Assembly. By these means Judicial appointments became 
subject to Parliamentary control, thus establishing the 
ultimate link with the people as a whole. Adopting the 
provisions of the Soulbury Constitution the 1972 
Constitution, however, retained the stringent requirement 
of an address and a vote in the National State Assembly
9
for the removal of a Judicial Officer. But, unlike the 
Soulbury Constitution, the ultimate responsibility for 
the transfer of a judicial officer was left in the hands 
of "the Minister in charge of the subject of Justice"
The thrust of these provisions was to make the judiciary 
subordinate to the National State Assembly - which was 
considered the supreme instrument of State power.
The 1978 Constitution, "*"■*" retained this paradigm.
It reads:
"Article 3s ln the Republic of Sri Lanka 
sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. 
Sovereignty includes the powers of government, 
fundamental rights and the franchise."
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Having thus located the sovereignty the next three 
sub-articles of* the Constitution proceeded to explain 
the way the people exercised their sovereignty.-
"Article k : The sovereignty of the people shall
be exercised and enjoyed in the following manner:—
(a) the legislative power of the people shall be 
exercised by Parliament ... and by the people at a 
referendum;
(b) the executive power of the people, including 
the defence of Sri Lanka shall be exercised by the 
President of the Republic elected by the people;
(c) the judicial power of the people shall b e ^  
exercised by Parliament through Courts, ... ."
To make the ascendancy of the peoples* sovereign
power over the judiciary unmistakably clear, the 1978
Constitution empowered The President, who is also the
head of the Executive, to appoint the judges at all
13levels, at his absolute discretion. As for the removal 
of judges, the traditional procedure of an address from
lii
Parliament was retained. Although it was the Cabinet
which held the collective responsibility for the appointment
of judges under the 1972 Constitution, Article 126 (l)
required the Cabinet to consult the Judicial Service 
15Advisory Board before a judicial appointment was made. 
Article 107(l) of the 1978 Constitution, however, carried 
no such pre-condition for the exercise of the President's 
power to appoint judges. In this context the President’s 
power to appoint the judiciary was unconditional. There 
is, of course, an important constitutional issue that 
comes to light, in that the President is not a member of 
Parliament. The President is elected by the people but is 
outside Parliament. This may create a conflict between 
what is said in Article h  (c) of the Constitution, that 
"the judicial power of the people shall be exercised by 
Parliament ... through Courts" and the fact that
the ultimate power of appointing judicial officers is held 
by the President, who is not responsible to Parliament.
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The provision of4 the 1972 Constitution is more in harmony 
with the location of the Sovereign power in the people of 
Sri Lanka, than is the parallel provision in the 1978 
Constitution. For the Cabinet, which is responsible for 
judicial appointments under the 1972 Constitution, is 
responsible to Parliament, which is the repository of the 
Sovereign power of the people. This makes the claim that 
the judicial power of the people (an attribute of their 
Sovereignty), is exercised primarily by Parliament, but 
through the agencies of the Courts, a constitutional fact. 
However, the broad principle of political policy which, in 
both constitutions, was translated into Law - namely, that 
the Sovereignty of the country lies in its people — must 
help in establishing the Sovereignty of the Sri Lanka 
parliament for all times. This was meant to be a suitable 
answer to the problems raised, by implication, in Lord 
Pearce1s obiter dictum in The Bribery Commissioner case.^
XII• Executive Government
The principle element in the Westminster model is the 
separation of the Head of State from the Head of Government. 
The Head of State becomes constitutionally identified with
r
powers, rights and privileges dema'cated by law. The Head
r-
of Government, on the other hand, as the Chief Executive, 
presides over a ministry which he has selected for 
himself, and sits as a member with voting rights in the 
legislature. The 1972 Constitution, while adopting the 
Westminster model, took a further step towards isolating 
the Head of State from Parliament by declaring that a Bill, 
when passed by the requisite majority in Parliament, 
becomes law upon its certification by the Speaker that:
"This law (here include the short title of 
the law) has been duly passed by the National 
State Assembly.”
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This position has been retained in the 1978 Constitution,
This dispenses with the need for the Presidents assent 
before a Bill becomes law and thereby internalises the 
law making power totally, in the hands of the People*s 
representatives in Parliament, This again is a manifestation 
of the absolute view of Sovereignty pursued by the makers 
of the two Constitutions,
Under the 1972 Constitution, Ma Cabinet of Ministers
19charged with the direction and control of government"
was made "collectively responsible to the National State
Assembly and answerable to the National State Assembly
20on all matters for which they are responsible," The 
1972 Constitution thereafter declared, that:
"of the Ministers, one who shall be the Head 
of the Cabinet of Ministers shall be the 
Prime Minister, The President shall appoint 
as Prime Minister the Member of the National 
State Assembly who, in the President*s opinion, 
is most likely to command the confidence of the 
National State Assembly."
21
The Prime Minister was given the task of determining the
number of ministers and the assignment of subjects and
22functions to them. The President was thereafter required
to appoint them to the portfolios designated by the Prime 
23Minister. The model pursued under the 1972 Constitution 
maintains a strict separation between the Head of State 
and the Head of Government. The President under the 
1972 Constitution was no different from the Governor- 
General under the Soulbury Constitution. Under both 
Constitutions, the President and the Governor—General 
merely functioned as Heads of State not as Heads of 
Government. This was clearly*the essentials of the 
Westminster model, retained in the 1972 Constitution.
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The United National Party which formed the 
Government in 1977» proposed to the electorate a 
departure from the 'Westminster Model', at the General 
Elections of that year. Having obtained a mandate to 
change the system of government to what was then called 
a 'Presidential Model', Parliament designed some of the 
principal provisions of the 1978 Constitution in order 
to break away from the 'Westminster Model1, which had 
persisted in both the Soulbury Constitution and in the
2 h
1972 Constitution, Article 19 of the 1972 Constitution
declared the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka to be
her Head of State while Article 30 of the 1978 
25Constitution expanded the role of the President to be:
" ... the Head of State, the Head of the 
Executive and of the Government, and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,"
Further, in Article 43» the 1978 Constitution declared 
that:
"(l) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers 
charged with the direction and control of 
the Government of the Republic, which shall 
be collectively responsible and answerable 
to Parliament.
(2 ) The President shall be a member of the 
Cabinet of Ministers, and shall be the Head 
of the Cabinet of Ministers:
provided that notwithstanding the dissolution 
the Cabinet of Ministers under the provisions 
of the Constitution, the President shall 
continue in office,
In addition, the 1978 Constitution gave the President
27the responsibility of appointing a Prime Minister, and
determining the number of Ministers, their Miciisteries,
28and the assignment of subjects and functions to them.
In the latter, the President was not required to consult 
the Prime Minister if he wished to act without his 
advice. The cumulative effect of these provisions was
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to merge the position of* the Head of State and that of
the Head of Government in one person. Although the
President had a right to address Parliament at any time,
29by virtue of his office, he could neither be a member
30of Parliament nor be answerable to it. The President
could if he so wished, ’’assign to himself any subject
or function” and thus assume responsibility for any
31particular ministry in the Government. However, the
1978 Constitution makes no provision for the President’s
answerability to Parliament in his capacity as a Minister 
32of State. The danger lies in the fact that the
President could, by not assigning any functions to any
o o
Ministers, assume responsibility under Article 44(2) 
for all functions of Government, and thereby deny 
Parliament the right to control the nation’s business. 
Such a point would, however, make the Constitutional
34position of the government of the United States of 
America appear in many ways similar to that of Sri Lanka 
under the 1978 Constitution. In practice the Deputy— 
Minister responsible for the portfolio in question would 
answer to Parliament — as the mouthpiece of the President; 
but only in his ministerial capacity.
The Presidential system of Government contained in
the 1978 Constitution effectively ended the ’Westminster
Model* of Government for Sri Lanka. The 1972 Model,
while changing the role of the Governor-General from one
of being a mere representative of The Queen, to that of
a President, as a Head of State for Sri Lanka, retained
in other respects the ’Westminster Model* of Government.
In that sense the 1978 Constitution, in the area of
Executive Government, presents a higher synthesis in this
35dialectical process of Constitutional development, than 
the model presented by the 1972 Constitution.
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IV. Legislative Powers
Earlier it was pointed out that the limits placed
on the legislative powers of the Parliament of Ceylon
after Independence provoked considerable concern among
political leaders, particularly after The Bribery 
37Commissioner decision. The 1972 Constitution, therefore, 
paid particular attention to the question of the 
legislative powers of the National State Assembly which
00
replaced Parliament. The 1972 Constitution required 
the publication of a proposed Bill in the Gazette for a 
period of at least seven days, in both Sinhala and Tamil,
before it was placed on the Agenda of the National State
39Assembly. During the proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly, the Minister in Charge of Constitutional Affairs
40explained that this procedure would help to give the
Bill wide publicity and time to stimulate discussion on
the provisions contained in it. Thereafter, the Bill
would be placed on the Order Paper and there is yet
4l
another week before the expiry of the period allowed
to challenge it upon Constitutional grounds. According
to normal practice, however, several weeks do elapse
between the first publication of the Bill in the Gazette
42and its appearance on the Order Paper. During the 
first week after its appearance on the Order Paper, any
member of the National State Assembly, through his
43 h hpolitical party, any twenty members of the Assembly,
45 46the Speaker or his deputy or any citizen may raise
the question of its Constitutionality with the Speaker,
47in writing. The Speaker is then required to refer the 
question of Constitutional validity to the Constitutional 
Court established under Article 5^(l) of the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court must, except in the case of Bills 
which the Cabinet of Ministers had certified as being 
’urgent in the National interest’; deliver their opinion 
within two weeks of the Bill being referred to such Court.
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In the case of* * Urgent Bills', the period was limited
48to twenty-four hours. What is required within the 
prescribed period is the view of* the Constitutional 
Court as to whether the Bill offends the Constitution.
49Their reasons, however, could be delivered later.
If the Court concludes that:
" ... this Bill or any provision therein is
inconsistent with the Constitution or that
the Constitutional Court entertains a doubt
whether the Bill or any provision therein
is consistent with the Constitution such
Bill may not pass into Law except with the
special majority required for the amendment
of the Constitution.” -3U
The special majority required for Constitutional amendments 
was two—thirds at least of the whole house (including those 
absent) voting affirmatively in favour of passing the 
provision.^ While Article makes the decision of
the Constitutional Court binding on the Speaker and 
conclusive for all purposes, no challenge of the Bill 
could ever be made after the lapse of a period of one week 
rekoned from the day of its publication upon the Orde:r 
Paper. Explaining the policy behind these provisions, 
the Hon. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva told the Constituent 
Assembly:
"So, I do not think it is possible for anyone
to go further within the principle that laws
cannot be challenged after they are passed in
the interests of certainty of the Law and the
security of the citizen." 0
52
Explaining the important role which the Constitutional 
Court would play under the new scheme for delineating, 
the legislative powers of the National State Assembly,
Dr. de Silva said:
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I
"If, however, the Constitutional Court or 
the Speaker or both, the Constitutional 
Court in particular, think that there is 
a question of repugnance, then the Government 
must take its choice. Either it must forget 
its hurry and go through it in the ordinary 
way, or, the Government being of the opinion 
that it is a matter of urgency in the national 
interest, it can decide on one of two courses 
of action. It can either remove that provision 
and present the Bill without it, and then there 
would be no problem, or it can decide that that 
provision is necessary and proceed with the 
Bill with that provision, but in that case the 
Speaker will insist on a two-thirds majority.
In other words, it will have to reach that 
status. So every precaution is being taken.
What I. want to stress is that I am seeking to 
build into the Constitution various precautions 
which will prevent any laws being passed that 
ought not to be passed except by a special 
majority. Those are precautions which the 
British Parliament do not have, they are 
precautions they do not observe, because even 
by a snap majority they may pass a law and 
that law would be good law. I am seeking to 
build into the Constitution these precautions.'' „
The United National Party, which was leading the opposition
at the time, agreed to these Constitutional provisions,
/ \ but its leader, Mr. J. R. Jayawardene (as he then was;,
expressed serious doubts as to the competence of a special
Constitutional Court to hear the Constitutional challenge
55raised against a Bill. The Court, as constituted under 
Article of the 1972 Constitution was not expected to be 
drawn from career judges of the Supreme Court. Dr. de Silva 
on behalf of the government explained that:
"In the matter of this question of the 
Constitutional Court it must be realised 
that expertise in legalism alone is not 
enough. For instance, supposing we had 
an equivalent to Sir Ivor Jennings here, 
would we not consider him a suitable 
member of the Constitutional Court? ... •
We have professors of Constitutional Law ... 
we have men of goodly position and expertise; 
and what has to be brought in is not only the 
legal expertise but proper attitudes. I may 
say it is a consideration of all these matters
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that caused me also to limit the life of 
the Constitutional Court to the period of 
a given Parliament."^
The Government's position was that the Constitutional
Court was required not only to decide a legal issue
but to do so within a political framework. For,
whether a Bill was in conflict with the Constitution was
not only a legal matter but also a political matter.
What a Bill was primarily intended to do was to act as
the vehicle for the transformation of political policy
into legal rules. What is found embalmed in Constitutions
are the fundamental political philosophies of the framers.
Xt was this line of argument which the Government adopted
before the Constituent Assembly in 1971* As an element
of the superiority of the National State Assembly, the
Constitution required that no member of the Constitutional
57Court could refrain from voting and the decision of
58the Court should be by a majority vote. The President
was required to appoint five members to the Court and at
each sitting three of them would be required to sit as a
59fully constituted Court. In practice, the majority 
of the Court, always including the Chairman, were career 
judges drawn from the Supreme Court. Dr. Cooray,^ 
the Constitutional lawyer and law teacher, was the only 
non-judicial member of the Court.
The United National Party took office in 1977 and
retained the fundamental structure of the 1972 Constitution,
in this area. But two minor changes, and one substantial
were introduced. The substantial change was made by
substituting the Supreme Court,^  the highest Court of 
62the land under the 197° Constitution, for the 
Constitutional Court under the 1972 Constitution. Being 
the highest Court of the land, its ruling bound every 
Court on the Island, as established under the 1978 
Constitution. This change of the forum was in line with
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the views expressed by the leader of the United National 
Party, from the opposition, in 1971* The two minor 
changes were that the Supreme Court now, under the 1978 
Constitution, was given an extra week — namely three weeks 
- to make a determination on the Constitutional validity
64 /of an Ordinary Bill and three days (instead of the 
twenty-four hours granted under the 1972 Constitution)
65to make a similar determination over an fUrgentf Bill.
Under both, the 1972 Constitution and the 1978 
Constitution, all Bills which expressly or by implication 
attempted to alter the Constitution were required to be 
passed by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership 
of Parliament (including those who may be absent). This 
under the Constitution ensured their Constitutional validity. 
Those Bills which did not conflict with the Constitution 
could however be passed into law by a simple majority.
While recognising these two categories of legislative 
provisions, the 1978 Constitution carved out a third 
category of Bills which, in addition to obtaining a two- 
thirds majority in Parliament as required for any 
Constitutional amendment, carried a further requirement 
that they be submitted to a vote by the People at a 
Referendum.^9, Article 83 of the 1978 Constitution laid 
down six areas of the Constitution which fell under this 
third category.
(1) Where the Sovereignty of the State**-**3 
and its people^ are concerned or the 
unitary nature \ of the State is in question;
(2) Where the National flag,**® the National Anthem*^ 
or the National Day^Q is in question;
(3) Where the position of Buddhism in Article 9 
is in question;
(4) Where the guarantees of such fundamental rights 
as freedom of thought, conscience, religion71 and 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment72 is in question.
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(5) Where the maximum life of the Parliament, _ 
normally ordained as six years, is in question.
(6) Where the repeal of Article 83, itself, is 
in question.^
Besides these six areas where the Constitution requires 
the holding of a Referendum, Article 86 of the Constitution 
declared that:
flThe President may ••• submit to the people
by Referendum any matter which in the opinion
of the President is of national importance." _
I D
In additions
"The President may in his discretion submit 
to the people by Referendum any Bill (not 
being a Bill for the repeal or amendment of 
any provision of the Constitution, or for 
the addition of any provision to the 
Constitution, or for the repeal and replacement 
of the Constitution, or which is inconsistent 
with any provision of the Constitution), which 
has been rejected by Parliament." ^
The Constitution further declared that a matter submitted
for Referendum is deemed to have been approved by the
people if it receives an absolute majority of the votes
cast at such Referendum. However, where the total
number of votes cast at a Referendum does not exceed
two—thirds of the whole number of electors eligible to
vote then atleast one—third of the whole number of such
electors must vote in favour of the question referred to
77them of its approval.
Although the areas required to be subjected to a 
Referendum do not expressly include changes to the 
territorial extent of the Republic, presumably any such 
changes would raise questions of sovereignty and would, 
therefore, be required to be subjected to a Referendum.
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In any event, any matter concerning the territorial 
integrity of the nation would raise an issue of such 
national importance that the President would be obliged 
to submit the issue to the people, through a Referendum, 
under Article 86 of the Constitution. The Tamil demands 
for separation or federalism raise such an issue which 
must by necessity be an issue concerning the whole nation 
and not only their elected representatives in Parliament.
In conclusion,the 1978 Constitution maintains the
framework of the 1972 Constitution regarding legislative
powers subject to the two aforementioned changes. Hie
substitution of the Supreme Court for the Constitutional
Court is one and the introduction of the Referendum as
a part of the legislative process is the other. The
Referendum is a very new idea in the constitutional
78 7 0
models thus far applied to Ceylon or Sri Lanka.
Its significance is that it signifies the ultimate
location for Sri Lanka*s sovereignty; namely, in the
people, a principle acknowledged by both constitutional
models•
V. Religion and Language
In Chapters II and III of the 1972 Constitution
the position of Buddhism and of the Sinhala language
was stated, in that order. Buddhism was declared as
being accorded "the foremost place and accordingly it
shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster
Buddhism while assuring to all religions the rights"
granted under the provisions contained in the chapter
8o
on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The 1978
Constitution in Chapter II adopted and affirmed these
. . 81 provisions.
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In Chapter III of* the 1972 Constitution the validity
82of* the Official Language Act and the Tamil Language
go 84
(Special Provisions) Act were confirmed. Besides
re-establishing the validity of these Acts, Chapter III 
8 *5adopted the provisions of the Language of the Courts
Act of 1961. ^  The 1978 Constitution,^ in Chapter IV,
adopted and affirmed the provisions of Chapter III of
88the 1972 Constitution, but with one change. It is this. 
After confirming in Article 18, that the Official Language 
of Sri Lanka is Sinhala, in Article 19, it provided:
"The National Languages of Sri Lanka 
shall be Sinhala and Tamil.
The significance of Article 19 lies in the fact that 
the Tamil language, together with Sinhala, has now 
become recognised as one of the languages of a national 
group within Sri Lanka. Arabic, Malayalam, Malay or 
English cannot claim to have a national status as a 
recognised language of a particular ethnic group of 
Sri Lankans. Not even the Welsh language in the United 
Kingdom may claim such a recognition; for Welsh is only 
a regional language which may not be used for any purpose 
outside the Principality of Wales. Arising out of 
Article 19, is the assurance that the Tamil—speaking 
people of Sri Lanka may now, as a right, use their 
language, in all matters concerning them, in any part of 
the Island. In Articles 22, 23 and 24 reference is made 
to three particular areas in which particular rules
regarding language may apply: these are the areas of
90 91public administration, the Language of legislation and
92the language of the Courts. These areas are governed 
by earlier legislation which has come down to the 1978 
Constitution by way of the 1972 Constitution. Article 
23 of the 1978 Constitution projects the basic relation­
ship between the Official Language and the two National 
Languages:
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"All Laws and subordinate legislation shall 
be enacted or made, and published, in both 
National Languages together with a transla­
tion in the English Language. In the event 
of* any inconsistency between any two texts, 
the text in the Official Language shall 
prevail.
The position of the English is expressly mentioned as 
a language into which a law be translated, presumably
for international use.
The Official Language comes into operation when 
there is a conflict' between the Sinhala version and the 
Tamil version, but until then, both Sinhala and Tamil 
texts have equal force as law properly constituted in any 
region of the Island. The inclusion of Article 19 in the 
1978 Constitution may well have a psychological effect of 
some magnitude for the minority Tamil community.
VI. The position of the Servants of the State 
under the Post—Soulburv Constitutions.
One of the key issues before the Soulbury Commission
was the question of guarantees for a non-politicized
9 kpublic service. By placing the public service under an
95independent body, the Public Service Commission, the
Soulbury Constitution sought to guarantee its independence.
During the post-independence period, and particularly
under the Bandaranaike Governments, the complaint was
often heard of the non-cooperative posture of the public
services to political changes and demands. This was said
to be most pronounced at the more elitist levels of the
public services. Several attempts were made during these
periods to re-structure the services. However, in the
1972 Constitution it was provided that the public services
96should remain directly under the cabinet. The 1972 
Constitution renamed "public officers" as "state officers". 
Having done that, by Article 105 of the Constitution, a 
"state officer" was defined as:
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"any person who holds a paid office as a 
servant of the Republic, but does not 
include -
(a) the President;
(b) a Minister or a Deputy Minister; and
(c) a Member of the National State Assembly
by reason ’only of the fact that he receives 
any remuneration or allowance as a member."
That definition of a 1 state officer* was in line with
the definition of a *public officer* found in the
97Soulbury Constitution. The 1972 Constitution created
98a State Services Advisory Board to advise the Cabinet
99on appointments and a State Services Disciplinary Board
to advise the Cabinet on disciplinary matters. The
transfer of state officers was left to the Cabinet of
M i n i s t e r s w h i c h  could delegate that power to other
persons or b o d i e s . T h e  1978 Constitution, however,
left the appointment of public officers (as they are
102now called) in the hands of the President. By
Article 55(l) of the Constitution^^ the powers of 
appointment, dismissal or transfer of all public officers 
were delegated to the Cabinet, with a further power of
delegation to a body called the Public Service Commission
104created under the 1978 Constitution. The sub—delegation
to the Commission was limited to all Public Officers who 
were not departmental heads. The matters concerning the 
appointment, dismissal and transfer of Heads of Departments
were non-delegatable and therefore were required to be
105carried out by the Minister himself.
VII. Finance
The provisions contained in the Soulbury Constitution
concerning public f i n a n c e , h a v e  survived in both the
1972 and the 1978 Constitutions. The creation of the
107Consolidated Fund, into which all revenue flows,
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and of* the Contingency Fund, as a part of* the
Consolidated Fund, received constitutional protection
in all three Constitutions. These funds fell under the
control of the Finance Minister, who was himself subject
109to Parliamentary Control. The Finance Minister is
prohibited from dealing with monies in either fund without
Parliamentary approval. All three Constitutions recognise
the position of the Auditor-General as an independent
o f f i c e r , w h o s e  tenure of office and salary is protected
111by the Constitution, The present Auditor-General, has 
served under all three Constitutions in that capacity.
Thus Chapter XVII of the 1978 Constitution follows 
Chapter XII of 1972 Constitution which was based on 
Chapter VTII of the Soulbury Constitution, Every 
administration in Ceylon (and in Sri Lanka) has taken the 
question of the control of Finance with due seriousness.
VIII. Public Security
The area of public security was subjected by the
Soulbury Constitution to the provisions of the Public
112Security Ordinance of 19^7• This Ordinance was
amended once in 1 9 5 ^ Th© 1972 Constitution in 
Chapter XVT adopted the provisions of the aforesaid 
Public Security Ordinance, subject to the limitation 
that:
"The President shall act on the advice of 
the Prime Minister in all matters legally 
required or authorised to be done by the 
President in relation to a state of 
Emergency .1
The reliance on the advice tendered by the Prime Minister
as a prelude to a declaration of emergency was a borrowing
from the days of the Soulbury Constitution. Both*under
that Constitution and under the 1972 Constitution the
Prime Minister was the Head of the Executive. The
115Governor-General under the Soulbury Constitution and
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the President under the 1972 Constitution were 
Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces. By subjecting 
a declaration of emergency to the advice of the Prime 
Minister the two Constitutions upheld the supremacy of 
Parliament, subjecting both the Head—of—State and the 
Commander-in-Chief to the will of Parliament. The 1978 
Constitution, however, was differently conceived. Under 
that Constitution, the Head-of-State is both the Head-of— 
the Executive and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. The 1978 Constitution declared:
"The Public Security Ordinance as amended and 
in force immediately prior to the commencement 
of the Constitution shall be deemed to be a 
law enacted by Parliament•
All matters connected with the effective implementation 
of a 1 State of Emergency' were left in the hands of the 
Head of State, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief 
of the armed forces. However, the Constitution required 
the declaration of a State of Emergency and the rules and 
regulations proclaimed by the President during a State of
118Emergency, to be approved by Parliament, within ten days. 
Although these provisions were contained in the Public 
Security Ordinance as amended, the adoption of the 
requirement of Parliamentary approval, by the 1978  
Constitution, provides a Constitutional safeguard for 
these parliamentary checks and controls during a period 
of Emergency. This in effect is the difference between 
the 1972  Constitution and the 1978 Constitution in this 
respect.
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XX. The Principles of State Policy
While introducing Basic Resolution h  containing the
principles of State Policy to the Constituent Assembly,
119the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, speaking in 
Sinhala, explained the aims and purposes of that 
Resolution in this ways
Da ecSdjifflsoaai <5© sofcacoao 
4oa 43csa 8 4c?sSasi^J taa»dSo% g6»&aifeS3ec3 
«9*> ®3s6s32>aSaew§, De«l «>a8i«S25®3 ja.a 9 
dfflidcsjd efc^s jfjg
(translation "What we have accepted from that 
Resolution and what has indeed become our 
responsibility is to establish a Republican form 
of Government which is.both dedicated and is able 
to work towards achieving a socialist democracy.")
The structure adopted by the draftsmen of the 1972
121Constitution in the Chapter on 'The Principles of
State Policy' appears to have been borrowed from the Irish
122and Indian Constitutions. But it was revealed during
the lengthy debate on the principles of State Policy* that 
Constitutions around the world had previously followed this 
p a t t e r n . T h e r e  were, therefore, precedents for this 
structure. The basic aim of including such a section Is 
merely to draw attention of future parliaments to some 
fundamental notions which the framers of the Constitution 
had adopted as guides to legislation. The belief is 
espoused that by following such principles of State Policy* 
Parliament functioning under that Constitution could move 
the country as a whole towards creating the conditions 
necessary for the growth and development of a new society.
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The view held, by the framers of the 1972 Constitution was
that those principles would move the nation towards creating
a social democracy in Sri Lanka. From the stand point of
development, a closer analysis of these "Directive
Principles of State Policy" should help in assessing the
degree of social change that was projected. The degree
to which that projection had become a reality could only
be assessed from the type of legislations that had emerged
and its affect on the socio-economic structure of the
country. It is because of this need to make a fundamental
assessment of these principles, that their further
scrutiny is postponed until the concluding chapter is
reached. For the present there are two less important
matters to state. First, the 1978 Constitution, too, has
followed the structure of the chapter on "The Principles
12kof State Policy" of the 1972 Constitution* The 
difference between the two Constitutions, in this respect, 
is that the 1978 Constitution appears to state these 
principles in less general and in more concrete terms. 
Chapter VI, containing the principles, is headed:
"Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental 
Duties", while the heading in Chapter V of the 1972 
Constitution is "Principles of State Policy". Secondly, 
the 1978 Constitution, having laid down the principles 
behind the policies of the State, proceeded to enumerate 
a set of fundamental duties expected of the citizen.
In Article 29 the 1978 Constitution declares:
"The exercise and enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms is inseparable from the performance 
of duties and obligations, and accordingly 
it is the duty of every person in Sri Lanka —
(a) to uphold and defend the Constitution 
and the law;
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(b) to further the national interest and 
to foster national unity;
(c) to work conscientiously in his chosen 
occupation;
(d) to preserve and protect public property, 
and to combat misuse and waste of public 
property;
(e) to respect the rights and freedoms of 
others; and
(f) to protect nature and conserve its riches.^5
In both the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions, these
directive principles of State Policy and the Fundamental
Duties in Article 28 of the 1978 Constitution, were declared
not to impose legal rights or obligations and were declared
126not to be enforceable in a Court of Law.
X. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
The Basic Resolution No. 5 put forward the provisions
of Chapter VI of the 1972 Constitution concerning
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. This Chapter, containing
Article 18, was the counterpart of Article 29 of the
127Soulbury Constitution, where some of the protections
128remained unalterable while others required a two-thirds 
majority for amendment.12 '^ The protections contained in 
Article l8(l) were subject to the provisions of Article 
18(2):
11 The exercise and operation of the
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms provided 
in this Chapter shall be subject to such 
restrictions as the law prescribes in 
the interests of national unity and 
integrity, national security, national 
economy, public safety, public order, 
the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others or giving effect to 
the principles of State Policy set out in 
Section 16.”^^^
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It is important to not© that the implementation of a
"Principle of State Policy" takes precedence over the
"Fundamental Rights and Freedoms" mentioned here* The
1978 Constitution has spread the "Fundamental Rights",
131Chapter, over eight Articles. Xn doing so, the
Constitution has enacted varying limitations applicable 
to certain types of rights while other limitations 
may apply to other types of rights. The Chapter does 
not submit all rights to a single list of limitations 
as in the 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e  1978 Constitution, 
however, takes a step further than the 1972 Constitution 
by providing, in Article 17» for recourse to the Supreme 
Court where a person claims that there has been an 
infringement or there is a possibility that an infringement 
is imminent:
"by executive or administrative action of a 
fundamental right to which such person is 
entitled under the provisions of this
chapter . " ^ 2
It is important to notice that this remedy is available 
provided that the particular infringement is not autho­
rised by any one of the limitations placed on the 
fundamental right in question. However, unlike the 
1972 Constitution, the 1978 Constitution does not subject 
the fundamental rights to the supremacy of the Principles 
of State Policy. Looking at both the 1972 Constitution 
and the 1978 Constitution from the standpoint of the
protections entrenched in Article 29 of the Soulbury 
134Constitution, one sees a clear absence of any kind 
of protection to any class of people in any matter which 
could in any way be considered as effective. At the end 
of the last chapter the view was expressed that the 
introduction of the entrenched provisions may have been 
unfortunate as a misguided effort of the Soulbury 
Commissioners to protect the minorities. By placing 
these social problems squarely within legal bounds,
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and confining them to a fixed position taken by a
Constitution (as section 29(2) of the Soulbury
Constitution did in declaring those provisions to be
unalterable and therefore fixed for all times), the
resulting social pressures could have by now found no
legitimate escape route. For instance, had a re-
135hearing of the Kodeswaran Case as directed by the
Privy Council been held, and had that resulted in the
Official Languages Act being declared null and void on
the grounds that its implementation violated sections
29(2) (b) and (c), of the Soulbury Constitution, the 
136only other legal choice that the Government would
have had at the time was to seek an amending power from
Westminster. That would clearly have created a complex
socio-political problem for the country. It was, perhaps
137the good sense of the officials during the 1970—72 
period which helped to avoid the enormous social and 
political problems that could have rocked the Island, 
had the Language Act become invalid as a result of a legal 
action commenced on behalf of Tamil rights. By delaying 
the re—hearing of the Kodeswaran Case until the Official 
Languages Act became embalmed within the 1972 
Constitution, the Island was spared of a highly volatile 
situation both in social and political terms.
XI. Transitional Provisions
Each new Constitution must take into consideration 
the existing institutions recognised by the one it is 
meant to replace. Of these institutions there may be 
some which the new Constitution had declared to be 
valid and those thajb it may have excluded expressly or 
by implication. There may have been many institutions 
which may have been changed or amended before being 
adopted by the new Constitution. The front-line 
casualties of any constitutional change are the Members
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of Parliament, the Head of State, the Head of the 
Executive and the members of Judiciary. These have 
had the most intimate relationship with the replaced 
Constitution, for they would have been either elected 
or appointed under it. The Courts, the Parliament and 
the Office of the Head of State are institutions whose 
validity is derived from a Constitution. Therefore, 
the replacement of one Constitution by another must 
necessarily affect these institutions. The transitional 
provisions are, therefore, meant to regulate and govern 
the impact of a constitutional change on these and a 
number of other institutions. The Public Service and 
the Armed Forces including the Naval and Air Force 
establishments are clearly affected by changes of the 
Fundamental Law — the Constitution.
The 1972 Constitution, by Article 19 $ created for 
the first time, the position of a President as the Head 
of State. This creation suppressed the Office of the 
Governor—General, which had existed under the previous 
Soulbury Constitution. By Chapter VXXX of the Constitu­
tion the House of Representatives under the Soulbury 
Constitution was replaced by a National State Assembly.
By Article h Z (l) of the 1972 Constitution the members 
that comprised the Constituent Assembly were appointed 
as the first members of the first National State Assembly. 
As mentioned earlier, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
Government had maintained a clear distinction between the 
House of Representatives sitting as Parliament, a 
legislative body, and the Constituent Assembly sitting as 
a Constitution making body. It is to the latter that 
Article h Z (l) applied and it was as members of the 
Constituent Assembly that the former elected representa­
tives of the people became members of the first National 
State Assembly.
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By Article 42(5) the life span of the National 
State Assembly was thus established:
"Unless sooner dissolved, the first National 
State Assembly shall continue for a period 
of five years, commencing on the date of the 
adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent 
Assembly."
By Article 43 the Constitution declared that:
"The holder of the Office of Prime Minister 
immediately before the commencement of the 
Constitution, shall be the first Prime Minister 
under the Constitution ... ."
By Article 13, it was declared that:
" ••• every person who immediately prior to 
the commencement of the Constitution —
Ceylon, any local authority or any 
public corporation; or
(c) held any office in any local authority 
or public corporation; or
(d) held any appointment under any written law, 
shall continue in. such service or hold such 
office or appointment under the same terms 
and conditions".
Aside from the suppression of the post of Governor- 
General and the House of Representatives, the 1972 
Constitution preserved the rest of the governmental 
infra-structure inherited from the Soulbury Dispensations.
The 1978 Constitution too included a Chapter on 
’Transitional Provisions’.'*'^  ^ In Article 160, the 1978 
Constitution declared that the President in office at 
the commencement of the Constitution, "shall be deemed 
for all purposes to have been elected as the President 
of the Republic, and shall hold office for a period of 
six years from February 4th, 1978." The 1978 
Constitution was promulgated on Thursday, September 7th, 
1978. The President who was holding that office immediately
held judicial office in any Court;—  
was in the service of the Government of
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prior to the commencement of the 1978 Constitution had 
assumed that position under the 1972 Constitution on 
the February, 1978. By Article l6l(a) the Constitution 
declared that all persons who were members of the 
National State Assembly immediately before the commence­
ment of the 1978 Constitution, ’shall be deemed to have 
been elected as Members of Parliament under the new 
Constitution1. By Article l6l(e) the new Constitution 
established the life span of the first Parliament at 
six years from August 4th, 1977» unless dissolved any 
earlier. That was the day on which persons who 
subsequently became members of the first Parliament 
under the 1978 Constitution, took office, as members of 
the last National State Assembly under the 1972 
Constitution.
The difference in attitude to the dates of 
commencement of the relevant periods of the First Heads 
of Government and the First Parliaments under the two 
Constitutions is significant. It highlights the fact 
that the 1972 Constitution was intended to make a 
complete break with the past. Therefore, the Constitution 
was regarded as marking a new beginning and membership 
of the new National Assembly was made to run from the 
date of commencement of the new Constitution. It is 
also significant that membership of the new National 
State Assembly under the 1972 Constitution was linked, 
legally, to the Constituent Assembly and not to the House 
of Representatives established under the Soulbury 
Dispensations. The 1978 Constitution, on the other hand, 
adopted a continuation of the 1972 Constitution into the 
1978 Constitution in a basic way, making changes only 
where the new political directions dictated them.
For instance, the framers of the 1978 Constitution made 
a political decision to reorganise the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts: Article 163 declared that:
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"All judges of the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts • • • holding office on the day 
immediately before the commencement of 
the Constitution shall, on the commencement 
of the Constitution, cease to hold office."
As for other officers of State, Article 164 declared 
that:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 163 
every person who immediately before the 
commencement of the Constitution - (a) 
held office in any Court or Tribunal 
deemed, ..., to be a Court or Tribunal 
created and established by Parliament,
(b) was in the service of the Republic, 
any local authority or any public 
corporation, (c) held office in any local 
authority or public corporation, or (d) 
held any appointment under any existing 
written law, shall continue in such 
service or hold such office or appointment 
under the same terms and conditions."
An argument against the provisions contained in
Article 1 63 is that they reduce to nought the guarantees
given by the 1972 Constitution to judges concerning their
139security of judicial tenure. Xt is argued that the judges
would be exposed to the constant threat of possible 
constitutional changes, which might affect their judgments 
concerning the State. A counter argument would be that 
the need to make a new Constitution carries with it the 
responsibility to examine every institution within the 
nation, together with the power to change any institution 
if the aims and purposes of Constitution-making so 
require.
XIX• The Electoral System
The electoral system under the Soulbury Constitution 
was adopted by the framers of the 1972 Constitution without 
change. Elections to the House of Representatives were by 
a direct vote cast under Universal Adult Franchise.
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Any vacancies that might arise subsequent to a General 
Election were filled by by-elections. An argument that 
was often heard against the latter was that the com­
position of Parliament could change radically during its 
life span due to by-elections. This may even lead to a 
change of government, which should normally result from 
a General Election. The 1972 Constitution, notwithstanding 
these arguments, adopted the electoral system which the 
country had inherited from colonial times. The 1978 
Constitution is significant in that it changed the 
electoral system radically, principally in two ways.
(i) The By-Elections
The 1978 Constitution declared that where a vacancy
arises, either after or before the promulgation of the
Constitution, and in the case of a vacancy which had
arisen before the promulgation of the present Constitution
and, under the 1972 Constitution, had continued under the
present Constitution, such vacancies shall be filled not
by holding a by-election but by nomination:
11 ... Zbi7 the Secretary of the Political Party 
to which such Member belonged ... • Upon the 
receipt of such nomination the Commissioner of 
Elections shall declare such person to be the 
Member for the electoral district in respect 
of which the vacancy occurred,
The only exception to this method of filling a vacant
seat is when the vacancy' occurs as a result of the member
being unseated by an election petition. Xn that event,
the 1978 Constitution directed the holding of a 
l4lby-election. The effect of these provisions is that
the electorate is denied an opportunity to express its 
reactions to the political party in power until the 
whole of the life span of a Parliament is spent. The 
counter-argument is that this gives the government a 
degree of political stability, throughout the life of a
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single parliament, enabling governments with slender 
majorities to govern effectively without the fear of 
defeat at mid-term.
One of the gaps left by these provisions is that,
where a member whose election is being challenged
before the courts decides to have himself unseated by
absenting himself from the sittings of Parliament during
142a continuous period of three months, the resulting
vacancy would then appear to be of a category which
must be filled by a nomination from the Secretary of
the Party to which the member belonged. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prevents the same
person being nominated to fill the vacancy he had him- 
143self created. Needless to say, such a step would
attract political condemnation but not legal redress.
(ii) The Distribution of Seats
The 1978 Constitution introduces a novel system for
the distribution of seats among electoral districts.
The Delimitation Commission, an institution coming down
from the Colonial times, was required by Article 9 6 to
divide Sri Lanka into at least 20 but no more than 24
electoral districts. The total number of members
required to be elected from the total number of
electoral districts which the Commission may create was
declared to be 1 9 6 . ^ ^  The composition of the 1 9 6
members was made up of two groups. In the first group
there were 3 6 members^/ ^ ^These members were found from
each group of electoral districts from the 9 provinces on
the Island. Each such group was required by the Constitu—
145tion to elect four members. The 9 provinces would
thus elect 36 members. This would leave the rest of the 
160 seats to be shared among all the electoral districts.
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In a fairly complex manner the Constitution laid
down the method by which the rest of the 1 60 seats may
be filled. The first step that the Constitution takes is
to determine what is referred to as the Qualifying number1 
l47of electors. This number is found by dividing the
total number of electors of all the Electoral Districts
on the Island by the figure 160. The total number of
electors of all the Electoral Districts shall be the
total number of voters on the Island. The resulting
148number is designed to be the Qualifying number.1 
The method merely predicates the number of electors that 
must share the number of members available to the electoral 
districts of the country.
Having determined the Qualifying number1f the total
number of voters in each electoral district is then
divided by that number. The resulting figure taking its
whole number by omitting the fractions or the decimal
figures resulting out of that division, would establish
the number of seats which each electoral district would 
14-9have. As the Constitution requires the adoption of
the whole number and not the fractions or the decimal 
points resulting from the above division, the total 
number of seats given to each electoral district on the 
Island will not add up to l60. The Constitution, therefore, 
prescribes a complex arrangement to distribute the remain­
ing seats equitably. In the latter exercise, the 
Constitution requires that demographic considerations 
and considerations of under representation should guide
the distribution of the remaining seats, so that the total
150number of seats would then add up to l6 0 .
(iii) Voting at Parliamentary Elections
151The first step which the Constitution takes is to 
declare that any recognised political party or an 
identifiable' group of independent candidates may submit
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one nomination paper. In that single nomination paper, 
each party or group is required to set out a list of\ 
candidates:
" ••• in order of priority, of such number 
of candidates as is equivalent to the 
number of members to be elected for that 
electoral district, increased by one—third. n
The increase by one-third is to the nearest whole number
and these presumably may be called in aid of the extra
seats that may be allotted so as to bring the total
153number of seats to l60. Reference was made to this
aspect at the end of the last section. At the elections 
each elector was entitled to one vote for each electoral 
district, which he may cast in favour of a recognised 
political party or in favour of a group of independent 
candidates contesting the seats allotted to that electoral
154district. A vote cast during the elections held under
the 1978 Constitution was declared as a vote cast in
favour of a particular *political group1 rather than in
155favour of an individual candidate. Therefore, the
candidate named first by the political party, or the group 
of Independents, which polls the highest number of votes 
in any particular electoral district, will be declared 
elected. Where any political party or any group of 
independents fail to obtain one-eighth of the total votes 
polled in any electoral district, that party or group
156would be declared by the Constitution to be disqualified. ^ 
At that stage of the counting process, the votes polled 
by such a party are deducted from the total number of 
votes cast in that electoral district. The resulting
157figure is referred to as the "relevant number of votes."
The "relevant number of votes" is used as a means
of determining as to which political party or group
in what proportion should represent the particular
electoral district. Towards this end, the ’relevant
number of votes * is divided by the number of members to be
158elected for that electoral district, reduced by one.
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The one in question is the candidate who heads the list 
of:
"The recognised political party or 
independent group which polls the 
highest number of votes in any 
electoral district.1'
He will be declared elected first before the process of 
dividing the 'relevant number of votes' is set in motion. 
Having declared him elected, the 'relevant number of 
votes' is divided by the number of seats allocated to 
that electoral district, less one. The arithmatical result 
of such a division is referred to by the Constitution as 
the 'resulting number*
The 'resulting number* is thereafter used as a
means by which the proportion of the seats to be allocated
l62to .each political party or group may be determined.
This is done by dividing the total number of votes polled 
by each of the 'political groups', (not thus far eliminated 
by failing to obtain the minimum number of votes mentioned
•» go
earlier), by the 'resulting number1. The arithmatical 
result obtained by dividing the total number of votes 
cast in favour of each 'political group' by the afore­
mentioned 'resulting number* determines the number of
seats which each political group in any particular
164electoral district shall have. The Constitution
further provides for the possibility that by selecting 
whole numbers in every arithmatical process and omitting 
fractions and decimals, the number of seats allocated 
by the aforementioned process may add up to a total less
than the number of seats given to any particular electoral
165district. In two sub—articles the Constitution
provided for a complex process of equitable distribution 
of the remaining number of seats among the 'political 
groups' remaining qualified.
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It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 
this novel method of electing members to Parliament 
without some considerable practical experience of the 
process in operation. It is a unique system, for in 
no other country has such an elaborate exercise been 
prescribed. It must, however, be said that the 
process involves both a method of proportional 
representation and a method of re-distribution of 
votes. The first and the only experience the country 
has thus far had of this new method of election was 
during the local government elections of 1979• If the 
municipalities, which are smaller in extent than the 
electoral districts, are to be considered as electoral 
districts, the following table emerges from four select 
municipalities on the Island.
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A comment may be made regarding the results obtained* 
First, there is no correspondence of* the percentage of* 
votes obtained and the percentage of seats won in so far 
as it applies to the party which polls the highest 
percentage of votes* In each of the four municipalities:
(i) Colombo
U.N.P. polled 62 percent and won 74 percent
of the seats•
(ii) Kandv
U.N.P. polled 53 percent and won 6l percent
of the seats *
(ixi) Jaffna
T.U.L.F. polled 66 percent and won 78 percent
of the seats•
(iv) Galle
U.N.P. polled 46 percent and won 67 percent 
of the seats*
The party which polls the highest number of votes appears
to receive a number of seats well in excess of the
percentage of votes polled* The party (or parties) which
obtain the second (or the third) highest number of votes
appear to receive a number of seats which corresponds with
the percentage of votes received by them* This naturally
helps a party which may poll less than half or less than
two-thirds majority (as the case may be) in the legislature
provided that it has received the highest percentage of
votes among all other political parties* The average
difference of the percentage of seats received and the
percentage of votes obtained at the elections in question
167for the four selected municipalities is fourteen*
168The results indicate a 12°/o difference for Colombo,
Kandy and Galle and a 20.1 °/o difference for Jaffna, 
averaging to a i k j o  difference across the board. The 
conclusion is that the party which comes out on top would 
reap a bonus of 12 to l4 percent of the votes they had 
actually received. This could to a large extent be
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related to the elimination of those parties which had 
failed to obtain 12^ percent of the total votes polled, 
without making a corresponding reduction of the number 
of seats allocated to the particular electoral district. 
The elimination of the parties which have failed to 
obtain 12-g- percent of the total vote appears to serve an 
important purpose. In circumstances in which the party 
obtaining the highest number of votes may find itself 
in a minority, the 12 ^ ° / o rule helps that party to find a 
majority in the legislature. This fact becomes evident 
from the figures set out in the last column of the 
table.169
The electoral process adopted under both the
Soulbury Constitution and the 1972 Constitution, produced
170an imbalanced result. This process was based on what
has become to be known as: The First past the post
171system. Commenting on this system MacKenzie wrote:
"So far as concerns elections, the simplest 
and perhaps most naive answer is to say that 
the candidate who gets the most votes is to 
win. This at least*was the traditional 
English practice from the thirteenth century 
onwards ... .^72 First, the *first past the 
post1 system may have very bad results. •:
A (Conservative) 12,000
B (Labour) 11,000
C (Liberal) 9,000
D (Communist) 2,500
E (Welsh Nationalist) 2,000
F (independent) 500
37,000
A was elected Member of Parliament
Such a result would at once raise questions 
about the *realityf or representation; does 
the winner Really* represent the seat? Or 
has he merely been lucky?
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(iv) The Presidential Elections
The 1978 Constitution provided for the election of
174the President by an Island-wide electorate. In these
elections the electoral districts have no relevance to 
the electoral process leading up to the election of a 
President. The Constitution, however, makes differences 
in the voting procedure depending on the number of candidates 
that have been nominated for the Presidential election.
The Constitution declares that:
Where there are two candidates, voters will 
choose one; where there are three candidates 
voters will indicate their second preference; 
where there are more than three candidates, the 
voters will indicate their first three preferences
The candidate who obtains more than half of the votes cast
177will be elected as President. Where no such candidate
emerges, all candidates, except the two receiving the 
highest and the second highest number of votes, will be 
eliminated. Thereafter:
"the second preference of each voter whose vote 
had been for a candidate eliminated from the 
contest, shall if it is for one or the other 
of the remaining two candidates, be counted as 
a vote for such candidate and be added to the 
votes counted in his favour ... 177a
But where there has been more than three candidates then 
the third preference of each voter who had voted for one 
of the candidates eliminated would come into focus.
Provided that his second preference had not been taken into 
account his third preference will be added to the totals 
thus far secured by the two remaining candidates; provided
that his third preference had been for one or the other 
l 78
of them. ' The totals thus obtained will determine the 
winning candidates for the presidency.
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Thus the ultimate result may depend on second and 
third preferences rather than on first preferences.
This may weaken the political standing of the ensuing 
presidency. Although the system devised for parliamentary 
elections should attract a great deal of political support, 
by returning Parliaments which are fairly representative 
of the voting patterns, the presidency may become the centre 
of some discontent. In a system of Presidential Government 
it may be thought that the Presidency should be a matter 
totally free from any controversy. The French system of 
Presidential election involving a second, *rim—off* 
election is expensive, but psychologically satisfying 
both to the electorate and to the President elected by it. 
However, it must be emphasised that the method requiring 
the counting of the second and the third preferences, 
theoretically, represents *a run-off* operation. For there 
is the assumption that at the *run-off* election the 
persons who preferred a particular candidate a s  his second 
or third choice would vote for that candidate, if his 
first or second choices were not available. Aside from 
the psychological aspect the method laid down in the 1978 
Constitution saves the country from the expense of 
conducting a second presidential election.
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CHAPTER 9
Judicialism: The Survival of a Colonial Legal System
X. The Administration of Ceylon by The British East 
India Company: The Early Period — 1796-1802
In order fully to understand the assumptions upon 
which the constitutional development of Ceylon was 
based by the British Administration, it must first be 
realised that the conquest of Ceylon in 1796 was an 
economic venture of the British East India Company and
was not initially considered as a military adventure of
1 2 the British Government* At the time in question, the
British East India Company remained uncertain as to
whether the Maritime Provinces would after all, be
returned to the Dutch as part of an overall settlement
worked out in Europe, for the achievement of peace among
3
the European powers. With that as a very real possibility,
the Company, as from the first day of its operation in
Ceylon, proceeded to set up an elaborate administrative
structure for revenue-gathering, with little else in 
4
contemplation. At least between 1796 and 1798, when
5
the first British Governor made his appearance in Ceylon,
the interim administration headed by Colonel Stuart^
concerned itself very little in governing the country by
providing the basic needs such as education, health and
public welfare services or the Administration of Justice,
but concerned itself as instructed by the Directors of
the Company, with the gathering of revenue to recoup the
expenses incurred in the military activities against the 
7Dutch. It is interesting to note that the British East 
India Company had instructed its representatives in
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Colombo to deal with its criminal matters not in the courts
of law but at the various revenue offices so that they
could be treated as matters concerning fines, and therefore
revenue to the Company, rather than as occasions for 
8imprisonment. But for heinous offences involving felonies,
murders and others carrying capital punishment, the
instructions were that Colonel Stuart (the military
governor) should be contacted so that Courts—Martial could
9
be set up to try such offenders. If one were to search 
for a system of civil administration for Ceylon at this 
period of time, one would find that it consisted mainly 
of an elaborate revenue-collecting system and the rest, 
if it existed at all, would be found in a rudimentary 
form. The system of civil administration began from the 
Superintendent of Revenue and wound its way through the 
Assistant Superintendents of Revenue — called Collectors — 
whose functions were to supervise the collection of 
revenue. Emphasising the British East India Company*s 
policy towards Ceylon as one of undisguised mercantalism 
one commentator^^ wrote:
"These Collectors also exercised judicial 
powers both in Civil and Criminal matters 
but the judicial power was mainly confined 
to cases relating to revenue.H ... Below 
the Collectors were minor officials called 
Aumildars. They were under the direction 
of the Collector and helped in the collection 
of revenue. They were the officials who 
replaced the Mudalivars (the native chiefs) 
who were responsible for the Native system of 
revenue collection. There were other minor 
officials too who were in some way or other 
involved in the collection of revenue. They 
had strange names — Peschcars who had to 
execute orders respecting revenue; Sumpreadies 
who were responsible for keeping accounts;
Cuttwals who were charged with the duty of 
keeping the peace; and Maniagars who had to 
carry out the orders of the government.
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As a result of the Company*s interest in the
revenues of Ceylon, the Administration of the
Maritime Provinces was initially placed under the
13Government of the Presidency of Madras. The same 
commentator wrote:
"Faced with the hostility of the Dutch 
and the truculence of the natives, /the 
Company^ introduced the Madras revenue 
system, and substituted Aumildars from 
Madras for the Native Mudliyars. /.The 
Company7 summarily abolished the ancient 
form of land holding.
The latter was found to be not very conducive to tax-
gathering, for it was difficult to identify the persons
upon whom the duty to pay land-tax should lie. The
total confusion in which the administration was at the
beginning had often been blamed for a number of diffi—
15culties which resulted in the revolt of 1797* Lack 
of foresight and the absence of personnel may be the 
reasons why the Company was compelled at this stage 
of colonial development to leave the organisation of 
the public administration in the hands of those who 
were trained to fight as soldiers, rather than those 
with the expertise in economic planning and in 
administration. The resulting chaos made it necessary 
for the Madras Government to appoint a Committee of 
Investigation. The Committee recommended that for the 
time being the Dutch system of government should be 
continued as far as possible.^
Colonel Stuart, who had acted as the Military- 
Governor on behalf of the Company, had done his best to 
maintain a system of law and judicial administration. 
However the political limitations within which he was 
compelled to function left him with very little scope 
to work out an efficient system of colonial administration 
for the new settlement. In terms of early judicial
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development, the period between the capitulation of 
Colombo in 1796 and the Charter of Justice (l833) could 
be regarded as providing the foundation for the colonial 
judicial system for Ceylon, which in varying degrees had 
influenced the legal developments of that country until 
the present day. The methodology to be adopted here is 
to examine the political basis for, and the inter-action 
of, policy decisions which by a dialectical process 
moved the Colonial Administration, in stages, towards 
the Charter of 1833• This exposition will be in seven 
stages.
17The Treaty of Capitulation, signed between the
18Dutch Administration and the officers of the British
19East India Company on the 15th of February, 1796 was
20subsequently proclaimed on the 9th March, 1796, 
giving it the force of law. The Treaty, in the form of 
'requests1 and 'acquiescences' gave the distinct impression 
of being a document drawn up in an ad-hoc manner, without 
any legal assistance. Article 23 of the Treaty read:
"All civil suits /deTpending in the Council 
of Justice shall be decided by the same Council 
according to their laws.
Answer: Granted, but they must be decided in
twelve months from this date.'’^ -^
The fact that the Treaty made no provisions for the 
hearing of civil disputes arising after the 15th February, 
1796, was a major concern to Stuart. Serious criminal 
offences were heard by military tribunals under martial 
law and other offences meriting fines, as mentioned 
earlier, were heard by Revenue Officers. The total absence 
of a forum for settling civil disputes compelled Stuart 
to make representations to his superiors in Madras.
The Madras Residency authorised Stuart to re-establish
22
the administration of both civil and criminal justice.
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Recognising the absence of* lawyers trained in English
law, the company instructed Stuart to utilise the Dutch
legal infra-structure for the purpose of administering
justice. This necessarily involved.the re-employment of
Dutch lawyers and the application of the Dutch Law in
settling disputes. Accordingly, Stuart promulgated an
23
!Act of Authorisation1 on the 1st June, 1796, Under 
that Act, the Dutch Courts of Justice at Colombo, Galle 
and Jaffna were re-established and given jurisdiction to 
try causes of both civil and criminal nature in accordance 
with the Dutch Law that existed at the date of
2 hCapitulation, Certain aspects of the Dutch Criminal
Law, involving capital punishment, the mutilation of
limb or organ and other types of torture were made subject
25to review by Stuart himself. There was an initial
problem which Stuart was unable to overcome. The Dutch
lawyers were unwilling to go beyond the twelve month
period mentioned in the Treaty of Capitulation. Their
stubborn refusal to co-operate with the British
Administration, by sticking closely to Article 23 of the
Treaty of Capitulation left Stuart1s endeavour in jeopardy.
After more than a year, the British Administration succeeded
in persuading the court at Galle to resume their work, but
the obstinacy of the Courts in Colombo and Jaffna 
26persisted. However, Stuart managed to collect three
Dutch lawyers who were willing to preside over a court in
Colombo, which he established as the Court of Equity,
This court was empowered to try petty causes in a summary
27manner according to the Dutch law. The Court at Galle 
sat from September, 1797 the Court of Equity sat
from October, 1797» Both these courts continued to 
function for the next twelve months. North having 
received his commission as the Governor of the Colony on 
the 19th April, 1798, requested the three judges on the
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Court of Equity to take an oath of allegiance to the
28British Sovereign, Their refusal to take that oath 
resulted in the dissolution of the Court of Equity 
which was later followed by the suppression of all 
other courts of both civil and criminal jurisdiction 
on the Island,
Paced with this dilemma, North began to examine the
problem. He noticed that the Dutch procedure was totally
unsuitable to the conditions prevailing in the new
Settlement. For the Dutch procedure required a seven-
judge bench for criminal matters and a five—judge bench
for civil matters. It had no jury system. The difficulty
in finding judges trained in the Dutch Law, willing to
take the oath of allegiance, at the time, seemed a real
one. For the future of the Maritime Province was still 
29in doubt and no Dutch national was willing to risk his
life by taking such an oath, in case the Settlement
reverted to the Dutch as a part of an overall settlement
made in Europe. Recognising these immediate difficulties,
North decided to make a complete break from the Dutch
legal institutions of the past. He, therefore, established
a new model for legal development, relying solely on the
limited British talent then available on the Island, It
is within these considerations that North’s administration
conceived the provisions of the Proclamation of October,
30l4th, 1797* This Proclamation may be regarded as the 
earliest attempt by the British Administration to 
introduce a hierachical court structure to the 
’Settlement of Ceylon*, The Proclamation established 
the following Courts:
First: it introduced two Courts of Appeal
and called them The Greater and the Lesser
Courts of Appeal.31 The Greater Court of 
Appeal was consisted of the Governor, the 
Chief Secretary and the Commander—in—Chief 
of His Majesty’s Troops.3^ The Lesser Court 
of Appeal was to consist of those members 
who belonged to the Supreme Court of Criminal 
Jurisdiction.33
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The Jurisdiction of the Greater Court 
of Appeal was limited to civil disputes, 
exceeding £200.3^ Xt also had jurisdiction 
to direct courts below to hold further 
enquiries and to gather additional materials 
for the consideration of the Greater Court 
of A p p e a l . 35 The jurisdiction of the Lesser 
Court of Appeal in civil disputes was limited 
to disputes less than £200.3® Its criminal 
jurisdiction was limited to fines of £100..
All other sentences were appealable directly 
to the Privy Council.
Second: The Proclamation created The Supreme
Court of Criminal Jurisdiction.3° This Court 
consisted of the Governor, the Commander—in—
Chief, the Chief Secretary, the Commandant of 
the Garrison at Trineomalee and a gentleman 
of the Irish Bax — James Dunking Esq.39 
This Court replaced the Dutch Hoff von Justitie 
at Colombo, Galle and Jaffna.40 Its jurisdiction 
covered all serious criminal matters, leaving 
lessor offences to be tried by the Fiscal 
The Supreme Court of Criminal jurisdiction went 
on circuit with the Governor.
The Town Courts, which had functioned to hear petty
civil matters and matrimonial matters during the
governance of Stuart, continued even after the
Proclamation of 1799* Appeals from these Courts were
heard by the Greater or Lesser Courts of Appeal, depending
42on the value of the dispute. The promulgation of this
Proclamation effectively annulled the Dutch Courts. By
43
a second Proclamation promulgated on the same day the 
British government recognised the right of appellants, 
whose appeals were pending before the Dutch Courts, to have 
such appeals transferred to the newly constituted Courts 
of Appeal:
“Provided always that such Petitions, 
in the nature of Petitions of Appeals, 
be preferred to us within three months 
after this our Proclamation shall have 
been promulgated ... •”^4
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These appeals too were limited by reference to a particular
45
value. ** The pith of this Proclamation was to introduce a 
legal system for the administration of justice in a way 
that it would not in future be affected by the obstinacy 
and the recalcitrance of the Dutch lawyers left on the 
Island. Out of a conflict between the legal profession 
of the time and the Executive, there has emerged a new 
model for legal development which provided a starting 
point for a British-oriented system for the administration 
of justice in Ceylon. That was in 1799*
IXo The Beginnings of British Colonial Rule: 1799—1810
The structure for the administration of justice
established by the Proclamation of 1799 was affirmed and
substantially strengthened by a Royal Charter of Justice,
46
in 1801, By Article VI of that Charter, the name of the
Court of Record was fixed as ’The Supreme Court of
Judicature’, and it was to be presided over by two judges:
— one being "the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Judicature and the other to be called the Puisne Justice
of the Supreme Court of Judicature in the Island of Ceylon;
which the said Chief Justice and Puisne Justice shall be
Barristers, in England or Ireland, of not less than.
47
five years standing, to be appointed, by us ...
It appears to be clear that the British Government had
decided to move the system of judicial administration away
from the Dutch system. By resorting to the appointment of
British Barristers, the intention became clear that the
English Law to a measureable extent was intended to be
introduced into the substance of the Ceylonese legal
system. The administration effected this introduction
48through Ordinances. By ignoring the existence of legal 
expertise of the Dutch lawyers, the British government in a 
sense had taken certain retaliatory steps to punish the 
obstinacy of the Dutch nationals left on the Island.
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They were now required to fall into line with the new 
arrangements to ensure their place within the new 
judicial system. The system no longer needed their 
participation for its effective application. There is a 
second implication too, to be gathered from the foregoing 
Articles. The decision to have the members of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature appointed by the British Crown, and 
not by the British East India Company, foreshadowed the 
colonial plan to wrest the Maritime Provinces from the 
Company and have them annexed to the Crown as a Crown 
Colony.
On January 1st, 1802 the Maritime Provinces became a
Crown Colony under the Colonial Office, thereby resting
the ultimate legislative and executive authority in the
British Crown. No more was there a doubt regarding the
future of the Maritime Provinces. It was not to be returned
h 9to the Dutch as a part of a European settlement. The
Dutch inhabitants felt a little melancholy for they felt
abandoned: in effect they were left to deal as best as
50they could with the British. As statistics show, their 
role in the strategy for colonial development was clearly 
a significant one, due largely to their unmistakable 
advantage. For they were able to claim a cultural 
identity with the British to their distinct benefit.
The Charter of Justice of 1801 was wide-ranging in its
effects. It concerned itself with the Admission of Advocates 
51and Proctors, the localisation of the jurisdiction in 
52civil matters, the native laws relating to inheritance
53 5h  -and succession, the equity jurisdiction of the courts,
the jurisdiction concerning testamentary and matrimonial
K  K
causes, the superintendence of the Supreme Court in
5 6 57Criminal matters and the appellate jurisdictions. The
Charter in fact created a whole system of judicial
administration for the Island. The Proclamation of 25th 
58June, 1802"^ introduced some minor changes to the
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Charter of Justice. It introduced a new Court - the 
Vice-Admiral’s Court with both ecclesiastical and 
Admiralty jurisdiction. The Proclamation abolished the 
Greater and Lesser Courts of Appeal first proclaimed in, 
1799* In its place a single Court of Appeal was 
established, consisting of the Governor, the Chief 
Secretary, the Chief Justice and a Puisne Justice or any 
two of them. The position of the British Governor in a 
colony was a confusing one. He was free from any direct 
control by the Houses of Parliament at Westminister. He 
was merely subject to the authority of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, who in turn remained answerable 
to the legislature at Westminister. Within the colony he 
had an Advisory Council comprising of his own nominees. 
Their membership on the Council was determined by the 
Governor. This type of agreement presented the most 
conducive environment for the British Governor to grow 
into an autocrat within the colony, while being considered 
as a technocrat by his superiors at the Colonial Office. 
These predispositions of autocracy placed the British 
Governor upon a collision course with the Judiciary, 
particularly, during the early days of Colonial rule in 
Ceylon. Two instances of such a conflict merit particular 
mention. For they in some way appear to have influenced 
the introduction of the next Charter of Justice: that of
1810.
59First, during the 1803-1804 Kandyan invasion under 
the governorship of North, his Commander—in—Chief, General 
Wemyss had the occasion to address a letter to North about 
the Judiciary. He, particularly, had unkind words to say 
about Lushington, the then Chief Justice. The letter was 
in fact the climax to a developing disagreement between the 
Army and the Judiciary. Due to the exigencies prevailing 
with the Kandyan invasion, Governor North was compelled 
to side with the army in this dispute. Although the
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beginnings are somewhat convoluted rather than being 
complex, it appeared that one Flower, the then Magistrate 
in Pettah, had two soldiers who were found drunk within his 
jurisdiction, subjected to corporal” punishment. It was 
alleged by the army Commandant of Colombo that they were 
not in fact in breach of the peace, but merely drunk and 
merry. That was in early September 1804. But by October 
3rd, a little more than a month later, matters had reached 
such a pitch that Lushington, C.J., had General Wemyss, the 
Commander—in—Chief upon a contempt charge for writing to 
the Governor in contempt of the judiciary. Wemyss having 
pleaded guilty was released after entering into a recogni­
zance of 100,000 Rix-Dollars (£50,000) to keep the peace 
for a year. It is important to mention that Wemyss had 
asked the court by letter for a delay of the hearing until 
October l4th on the grounds that he was in fact in the 
battle zone conducting operations against the Kandyans. 
Lushington, C.J., refused that request in an attempt more 
to impress the superiority of the judiciary over all other 
establishments than on grounds of urgency or convenience.
The Kandyan invasion ended in an unmitigated disaster 
for the British. North was replaced by Sir Thoman Maitland 
as Governor in 1805, but Lushington continued as the Chief 
Justice. Royal instructions were that all public instruments 
should be signed by the Chief Secretary by order of the 
Governor—in—Council. But customarily the Deputy Chief— 
Secretary signed them in the Chief Secretary’s absence. 
Maitland, exercising his prerogative powers of mercy, 
pardoned a convict. With the consent of the Governor—in- 
Council and in the absence of the Chief Secretary, his 
Deputy signed the commutation order. Lushington1s refusal 
to recognise the pardon constituted the second^ conflict 
between the judiciary and the executive. Although Maitland 
took the immediate step of legislating in favour of autho­
rising the Deputy-Chief Secretary to sign, the fact that
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the legislation was against the Royal instructions remained
an obstacle in the Governor’s path. The decision to exclude
the Chief Justice from the Governor’s Council in 1808 merely
exacerbated these difficulties. Xn 1809 » Maitland threatened
to suspend Lushington as the Chief Justice if he still
maintained his refusal to recognise the Governor’s pardon.
At that point, Lushington resigned. By 1809, Maitland had
compiled a dossier of considerable proportions in support
of judicial reform. When Maitland was appointed Governor,
in 1805, he was specifically directed to put the country’s
finances and the administration into order. His predecessor’s
extravagance and inefficient administration was crowned with
6lhis disastrous invasion of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1803#
Maitland had in less than five years corrected the economy
62and introduced a viable system of civil administration.
His standing with the Colonial Office in London was, 
therefore, high. Taking these matters into consideration, 
Maitland dispatched Alexander Johnstone to the United
go
Kingdom with a request for a new Charter. He emphasised 
his problems with the judiciary, and Johnstone who was one 
of the Puisne judges at the time of Lushington*s tenure of 
office, was able to stress the difficulties that the colony 
could meet under the present arrangements if there was the 
necessity to deal with an uncompromising judiciary. The
64result was the Charter of 9th August, 1810.
III. The Charter of 1810
The Charter of 1810 may be examined as an attempt 
to avoid a repitition of the past collisions between the 
judiciary and the executive. Considered within its 
historical framework four points emerge.
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First: The Charter made a clear distinction
between the executive powers and the judicial 
powers in the colony. In this sense, the 
judiciary was given civil and - criminal jurisdiction 
over the Maritime Provinces and over every inhabitant 
— native and European.65 The Supreme Court was 
directed to sit in two circuits which effectively 
covered the whole of the Maritime Province.66 in 
criminal matters it was ordained that there would 
be a jury of 13 men drawn from the community to 
which the dispute belonged.67 The Chief Justice was 
placed solely in charge of the Judicial Department.68 
The extension of the civil jurisdiction made the 
provincial courts redundant. These were accordingly 
a b o l i s h e d . T h e Burgher community, which had 
faithfully served and supported the administrative 
infra-structure, was rewarded by creating a special 
court, presided over by one of their peers, for 
matters coryserning their domestic and interpersonal 
disputes
Second: The Charter characterised the areas to be
shared between the two arms of the administration.
It provided that the Chief Justice may suggest to 
the Governor, areas in which the Charter is lacking 
and is in need of completion. Upon a request made 
by the Chief Justice, the Governor was empowered to 
legislate in such areas.71 The appointments of 
Registrars, clerks and other Ministerial Officers 
too were to be made by the Governor in accordance 
with the advice of the Chief Justice.^
Third: The Governor’s contribution to the
administration of justice was limited to the 
’sitting magistracies 1.73 By reducing the powers 
of the Headmen, the new arrangements extended the 
powers of the ’sitting magistrates’.74 By 
Instructions75 accompanying the Charter, the British 
Government left the system of sitting magistrates 
solely in the hands of the G o v e r n o r . *6 Although 
there has been a fairly comprehensive statement 
disassociating the executive from the judiciary, 
the Charter permitted the intrusion of the executive 
into the area generally considered as the preserve 
of the judiciary through the ’sitting magistracies*. 
The Instructions justified this intrusion on the 
grounds that the sitting magistrates functioned best 
by being ’closer to the ground* utilising their 
’local knowledge*77 and, therefore, was best suited to 
be handled through the agencies of the executive 
government rather than through the judiciary.
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Fourth: The Instructions accompanying the
Charter re-organised the Governor’s Council in 
such a way that it followed the Sovereign’s 
Council in the United Kingdom.. In adopting 
this British Model, the Colonial Office appeared 
to have failed to comprehend a cardinal difference 
between the two political entities, The British 
Sovereign, being a constitutional monarch, was 
here being paralleled to a British Governor who had 
the powers of a potential autocrat. The failure to 
appreciate this vital difference, as later events 
will show, frustrated the model chartered in the 
Instructions. The model was as follows:
The Governor was considered as the representative 
of the C r o w n . 78 The Chief Justice, like the Lord 
Chancellor in the United Kingdom, was considered 
as the President of the Council.79 The Chief 
Secretary, the Commissioner for Revenue, the Vice- 
Treasurer and a person to be nominated by the 
Governor, subject to the Sovereign’s consent, were 
to constitute the membership of the C o u n c i l .
Except for the last mentioned the rest occupied 
their seats ex-officio. The keeper of the Great 
Seal, namely the Chief Justice was the President 
of the Council.^2 All grants of land83 and all 
legislative Acts were to be validated by affixing 
the Great Seal.8**
The Charter and the Instructions accompanying it
succeeded in delineating with clarity the roles required
to be played by the Executive and by the Judiciary. This
is not to say that the participants in this model,
particularly the Governor, were content with the ensuing
part they were each expected to play. For the complete
exclusion of the Governor from his Council was to cramp
his style as a potential autocrat. By the time the
Charter of Justice issued in London on the 6th August 1810,
and the accompanying Instructions issued in London on the
30th September, 1810 reached Ceylon, Maitland had left the
8 5Island, relinquishing his duties as Governor. Although 
the new arrangements did not directly affect Maitland, he 
was concerned with the possible consequences of separating
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the Governor from the Council. Besides, the Chief 
Justice,in his capacity as the President of the Council 
would,while initiating legislation be conscious of his 
role as a judge who may in due course be called upon to 
enforce them. His role of an initiator of legislation 
may sometimes become confused with his role of an interpreter 
of legislation in his judicial capacity. After arriving in 
the United Kingdom, Maitland wrote to Robert Peel, the 
Prime Minister saying that:
11 The Governor ought to be President of the 
Council and hold the Great Seal. He ought 
also to legislate in Council: the phrase
’Governor and Council1 was misleading and 
ought to be avoided - nor was the signature 
of the Chief Justice necessary for grants of 
land."gg
Maitland in his letter warned the government that
the Constitution of the Council '’could perpetuate
quarrels in the Council", which he himself had attempted 
87to avoid. Maitland’s views attracted the greatest
respect. Lord Liverpool, the then Secretary of State for
88the Colonies, wrote to Sir Robert Brownrigg, who had by
Council. This was followed by a new Charter of Justice,
89
then succeeded Maitland, revoking the composition of the 
,
of 1811.'
IV. The Charter of Justice of 1811
The Charter of 1811 was basically designed to achieve 
two goals: First, to limit the powers of the judiciary
and second, to extend the powers of the Governor. The 
Charter achieved these two objectives with ease. But it 
also succeeded in planting the seeds of discord between 
the judiciary and the executive which in a sense was to lead 
the Colony towards effecting further changes to its legal 
system.
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Turning to the provisions of* the Charter of* 1811,
90it was clear that by limiting the jurisdiction of* the
Supreme Court to its pre-1810 position, its powers to hear
civil causes was thereby revoked. Tt was, therefore, left
only with its former criminal jurisdiction to be exercised
before a jury. Less serious criminal offences, however,
were left in the hands of ‘sitting magistrates*, who fell
91under the direct control of the Governor. That position
was left unchanged. As a result of the denial of civil
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies was compelled to re-activate the Provincial
Courts. This the 1811 Charter did and in so doing subjected
92
the Provincial Courts to the powers of the Governor.
The total package regarding the re-allocation of judicial 
duties and powers was such that the area of the Governor*s 
authority was increased while decreasing the area left to
93the Supreme Court by the Charter of 1810. By Instructions
9 kaccompanying the Charter, Liverpool instructed Governor 
Brownrigg to reconstitute *the Council*. The Great Seal 
was returned to the Governor who was made the President of 
Council. The Governor was empowered to initiate legislation
unfettered by any restraints placed by the Charter of 1810.
9 5 96By revoking paragraph 17 of the Instructions accompanying
the Charter of 1810, the Chief Justice was effectively removed
from the Council. This necessarily meant that the Supreme
Court was confirmed in its position as the interpreter of
legislation rather than its initiator. The Instructions
categorically stated that the powers created in 1810
regarding the:
** ... formation and functions of the Council; 
the custody, and application of the Great 
Seal; the framing of legislative Acts; and 
the passing of grants of land; are also to be 
considered void and of no effect; ...
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The Governor was returned to his former position of 
absolute power on the Island. The events had come a full 
circle. The failure to take notice of the position of the 
British Governor as an autocrat had proved unwise.
V • Towards Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms: 1811—1833
The next two decades were packed with tension,
erupting occasionally in dramatic exchanges between the
98judiciary and the executive. Commenting on this period 
De Silva wrote:
11 If the Charter of 1810 was unfortunate in 
its political effects, the restoration of 
the pre-1810 position left the judiciary 
open to the earlier criticisms, so much 
so that in 1822, and again in 1827 f judicial 
reforms were considered. In the latter year 
the judges even submitted draft charters 
embodying the alterations they regarded asQQ 
necessary. But as a Commission of Enquiry 
was about to visit Ceylon, the question was 
deferred till after their report."^qq
The Commission of Enquiry to which De Silva refers
was the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission.^ Its Report,
in 1832, resulted in the Charter of 1833* which finally
gave Ceylon a system for the administration of Justice which
103was to survive, in its original form, until 1974. The
Commission and the Charter were made necessary by the 
frequent difficulties experienced by the Judiciary and the 
Governor, representing the two arms of the British 
Administration in Ceylon. It is in the light of these 
continuing conflicts that the final set of law reforms 
introduced in 1833 become meaningful.
In 1815, Governor Brownrigg, gained control over the
Kandyan Kingdom on behalf of King George III. By virtue
104
of Article 8 of the Kandyan Convention, under which the 
British Administration of the Maritime Provinces assumed
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control of* the Kandyan Provinces, it bound itself to 
administer Kandy in accordance with the laws of the 
Kandyan Kingdom. By Article 6, the British government 
declared that: "Every species of bodily torture, and
all mutilation of limb, member or organ, are prohibited 
and abolished." By Article 7* "no sentence of death 
can be carried into execution against any inhabitant 
except" with the written permission of the Governor or 
Lieut—Governor. By Article 9* special procedures for the 
trial of persons — military and civil — who were not the 
inhabitants of the Kandyan Provinces, were enacted.
These special procedures naturally applied to the British 
and the inhabitants of the Maritime Provinces who might be 
found within the Kandyan Provinces. By Articles 6 and 7 
the British Administration excluded the more horrendous 
aspects of the Kandyan Criminal Law. Having made these 
arrangements, the Administration accepted the obligation 
to enforce the Law of Kandy under Article 8. That Article 
read:
105"Subject to these conditions, the administration 
of Civil and Criminal Justice, and Police over the 
Kandyan inhabitants of the said Provinces is to be 
exercised according to established Forms and by the 
Ordinary authorities, saving always the inherent 
Right of Government to redress grievances and reform 
abuses in all instances whatever, whether particular 
or general, where such imposition shall become 
necessary."
Relying on the foregoing provisions, Brownrigg 
excluded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court from the 
Kandyan Provinces. The judiciary claimed that despite 
what the body of Article 8 may say, the British government 
could under the proviso extend the jury system and trials 
before the Supreme Court to those provinces as an exercise 
of the "inherent right of government to redress grievances 
and reform abuses ... " in the Kandyan law. Just as 
persons in the Maritime Provinces had a right to a jury
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trial before the Supreme Court, so too must those who
live in the Kandyan provinces. The challenge of the
judiciary became so severe that the Governor referred
the matter to the Colonial Office in London. The latter
advised the Governor that the view held by the Crown lawyers
was that the Kandyan provinces were not yet annexed to the
British Crown and until it was so annexed by an Act of the
British Parliament, the laws applicable to the Maritime
Provinces do not supercede the obligations assumed under 
107the Treaty. This response was patently defective, as
the judges were not attempting to put the Treaty to a test 
but the proviso under Article 8 into effect. The judges 
remained dissatisfied with the way Brownrigg was administer­
ing the Kandyan Provinces. The critical moment arrived in 
1818 — during the first Kandyan Rebellion against the 
British Crown. In aid of the war effort, Brownrigg pressed
local inhabitants into forced labour. The Judges declared
this illegal. Considering the urgency and the prevailing 
state of emergency in the Kandyan Provinces, Brownrigg 
passed a regulation declaring!
"the legality of pressing for the service of 
government persons bound to such service by
caste, Tenure of Land or Custom, and of the
mode enforcing the same as heretofore practised.”203
The recognition of a duty to render services based
on caste and other forms of social disabilities naturally
enraged the judiciary. The battle lines now began to be
clearly drawn between the two branches of the British
Administration. Brownrigg was succeeded by Sir Edward
Barnes and during the latter*s tenure of office an
109extraordinary case came before the Collector of Jaffna 
in 1820. A person of the Covia Caste, to which all 
liberated slaves belonged, was accused of having been 
carried in a palanquin. By the customary law prevailing
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among the Tamils in Jaffna a ride in a palanquin was 
reserved for those of a higher caste. The Collector of 
Jaffna, Mr. Hooper, sentenced the miscreant to be flogged.
The Collector found that the Dutch law prohibited such a n  
act by a person of a low caste and the British law required 
a licence to do what he did. As he had no such licence, he 
was clearly in breach of every law applicable to his case.
The convict appealed to the Supreme Court which was in fact 
on circuit at the time in question, in Jaffna. That Court 
quashed the conviction. Mr. Hooper, who was, as the 
Collector of Jaffna, responsible exclusively to the Governor, 
submitted his report to Barnes. Xn his report Hooper wrote 
that: _
11 ... this infraction of the customs and 
usages of the district was calculated to 
create a serious ferment,
and proceeded to cite instances where his predecessors had 
recognised these caste commitments by punishing persons 
who breached them. Fears were expressed by other Government 
officers, such as the Revenue Commissioner, about the 
possible social consequences of the Supreme Court*s decision. 
Barnes, enacting a Regulation^ confirming the Dutch law, 
reversed the decision of the Supreme Court. The Dutch law 
decreed flogging for such social infractions. The mood of 
the Supreme Court in 1820 defied description. A classic 
dichotomy appeared to have arisen^^^ between the Supreme 
Court and the rest of the Courts. The latter were those 
which fell directly within the control of the Governor 
the Charters of 181(1 and of 1811. Xn an apparent act of 
defiance the Supreme Court refused to recognise *the 
minutes and the advertisements* of the Council. They gave 
recognition only to the Regulations and to the Ordinances.
The *minutes* were the records of dialogues and debates 
that were kept by the Council. They represented the 
government *s policy and these to a large extent were
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indicative as to the way the British Administration wished 
the judges and the civil service to act. 'Advertisements* 
on the other hand were directives of an administrative 
nature which the Council periodically issued. These were 
as a rule published in the government Gazette. Xn the 
classical sense none of these could be regarded as law.
The Sitting Magistrates, the Provincial Courts and all 
other Courts which fell under the Governor's exclusive 
control recognised and thereby gave the force of law to 
all four documents - namely, Minutes, Advertisements, 
Ordinances and Regulations. The laws applicable in the 
two sets of Courts were, therefore, different. Problems 
arose when appeals were heard. A very different system 
to the aforementioned prevailed in the Kandyan Provinces.
The whole system of judicial administration was now 
approaching a state of chaos. The Supreme Court was doing 
its utmost to create a state of judicial anarchy hoping 
that the whole system would be overhauled after a careful 
review of both the substantive and the procedural laws 
on the Island.
112In 1824 the Supreme Court had the case of 
J. D. Rossier before them. A Sitting Magistrate had 
Rossier arrested upon suspicion that he was a deserter 
from the British East India Company. He was in custody 
pending removal to India. The Supreme Court, hearing 
this event, issued a mandate ordering Rossier to be produced 
before them. The fact that the Supreme Court was planning 
to have his corpus released became obvious to the 
Administration. Barnes issued a Regulation under which 
a detention of any person under a warrant issued by the 
Governor, the Chief Secretary or by his deputy was a 
complete answer to any mandate issued by any court — 
civil or military. The correspondence which passed between
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Sir Hardinge Giffard, the Chief Justice, Sir Richard
Ottley, the Puisne Judge, and Sir Edward Barnes, the
Governor, as a result of this Regulation, was mostly
abusive. Giffard characterised the Governor's Regulation
as 'objectionable in the highest degree*, for it was not
only retrospective in that it applied to Rossier's case
but also in clear negation of the sacred principles
concerning the freedom of the individual. The matter
reached the British House of Commons and Bathurst, the
then Secretary of State for the Colonies sent orders to
Barnes directing him to repeal that Regulation. More
with cunning than with skill, Barnes managed to keep the
original Regulation alive until I8 3O. By an Order-in- 
113Council passed on the 1st November, I8 3O, the offensive 
Regulation of 1824 was repealed. But the Governor was 
left with a residual power to detain persons without 
recourse to Courts for a period not exceeding eighteen 
months. By the same Order-in-Council, the Supreme Court 
was given the right to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus 
similar to that of in England.
The struggle for power between the Supreme Court
and the Governor resembled an amateur game of chess.
New strategies became necessary after each move. The
Governor controlled all the courts on the Island except
the Supreme Court. Through the Board of Judicial
Commissioners he controlled the Administration of Justice
in the Kandyan Provinces too. The Advocate-Fiscal was
the Governor's agent, through whom these Courts had access
to the Governor. Unlike the chastity of Ceasor's wife,
the Governor was not beyond reproach. Patronage appeared
largely to govern appointments to these Courts. Relying
on a view expressed in the Charter of 1810, that the
Sitting Magistrates should be possessed with knowledge of
113athe locality in which they sit, the Governor maintained
that his Courts must have a thorough knowledge of the 
114locality. Unlike the judges of the Supreme Court, his
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appointees should not stand aloof* from the social
environment. This politicisation of* a large part of* the
judicial administration of* the country was viewed with
115horror by the Supreme Court, the judges of* which 
court made yet another move. They proposed that all laws 
should be registered in the Supreme C o u r t . T h i s  
proposal was made so as to subject the validity of* laws 
passed by the Council to judicial scrutiny. By such 
means the judges were in effect proposing a veto power 
over legislation. As De Silva remarks:
"/The7 Council, as constituted, was a 
very unreal check. Officials dependent 
on the Governor*s patronage could hardly 
be in a position to display much indepen­
dence, if they did, it could not be with 
much effect.
Although the relationship between the judges of the
Supreme Court and the Governor was one of open hostility,
the British government was determined to engage no more
in piece-meal reforms. They were determined to await
118the outcome of a Royal Commission they had appointed
as far back as the 18th January of 1823* Due to a number
119of unrelated events, one of the Commissioners, Golebrooke,
did not arrive on the Island until April, in 1829* He
was joined by another, Cameron, in March, I8 3O. While
Colebrooke was made responsible for the administrative 
120reforms, Cameron undertook to enquire into the judicial
reforms. Together they produced a joint report in I8 3 2 ,
which has come to be known as the Colebrooke-Cameron Report
of that year. Although the final Report appeared as a
part of a single enquiry, there were many sub-reports
dealing with particular aspects of the Colonial
121Administration of Ceylon. Of these, the Report by
Cameron on the * Judicial Establishments and Procedure in 
Ceylon* will be considered here.
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VI. The Cameron Report
Although the final report appeared under Cameron*s 
name, most of the evidence was collected by Colebrooke
122some time before the arrival of Cameron on the Island.
The evidence of Mr. Justice Marshall was particularly
damaging to the Governor1s role in the administration of
123justice on the Island. The recommendations contained
in the Report aptly indicated the apprehensions created
124in Cameron*s mind by the evidence given by the judiciary.
The Commission recommended that the Island as a whole,
including the Kandyan Provinces, should have a single,
• 12 5uniform legal system. The obligation to maintain a
separate system in Kandy by virtue of Article 8 of the
Convention, a principle submitted by the Governors since
Brownrigg, was brushed aside. The Report mentioned that
**The argument I allude to is founded upon 
the attachment which mankind in general, 
and the Oriental races in particular, feel 
for systems which have been long established 
among them, and which are commonly connected 
with their religious opinions. This argument,
I say, has no application to the case of Ceylon;
. . . . A  fairer field than the Island of 
.Ceylon can never be presented to a legislator 
for the establishment of a system of judicature 
and procedure, of which the sole end is the 
attainment of cheap and expeditious justice•”^ 26
Contrary to the views of the Colonial Administration in
Ceylon, the Report recommended the extension of the civil
127jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 1 The Commissioner
saw no reason why a special jurisdiction in civil matters
concerning the European population should be isolated 
128from the rest. It was recommended that Governor's
control over the local courts should be revoked and that
control over all courts should be vested in the Supreme 
129Court. The Report recommended the retention of the
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130jury system in criminal trials* It was further
recommended that Ceylonese Assessors should be associated
with the judges as had been done ip the Kandyan provinces 
131since 1815* The Commissioner recommended the extension
of the jury system to the Kandyan Provinces, a matter of
deep concern to.the Supreme Court, particularly under 
132Brownrigg* To a large measure the foregoing settled
the issues that were muddying the waters between the
Governor and the Supreme Court. Several other recommen—
133dations were made to strengthen the Appellate system
and for the efficient administration of justice through
134out the Island. Some of these will surface in the
next section of this Chapter. The British government, 
having accepted the recommendations, issued a new Charter 
of Justice on the 18th February, 1833*
VII. The Charter of Justice 1833:^'* A Basis for 
Colonial Legal Development
It is necessary to view the Charter of 1833 as
the climax of a dialectical process of change and
development which had progressed within a historical
framework dating back to the Treaty of Capitulation in 
1361796. It is also necessary to consider the Charter
as the end product of a long and sustained struggle
between the judges of the Supreme Court and the British
Governors for the control of the source of power within
the Colony. The Charter itself appears to have settled
the administration of the Colony in that it provided the
legal infrastructure for colonial development for the
next 115 years, until Independence in 1948, and even
continued to support the post-independept strategies
137for social change and development until 1974*
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Initially, the Charter provided the Colony with a 
system for administering justice similar to the one 
pursued by the Imperial government during the Victorian
I oO
era for England. In subsequent years, planners and
plotters for colonial development took due regard of the 
legal infra-structure provided by the Charter as a foundation 
for colonial expansion. Moreover, in the years that 
immediately followed the introduction of the Charter, 
concern of the colonial administration in Ceylon was not of 
legal reform but of economic expansion through the creation 
of a plantation economy. Such a concern had not arisen in 
the Colony during the years preceeding I833, for the
139preceeding 37 years were years of territorial expansion
and administrative consolidation. A combination of these
reasons, however, appears to have held together the
structure for judicial administration provided by the
140Charter for the next fourteen decades. The Charter
may therefore, be assessed as a basis for colonial legal 
development.
It is fundamental to the strategies for colonial 
development that a single land mass should be considered 
in every respect as a single territorial unit. The need 
to administer the Indian sub-continent as one whole 
territorial unit was a result of this line of thought.
The Charter fundamentally recognised the unitary nature 
of the Island of Ceylon by removing the distinction, 
maintained by successive British Governors since 1815, 
that the Kandyan provinces required separate treatment.
The Charter abolished inter alia the Board of the Judicial 
Commissioner for Kandy and expressly extended the
l4ljurisdiction of the Supreme Court to those provinces.
A congeries of courts under two different arms of 
the Administration, following different and distinct 
procedures, was not conducive to legal development.
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The British have had their experiences in judicial
administration moulded out of the conflicts between the
Common Law Courts and the Courts of Equity. By 1833
thinking in England was moving towards some accommodation
l4labetween these two judicial structures. The year
1421873 was not far away and Lord Mansfield had already
1^3departed for another world. The Charter with one
clean sweep abolished:
"The Provincial Courts, the Courts of the 
Sitting Magistrates, the Court of the 
Judicial Commissioner, the Court of the 
Judicial Agent, the Courts of the Agents 
of Government, the Revenue Courts, and 
the Court of the Sitting Magistrate of the 
Mahabadde .11 ^ 44
These were all the creations of the British Governors 
in their struggle for power with the Supreme Court. These 
institutions, in a sense, were the supporters of the 
British Governors, which were presided over by his 
appointees. The Charter mentioned that these courts:
" ... differ among themselves in respect 
of their constitution, of their rules of 
procedure, and of the kinds and degrees 
of the jurisdictions which they exercise 
within the limits of their respective 
districts or provinces•"^45
146The Charter further abolished all existing 
appellate tribunals; namely,
" ... the Court of the Judicial Commissioner 
exercising ... appellate jurisdiction ... in 
the Kandyan Provinces ... certain Courts 
called the Minor Courts of Appeal, and certain 
Courts called the Minor Courts of Appeal for 
Revenue cases ... *"147
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Again it must be mentioned that these appellate 
tribunals were the creations of the British Governors 
and, like those that were mentioned earlier, were not 
under the control or supervision of the Supreme Court.
The Charter gave the following reason for abolishing 
the appellate tribunals:
11 ... the existence of several independent 
appellate judicatures in the said Island 
tends to introduce uncertainty into the 
administration of justice ... ,Mi48
Having done away with every Court on the Island
except the Supreme Court, the Charter proceeded to lay
down a rule in absolute terms prohibiting the Governor
from creating Courts other than those which the Charter 
149recognised. As to those Courts which the Charter
recognised, it was declared:
11 ... that the entire administration of 
justice civil and criminal therein; shall 
be vested exclusively in the Courts erected 
and constituted by this our Charter•" __15"
151As a proviso to the prohibition placed upon the
Governor, the Charter recognised in the Governor a power
to appoint "certain assemblies of the inhabitants of
152villages known ... by the name of Gamsabaves" in 
response to a request made by persons wanting to submit 
"their differences to ... arbitration".
The British Government was accustomed to a four-tier
system of judicial administration in the United Kingdom
and therefore was happy to introduce such a system to
her colonies. The Charter of 1833 produced a four—tier
system, its base rooted at the district level. The
153Island was divided into four circuits — Colombo,
Northern, Southern and Eastern - each divided into 
154districts. At the first tier of judicial administration
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155each district was given a District Court, with both
I 1 k *7
Civil and Criminal jurisdiction. Its Civil
jurisdiction was quite extensively and exhaustively
158described in various Articles of the Charter, The 
basic principle was that the District Courts:
II ... shall have cognizance of and full 
power to hear and determine all pleas, 
suits, and actions in which the party 
or parties defendant shall be resident 
within the district in which any such 
suit or action shall be brought, or in 
which the act, matter, or thing in 
respect of which any such suit or action 
shall be brought, shall have been done or 
performed within such district
± ^ y
Thus the local character of the jurisdiction of the 
District Courts was emphasised: they resemble the County
Courts and the Courts located below the High Court system 
in the United Kingdom,
160The second tier was indeed the Supreme Court,
It was to have a Chief Justice and two Puisne Judges,
i n i t i a l l y , I n  a separate Article^^ the Charter
clearly stated the ranking of the Chief Justice and the
Puisne Judges within the Colony: while the Chief Justice
l63ranked second, immediately below the Governor, the
Puisne Judges ranked fourth, after the officer commanding
164the forces in the Colony, The appointment of the
judges bif the Supreme Court and those of the District
Courts were to be "by letters patent to be issued under
the public seal of the ••• Island, in pursuance of
warrants to be from time to time issued by us i.e. the 
165Sovereign.” The Governor was to play no part hereafter
in the appointment of judges of any Court on the Island
except upon a temporary basis during: resignation,
incapacity, death, absence or suspension of the holder
166of such office. Such appointments were regarded as
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acting appointments, which could only be confirmed by
a warrant issued by the Sovereign. The Supreme Court
JL 6 7 1 68was given original civil and criminal jurisdiction
and in that aspect resembled the High Court of Judicature
in England.
The third-tier of judicial administration was
l69concerned with the appellate jurisdiction, in its
penultimate stage. In that sense it resembled the appellate
division of the various branches of the High Court of
Judicature, as it existed at the time in question in
England. In this penultimate stage it was made the 
1 7 0responsibility of the Supreme Court to constitute itself
171into a suitable appellate tribunal and, until I852, this 
third—tier of judicial administration had individual 
assessors forming a part of the appellate Court.
172The fourth-tier was an appeal to His Majesty in
Council, i.e., to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
17^ cLCouncil. This ultimate Court of Appeal corresponded
with the House of Lords in its judicial capacity.
The respective jurisdiction and procedures associated
173with each of the four tiers were carefully laid down.
The similarity this arrangement bore to the English legal
system, not only in 1833 when it was first introduced but
2 . 7 balso in 197 -^» when it was finally replaced, may have
been a further reason for its longevity. The Charter
having laid down a viable infra-structure to support the
implementation of a legal system left, to the Executive,
the responsibility to plan the strategies for colonial
development in other areas of concern. Expansion and the
perpetuation of a colonial economy were in fact the
principal concerns of the administration during the years
following the promulgation of the Charter. This has been
175examined at various stages of this dissertation. Although
this colonial model was to some extent disturbed by the 
Administration of Justice Law in 197 -^9 to which reference has 
previously been made, the model was, however, re-established
1 w/T
in its original form in 1978.
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Chapter 10 
From Adjudication to Conciliation
I. An Introduction
The Cameron recommendations, which formed the basis for The
Charter of Justice of 1833, were discussed in an earlier chapter. ^
It was argued there that the model for the administration of justice
which was provided by the Charter of Justice in 1833 stood the test
. 2
of time until the early part of the seventies of this century. The
3
abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1971, followed by the
re-organisation of the Court system and the changes introduced at
4
the procedural level of adjudication in 1973, did not in any way 
alter the adjudicatory framework within which the system of dispute 
settlement was conceived.
To ensure the continuation of the adjudicatory system, the plan 
for Legal Education introduced by The Courts Ordinance of 1889, 
despite the twenty-four amendments it had thus far undergone, re­
tained to this day the adjudicatory role for which the students-at- 
law were trained.  ^ Although the method of conciliation, as distinct 
from adjudication, had had a very ancient history in Ceylon dating 
back to 425 B.C., the colonial system of justice did not readily 
accept the ideas of conciliation and the method of extra-legal 
settlement of disputes as alternative methods to the judicial pro­
cess.
The ancient forum for conciliation was the Gamsabhava. The 
Colebrooke recommendations made particular reference to the Gamsabhavas 
as an institution meriting retention.  ^ The Gamsabhavas, therefore, 
survived British rule; but they were recast in a style different 
from their ancestors and within an adjudicatory framework. The 
Gamsabhavas underwent several changes during the colonial period
g
and, in 1945, assumed the character of Rural Courts. The only 
significant character which the early Gamsabhavas and the later 
Rural Courts preserved was the fact that their jurisdiction was 
locally based. Aside from that one small feature, the Gamsabhavas 
were still adjudicatory. The movement towards conciliation as a 
method for dispute settlement went hand-in-hand with the setting
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up of quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. But there was no 
deliberate movement, until 1958, towards recognising conciliation 
as an alternative method to adjudication for the settlement of dis­
putes generally. It is in this light that The Conciliation Boards 
Act of 19 
the past.
58 ^  is considered to have made a significant break with
II. The History of Conciliation ^
12According to the Mahavamsa, the conciliation procedure for
13dispute settlement was known to Sri Lanka from as early as 425 B.C.
The Conciliation Boards were called Gamsabhavas or Village Councils.
14Commenting on the functions of the Gamsabhavas, Dr. Tambiah, quoting
from D'Oyly, wrote:
"Pandukabhaya, the ruler of Lanka, ^  es­
tablished the village boundaries over the 
whole island of Lanka. Ever since the ex­
istence of these villages the Gamsabhavas 
must have existed. The court was held both 
in the dissawanies (villages under the rule 
of the dissawas) and the upper districts, 
and consisted of an assembly of the prin­
cipled men of the village. The court met 
at an ambalama (resting place), or under 
a shady tree, or in some other central place, 
upon the occurrence of any civil or criminal 
matter, and heard cases involving debts, 
petty thefts, quarrels, etc. After an in­
quiry into the case they settled it ami­
cably."
The Gamsabhavas survived British rule. But their constitution 
and purposes underwent several changes. On the other hand its 
structure as a forum for settling disputes, within a local setting 
was, strictly preserved. The movement towards the creation of 
Conciliation Boards was a slow one. One of the earliest quasi­
judicial or administrative bodies for dispute settlement was set
18up under the Workman’s Compensation Ordinance. Besides this
there were a series of such bodies established under varying statutes.
19
To mention some: The Patents and Trade Marks Ordinance, The
20 21 Rent Restriction Act, The Industrial Disputes Act, The Land
22 23
Acquisition Act, the Inland Revenue Act, The Licensing of
24 25
Traders Act, The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, and The
26Paddy Lands Act. In addition, the professional bodies such
27 28as The Ceylon Medical Council, The Ceylon Law Society and
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the various institutions for higher learning were each authorised 
to appoint panels for dispute hearings and dispute settlements. The 
foregoing catalogue spanned several decades, extending from colonial 
times to the present day. In each creation, the government’s main 
concern was that certain types of disputes were best suited for a 
non-adjudicatory process of settlement. The best settlement, the 
legislators believedt was a settlement worked out by the peers of 
the disputants.
On April 10th 1956 the first Bandaranaike government was elected
into office. Its electoral victory was hailed as a victory for the
common man; it was considered the very political anti-thesis of the
United National Party which it had successfully defeated. On the
12th March 1958, the Bandaranaike government passed into law, The
30Conciliation Boards Act, which forms the subject of this chapter.
31Certain sections of the Act were amended on the 24th December,
1963 but these amendments were merely cosmetic in nature. The Con­
ciliation Boards Act was the creation of the then Minister of Justice, 
Senator M.W.H. deSilva. Senator deSilva was an experienced Queen’s 
Counsel who had won his silk^ from the British Administration. He 
had practiced as an advocate both in the trial Courts and in the 
Appeal Courts. He had occupied the posts of Solicitor-General and 
Attorney-General and had also functioned as the Legal Secretary at 
a time when the Island was still a Crown Colony. His career became 
eventually crowned by being appointed to the Bench of the Supreme 
Court of Ceylon. His judicial career brought him to preside over
a number of important and now famous criminal trials of Ceylon. As
32he were to recall while presenting the Conciliation Boards Bill 
to the Senate, these experiences made him only too aware of the un­
satisfactory conditions of litigation on the Island. He admitted 
to the Senate that he had examined the pre-trial conciliation pro­
cedures of other countries, but made it clear that the ideas con­
tained in the Act was an essential response to wholly local needs. 
Senator deSilva's speech to the Senate did not suggest in any way 
that the Bill was intended to establish Courts in the nature of 
People’s Courts similar to those that may be found in the communist 
world. After a careful reading of the Senator’s speech Goonesekera 
and Metzger concluded that:
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"In the Minister of Justice’s remarks intro­
ducing the scheme to the Senate, he made par­
ticular reference to the voluntary Conciliation
Boards functioning in Moratuwa and Panadura.
Experience there and the history of the 
Gamsabhava seem to have had significant in­
fluence on the new Act, particularly in its 
choice of a lay body of leading citizens 
serving part-time and without remuneration 
as the mechanism through which conciliation 
was to be encouraged." 33
The fact that the Conciliation Boards Act was intended to provide
the Island with a unique model for settlement of disputes, very
different from similar institutions in the Communist world and equally
different from conciliation through Arbitration processes known in
the United Kingdom becomes clear, from the pith and substance of the
3ASenator’s Speech. The political significance of the Conciliation 
Boards Act may be found in the political directions of the new Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (S.L.F.P.) Government which was responsible 
for piloting the Bill through Parliament in 1958. The S.L.F.P. in 
taking office had declared its intention to create the necessary 
socio-political conditions in Ceylon which could provide the frame­
work within which a new society with a new orientation geared to­
wards the re-establishment of a lost national heritage could be 
achieved. One of the principal changes which the new Administration 
was eager to bring about was in the realm of dispute settlement. As 
it had been made clear during the debate in the Senate, the ancient 
Gamsabhavas and the voluntary experiments by residents in two sea­
side towns - Moratuwa and Panadura, some 12 and 17 miles distance, respectively 
from the capital city of Colombo - appeared to have provided the 
necessary inspiration to the Minister of Justice.
During the debate on the Bill, in the House of Representatives,
Dr. Colvin R. deSilva explained the aims of the Bill in this way:
" let the Conciliation Board, whose task'
is not to find a person guilty or find a per­
son in the wrong, search all matters that 
are troubling the parties and arrive at a
conciliation. It is a little like the--
procedure used in psychotherapeutics, in
a sense. You try to find out what is 
troubling the two parties so that you may 
reconcile them and make them live in har­
mony together." 35
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Popular acceptance of the settlement hammered out through conciliation 
was an important corner-stone in this process. Much criticism was 
made during the debate about the lack of power in the Board to re­
ject a repudiation of a settlement arrived at within the 30 day
period which was allowed by the Act. The Act permitted the parties
to repudiate the settlement with or without reason within that period. 
The Government argued that the practices of the ancient Gamsabhava 
were such that the disputants had a reasonable time within which they 
were able to repudiate their settlements. The importance of this 
escape route was put in graphic terms by Dr. Colvin R. deSilva in 
the House of Representatives in the following passage from his speech.
— here you catch them by the ear, you bring 
them before the Board, you bang their heads
together hoping that a settlement will arise,
and since they only see stars by reason of 
the banging of their heads, they say, "Very 
well, (since you say so, then I accept)."
Then one of them goes home and says, "what
did I do?" He writes back and says "Well,
you knocked our heads together; . I did not
like it." Then you are back where you are.
It is, if anything worse than before, in 
that more enmity will be created, for the 
other man who says, "you are a funny fellow.
The two of us went before the Board, and I 
agreed to all sorts of concessions in order 
to arrive at some kind of settlement, but 
now you want to go back on it." Thus you 
will see that there will be no conciliation, 
no settlement, but murder." 36
The Conciliation Boards in essence were to provide the people with the
ways and means of settling their disputes extra-judicially, if they
so wished, while always leaving their route to adjudication free and
open to them. The Act itself remains inoperative unless, by Gazette
37notification, the Minister of Justice proclaims the application 
of the Act to a given "village area". By section 2(3) of the Act,
"the expression ’village area* has the same meaning as in the Village
Councils Ordinance." The basic local unit of administration is the 
Village Council. The next unit is the Town Council. The Urban' 
Council represents a higher stage of local Government than the Town 
Council and the principal cities are administered by the Municipal 
Councils. The Municipal Councils are considered as occupying the 
most advanced form of local Government. The Conciliation Boards 
are therefore fitted into the geographical area governed by the
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basic local government-unit; namely the Village Council. Although 
the Conciliation Boards Act had been in existence for nearly two 
decades, its operation has never reached the areas administered by 
the Municipal Councils. Not all the Urban -Councils and the Town 
Councils in the Island have Conciliation Boards. In many of those 
which have been designated by the Minister, Conciliation Boards 
have periodically remained defunct due to the expiry of their man­
dates. Members of the Conciliation Boards approved by the Minister
38 39of Justice serve for a period of three years, but may be re-
40moved by ministerial order, "without assigning any reason." The
41Minister of Justice has an additional power to appoint the Chair­
man of the panel of conciliators and also to remove him "without
42assigning any reason." Certain local associations engaged in
social work are empowered to submit a list of potential candidates
to the Minister of Justice for selection for appointment to the 
43Board. The Act lays down the powers available to the Conciliation 
Boards:
They are:
"(a) to procure and receive all such written 
or oral evidence, and to examine all 
such witnesses, as the Board may think 
it necessary or desirable to procure or 
examine;
(b) to summon any person residing in Ceylon 
to attend any meeting of the Board to 
give evidence or produce any document 
or other thing in his possession, and 
to examine him as a witness or require 
him to produce any document or other 
thing in his possession;
(c) notwithstanding any of the provisions 
of the Evidence Ordinance, to admit 
any written or oral evidence which 
might be inadmissible in civil or 
criminal proceedings." ^
One of the critical points that needs emphasis is contained in sub­
section (c) of the foregoing section. The freedom to admit any 
evidence, insofar as it seems relevant to the enquiry, is a nec­
essary element in the conciliation process. Further, this renders 
the analytical exercises which goes with the art of advocacy of the 
legal profession redundant. Accordingly, legal representation is 
not permitted before Conciliation Boards. By Section 12 of the Act
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the duties of a Conciliation Board are laid down. Insofar as the
dispute is non-criminal, the Board has a duty to summon the parties
before it and "after inquiring into such dispute make every effort
to induce such parties to settle such dispute, and, where such parties
agree to a settlement, record such settlement and issue a copy there- 
45of." Where the matter in question constitutes a criminal offence
then the Board is required to make every attempt to compound such 
46offence. Depending on whether the offence is a Schedule 1 offence 
or a Schedule II offence, the consent of the Attorney-General may 
be necessary to effectuate an agreement to compound. The word "com­
pound" in the Statute is used in a non-technical sense: it means
the settlement, condoning a liability for an offence committed upon 
the payment of money, forebearing prosecution upon a private motive 
or coming to terms with a person for foregoing his claim for an 
offence committed against him. These shades of meanings are culled 
from the dictionaries of the English language. Webster’s English 
Dictionary, defines the word ’compound' in this way:
" to settle amicably; to adjust by agree­
ment (a controversy); to fail to prosecute 
(an offence) for a consideration; to dis­
charge (a debt) by paying a part - viz; to 
agree upon concession; to come to terms of 
agreement; to arrange or make a settlement 
by compromise; especially, to settle with 
creditors by agreement, and discharge a 
debt by paying a part of its amount; or to 
make an agreement to pay a debt by means 
or in a manner different from that stipu­
lated or required by law (to compound with 
a person, and for a debt)." ^
Under Section 13(1) the parties to a civil dispute, having set­
tled their dispute before the Conciliation Board, may thereafter 
repudiate that settlement within 30 days. There are no provisions 
in the Act for repudiating the agreement to compound a criminal 
offence. This may be explained upon the grounds that criminal of­
fences being of a species of offences in which the State has an in­
terest, any agreement to compound a criminal offence involves the 
State. In such a situation it may be argued that repudiation of any 
agreement to compound, too, would involve the consent of the State: 
therefore to allow an individual a power to repudiate such an agree­
ment would by implication be an erosion of State power. It will 
clearly be against the principles of constitutional law to bind
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the State (or the Crown) to such an eventuality unless the legis- 
lation has expressly mentioned the State as a party to such an in­
dividual power.
By Section 14 of the Statute it is required that all disputes
48
falling under Section 6 of the enactment be first heard by a Con­
ciliation Board before "proceedings [are] instituted in, or [are]
49entertained by a civil court." The production of a certificate 
from the Chairman of a panel of conciliators, stating that "such 
disputes have been inquired into by a Conciliation Board, or that 
a settlement of such dispute made by a Conciliation Board has been 
repudiated by all or any of the parties to such settlement", is a 
necessary pre-requisite for the commencement of proceedings before 
a civil or a criminal court. The question has often been asked 
whether the parties have an option to proceed directly to the 
courts, if it is evident to them that a settlement before a Con­
ciliation Board appears to be an impossibility.
In Wickremaratchi v. The Inspector of Police, ^  the Supreme 
Court, sitting as a single bench, thought that:
"Section 6 reads as follows: -
"The Chairman of the Panel of Conci­
liators constituted for any village area 
may, and shall upon application made to 
him in that behalf, refer for inquiry to 
Conciliation Boards constituted out of 
that Panel the following disputes and 
offences.
There is thereafter an enumeration 
of the disputes and offences that can be 
inquired into by a Conciliation Board.
Section 6, therefore, in my view, con­
templates that the only disputes and of­
fences which can be referred for inquiry 
to a Conciliation Board, are such disputes 
and offences of the kind enumerated in 
section 6(a) to (b) which the Chairman 
may of his own motion refer to the Board 
of such disputes and offences which the 
parties desire should be referred to the 
Board. Disputes and offences of the kind 
enumerated in section 6(a) to (d) which 
are not referred to a Board by either 
one or other of the two methods men­
tioned above would ordinarily be justi­
ciable by the established Courts, even 
without the required certificate. The
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proposition therefore that every dispute 
or offence of the kind enumerated in sec­
tion 6 must in the first instance be re­
ferred to a Conciliation Board and a cer­
tificate obtained from the Chairman, be­
fore proceedings can be instituted or en­
tertained in an established court of law, 
is a proposition not warranted under.the 
provisions of the law and one which I am 
unable to accept."
This decision was reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Nonahamy v.
52 53Halgrat Silva. Overruling the Wickremaratchi case, the Court
held that reference to a Conciliation Board of matters falling with­
in section 6 was a pre-requisite to the commencement of civil or 
criminal proceedings before courts ordinarily constituted. There 
was no option open to the plaintiff. It is an imperative require­
ment and must always be followed. The judgment fails to state the 
reasons for the decision, which leads one to suspect that it could 
well be a policy decision of that Court.
The powers of the Conciliation Boards are enhanced by two im­
portant sections of the Act. Section 16 declares that the members 
of a Conciliation Board are deemed to be public servants and pro­
ceedings before them are deemed to be judicial proceedings. That 
empowers the Board to cite parties for perjury and for contempt of 
the Board. A theoretical, but Indeed a fascinating, aspect of this 
power is that, while proceedings for perjury are possible, the 
eliciation of the facts and the determination of the degree of 
falsity are not required to be determined by a process of cross- 
examination but as a result of a dialogue between the panel and 
the witnesses. The absence of legal representation is a relevant 
factor in this respect. Criticisms have often been made that the 
proceedings before the Board have sometimes taken the form of an 
interrogation reminiscent more of an inquisitorial system rather 
than of a conciliation process.
Locked into the judicial nature of the Board's activities
is the provision in section 8 that failure to appear upon being
summoned by a Conciliation Board is a criminal offence, subject
to a summary trial before a Magistrate. A similar fate awaits
a person who, without cause, fails "to produce and show to the Board
any document or other thing which is in his possession or power and
which is in the opinion of the Board necessary for arriving at the
54truth of the matters that are being inquired into by the Board."
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During the Bandaranaike administration the Parliament of Sri
Lanka adopted the theme of ’facilitative law' for public policy
legislation. Under that theme the Statutes merely authorised the
Ministers of State to implement particular.government policies.
Section 17(1) of the Statute states:
"The Minister of Justice may make reg­
ulations to give effect to the prin­
ciples and provisions of this Act."
By sub-section (2) of section 17, regulations formulated under sub­
section (1) require to be approved by Parliament and thereafter to 
be gazetted before they become effective. Utilising this method 
of legislation, successive Ministers of Justice expanded and con­
tracted the conciliation process for settlement of disputes on the 
Island. Each regulation made under Section 17 was dictated by the 
prevailing policy of the party in power towards Conciliation as an 
alternative to adjudication. By Section 18, the provisions of the 
Conciliation Board Act were declared to be effective notwithstand­
ing "anything to the contrary in any other written law."
The purpose of the Boards, as the foregoing description should 
show, was merely to create an institutional means to bypass the 
adjudicatory process that had gained control of the institutions 
of judicial administration in the country for nearly one and a half 
centuries. It must, therefore, be emphasised that the Conciliation 
Boards form a part of the total socio-economic reform programme 
which the Sri Lanka government proposed for the whole nation.
III.The Ambit of Conciliation
Unlike the role relegated to conciliation of disputes in such
54acountries as The People's Republic of China, in the Sri Lankan 
experience, conciliation of disputes is limited to certain cate­
gories of disputes. These categories are detailed in section 6 of 
the Conciliation Boards Act.
"(a) any dispute in respect of any movable
property that is kept, or any im­
movable property that is wholly or 
partly situate, in that Conciliation 
Board area;
(b) any dispute in respect of any matter
that may be a cause of action arising
in that Conciliation Board area for 
the purpose of the institution of an 
1 action in a civil court;
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(c) any dispute in respect of a contract 
made in that Conciliation Board area;
(d) such offences specified in the Schedule 
to this Act as are alleged to have been 
committed in that Conciliation Board
iiSAarea.
Despite the apparent width of the formulation contained in the fore-
* 57 58going subsections, academic discourses and judicial comments
have indicated certain types of disputes which have, to a large
measure, been regarded as unsuitable for conciliation. It has been 
59argued that they are best suited for adjudication. It has been 
suggested that the use of Conciliation in such cases would lead to 
injustices and inconveniences.
While compiling a list of eighteen case-types, Goonesekera and 
Metzger ^  have submitted them ^  as those which should be expressly
excluded from the Conciliation Boards jurisdiction or made subject to
62 63special treatment. The list has been divided into four parts.
64Dealing with a list of ten case-types under the broad heading of
'non-contentious proceedings1, the authors argue that the list con­
sists of certain case-types over which there are ’special State in­
terests' and, therefore, it is in the interest of the State to extend 
its supervisory jurisdiction over them. By such means, the authors 
argue that stability in the community could be maintained. In their 
words:
"The special state interest upon which 
the courts' supervisory jurisdiction is 
founded may stem from the significance of 
the relationship to stability in the com­
munity (e.g., marriage or title to land), 
a need to provide special protection to 
certain individuals (e.g., children or 
lunatics) or the need to protect third 
parties in complex, multi-party liti­
gation (e.g., partition or trusts). So 
viewed a section 14 certificate 65 -£s 
not a condition precedent to going to 
court with these actions: they do not
involve disputes within the jurisdiction 
of the Boards as defined in section 6, 
and they cannot be the subjects of Con­
ciliation Board settlements with the force 
of a court decree." ^
Dealing ^  with ’applications for injunctions, arrest or sequestration
before judgment, or restraint of waste’, under the broad rubric of
’interim relief’, the authors argue, that:
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"It must be recognised, however, that cer­
tain interim remedies created for the sole 
purpose of providing expeditious relief 
pending a full decision on the merits by 
a court, will be made meaningless pro­
tections if the delays inherent in the 
conciliation process permit damage to be 
done where earlier it might have been 
avoided. There are two conflicting in­
terests here: one party's need for ex­
peditious temporary relief, and the State's 
interest in avoiding frivolous and dis­
ruptive litigation." 68
Regarding 'actions entrusted by law or by agreement to administrative 
or quasi-judicial tribunals or to arbitration', ^  the authors make 
the point ^  that in cases where legislation grants jurisdiction to 
entertain certain disputes to administrative or quasi-judicial tri­
bunals, such as the labour tribunals, the Conciliation Boards play
no useful role. It is correct to say that the Industrial Disputes
71 72Act of 1950 and the several amending Acts have all maintained
the principle of reserving disputes for labour tribunals, rather than 
for an adjudicatory process within the framework of the hierarchical 
system of courts. Since 1950, successive administrations have intro­
duced a series of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies to settle
disputes in a number of other areas. Under the Rent Restriction Ordi- 
73nance, rent conciliation boards have been created. Further, a
number of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies have, of late, been
74created under a variety of statutes. In each case, the authors 
argue that no useful purpose would be served by submitting the dis­
putes therein to a Conciliation Board: this would lead to a dupli­
cation of efforts, but might not necessarily lead to settlement of 
the disputes.
Lastly, the authors cite six categories ^  of disputes which they 
argue, should be excluded from the jurisdiction of conciliation tri­
bunals under the heading of "Inappropriate Parties and Subjects". In 
support of this contention they submit a variety of reasons why Con­
ciliation is inappropriate for them. As for their first category, 
persons under legal disability, the author's argue that the State 
has an interest in these matters and that therefore they should be 
subjected to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. As for their 
second category, Admiralty matters, the magnitude of the claims and 
the complexity of the disputes should predicate the unsuitability of 
such issues to go before a Conciliation Board. As for their third cate­
gory, election petitions, the socio-political nature of the dispute,
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together with its emotional underpinnings, render it totally unsuit­
able for a Conciliation Board hearing. Further, they argue, the 
power to unseat an elected member of Parliament is given to a special 
court called the Election Court, presided over by a Judge with a par­
ticular jurisdiction, derived from The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) 
Order in Council of 1946 and its later amendments. With reference 
to their fourth category for exclusion, namely those disputes in which 
the Government becomes a party, the authors argue that the Boards 
may as a rule be biased in favour, of the citizen who may well be their 
neighbour, as against a remote government agency. They also mention 
the cost in terms of money, for the taxpayer, that may be spent in 
sending government officers to represent the agency at the hearing. 
Fifthly, in a dispute involving the clergy, the authors argue that 
it:
" tends to place the conciliation process
on its head: rather than common men appear­
ing before a body of prestigious community 
leaders, one has clergymen appearing before 
a group of lower social standing which as­
sumes a posture of deference to the clergy.
This is not an atmosphere conducive to con­
ciliation.” 77
And lastly, the authors suggest, the enforcement of foreign or municipal 
judgments should be kept out of the jurisdiction of conciliation boards. 
For, these entail matters which have already been settled and therefore 
are ripe not for a process of conciliation but for a process of enforce­
ment.
These views of Goonesekera and Metzger have been restated here, 
because they present the only extensive analysis of the jurisdictional 
question regarding Conciliation Boards. Indeed, they were the only 
writers who responded to the need to publish on the Conciliation Boards 
of Sri Lanka
Before leaving this area of case-types excluded from the Conci­
liation Boards, it is necessary to submit one or two comments on the 
views of the aforementioned authors. While agreeing that some of 
the disputes they have mentioned are clearly unsuitable to go before 
Conciliation Boards, there are some within the categories they have 
listed which are suitable for conciliation rather than adjudication.
The goal of conciliation is the achievement of social harmony.
78The special State interest case-types which the authors mention,
Where supervisory jurisdiction, rather than conciliation, is recommended
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by them, are in a sense disputes, where the interest in the preser­
vation of social harmony and the special State interests involved in
79such disputes become co-terminous. Disputes falling under Matri­
monial proceedings, custody of a minor, adoption proceedings, actions 
in lunacy, actions in regard to guardians, curators (not receivers) 
and even to an extent some of the testamentary disputes, are inti­
mately concerned with the social paradigms of a group. They are, there­
fore, most suited for conciliation by a group of elders or by a group 
of respected citizens drawn from within that society. The disputants 
do have the right to resort to a court of law if the settlement worked 
out is not to their liking. This ultimate recourse, which is always 
made available to the parties, is an important consideration which 
should allay some of the fears expressed by the authors. This is 
particularly relevant when considering the question of bias.
Concerning 'actions to which the State, State enterprises, another
governmental body, or its authorized agent is a party', the authors
argue that because the panel members of a Conciliation Board may be
biased against the "remote government agency which people believe should
be their servant and a local villager who has suffered injury, the
pressure brought to bear by the conciliators to effect a settlement
80can be expected heavily to favour their neighbour." Depending on 
the popularity of the government agency or even the particular political 
party in power, it is possible that the panels may take a view in 
favour of the citizen. But the critical issue is that the citizens have 
in such cases grasped an opportunity to judge their government. Some 
of the views expressed by the panels would serve as a useful indi­
cator for the government as to the way in which public opinion may 
appear to move. Critical views of a particular policy aspect could 
be valuable indicators for the local elected officers to utilise in 
debates both in local legislative bodies and in Parliament. This kind 
of feedback would be cut off the moment the Conciliation Boards were 
robbed of their jurisdiction to hear disputes between the citizen and 
the government. To this extent, it must surely be in the interest of 
the political party in power to utilise the Conciliation Boards to their 
fullest so as to facilitate the submission of government policy to criti­
cal appraisal by the people.
Subject to the foregoing comments, it is correct to say that 
some case-types must clearly be excluded from the jurisdiction of the
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Conciliation Boards.
88
IV The Settlement of Debts Law
By 1975 the Government was anxious to extend the facili­
ties of the system of Conciliation Boards to the area of settle-
81
ment of debts. By a statute enacted in that year all credi­
tors who were not banking corporations or companies were required
to apply to the Conciliation Boards of their respective areas
82for the settlement of any debts except those exceeding 5000
rupees. The Conciliation Board which settles the dispute was re- 
83quired to consider a number of circumstances in arriving at
84the settlement: the original debt, . the period during which
85the debtor had fallen into arrear, the reasonableness of the
86rate of interest charged, the amount of money that had al-
87ready been paid by way of interest or other charges and the
capacity of the debtor to pay the amount presently due from him.
The latter could include any change of circumstances and other
personal matters. The Conciliation Board was further required to
89consider the financial position of the creditor and the ex­
tent to which a delay in completing the payments might affect him. 
The Statute left a large measure of discretion to the Board, by
requiring it to consider such other matters as the Board might 
90think desirable. The settlement arrived at was incorporated
91in the certificate which the Board must issue; where the debtor
fails to carry out the arrangement settled for the repayment of
the debt, the creditor was required to do no more than to apply
92
to a Court for the execution of that agreement. The Law re­
quired such a court to order an execution without a further hear­
ing. The certificate handed down by the Board was considered "as
a decree", the execution of which formed the basis for the order 
93of the Court. The submission of debt claims within open-ended 
94guidelines to Conciliation Boards, had to a large measure re­
moved an important area of personalised disputes from the adjudi­
catory processes of the Courts. By doing so, the legislature had 
recognised the importance of taking into account matters which may 
not be strictly legal and may well be social. Aside from habi­
tual drunkenness and such other self-imposed disabilities, economic 
calamities arising out of droughts, floods and pestilance coupled 
with retrenchment and loss or lack of employment, could all be
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relevant factors in the settlement process. Moreover, since the 
process was conducted within the debtor’s locality, the Board might 
be conscious of a number of local factors which could be relevant 
to the repayment of the debt. The submission to conciliation, 
therefore, could produce a very different result from that which 
the creditor might have obtained by way of adjudication.
V. The Overall Place of Conciliation within the Legal System
It is important at the outset to conceive the Sri Lankan legal 
system within the broad framework of Western Jurisprudence. The in­
stitutions of the law, the substantive rules of law, the procedures 
providing the access to law, the techniques of deduction, the an­
alysis of the principles of law, and the modalities for dispute 
settlement through legal instrumentalities, have all been spun from 
within a western legal tradition. The English legal system and 
the Roman Dutch Law have, to varying degrees, provided the basic 
materials for the Sri Lankan legal system. Despite the fact that 
these elements have come from two different sources, it is abund­
antly clear that the skills of British colonial legal creativity 
have blended these disparate strands into a single common prin­
ciple to anchor the colonial legal system of Ceylon to the bed­
rock of colonial legal institutions which were handed down to in­
dependent Ceylon in 1948. It is this institutional edifice that 
the Bandaranaike Government confronted when it enacted the Con­
ciliation Boards Act of 1958.
The overall position of the Conciliation Boards in the legal 
system may be assessed at two levels. First, the procedural level. 
This is covered by Section 14 of the Act to which reference has al­
ready been made. The substance of the section suggests the creation 
of an institutional by-pass by which access to the courts is made 
conditional upon a prior submission for conciliation. The es­
tablished nature of the legal institutions which Ceylon and Sri 
Lanka had inherited from the colonial administration made it dif­
ficult for the Government, at this late stage, to introduce funda­
mental changes into the existing colonial legal structures. Con­
ciliation methods for settling disputes, it was found, could not 
be accomodated that easily within a system geared towards main­
taining an adjudicatory process. Consequently, as a kind of a via
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media between the complete elimination of the colonial institutions 
and the integration of the conciliation process into those institu­
tions, Section 14 of the Act succeeded in creating an institutional 
by-pass. At the time the Boards were created, the Government hoped 
that the force of this change in the direction hitherto taken in 
settlement of disputes on the Island, would carry to fruition a 
fundamental change in the attitudes of the citizens towards the 
whole process of dispute settlement. It is to this that ‘we will 
turn next.
The second level of our assessment is the substantive level.
Here the analysis shows that the decision to do away with strict
95rules of evidence and the lawyers* right of audience have been 
dictated by a desire to introduce popular participation into the 
process'of settling disputes. The elimination of legal technicali­
ties has to a large measure paved the way for popular represent­
ation at the panel level. Thus in a village, ^  35 miles from the 
capital city of Colombo in the North Western coast of the Island 
was a Conciliation Board which was studied in the course of this 
research. The Chairman of the Board was the Headmaster of a local 
central school. He was a graduate in the Sinhala medium and was 
related to the village community by marriage. He was also an active 
member of the local branch of the political party then in power.
The rest of the Board was composed of the following four members. 
First, there was a person of no more than third grade education 
in the vernacular. By profession he was a coconut husker. His 
earning power was geared to what he could acquire by his own labours. 
He did not own land in the village except his own dwelling. He 
had no accumulated capital to rely upon. Second, there was an 
individual who had a basic vernacular education. By profession 
he was a coconut toddy tapper. Third, there was a village farmer 
with no significant vernacular education. The fourth too was a 
farmer, again with little or no education. Each of these members 
possessed common characteristics. They were neither wealthy nor 
had powerful political or economic connections. They were each 
respected members of the community. They had no criminal records. 
They were regarded as honest and incorruptible. They were the 
very epitome of the common man. Their participation as members 
of the Board was made possible by the removal of some of the
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technical rules of procedure, of evidence and of law. The object of 
the conciliation procedure was not to produce an outcome desired by 
law but rather to reconcile the dispute to the satisfaction of the 
disputants. The tools for conciliation were not rules of law but the 
standing of the Board in the eyes of the community. Conciliation 
pressed into service not the rules of the law, but compromise and 
persuasion. The institutional framework within which the Boards 
functioned was very different from what the nation had inherited 
from the colonial era. To that extent it may be said that the 
creation of Conciliation Boards constituted an institutional by­
pass to the Sri Lankan legal system. The fall of the Bandaranaike 
Government on the 21st July, 1977 brought the system of concili­
ation to a halt by removing members of all Conciliation Boards 
without appointing their successors. Thus the whole process of 
Conciliation was made defunct.
VI. The Effectiveness of Conciliation as a Process
(a) Comparison with adjudication
Although conciliation and adjudication have similar goals in 
view, namely the settlement of disputes, yet the routes chartered 
for the two processes remain fundamentally different and distinct.
The adjudicatory process is usually locked into a concretized hier­
archical court structure. The belief is clear that the adjudicatory 
process could, lead to inconsistencies and errors and, therefore, a 
system of appeals for their correction and clarification is thought 
to be a necessary element that should be built into that system.
In the common law tradition, particularly among the nations that 
once were British dependencies, there are at least two, and some­
times three levels of appeal: firstly, to the Divisional Court or
the Supreme Court of Judicature. The latter constitutes a single 
bench hearing while the former may constitute a hearing before a 
two member bench or a three member bench. The second level of 
appeal is to a Court of Appeal, consisting of a three or five 
member bench and the final appeal is usually to the House of Lords 
or to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. In 
some instances the final hearing may be held in a court within the
country in question. It is only in a very few instances that ap-
97peals now lie to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
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Conciliation logically excludes the need for an appellate pro­
cedure. For, once the parties have voluntarily decided upon a course 
of action as a settlement of their dispute, it is wrong in principle 
to re-open the door leading to further disputation. Therefore, one 
of the classical differences between adjudication and conciliation
is the need to establish an appeals procedure for the former while
recognising the need-to prevent appeals against the decision ar­
rived at through conciliation in the latter.
The adjudicatory procedure must be viewed as a narrow con­
struct. It utilises rules which may be traced to the sources which
the system recognises as those capable of generating valid law. 
Legislation, judicial decisions subject to the doctrine of stare 
decisis and custom would, for the common law tradition, be regarded 
as legal sources, in contrast, the conciliation process would 
recognise a broader vista of operation, taking into consideration 
the totality of elements which characterize a given society. These 
may include the norms for social organization, the criteria for 
economic decision making, the criteria for determining a value 
system within a society, and a whole catalogue of such socio­
economic, cultural and political factors. It is important to grasp 
this flexibility upon which the conciliation process rests. The 
adjudicatory process rests upon the belief that legal norms must 
apply uniformly to all within a given legal category. In criminal 
law, the differences pertaining to the circumstances of the offence 
are noticed by means of mitigation with reference to sentencing.
The adjudicatory process does not take personal differences, dif­
ferences in status and such other non-legal elements into consider­
ation, while the•conciliatory process does take into consideration 
all manner of facts which are relevant to the dispute. It is this 
that renders technical rules of evidence inappropriate to the con­
ciliatory process.
The adjudicatory process relies upon the availability of an 
identifiable and consistent source for the creation of law. This 
reliance is a result of the need to use flaw* as the criteria for 
dispute settlement. The conciliation process as a matter of principle 
avoids the utilisation of norms. The essential element of this 
process is to utilise facts, circumstances, social consequences, 
economic pointers, political advantages, community interests and
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a host of such factors which do not strictly fall within the peri­
meter of law, as instruments for dispute settlement.
The adjudicatory process disassociates the organs which create 
the law from the organs which apply the law. In a relative sense, 
the adjudicatory process espouses a doctrine of separation of powers. 
This is both a necessary and a crucial part of the adjudicatory pro­
cess. The idea is alive that those who make the laws are not their 
best judges. Carved out of Montesquieu's doctrine of separation 
of powers is the fundamental rule that the law-making organ must
not supply to those who judge those laws anything other than the 
98law itself. Where Conciliation Boards constitute the primary
organs for settlement of disputes, the association of the fori for
formulating normative orders and guidelines with the fori which
settles disputes has been regarded as a necessary element in the
99 nconciliation process. The Conciliation Boards in Zanzibar,
Cuba and The People's Republic of China are classical
examples. The success of their conciliation process is linked
to the fact that the persons who are involved in the law-creating
process are the same persons who are called upon to participate
102in the process of settling disputes. Under the banner of
'popular participation in the dispensation of popular justice*, 
the aforementioned countries encourage the fusion of the norm 
creating organs with the organs responsible for the settlement 
of disputes. The argument is often made that such a system could 
support internal consistency in settling disputes rather than 
cause the dissensions associated with an adjudicatory process 
conducted within a framework of separation of powers.
The adjudicatory process rests largely on the efficacy of 
the legal profession. The need to unravel the law, the need to 
argue its logical consistency, the need to identify the facts and 
the need to relate the law to the facts are all considered as 
pointing towards the need to perpetuate a strong legal profession.
The fact that norms do not form the basis for the conciliation 
process, by implication, calls for the total elimination of the 
role played by the legal profession.
This leads to the total absence of specialized techniques 
of thought and particular types of analyses and arguments which 
do not consider the common social and political trends pre­
vailing during the proceedings before a Conciliation Board.
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It needs no particular mention that the foregoing could have frus­
trated the workings of the Conciliation Boards in the absence of 
legal expertise among the members of such Boards.
The dispute resolution process within an adjudicatory frame­
work is often shrouded in mystery and is grossly ritualistic. This 
is intended to provide the 'psychological punch' to those who are 
called upon to observe the law. Within the adjudicatory process 
the complex of fear is preponderant. The conciliation process 
functions best within an atmosphere of informality. The absence 
of ritual and mystique is characteristic of the informality which 
pervades the whole process of conciliation. This encourages a free 
dialogue among the disputants and the members of the Conciliation 
Board. The two processes differ fundamentally in two further as­
pects. In the area of remedies, the adjudicatory system is geared 
towards the ordering of human conduct —  towards compensation, right- 
recognition or punishment. In contrast the conciliatory process 
arrives at a settlement. The settlement may embody all the ele­
ments that may be contained in a judgment reached as an end-product 
of the adjudicatory process. But these would appear in a different 
guise; namely, as a result of a compromise mutually agreed upon, 
and having the sanctity of an agreement freely arrived at between 
the parties, not as a result of an exercise of a legal right by 
one over another, but as a result of a voluntary assumption of 
rights in the belief that such is beneficial for their common well­
being. If the settlement arrived at and agreed upon before the 
Conciliation Board is repudiated within the 30 days allowed for 
that purpose, the slate is wiped clean, and the parties may there­
after proceed to litigation before a Court of Law. The proceedings 
before that Court, is a hearing de novo and not to be considered 
as any kind of appeal from the Conciliation Board. Therefore, 
the decision to accept the settlement and thereafter to remain 
bound by it must ultimately rest on the free choice of the dis­
putants. In no way does the coercive arm of the executive intrude 
into the process of conciliation before the Boards.
Lastly, it must be emphasised that while in the adjudicatory 
process there is a party who succeeds and a party who loses, in 
the conciliation process there is neither a victor nor a vanquished.
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Parties are required to give a little and take a little. The result­
ing agreement is a voluntary conclusion that the disputants have 
reached with the advice and persuasion of the Board. The concili­
ation process has its sights set on achieving greater social co­
hesion and stability. Its goals are to produce a compromise solu­
tion rather than a condemnation of one in the favour of the other.
The foregoing catalogue of differences is meant to support the 
view that has been previously espoused. Namely, that the two sys­
tems are different and distinct in a fundamental way.
VI (b) Description of the manner in which the process is employed
One of the key questions about which clarification appears to 
be wanting is this. Who under the Conciliation Boards Act has the 
power to initiate the conciliation process? Section 6 of the Act 
is the only available guide in this matter. The preamble to that 
section indicates that upon application made to the Chairman of 
the panel of conciliators, he may thereafter refer the matter in 
dispute to the Conciliation Board for inquiry. The section is un­
clear as to whether the application should come from one of the 
disputants or from some other interested party or from the police 
in criminal matters. There have been no regulations promulgated 
under section 17 of the Act clarifying this problem. However, the 
tendency among the Chairmen and the panels, according to Goonesekera 
and Metzger, is to admit complaints made by anyone who has an in­
terest in the matter, which necessarily includes the police in 
criminal cases. Once the complaint is made, or the claim is com­
municated, the Chairman, under section 8 of the Act, summons the 
parties to appear at a hearing on an appointed date. A refusal 
to appear or a failure to appear, upon being summoned, will, under 
section 8(4)(b), constitute an offence. The party in default will, 
at that point, become liable to a summary trial before a Magis­
trate and, upon conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred 
rupees.
When the parties appear before the Board in response to the 
summons, the conciliation process commences. This process involves 
both the hearing of oral testimony and the admission of documentary 
evidence. The parties may call witnesses in support of their claims 
and these witnesses may be questioned either by the members of the
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panel or by the parties to the dispute, with a view to eliciting the
true facts pertaining to the dispute. By section 11 of the Act:
"Every person who gives evidence before 
a Conciliation Board shall,- in respect 
of such evidence, be entitled to all 
the privileges to which a witness giving 
evidence before a court of law is en­
titled in respect of evidence given by 
him before such court."
By section 16, the proceedings before the Conciliation Board have 
been characterized as judicial proceedings.' This, by implication, 
makes the evidence given before the Board judicial evidence and 
therefore subject to the law relating to perjury. The witnesses 
are subject to a judicial oath, which is administered by the Chair­
man of the panel.
The proceedings before the Board take the form at times of a 
dialogue. The members of the Board may sometimes engage themselves 
in an admonition, in a friendly persuasion, in an explanation, or 
in tendering advice to the disputants.
To quote an example from a Conciliation Board, from the North 
103Western Province: there was before that Board a dispute concern­
ing a right of way.
Lots A.B.C.D.E and F were owned and occupied by members of the 
same family. The owner-occupant of lot B for decades had a right 
of access to the main road and the store across A's land, A's 
children, having secured government employment, moved to the capital 
city of Colombo. They subsequently sold lot A for the highest offer.
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That offer was made by an outsider. (Neither B, nor the other neigh­
bours to lot A were able to find the necessary money to match the 
outsider’s offer.) The outsider Z went into occupation of lot A. While
preparing to build on lot A, he, Z, set up a gate at the point at which
B had, for decades, crossed on to lot A to gain access to the main 
road. B became apprehensive and sought a declaration of an ease­
ment over Z’s land, namely lot A. The Conciliation Board engaged in 
the following dialogue:
Chairman: (addressing B)
For this long you have not taken steps to regularise
this claim. What makes you bring this up now?
IS: Now we have an outsider owning and controlling our
ancestral property. He has no reason to consider 
my right.
Chairman: But he has not prevented you from walking across that
land. He has in fact erected a gate and has made ac­
cess easy. Formerly you had to jump over two strands 
of barbed wire. Now there is a gate.
IS: Yes, but who has the key to the padlock. He could
shut me out any time.
Chairman: (addressing Z)
Why did you put a gate there?
Z : Cattle have been jumping over the barbed wire bent
and tied together previously to facilitate ingress 
and egress to my land. I plan to build a house and 
farm. I need to keep the cattle out. So there is a gate 
which IS should close each time he opens it. There is 
also a gate, now, at the entrance to the main road. 
Chairman: Do you envisage any situation in which you intend to
keep IS out?
Z i Surely it must be clear to B that I am an outsider in
this village. I have no kith and kin here. If I were 
to survive in this village I have to do everything in 
my power to be a good neighbour to B and his other 
relatives. It is I who has to travel that extra 
distance (extra mile) to keep within the friendship 
of the village. So do you think I am such a fool (so 
insensitive) as to act against my own interests?
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That set the tone for the conciliation process. The panel convinced 
B that it was in Zfs interest to keep the access to the main road 
open for him. B accepted that position and the parties departed with­
out having had to enter into a binding agreement. It may be pointed 
out that B, in my view, could not have claimed, on the available 
evidence, an easement in his favour before a court of law. Had 
there been no conciliation process available to them, B would have 
unsuccessfully litigated the matter before the civil courts. The 
result would inevitably have been to create an almost permanent state 
of enmity in the relationship between B and Z. The right of way 
could, for all practical purposes, have been lost by such an attempt 
to assert it.
It must be said that the Conciliation Boards do not always 
extract binding agreements from the parties. In many cases the
104parties agree to a particular course of action and in most cases 
these have been faithfully followed.
VI(c) The Extent to which disputes before Conciliation Boards are 
eventually taken before the Courts.
Unlike the method of conciliation through arbitration adopted 
in the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka does not recognise the right of 
appeal from Conciliation Boards to Courts ordinarily constituted.
In the jurisprudence of Sri Lanka, the Conciliation Boards occupy 
a distinct and separate system for dispute settlement, resting on 
principles which are peculiar to them. To that extent, a dispute 
before a Conciliation Board constitutes a very different thing to 
that before a Court ordinarily constituted. The latter while being 
an adjudicatory process where the voluntary consent of the parties 
to the processes leading to the settlement becomes irrelevant and 
inconsequential, the volens and the acquiescence of the parties to 
the dispute to go before the Board was considered as the corner 
stones for conciliation. The results obtained by the Board to a 
very large measure depended on the willingness of the parties to 
settle their disputes irrespective of their legal rights. The 
recognition of these basic differences led the Minister of Justice, 
in 1958, to separate the two systems.
The Act recognises the right to bring a dispute which had been 
heard by a Conciliation Board before the ordinary courts in two
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situations. First, where the parties have failed to reach an agreed
settlement before the Conciliation Board. And second, where, a
settlement having been agreed upon, at least one of the parties to
the dispute had subsequently exercised the power recognised under
106Section 13 of the Act, to repudiate it. In either event the
matter could go before the ordinary courts. It must be emphasised 
that where the parties have agreed to a settlement and have not ex­
ercised the power given to them under Section 13 of the Act to re­
pudiate that settlement, within the statutory period of thirty days, 
the matter cannot thereafter be raised before the ordinary Courts.
Here again a difference may be detected. Where a judgment has been 
handed down by the ordinary Courts an appeal against that judgment 
is a right recognised generally by all countries. But in concili­
ation, where acquiescence and volens play a predominant role, re­
vocation within 30 days of a settlement once agreed upon, leads 
not to an appeal process, but to a first hearing within a new process 
of dispute settlement, namely Adjudication.
Once the proposition is made that the jurisdiction of ordinary 
courts is limited to matters in which no settlement has been ob­
tained by conciliation, then it becomes axiomatic that the hearing 
before the ordinary courts is not an appeal from a judgment but a 
hearing de novo. For there is nothing from which an appeal could 
be launched. The matter comes up for hearing as a new matter, 
which thereafter leads to a judgment, binding upon the parties, 
not as a consequence of an agreement but as a result of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in accordance with the 
Law. This, therefore, should explain that in the way the Conci­
liation Boards are set up and in the way their functions are des- 
108cribed, their hearings do not in any event give rise to an 
appeal to the ordinary Courts. They merely constitute the terminal 
point of a particular process for the settlement of disputes in 
Sri Lanka, namely, the extra-judicial process, which forms an alternative 
to the Courts as a means of dispute-settlement.
VII.Attitude towards the use of Conciliation 
(a) The Advocates
The exclusion of legal representation from Conciliation Boards, 
coupled with the need to proceed to conciliation as a condition pre-
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cedent to commencing legal proceedings before ordinary Courts, was 
viewed by the legal profession more as an attack on their economic 
interests than as a challenge to their profession. The threat to 
their economic interests was felt mostly by the rural members of 
the legal profession. It was right that their opposition to the 
Conciliation Boards Act was the most vociferous, for the Boards 
were constituted soon after the passage of the Act, in the rural 
rather than in the urban areas. Certain towns like Colombo, Galle, 
Kandy and Jaffna have never had Conciliation Boards. This apparently 
was a result of a policy decision in which the Governments of the 
day had decided not to appoint any members to a Conciliation Board 
in these municipalities. Despite this decision all four municipali­
ties were given Rent Control Boards which were partly Conciliation 
Boards and partly quasi-judicial tribunals. The urbanity and 
sophistication of the society in these municipalities may have 
made the Conciliation Boards a necessary evil that had to be en­
dured before the parties could go into a Court of Law. The Society 
may not have received the Conciliation Boards with the kind of res­
pect and faith with which they were received by the rural society 
in the rest of the Island. That may well have been a consideration . 
that may have influenced the Administrations at the time.
The legal profession criticised the Boards for several reasons.^ 
The legal profession sought from the Government the judicialisation 
of conciliation proceedings so that, in their view, the proceedings 
would be more systematic and less arbitrary. They asked for the 
appointment of lawyers as chairmen, a reduction of the Boards’ 
ambit of jurisdiction and the strict application of the Evidence 
Ordinance. The profession further sought the exclusion of Section 
14 so that the effect of the rule in Nonahamy v. Halgrat Silva 
could be avoided. (It may be recalled that under the Nonahamy rule, 
conciliation in matters mentioned under Section 6 of the Act is a 
condition precedent to instituting proceedings before the ordinary 
Courts, both in civil and criminal matters. The legal profession 
desired the removal of this condition.) Finally, the profession 
asked for the right to be given to their members to appear and 
represent parties before Conciliation Boards, as legal represent­
atives of the disputants. It seems to be clear that insofar as the
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foregoing comments are concerned the lawyers were in fact seeking to 
have their position before the Conciliation Boards established so 
that, in purely economic terms, there would be open to them an ad­
ditional judicial forum before which they could appear for a fee.
The Government was clearly opposed to providing an additional forum 
to serve the economic well-being of the legal profession. The govern­
ment considered comments from the legal profession about Conciliation 
Boards with scepticism. Goonesekera and Metzger have said:
"Lawyers* distrust of the Conciliation Boards 
scheme has taken concrete form in some local 
law societies by gentlemen's agreements that 
lack of a section 14 certificate will not be 
pleaded as a defence in certain types of cases.
Judges have been aware of such practices, but 
have allowed such collusion to take place in 
their courts."
Aside from the foregoing catalogue of defects raised by the
112legal profession, Goonesekera & Metzger suggest a number of 
other reasons why the legal profession should be particularly cri­
tical of the conciliation process. "The unavailability of extra­
ordinary reliefs like injunction or arrest and sequestration before 
judgment —  without first going before a Conciliation Board has been
viewed as a source of delay which negates the very purpose of these 
113remedies." Before Conciliation Boards, the rules of law had.
no relevance. The Board is merely charged with the duty to work 
towards an agreed settlement. Therefore, the settlement, once in esse, 
could compensate for the loss sustained by delay or for the un­
availability of the aforementioned extra-ordinary reliefs. How­
ever, where an agreement cannot be obtained and the parties do 
decide to seek the aid of the Courts, then the loss by delays 
caused or by the unavailability of the extra-ordinary reliefs 
could become substantial because such reliefs may by that time 
have become useless. In such cases, the parties may have to seek
other methods of relief such as a resort to damages.
114The authors have raised another danger in the conciliation
process. They say:
"Concern has also been expressed that 
settlements are entered which bear no 
relation to the parties' legal rights.
The concern is that the parties are nego­
tiating a settlement in an environment 
much different from the one which would
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prevail if they were aware of their rights 
and of the probable view of their case which 
would be taken by a Court of Law. It is also 
felt that the protective provisions of certain 
social welfare legislation are being negated 
by settlements entered in ignorance of their 
existence."
This again is an obvious comment. But it must be remembered that 
when a person goes to conciliation, he does so not with the idea of 
scoring a right or an advantage over his adversary but intending to 
arrive at a settlement which is in consonance with social harmony. 
The aim must be to settle the dispute while at the same time main­
taining a harmonious relationship among the disputants. If the 
latter is not the goal, then the disputants could determine their 
legal rights by refusing to accept the settlement. Or they could, 
even after accepting a settlement, consult lawyers as to whether 
their rights according to the law could be any better, and then 
decide to invoke Section 13 to repudiate their agreement. That 
would necessarily pave the way to litigation before the ordinary 
Courts. Therefore, the comment made by the authors fails to take 
into consideration the goals set by the political party in Govern­
ment which piloted the Conciliation Board's Bill through Parliament 
into Law.
The authors make a further point that the Boards often 
exert a degree of psychological pressure which helps towards ar­
riving at a settlement. They say:
"The coercion is in the accumulated social 
standing and authority of the conciliator, 
which to a simple villager may seem quite 
formidable. Even if parties and concili­
ators sit round a table and the atmosphere 
is informal, there is a physical and psycho­
logical distance separating them. Conci­
liators in the bona fide belief that any 
settlement is better than allowing parties 
to go to Court recurringly use the same 
arguments on parties —  chiefly the just­
ness of the proposed settlement, the folly 
of going to Court and wasting both time 
and money, and the need to act decently.
In this atmosphere it may be difficult 
for the parties to reject a proposed set­
tlement."
Again, the authors ignore the fact that the party who has been 
psychologically coerced into accepting the settlement would be the 
first to seek legal advice and proceed to repudiate the settlement 
under Section 13. Therefore, the fact of acceptance under psycho-
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logical coercion, ought not to affect the justice of the agreement. 
For there is always a way out for those who feel that the settle­
ment is not in their best interest.
Thus although members of the legal profession reacted adversely 
to the Conciliation Boards, their opposition was largely based on 
their own economic interests rather than the substantial issues 
characteristic of the conciliation process. Many of the larger 
issues mentioned here may be viewed within the broader context of 
the principles underpinning conciliation, such as social cohesion. 
Viewed in that light, the criticisms made by the authors, Goonesekera 
& Metzger, lose their initial validity. The availability of the 
power to repudiate a settlement within 30 days is crucial to the 
justice of the whole conciliation process. The authors have 
failed to emphasise that fact in their paper.
But according to the statistics which the two authors have 
quoted from data made available to them by the Minister of 
Justice, the percentage of disputes settled by the Conciliation 
Boards on the Island was as high as an average of 58%, over a 
period of five years between 1964-1969. According to the statistics: 
In 1964-65 the settlement rate was as high as 82%. In 1965-66 the 
settlement rate was 78%. In 1966-67 the settlement rate was 43%.
In 1967-68 the settlement rate was 37% and lastly in 1968-69 the 
rate went up to 47%. This gives an average settlement rate of 
58% over the five year period. A comment that could be made is 
that during the period between 1965-69 the Island was governed by 
the United National Party, which had opposed the Conciliation 
Boards Bill from the opposition. It is also important to mention 
that during their tenure of office they showed little interest in 
appointing members to Boards which had suffered vacancies - either 
through death or expiry of their mandates. According to the figures 
available at least four districts - Moneragala, Mannar, Jaffna and 
Amparai - had no panels functioning during this lean period.
VII(b)The Judges
117During the course of his judgment in the Nonahamy Case,
the then Chief Justice wrote:
"The function of the Board is beneficial 
and quite unobjectionable, because it is
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a function which is often performed by 
mutual friends or disputants or, by ad­
ministrative officials. If the Boards 
effort at making peace fails, and, if 
recourse to the judicial power is not 
avoidable, it is the Courts alone that 
can exercise the power. I am therefore 
unable to agree that insistence upon a 
production of the certificate referred 
to in s.14 of the Act in any way consti­
tutes an erosion of the jurisdiction of 
the Courts. There is no ousting or 
erosion of judicial power, unless such a 
power is taken away from the Courts and 
conferred on some other authority."
The judges have consistently taken the view that the Concili­
ation Boards have not threatened their jurisdiction and that "the pro 
vision does not bear -—  any semblance of a control of the Judiciary; 
if control is at all involved, it is only a somewhat loose control of
the litigant's right to institute an action, by (at the worst) delay-
119ing the institution." Although this has been the clear line of
approach, some members of the judiciary have taken a less open view 
of their opposition to the Conciliation Boards.
120In Wi ckramarat chi v. The Inspector of Police Alles J., took 
the view that the requirement to seek conciliation was not a pre­
requisite to instituting legal proceedings but was an optional pro­
cedure open to the disputants. The Court in Nonahamy disagreed with
121 122 that view. In the Nonahamy case, Alles J. in his dissent­
ing judgment made the point that:
"It has not been established since the 
decision of the Privy Council in The 
Queen v. Liyanage 1^3 that the judicial 
power of the state has been unaffected 
by the Constitution and rests on the 
provisions of law under which the Court's 
function (the Charter of Justice of 1833 
and other laws including the Court's 
Ordinance). Therefore, if the Legis­
lature required the subject to obtain 
a certificate from an officer appointed 
by the Executive it would appear that 
it authorised a procedure which did not 
secure to the judiciary, in the words 
of Lord Pearce, "a freedom from political, 
legislative and executive control". To 
this extent, therefore, a law which re­
quires recourse to a Conciliation Board 
before an application is made under 
Sections 86 or 87 is one which is 
likely to affect the jurisdiction of 
the District Court in preventing the
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subject from obtaining an effective remedy, 
for the practical effect of such a course 
would be to make the law laid down in sec­
tions 86 and 87 almost a dead letter. Such 
a deprivation would be tantamount to an in­
terference with judicial power. When the 
relief available under Sections 86 and 87 
is circumscribed in this manner, being de­
pendent on a certificate issued by the 
Chairman of a Board of Conciliators, there 
is, in my view, an ouster of the juris­
diction of the District Court and a con­
ference of such power however limited it 
may be, on a Conciliation Board (where a 
proceeding is deemed to be a judicial pro­
ceeding) in the sense that the subject is 
denied an effective remedy."
It is this reasoning of Alles J which the learned Chief Justice 
and Wijayatilake J. rejected in the Nonahamy Case. Despite the un­
equivocal statement of the law by the majority in subsequent de­
cisions, the Sri Lanka judiciary had made some successful inroads
into the rule requiring a submission to conciliation before resort-
126ing to adjudication. In several decisions after The Nonahamy 
Case, the Sri Lanka Courts have held that a failure to raise the 
issue of non-submission to conciliation at the commencement of the
judicial hearing would bind the parties to the resulting judgment.
127In Kurera v. Fernando, the defendant petitioner sought to have
a consent decree directing him to pay Rupees 7000 set aside on the
grounds that the action and the proceedings were null and void.
The reason being that the parties had not been to conciliation be­
fore proceeding to litigate. The Divisional Court held that it was
too late to raise the issue of failure to go before the Conciliation
128Board. In Fernando v. Fernando, the defendant raised the issue 
regarding non-submission to conciliation at a point after the com­
mencement of the hearing. The Divisional Court held that that was 
too late a stage to make such an application. The Courts have
taken the view that the issue is one of jurisdiction. In Kurera 
129v. Fernando, Samarawickrame J. wrote:
"It will be seen that the objection that 
the Court lacked jurisdiction was taken 
and the want of jurisdiction was apparent
at a very early stage. Where want of juris­
diction appears from the pleadings or on
the face of the proceedings there is a
-410-
patent want of jurisdiction and it is the 
duty of the Court to stay its hand. In 
such cases the objection to jurisdiction 
may be taken at any stage. The position 
appears to be different where the want of 
jurisdiction depends on the existence of 
facts which are not brought to the notice 
of Court. If a defendant fails to plead 
or prove such facts upon which the want 
of jurisdiction depends and permits the 
Courts to proceed to hear the action then 
he may be precluded by his conduct from 
seeking to rely on those facts at a later 
stage." 130
This line of reasoning helped the legal profession, though unwitting­
ly to generate their own responses for the diminution of the total 
effect of Conciliation Boards. The legal^profession, particularly 
in the rural areas, proceeded to propagate the idea that gentlemen's 
agreements between opposing counsel not to raise the issue of non­
submission to Conciliation should, as a matter of expediency, permit 
of the Conciliation process to be by-passed and directly to liti­
gation before the Courts. Provided that this gentlemen's agreement 
is kept, at least during the initial stages of the trial, the dis­
putants (or their counsels) may not at a later stage raise this
issue in order to defeat the effect of the resulting decree. The
judges are aware of these gentlemen's agreements and have taken the 
view that they would not allow this question to affect the remedy 
they may hand down.
131In Jayawickrema v. Nagasinghe, De Kretser J. wrote:
"I do not think that a plaintiff, if it is
found that he should in fact have filed a
Section 14 Certificate with his plaint, 
could complain of prejudice even legally 
when his effort to mislead the Court in­
to entertaining his plaint is found out.
The fact that a defendant who takes the 
objection late is perhaps resiling from 
what is called a "gentlemen's agreement" 
between plaintiff and defendant or more 
likely their respective lawyers, is no 
reason for penalising the defendant, when 
the plaintiff is as much to blame in what 
alone the court should resent, Viz the 
effort to mislead it into thinking that 
it has jurisdiction, for the Court acts
on the facts as pleaded before it and
1 32not as they actually exist."
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Looking at the policy behind the Conciliation Boards, the legis­
lature should have changed the procedural law of the Island to make 
it a positive requirement that a certificate from a chairman of a 
Conciliation Board should be a pre-requisite to the proper filing 
of a plaint, in order to commence a judicial proceeding. By tying 
their requirement to the law of procedure, rather than leaving it as 
a matter of jurisdiction, this large loop hole could have been con-
ventiently plugged. It is regrettable that neither Goonesekera and 
133Metzger nor the Ministry of Justice had considered this ap­
proach to remedy the situation. Goonesekera and Metzger had, how- 
134ever, detected this defect and its concomitant ill effects. 
Regrettably, they do not seem to have condemned the gentlemen's 
agreements which appear to subvert the purpose of the conciliation 
process - namely, to provide an effective alternative to litigation.
In the context of the legal tradition espoused by the Sri Lanka 
judiciary, the judges do not openly debate questions of government 
policy. Where government policy appears to be unacceptable, the 
path chosen by the judiciary is to test it against settled legal 
principles. In doing so, if the policy appears to be in harmony 
with such principles, the judges implement such policy within the 
total conceptual framework of the legal system. Where policy con­
flicts with settled legal principles, the judges stop short of con­
demning them by refusing to implement them, because they are not law. 
The requirement to submit to conciliation before proceeding to liti­
gation falls under the former category. It is known to English 
jurisprudence, which forms a large area of the jurisprudence of
Sri Lanka, that parties could contract to submit their dispute to
135arbitration before proceeding to law. It is equally known that
such issues are involved with questions of jurisdiction which re­
quire to be raised as preliminary issues at the commencement of any 
trial. Therefore, it is correct to say that, without more, the 
Nonahamy decision merely raises a question of jurisdiction and 
therefore a failure to raise that issue at the commencement of 
the trial makes it a lost issue. By implication, these matters 
did collectively defeat the very purpose of the Act.
VIII. The Future of Conciliation
(a) The Perceived Role for Conciliation Present and Future
The change of Government on July 23rd, 1977 makes it somewhat
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difficult to assess the future of the conciliation process for Sri 
Lanka. The Conciliation Boards Act remains on the statute books, 
but the whole process of conciliation could be thwarted by failure 
to appoint Board members. No sooner had the new Government assumed 
office, at the end of July 1977, the then Ministry of Justice issued 
an order, under the power vested in him by Section 3, sub-section 
(7) and Section 4, sub-section (3) of the Act, removing members and 
chairmen of all Conciliation Boards. That put the entire conci­
liation process into a state of suspended animation. Until such 
time as new members of the Board and new Chairmen are appointed, 
parties may proceed directly to litigation without first going to 
conciliation. An area without a panel of conciliators was regarded 
as an area in which there were no Conciliation Boards. This per­
mitted the disputants of that area to proceed directly to adjudi-
136cation. In Chandra de Silva v. Ambawatta the Divisional Court 
held that where only one of the disputants is within a Conciliation 
Board area and the other is not, there is no requirement to seek 
Conciliation before proceeding to courts. However, where both dis­
putants are within an area without Conciliation Boards then there 
is less reason to seek Conciliation before proceeding to courts.
The possibility that the conciliation process may be re-started 
is a remote one. The present Government, while in opposition, 
opposed the Conciliation Boards. Their argument was that the whole 
process of Conciliation through Conciliation Boards bred untold 
political corruption. The appointments of Board members under 
Section 3 of the Act and chairmen under Section 4 of the Act, it 
was said, were motivated by political considerations. Besides these 
arguments, the present Government while in the opposition continuously 
charged the previous regime with the violation of legal norms and the 
creation of para-legal or non-legal bodies to compete with the es­
tablished legal institutions of the Island. The Criminal Justice 
Commission was one of their targets. Soon after the new Government 
had taken office, it abolished the Criminal Justice Commission and 
released those who had been incarcerated under sentences imposed 
by that Commission. The trend, therefore, is clear that the 
present Government will not be a party to the re-establishment of 
para-legal or non-legal bodies to provide an institutional by­
pass to the courts ordinarily constituted. This appears to provide
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one of the basic political principles upon which the present admin­
istration is based. Therefore, the indications are clear that the 
future may not see Conciliation Boards in the shape and form in 
which they were previously constituted; as for the present, they 
appear to be in a state of abeyance.
VIII(b) A Review of the Societal Perspective on Conciliation as 
an Effective Legal Process.
It must be said at once that Conciliation processes for set­
tling disputes presents three types of models. Each model appears to 
cater for certain types of societal perspectives. Each of the models 
shares certain common characteristics but their differences are both 
distinct and fundamental.
The First Model:
Within this model one may find two parallel systems of conflict 
resolution. Firstly, there is a formal system of conflict res­
olution by an hierarchical court system. Secondly, operating side 
by side with this formal system, is to be found an informal system 
for conflict resolution. The two systems remain associated, with 
a built in appeal structure, whereby appeals originating from a de­
cision arising out of the informal system go to the formal system. 
Each system may formulate the nature and the form of the appeal 
procedure, but the link between the two systems remain formal. 
Examples of these could be found, particularly, in Cuba, the Soviet 
Union and in Mainland Tanzania. The Soviet and the Cuban Comrades 
Courts and the Tanzanian Peoples Courts are associated with their 
respective formal systems by an appeal procedure.
The Second Model:
The second model closely resembles the first model in that 
it has a formal hierarchical Court system functioning side by side 
with the informal system. But, unlike the first model, there is 
no inter-connecting association between the two systems which 
could make one supplementary or complementary to the other. The 
Conciliation Boards of Sri Lanka supply what is perhaps the only 
example of this model.
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The Third Model:
The third model resembles the other two models in a very small 
way, namely that it has an informal system for the settlement of 
disputes. It differs from the other models in that the principal 
means for settling disputes are all basically informal. Notwith­
standing the fact that it has several different fori for settling 
disputes, with an inbuilt appeal system, each fori espouses an in­
formal, conciliatory method for dispute settlement rather than a 
system which relies unduly on the correct application of rules and
established procedures. Perhaps the only available example of this
137model is the Peoples Republic of China between 1966 and 1977.
These three models of conciliation, to varying degrees of 
sophistication, have served the task of social engineering. The 
central theme for the Conciliation process was to draw in' people 
as a whole from the periphery of the socio-political unit and to­
wards the centre of a new society. Popular participation was extended 
to the institutions that administered justice. There was also a 
transference of the broad categories of state functions from govern­
mental organs to "social" agencies. The countries that have 
adopted the three aforementioned models portray a classical Marxist 
bias.
They have viewed "law" and its institutions as instruments 
of coercion and domination particularly when they rest in the 
hands of a dominant social class. The conciliation process was 
viewed as a means towards annulling that undesirable association 
and as a distant signal indicating a movement towards a gradual 
’withering away of the law’, and therefore of the State. This is 
a significant guideline along which the countries concerned with 
the three models have proceeded in developing their own'conci­
liation process.
The formal systems of dispute settlement do not concern them­
selves with the educational role of the process. Punishment, the 
Marxist jurists believe, does not result in remaking the collect­
ive conscience of a society. Both the Organic Law, creating the 
comrades Courts of the Soviet Union, and Khruschev's speech at the 
21st Party Congress, laid down the theme that the Comrades1 Courts 
were responsible at carrying out the all important task of re-
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making the conscience of the people. Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam,
while calling this the paternalistic elements in the legal system
added:
"The relative absence of status differ­
entiation between tribunal and dispu­
tants, the informality and the flexibi­
lity of their procedures, the social and 
physical proximity of the proceedings 
to the location of the dispute or the 
violation, enhance the effectiveness 
of the popular courts in re-shaping 
the attitudes and behavioral gatterns 
of workers and residence."
The educative process helps both in the enforcement of the laws 
and in the effective settlement of disputes under the laws. This 
necessarily involves the diminution of the quantity of the laws and 
the simplicity of the terminology in which they are couched. In a 
system like in Sri Lanka, where the laws are many and where all the 
laws are expressed in legal terminology borrowed from the colonial 
era, the Conciliation process had no choice but to abandon all norm­
ative propositions and resort to broad principles of basic social 
justice between two citizens administered within a broad socio­
economic framework. This draws into the centre of the conciliation 
process non-legal considerations which in turn raise the need for 
mass mobilization as a key to the success of the process.
One of the all pervading social consequences of the Concili­
ation process was the re-establishment of the channels for an urban- 
rural dialogue. The re-activation of the old Gamsabhava system (to 
which reference had been made at a very early stage of this chapter) 
in the form of Conciliation Boards has brought into the forefront 
of social thinking a return to the roots of Sri Lankan society.
A return to the roots necessarily indicates a return to a res­
ponsive attitude to rural demands; for it is the rural, and not 
the urban communities that have remained the repository, if not 
the guardians, of ancient Sri Lankan heritage. This move away 
from the urban to the rural has introduced into Sri Lankan Society 
new social and political dimensions, by diluting the political power 
of the elitist bourgeouise and thereby strengthening the power of 
the rural proletariat. As the composition of the Conciliation 
Boards indicate, the Conciliation process gave birth to a new era, 
the era of the common man, vernacular educated, and untouched by
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alien sophistry. The Boards form one of the several pieces of this 
whole jig-saw puzzle. Associated with the Conciliation Boards were 
a number of new social reforms: - for example, the People’s Committees, 
the language switch-over from English to Sinhala, the Land Reform 
Movement, the ceiling on incomes policy, the Educational Reforms and 
a whole set of other and somewhat minor reforms. Taken as a whole 
the Conciliation Boards demarcate a particular stage in the develop­
ment of Sri Lanka. The creation of the Boards indicate the import­
ant role which the society as a whole could play in settling dis­
putes, so that the system of adjudication inherited from the colonial 
period appears more as an alternative dispute settling method, rather 
than the only effective means for maintaining social harmony as an 
important contribution towards progress and development.
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Chapter 11 
LahdTolicies and Development
I. An Introduction
It is important to commence this chapter with a brief summary 
of the Law relating to Land holdings in Ceylon. The position of 
the English Law in Ceylon was in the nature of ’imposed law’ intro­
duced through Statutes, while the common law of the Island was the 
Roman Dutch Law, evolved over one and a half centuries of Dutch 
rule. These distinct and separate sources to which the two systems 
may be traced, ha!#2.determined the nature and the character of the 
law applicable to land in Ceylon. The position of the English Law 
with reference to rights over land was largely procedural introduced 
through Ordinances and limited to such areas as Registration of 
Title and rules of conveyancing. But the substantive law applicable 
to ownership of land was the Roman Dutch Common Law of Ceylon, there­
fore one must begin to understand the nature of land tenure in Ceylon 
by understanding the classifications of land ownership recognised under 
the Dutch law which has come down to the present times. The four 
types of land holdings recognised in the Dutch Civil Law have survived 
the passage of time and close parallels can be drawn with the con­
cepts found in English Land Law. One clear exception is that the 
title to land in the Roman Dutch Law was absolute, thus espousing 
the concept of Dominium. The absolute nature of the title in the 
Roman Dutch Law was achieved by the curative effect introduced in 
a defective title by the methods of Usucapio and by Longi Temporis 
Praescriptio. This absolute nature of the title to land was long 
established in the maritime provinces. As to the land holdings in 
the Kandyan Provinces the divisions were clear. All land was held 
by the King. But some lands were gifted to individuals and Temples. 
These were the Nindagam Land, and the Dewala and Viharagam Land, 
respectively. The Crown's claim to the Royal lands of the Kandyan 
Kings was by a process of State succession. This principle of State 
succession formed a continuum, conveying the original titles to 
the independent Governments of Ceylon.
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The four divisions of land tenure under the Roman Dutch Law 
are as follows:
(i) Res Communes: These were held in Common but
not owned by any one person. These were in­
capable of being appropriated into private 
ownership. - The classical examples ivere: 
the air one breathes, the water that runs 
along public streams, the sea and the sea­
shore .
Reform of the common ownership of the Res Communes had been brought
about by various statutes. The Seashore Protection Ordinance of
1911 introduced certain prohibitions upon the right to remove
2
sand. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1947 by section 58 vested the
3
power to administer and control the foreshore in the Crown.
4
The Fisheries Ordinance of 1940 introduced certain controls on 
the fishermen who used the foreshore of the sea. A number of 
other statutes reduced the extent of the right to common owner­
ship of the Res Communes.
(ii) Res Publicae: These were things which were
actually owned by the public. While the 
res communes remained unpossessed by the 
public or by a private individual, remaining 
free to be used by all, the Res Publicae
were things that had fallen into possession
of the State but were destined to be used 
only for public purposes. Into this category 
fell: the harbours, public roads and highways,
public footpaths, public rivers and lakes and 
public canals and water channels.
Various statutes have reformed the public rights over these by
limiting public access to them for very obvious reasons. The
Port of Colombo CAdministration) Act of 1950 controlled the
public access to the harbour, among other matters, thus making
the harbour area secure for its normal use. The Irrigation
Ordinance of 1946 ^ prohibited the drawing out of water from
certain lakes, rivers and water channels. The Forests Ordinance 
7of 1907 controlled the right of the public to cut down trees
g
from public forests. The Thoroughfares Ordinance of 1861 
introduced laws concerning the use of public roads. In these 
and in other ways the public's rights over the Res Publicae 
were limited. f
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(iii) Res Nullius: These were property not owned
by anyone. They become owned by the first 
person who takes possession of them with an
intention to own them. The process is des­
cribed as occupatio in the Roman Dutch Law.
Res Nullius fell into three broad categories- 
res sacrae (property consecrated.by the state 
for religious purposes, such as churches), 
res religi.osae (property devoted to the 
burial of the dead such as burial grounds) 
and res sanctae (these are hallowed things 
such as walls and gates of cities) - which 
were also referred to as res divini juris.
This category of property since the earliest days of British rule
had been subjected to legal controls. Churches have been subjected
to varying Ordinances applicable to each of the Christian denominations,
while the burial grounds have fallen under the Cemetaries and Burial
9
Grounds Ordinance of 1899. Res Sanctae are now governed by 
the Antiquities Ordinance of 1940. The only remaining Res Nullius 
was Treasure Trove which Maasdorp defined as: "Akin to lost pro­
perty is treasure trove, which is a deposit of money, bullion, 
precious stones, etc., hidden in the earth, or elsewhere, at a 
period beyond the memory of man, and the ownership of which had 
therefore become lost in obscurity, and the treasure itself there­
fore becomes res nullius once more."
Although the Treasure Trove was not land, its close association
with land probably merits mention here. However, in Ceylon as early 
12as in 1887 Treasure Trove was declared as being vested in the 
Crown. ^
(iv) Res Singulorum: Things which are owned by
individuals or Res Universitatis those owned 
by companies. This category contains all 
property (both movables and immovables) which 
are privately owned.
Since early times, little or no reform was attended to the private 
right of ownership of property either by the Dutch or by the British.
The only pieces of legislation that could be found in any way inter­
fering with the concept of ownership, until the early seventies of
14this century were the Land Acquisition Act of 1950 and the 
Requisitioning of Land Act of the same year. The size of the 
problem of land reform require little emphasis. For it is true 
to say that Ceylon has had no historical precedents of any inter­
ference with the concept of private ownership of property for many
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centuries. A new dimension was the position of the Nindagam Lands 
gifted by the Sinhalese Kings. An aspect of ownership of such 
lands was the services required to be rendered by the tenants to 
the landlords of such land. Reform of Nindagam Lands was there­
fore undertaken as a matter of re-routing the ownership derived 
by the landlords from the Kings, to their tenants. In other words, 
the Nindagam Lands Act of 1968, ^  while abolishing the requirement
to perform services to the landlords^&eclared that *every tenant
17or holder of any Nindagam Land was the owner thereof.1 But 
the problem was that the law abolishing Nindagam Lands and vesting 
their ownership in the tenants, was not a part of any overall 
plan for the reform of land in Ceylon. However well-intended the 
legislature was, in passing the Nindagam Lands Act into Law, in 
1968, it must be said at once that the measure cannot be regarded 
as a part of the land reform movement in Sri Lanka. A more complex 
dimension to the land reform movement was introduced by the problem 
of ownership of housing. The reform of land and the reform of the 
ownership of housing must be considered as the two faces of the same 
problem. One of the sub-divisions of land was Paddy Land. The 
dichotomy was therefore forged between Paddy Land and Dry Land.
These were subjected to two very different approaches because 
the reform of Paddy Lands involved the conflicting interests 
between the owner and the Tenant-Farmer. Land reform in Ceylon 
therefore require four separate expositions.
(i) The Colonial strategy for the Acquisition and Distri­
bution of Land.
(ii) The post-colonial plan for the reform of Paddy Land.
(lii) The post-colonial plan for the reform of land other than 
Paddy Land.
(iv) The post-colonial plan for the reform of housing property.
II. The Colonial Strategy for the Acquisition and Distribution 
of Land.
(a) Acquisition of Land
From the outset the British administration in Ceylon appeared 
to have considered it wise to base the economy of the country on a 
plantation industry; with this in mind it set in motion a number of
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strategies to find the land necessary to create such an industry.
A factor which the British Administration was compelled to take
into account was that land which was most suited for the plantation
industry was land owned by the Buddhist Temples and by the Kandyan
Chiefs. The Maritime Provinces had a settled system of land
holdings dating back to the Dutch period and was supported by the
notion that title to land was 'absolute1. The Thombus, the
Dutch records, which recorded the land holdings, left the British
in a weak position to interfere with existing property rights to
immovable property, in the Maritime Provinces. Besides, it was 
18found by 1873 that Ceylon had an exceptional climate for the
growth of tea in the Highlands. Particularly, in the wake of
the destruction of coffee as a result of a Blight, this presented
the colonial Government with an attractive prospect. In a previous 
19
chapter the legal methods employed towards reducing the Temple
20 21 Land holdings and the land holdings of the Kandyan chiefs
have been exposed.
In the chapter on Buddhism, where these matters were discussed,
the central role played by a Commission mandated to determine the
ownership of lands claimed by the Temples was mentioned. It was
there pointed out that the Commissioners appointed under the
22Registration of Temple Lands Ordinance was empowered to reject
claims.to ownership which could not be established before them.
The fact of the matter was that most of the land grants made by
the Kandyan Kings were either oral or under Sannas written on
Ola leaves which may well have been lost or decayed. Besides,
unlike in the Maritime Provinces there was no system by which
grants could be registered and therefore the question of proof
before a commission was a very difficult one. However, the British
23administration in Ceylon took the view that the Temple Lands to 
a large extent were once privately owned by individuals who had 
received land grants from the Kings, but had fraudulently transferred 
these lands to the Temples, so as to avoid performing Rajakariya 
or services to the King. Having made the transfers, it was 
alleged, they had fraudulently shared the profits with the Temples, 
thus swelling, notionally, the land holdings of the Temples for 
which no tithes were payable. The Commission therefore was a means 
* of determining the extent to which the Temples were entitled to tax
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24exemption and nothing more. Continuing this allegation, Sir Henry Ward
wrote in a despatch to Secretary of State for the colonies, in
1859:
’’The Consequence was, that the claims to exemption from 
Tithe, have been constantly increasing and that, as 
the possession of low or muddy lands carried with it
a claim to a certain, or rather to a more uncertain,
portion of high or chena lands without which it is 
impossible to carry on paddy cultivation, a very large 
amount of land in the central province could neither 
be alienated, nor improved, without the certainty of 
interminable litigation."25
26Appended to the despatch the Governor attached a printed 
copy of a Report on the progress of the Commission up to the end 
of 1858, namely during the preceding two years. The report carried 
the following chart of success.
The Work of the Temple Land's Commission. Table; 27 XXI
Fields High Lands
Registered Rejected Registered Rejected
A.R.P.* A.R.P.
Both Chena and Forests Chena Forests
A.R.P. A.R.P. A.R.P.
1051.0.4 1258.3.3 1704.2.5 1503.1.7 6668.1.1
*Acres, Roods and Perches
Although the Commission did not end its activities until I860,
the foregoing table indicates the proportion of the claims registered
to those rejected. It is important to recognise that the rejections
29are almost five times as high for Highlands, than those that have
30been registered. The ratio appears to be much less, in the
case of fields. This is significant because it was the highlands
that provided the earth upon which the coffee plant initially and
the tea plant after 1873 was destined to grow. Considering the
lands of one temple Lankatilaka in Kandy - Dr. Hans-Dieter Evers
31presented in his work the following table. This too was culled
from the information provided by Sir Henry Ward in the report on
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the Temple Lands Commission to which reference has previously been
Table33 XXII 
LANKATILAKA Temple Lands Registered - 1857-58
FIELDS HIGHLANDS TOTAL CLAIMED
Registered
a -r-p
Rejected 
* A-R-P
Registered
A-R-P
Rejected
A-R-P A-R-P
Viharagam 49-3-9 29-0-1 185-3-1 92-0-9 357-0-0
Dewalagama 24-3-0 13-2-2 0-0-0 105-1-1 143-2-2
Total 74-2-9 42-2-3 185-3-1 197-2-0 500-2-3
*Reject claims in Udunuwara only.
Although there may not be direct evidence to establish the work 
of the Commission as a factor contributing to the establishment 
of the plantation industry, there is abundant evidence that the 
motive behind its creation was at least indirectly to support 
that cause.
In a despatch from Sir Henry Ward, the Governor of Ceylon, 
in 1860, to the Secretary of State for the colonies, it was 
recorded that:
MSo few people, in this colony, appreciate the 
delicacy and importance of this enquiry, or the 
large results, that will be obtained by bringing 
it to a successful conclusion, that there is a 
considerable disposition to grudge the expenditure 
incurred, and to underrate its necessity. For 
myself, I can only repeat that I cannot conceive 
a more dangerous and irritating question to leave 
open, or one more certain to bring the Goverment, 
the priesthood, and the planters into Collision.”
Whatever was the motive for the establishment of the Commission 
of 1856, one thing remains clear. It was the work of the Commission 
that resulted in the accumulation of a large acreage of Highland 
declared to be without an owner, which was therefore available for 
sale to prospective enterpreneurs who became the founding fathers 
of the plantation industry of Ceylon.
A curious parallel may be drawn between this method of Land
35
Acquisition and a similar approach taken in Rhodesia. There the
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British Government, by refusing to recognise the Tribal Law concept 
of the collective ownership of tribal lands by particular tribes as 
’ownership', had them declared as vacant land. Thereafter they were 
declared as ’ownerless’, thereby placing them under the ownership of 
the Crown. The Crown in > turn proceeded to sell the land to pro­
spective entrepreneurs who acquired the land free from any encum- . 
brances. The starting points in the two modalities for the acquir 
sition of land may be different, but the end result appears clearly 
to be much the same. Once the Crown had assumed the ownership of 
the immovable property by a process of occupation, it becomes the 
owner, free from all encumbrances. That point is vital to the whole 
enterprise, for it gives the Crown an opportunity to convey a clear 
title to the investor. This undoubtedly helped to dispel any doubts 
as to the title that may possibly cloud the minds of potential 
investors. The Commission, therefore, played an important role by 
finding ownerless land for the Crown which provided the foundation 
for the new economic ventures in Ceylon.
36As early as 1840, by an Ordinance passed "to provide more.
effectively for the prevention of frauds and prejudices," the British
Administration in Ceylon required inter-alia that all interests in
37land created by deed must be executed before a Notary. However,
it was not until 1863 that comprehensive legislation requiring the
registration of titles to land and all interests created over land 
38was enacted. This was a few years after the conclusion of the 
work of the Temple Lands Commission of 1856. Recommending the 
approval of the ordinance, the Governor, Sir Charles McCarthy, 
in a despatch of 1863 to the Secretary of State for the colonies 
wrote:
"The question of the introduction of a measure 
of this kind has been for some time under the
consideration of this Government. Its want has (
been long felt, the absence of a proper system 
of registration of deeds affecting lands having 
been, found to be productive of serious injury 
to private interests." 39
The requirement that land sales be registered was an important 
stage in the colonial development of Ceylon. Although the Crown 
grants of the Highlands in the Kandyan provinces raised no doubts 
as to title, the new arrivals who were interested in planting 
coconuts in the Maritime Provinces appear to have had some anxious 
moments. Despite the requirement that interests over land must
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be created by deeds notarially executed, some planters venturing 
into the coconut industry appear to have experienced a few problems. 
The case of one Mr. Thomas Clarke received particular mention in a 
despatch from Lord Torrington, the Governor, to Earl Grey, the 
Secretary of State for the colonies in 1847, * Mr. Clarke's problem 
was this:
In 1843 one Mr. Edwin Whitehouse bought 179 acres 
of land situated at Waddatalpolle in the province 
of Jaffna. In 1845 he sold that land to Mr. Thomas 
Clarke. Both sales were made after certification 
from the headman after examination of the 'Thombo' 
or the register of lands maintained by the Dutch 
administration in the district of Jaffna. Eighteen 
months later the Crown made a claim to that land 
as Crown land-enroached by the first native seller 
to Mr. Whitehouse. Mr. Clarke had cleared the land 
and had planted 60 acres with coconut.
Lord Torrington while asking the Secretary of State for the
colonies for direction as to how Mr. Clarke's problem should be
resolved, requested the Secretary of State for the colonies to take
note of the fact that there was a great need for a system of land
41survey and registration. In a subsequent despatch to Earl Grey, 
Lord Torrington suggested the imposition of a land tax which would 
in part reimburse the expenses incurred in an extensive land survey 
which is a necessary prerequisiste to the registration of titles 
to land. Quoting from a letter addressed to his predecessor, 
Governor Mackenzie, by the then Chief Justice of Ceylon, Sir 
Anthony Oliphant, Torrington referred to a case heard by Sir 
Anthony where the dispute was over a 1/2200th interest of a coco­
nut tree which had been sold in execution Of a debt. This kind of 
problem is said:
"to arise from the practice on the part of owners of 
land, of permitting other parties to plant it with 
coconuts or other trees, allowing the planter to receive 
a third of the produce as his share, and frequently 
leasing to him also his own, or the proprietor's 
share. Hence it follows that one maii is owner of the
land, another the absolute proprietor of a portion
of the trees, and also the renter of another portion 
of the produce." 42
43In a personal note to Lord Torrington, The Secretary of 
State for the colonies suggested a modified strategy. He suggested 
that a land tax be imposed for several years to come. Those who
were doubtful of their rights to any particular property would
refrain from paying that tax. After several years, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies suggested, that those who have not paid
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the tax would be deemed to have surrendered their land to the 
Crown and at that stage a method of registration of titles to 
land could very easily be introduced. The letter began by re­
minding Torrington of:
"The immense difficulty which Napoleon with all his 
power experienced in getting 'Cadashe* (?) accurately 
settled in France is a (illegible) proof of the ex­
treme difficulty not to say impossibility of getting 
a satisfactory survey of an extensive territory of 
any description of the cultivation and value of the 
different properties— 11. 44
The result therefore was that proper registration of title
to land was delayed until 1863 and the survey of lands did not
commence until 1866. This may to an extent have been responsible
for delaying the active participation in the coconut industry by
foreign entrepreneuners until sometime after 1863. This must
explain why a large acreage of coconut plantations remained in
the hands of the natives up to and after Independence, while the
Highlands to a very large extent became the preserve of the
45settler community. The Land Survey Ordinance of 1866 opened 
the way for the ascertainment of boundaries and titles to land.
Under that Ordinance the Surveyor General was authorised to
46demand the production of deeds and other indicia of title.
Failure to supply proof of title resulted in the loss of land 
to the claimant. However, if proof was provided a survey plan 
authenticated by the Surveyor General’s department was provided, 
which could be:
47” offered in evidence in any suit,"
48concerning that land. On the same day that the Land Survey 
Ordinance became Law, an Ordinance "to compel the registration of
49Sannases, old deeds and other instruments of Title” was enacted.
The latter together with The Land Registration Ordinances of 1863, ^
formed the trilogy of statutes designed to bring clarity and
certainty to land titles in Ceylon. The 1863 Ordinance requiring
registration of title to land declared that unregistered titles
were inadmissable as evidence in any Court of Law.
52The 1866 Ordinance requiring the registration of Sannases 
and old deeds laid down in Section 2:
”A11 persons holding or claiming title under deeds 
Sanasses, olas, or other instruments on which title 
to land or other immovable property is founded,
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which bear date on or before the 1st day of Feb­
ruary, 1840, are hereby required to produce the 
same before the Registrar of Lands -- on or 
before the 31st December, 1967." ^3
By Section 7 of the Ordinance, no deed, Sannas, ola or other 
instrument executed before the 1st February, 1840 was admissable as 
evidence before any Court of Law, unless it had previously been 
registered under Section 2 of the Ordinance. February 1st, of
541840 was regarded as the relevant day for both the 1863 Ordinance 
and the Sannas and old deed Ordinance of 1866, because as from that 
date all interests in land had to be created by deed.
The thrust of these provisions was to introduce into the legal 
system of Ceylon machinery by which title to immovable property 
could be made more secure and clear. This in turn was intended to 
help attract potential investors not only through Crown grants, but 
also by private sales. The latter were deemed to be an important 
element in the colonial development of the Maritime Provinces.
For the Temple Lands Commission of 1856 was limited geographically 
to the Kandyan provinces.
(b) Allocation of Land:
Although the programme for acquiring land for sale to settlers
was not commenced until the creation of the Temple Lands Commission
of 1856, plans for the sale of land appears to have got under way
in as early as 1839; a copy was enclosed of an advertisement ready
for publication regarding sales in Ceylon in a despatch of 1839.
55
Two articles of that advertisement merit particular mention:
"Article 1: All lands in the colony not hitherto
granted, and not appropriated or required for public 
purposes, will be put up to sale by public auction.
The price will of course depend upon the quality 
of the land and its local situation, but no land 
will be sold below the rate of five shillings per 
acre."
Article 5: On payment of the purchase money the
purchaser will be let into possession, and a grant 
under the public seal of the Island will be made, 
in fee simple, to the purchaser at the nominal 
quitrent of a pepper-corn." ^6
Article 1 of the advertisement suggests that all land which have 
not been the subject of Land Grants and are not required for public 
purposes will be subject to sale by public auction. The’Temple Lands
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Commission of 1856 may be regarded as a means by which the British
Administration was able to determine whether a particular grant of
land, by a Kandyan Monarch, was in fact a valid grant. Article 5
makes a purchase valid, and capable of creating an interest in land,
without registration. However, at the request.of Governor Mackenzie,
57the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed that the advertise­
ment should be amended to require that all grants be registered in
the District Court of the District in which the land in question
was situated.
The attitude towards the giving of credit for land sales 
appears to have undergone a change after the Temple Land Commission.
In 1839 the attitude of the Government of Ceylon was to give extended 
credit for periods not exceeding 12 months. In reply to a request 
addressed by Governor Mackenzie for the grant of credit facilities, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies asked for further details 
before allowing that request, so as to satisfy himself that:
"— the real interests of Ceylon are promoted by the
sale of Government land in very small parcels and by
encouraging the purchase of such land by persons 
entirely destitue of capital for their cultivation 
and improvement.” 58
Again, in 1841 Governor Colin Campbell sought permission from
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to extend the period of
59credit given on land sales from one month to 12 months. In a 
Minute appended to the despatch Rt. Hon. Lord John Russell allowed 
that request. However, by 1863 the British Administration in 
Ceylon had taken a different attitude to credit sales. This was 
a period of increased land sales and the coffee boon was at its • 
peak. Native entrepreuners were anxious to buy land and, having 
limited resources they were compelled to ask. the Governor's permission 
to pay the purchase price in four equal instalments. Against the 
Governor's refusal they appealed directly to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. Advising the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to refuse their Memorial, the Governor, Sir Charles MacCarthy wrote:
"And there would be considerable difficulty in many 
cases in recovering the purchase money from native 
purchases, after they have been once let into
possession.” 60
The Secretary of State for the Colonies accepted the Governor's 
advice and disallowed the Memorial. But the Secretary of State did
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make an important point in a Minute appended to the Governor's
despatch. In that Minute the Noble Duke wrote:
"I conclude against a compliance with the prayer 
of the Memorials-though I shall say it was a case 
where the larger coffee planters might be anxious 
to keep out a class of small powers.” 61
It would have been more appropriate to say that the decision would
keep the native population out of the coffee industry. For they 
could quite easily be outbid at a public auction unless credit 
facilities in the nature of delayed or instalment payments were 
given to them. The attitude of the British Administration in 
Ceylon was designed to restrict the plantation industry to British 
nationals. This appears to have been the avowed policy of the 
British Government even before the property boon of the years 
succeeding the Temple Lands Commission of 1856. As early as in 
1844, one Captain Arabin sought permission to purchase land in 
Ceylon. The Governor, Sir Colin Campbell sought an opinion from 
the Colonial Office in London. In his reply, denying Captain 
Arabin's request to hold land, on the grounds that he was a 
foreigner, the Colonial Office explained that:
" the common law of England must in this case be
considered as extending to the colonial possessions of 
Great Britain. In that opinion I concur and I have 
therefore, to state that if any alien should desire to 
hold lands in Ceylon it will be necessary that he 
should first obtain 'Letter of Denigration'61a 
in the form of an Act or Ordinance of the local 
legislature. But you will understand that you are 
not at liberty to introduce any such Ordinance 
into the legislative council of Ceylon without 
having previously obtained Her Majesty's express 
sanction to the measure.”
The sum total of these provisions was to attempt at limiting 
land holdings to British nationals and to restrict native partici­
pation considerably. As for the latter, the denial of credit 
facilities may well have resulted in excluding them from the 
plantation industry of the Highlands. The unsettled nature of 
title to immovable property until 1866 may have been a saving 
grace which may well have enabled the native population to enter 
the plantation industry in the Maritime Provinces well ahead of 
the rush by the settler population from the British Isles. As 
suggested earlier, this may explain the greater native partici­
pation in the coconut industry in the Maritime Provinces, when
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compared with marginal impact in the Highlands.
(c) Regulatory legislation relating to Land.
In the preceding section the methods adopted for the dis­
tribution of land were examined. In order to'give a guarantee 
of title to potential investors, the British Administration had 
passed Laws which would ensure that the title to land would first 
vest in the Crown before the land was sold to the Planting Community. 
This was considered in the previous section. Besides this step, 
the British administration in Ceylon did enact a number of important 
pieces of regulatory legislation regulating the use and enjoyment 
of Crown land. These legislations were vital for the protection 
and preservation of such land. It is these types of legislation 
that will receive attention in the present section.
6 *7
(1) The Resumption of Lands Ordinance of 1887
One of the problems associated with land grants was that the
grantee might, due to supervening circumstances, find it difficult
or impossible to utilise the land to its full potential, thus
frustrating the purposes for which it was granted by the Crown.
The result then might be that the land may lie under a 'dead hand'
inaugurating a process for underdevelopment. To avoid such a
result, the Government enacted the Resumption of Lands Ordinance
of 1887. Under this Ordinance:
"When any land in Ceylon which has been or which may 
hereafter be alienated by or on behalf of the Crown 
shall appear to the Government Agent to have been 
abandoned by the owner thereof foy eight years or up­
wards and such owner or any person lawfully claiming 
under him cannot be ascertained, not withstanding 
all reasonably diligent inquiry made by such 
Government Agent, it shall be lawful for such 
Government Agent, with the sanction of the Land 
Commissioner, to declare by a notice to be published 
and to be posted on such land in the manner provided 
by this Ordinance, that if no claim to such land is 
made to him by or on behalf of any person able to 
establish a title within the period (not being 
less than twelve months) specified in such notice, 
such land shall be resumed by the Crown." 64
The Ordinance merely determines the issue of title. And once 
that is determined the next step, logically, would be to re-consider 
the Crown grant as a whole. This step is left to be taken under 
the Forest, Chena, Waste, and Unoccupied Lands Ordinance 
(hereinafter referred to as the Waste Lands Ordinance) o f  1897.
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(ii) Forest, Chena, Waste, and Unoccupied Land Ordinance 
of 1897.
Historically, the Waste Lands Ordinance represents the period 
following the creation of the plantation industry in the Highlands. 
It represents the period which followed the sale of Temple property 
obtained out of the industry of the Temple Lands Commission. In 
that sense it succeeds*the historical period commencing after the 
establishment of the Tea plantations in the Highlands. This 
necessarily meant that the Ordinance was principally aimed at 
acquiring the land situated outside the former Kandyan provinces.
For such land had by 1898 become fully absorbed into the 
Tea planting industry. It is significant to note that forests
and chenas were not to be found in the Kandyan provinces. Their 
principal location was in the North Central and Eastern provinces 
of the Island. The provisions of this Ordinance are also relevant 
to the Resumption of Lands Ordinance of 1887, insofar as it 
supplements that Ordinance. This is done by assuming the possession 
of lands the titles to which had been vested in the Crown under 
1887 Ordinance. The Waste Lands Ordinance, therefore, was 
assigned to achieve two purposes: firstly to acquire land for
the Crown from outside the Kandyan provinces, (for the Temple 
Lands Commission had already achieved the acquistion of land from 
the Kandyan provinces); secondly to supplement the Resumption of 
Lands Ordinance of 1887 by acquiring for the Crown the land which, 
under that Ordinance, had been declared as Crown Land. These two 
aspects of the Waste Lands Ordinance require separate treatment.
(a) The Acquisition of Forest, Chena and waste and 
unoccupied Land.
6 7The Ordinance by section 1 empowers the Government Agent 
or the Assistant Government Agent of a district to publish in the 
Government Gazette a notice requiring persons to make a claim to 
land which in the Government Agents1 or his Assistants* view is 
forest, Chena or wate land. The Gazette notification would, 
under the Ordinance require any claim to be made within a period 
of three months. The Gazette notification was further required 
to state that if no claim was made to the aforesaid land, within 
that period, the land in question "shall be deemed to be the pro­
perty of the Crown and may be dealt with on account of the Crown."
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Where a claim was made to the land in question within the
specified period, the Ordinance required the Government Agent or
68
his Assistant to hold an enquiry into the claim. The Ordinance
lays down the procedure to be adopted at the enquiry in some 
69detail. The decision of the Government Agent or his Assistant
could be challenged by an Appeal to a Commissioner or to a
70 71
District Court, with a further appeal to the Supreme Court
of the Island.
In order to facilitate the acquisition of land, the Ordinance 
lays down a presumption of fact in the favour of the Crown. Section 
24 read:
"For the purpose of this Ordinance:
(a) All Forest, waste, unoccupied or uncultivated 
land and all chenas and other lands which can be 
only cultivated after intervals of several years, 
shall be presumed to be the property of the Crown, 
until the contrary thereof be proved.
(b) The occupation of any person of one or more 
portions or parcels of land shall not be taken as 
creating a presumption of ownership against the 
Crown in his favour for any greater extent of land 
than that actually occupied by him.
(c) The term "unoccupied land" includes unculti­
vated land and all land which at the time of the 
passing of this Ordinance was not in the actual 
occupation of any person or persons, and also all 
lands shall not have been in the uninterrupted 
occupation of some person or persons of a period 
exceeding five years next before notice given by 
the Government Agent or Assistant Government Agent 
under section 1 in respect of the same."
The presumption of fact in this section makes the task of the
Crown much easier. The Waste Lands Ordinance proved to be a powerful
instrument in the hands of the British Administration in Ceylon for
the acquisition of land for the purposes of the Crown. Although the
73Land Settlement Ordinace of 1931 did repeal the Waste Land Ordinance,
the important elements of the Waste Lands Ordinance were chosen for
74re-enactment in the 1931 Ordinance.
The 1931 Ordinance was passed at a time when all the land which 
was required for the plantation industry had been provided to the 
planting community. The Ordinance, therefore, was able to deal with 
the surplus land, as it were, which was in the custody of the Crown. 
While preserving the instrumentalities necessary for acquiring land 
for the purposes of the Crown, the Ordinance of 1931 in addition dealt 
with the procedure for the distribution of the acquired land for public
purposes other than to the planting community. In the proviso to 
section 4(c), the Ordinance declared that:
’’Provided also that it shall be lawful for the settle­
ment officer, with the written consent of the claimant 
which shall not be revocable, to make a declaration in 
writing, which shall be deemed for the purposes of this 
Ordinance to be a settlement in favour of the Crown, 
that any land to which such claimant would otherwise
have been declared to be entitled is Crown property ‘
set apart for the purpose of a communal chena reserve 
for the use of the inhabitants of such village as the ^  
settlement officer shall specify in such declaration.”
Considering the fact that the extent of land that became avail­
able to the Crown by the beginning of the 30fs of this century, by
far exceeded the demands made by the planting community the British 
Administration decided to distribute the remaining Crown lands inter- 
alia among the Ceylonese native middle class for development purposes. 
The Government, therefore, enacted the Land Development Ordinance of 
1935. 76
One of the purposes of the Land Development Ordinance was to 
include the Ceylonese native middle class as members of that presti­
gious body of persons who have been the recipients of Crown lands.
The Ordinance while defining ’’Ceylonese” as:
"persons of either sex domiciled in Ceylon and possessing 
a Ceylon domicile of origin”,??
78
defined the "middle class” in terms of the taxable income.
Besides authorizing grants of land to native Ceylonese persons
of the middle class, the Ordinance further authorised the Land
Commissioner to set, Crown land, apart for any one or more of the
79following purposes. Section 8 read:
"(a) village expansion; (b) village forest; (c) village 
pasture; (d) Chena cultivation (e) village purposes 
not herein specified; (f) colonisation: (g) protection 
of the sources of courses of streams; (h) prevention 
of the erosion of the soil; (i) forest reserves;
(j) government purposes, including government buildings, 
roads and works; (k) preservation of objects of arch­
eological or historical interest; (1 ) the requirements 
of local authorities; (m) the development of towns;
(n) alienation to middle-class Ceylonese; (p) alienation 
to any persons whom so ever irrespective of the class 
or race to which they belong; (p) any other purpose 
that may be prescribed.”^
An important difference between the Land Development Ordi­
nance of 1935 and the Waste Lands Ordinance of 1897 was that the
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81objects of the Crown's bounty under the later Act included a
wide range of public purposes. With reference to the particular
historical period within which both the Land Settlement Ordinance
of 1931 and the Land Development Ordinance of 1935 were spun it is
necessary to point out that this period coincides with the emergence
of a new constitutional structure for the Island under Governor
Sir William Manning. This period of the "Manning Reforms" appeared
82
in the country during a period of divide et Impera and therefore 
it was in the best interest of the British Administration in Ceylon 
that certain sections of the more influential members of the 
Sinhalese community were drawn to the side of the Colonial Adminis­
tration on the Island. The inclusion of the 'Ceylonese middle- 
class* as a group may be explained more as a political decision 
than as any independent change of colonial policy towards land 
holdings on the Island. The Ordinance made a further enumeration 
of persons entitled to receive land grants in section 8(0), namely:
"alienation to any persons whomsoever irrespective 
of the class or race to which they belong." 83
This declaration which makes class or race irrelevant to a land 
grant recognises by implication that all sectors of the Ceylonese 
middle-class were for the first time made candidates for land
84grants. The criterion after 1935 was merely an economic one.
(b) The Waste Lands Ordinance as supplementing the Resiimption 
of Lands Ordinance of 1887.
The point was made before, that the thrust of the Resumption
of Lands Ordinance of 1887 was to set aside the title to certain
Crown lands which the grantee had forfeited due to a breach of the
conditions attached to the grant. The Ordinance itself did not 
provide for the re-sale or re-granting of the same land by the 
Crown in such a way that the new grantees' or the purchasers* 
title to the land as against the first grantee, would not become a 
matter of controversy. The 1887 Ordinance had failed to introduce 
a provision that would make resumption of the land by the Crown 
under the Ordinance co-terminous with the cancellation of the 
original grant. That left a lingering doubt as to the purity of 
the title which the second grant or sale could convey to the second 
grantee or to the purchaser- of the land. The problem which the
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government faced was the doubt that might linger in the mind of a
potential investor in the colony over the title to land which fell
under the 1887 Ordinance. Unlike Roman-Dutch law, English land
law provided no cure for a defective title. The Concept of
dominium in the English land law provided no cure for a defective
title. The concept of dominium in the English land law went no
further than recognising the idea of 'the best title', as distinct
from 'the only title'. The Roman-Dutch law on the other hand
recognised the doctrine of Usucapio and thereby provided the means
for curing a defective title. The introduction of English rules of
85conveyancing as early as in 1863, effectively shut the door in
the face of Roman-Dutch Law in this area. Therefore, it became a
matter of immediate importance to provide a means by which the
Government could, even subsequent to making a grant or a sale of
Crown land, re-establish its title over land claimed to be Crown
land. It is to this aspect of the problem pertaining to Crown
land that the Government addressed itself in section 29 of the
86Waste Lands Ordinance of 1897. Section 29 read:
"Nothing in this Ordinance contained shall preclude 
or prevent the Crown in any way in which no notice 
has been issued under section 1 in respect of any 
land from selling, leasing, reserving, or otherwise 
dealing with the same, or from instituting in any 
court an action to recover such land." ^
The necessity for section 29 was recognised by the Government
of Ceylon after the experience of a steady line of disputes. The
88decision in Saibo v. Andris in 1898 was the last of a line of 
decisions which may well have weakened the image of the Crown as 
a vendor of real property. There, the Kankanagedera family owned 
land at the bottom of which was a swamp. One of the members of 
the family developed the swamp into a fertile paddy field of nearly 
5Q acres. The Government Agent of the Southern Province by a 
Gazette notification published in three languages advertised the 
sale of the 50 acres as Crown land. The Crown argued that the 
swamp was unoccupied land and therefore was crown land. Its trans­
formation into a paddy field constituted an encroachment upon Crown
89Lands contrary to the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance of 1840.
The argument was based on the grounds that the swamp was in fact a
90'waste land' under the 1840 Ordinance. Therefore, it was submitted 
that the swamp could be considered under the Ordinance to be in the 
ownership of the Crown. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed a good
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title to the swamp as the purchaser from the Crown. But the defendants, 
members of the 'K' family prevented the plaintiff from entering upon 
it. The defendant denied the Crown of its title to the swamp. At 
first instance the District Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s case. 
Against that order, the plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court pointed out that private individuals 
often sold land not caring too much about its title to the land, 
leaving the buyer to sort that issue out with the claimants. While 
pointing out this unsatisfactory situation prevailing in the colony, 
Lawrie, J. wrote:
"There is no presumption that the land belonged to 
the Crown. Apart from the presumption arising from 
the character of the land, I am of opinion that there 
is no presumption that land conveyed by a Crown grant 
is land over which the Crown had disposing power.
No Ordinance has ever given the privilege to a Crown 
grant, and this Government has never held that there 
is a presumption. It is strange that a grant in the 
name of Her Majesty, under seal of the colony, signed 
by the Governor and by the colonial secretary, should 
have no intrinsic weight, but such I think is the law,
and the reason is not far to seek. Sales by Government
are often instigated by private applicants. Lands are 
surveyed and advertised to which Government has no 
real claim, of which it never was in possession. A 
reference to any Gazette shows that Government advertises 
and sells paddy" fields and lands planted with coconuts.
Government takes up the position that it does not 
warrant its title, that it leaves to the purchaser 
the chance whether he gets possession or not. Knowing 
this we must look into the evidence in each case and 
decide whether the land granted did or did not belong 
to the Crown." .91
Section 29 of the Waste Lands Act did not have the effect of 
curing the Crown's title to the land. But it had the effect of
giving the Crown a right of sale of land to which it had acquired
a title under the Lands Resumption Ordinance, without having the means 
of cancelling an existing crown grant. Recognising this gap in the 
Lands Resumption Ordinance, the British Government took care to set 
out an elaborate procedure for cancellation of Crown grants in 31 
sections in Chapter VIII of the Land Development Ordinance of 1935.
In a number of ways, the Government's thirst for land appeared 
to have made the servants of the Crown less than honest in their 
dealings with the people whom they had as their wards. The industry 
and the care taken by the courts in protecting the individual's
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rights to property against the sharp dealings by the servants of
92
the Crown, merit particular mention. In Silva v. Kindersley
it was found that the Crown had claimed property belonging to the
Dalada Maligawa in Kandy which in fact had been registered as Temple
property by the Temple Lands Commissioners acting under Temple Lands
93Registration Ordinance of 1856. Subsequent to the registration, 
it was found that the surveyors of the Crown had drawn several plans
and these had effectively excluded the disputed land from the survey
plan that had been recognised and registered by the Commissioners 
under the Ordinance of 1856. The Crown further contended that the 
land in question was chena land and unless these were the subject
of grants by the Kandyan Kings by Sannases, it was argued that the
Crown's claim became, in law, impossible to answer. The 
Trustees for the Dalada Maligawa were unsuccessful at first instance. 
Against that decision the Trustees appealed successfully to the 
Divisional Court. Allowing the appeal Pereira J . wrote:
"So far as the presumption concerns chena lands in 
the Kandyan Provinces, I do not think it can apply
to such lands in respect of which as a matter of
custom or practice Sannases and grants were never
issued, and no taxes, dues, or services were ever
paid or rendered. It is in evidence that for lands
granted by the old Kandyan Kings to the Dalada 
Maligawa no Sannases were ever issued, and, of 
course, in respect of such lands, as in respect of 
Temple lands generally, there was no liability on 
the part of anybody to render any services, nor were 
any taxes or dues payable. As regards chena lands in
the Kandyan Provinces, the only means provided in
the Ordinance to save them from the operation of 
the presumption is the proof of a Sannas or grant 
or of the payment of taxes, etc., and it would be 
absurd to suppose that the presumption was intended 
to apply to lands in respect of which proof of the 
only means provided for its rebuttal was an 
Impossibility. The Ordinance was not intended to 
vest absolutely in the Crown all chena lands in the 
Kandyan Provinces belonging to temples." 94
95 96
Both Saibo i/. Andris and Silva v. Kinders ley exhibit an
embarrassing aspect of the land policy of the British administration.
They also present two litigants who had the means to take their
disputes to courts at two levels of adjudication. The number that
must have accepted the encroachments by the Crown without any redress
have yet to be recorded. The Courts, however, were aware of these
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. . .  97activities of the servants of the Crown. In Saibo v. Adnris,
Lawrie, J. subscribed a paragraph to reveal such misdeeds. He wrote:
"Certainly the Crown is not presumed to be the owner 
of every bit of swamp or every bit of waste land in the 
Island. This swamp was not claimed by the Crown as an 
appurtenance of any other Crown land, it was surveyed 
and sold as a separate subject, although it is clear 
that it is a part of a land -- Karambadelahena — .
It is proved that the defendants —  were in possession 
of Karambadelahena, and that they claimed this- 'swamp' 
or 'wala' as part of their land. On every estate there 
must be some waste, some uncultivated land, some clumps 
of trees, some land for firewood or, as here, a hollow 
where the water lies, which waits for the man of energy 
and capital to improve. The Crown surely cannot be pre­
sumed the owner of scraps of uncultivated land adjacent
to the cultivated land belonging to its subjects.--
I hope the plaintiff will get rggayment of the money 
paid by him to the Crown ."
The plaintiff under the law of Ceylon at the time had no right 
of action against the Crown for return of his money, without first 
obtaining the consent of the Attorney-General. Aside from that, 
the plaintiff was mulcted with costs both at first instance and on 
appeal. If the vendor in Saibo v. Andris was a subject of the 
Crown, then Saibo could have proceeded against him for deceit using 
the actio ?.njuriarum. There may in addition have been a matter for 
the application of the Criminal Law too. However, the Crown and 
its servants stood protected from any visitations of the law. The 
Waste Lands Ordinance was regarded by the people of Ceylon as a 
thoroughly pernicious piece of legislation. Given the industry 
and the acquisitive intent of the servants of the Crown, a waste 
land or an occupied land could very conveniently be found. The 
equal industry and the good intentions of the Judiciary, to a large 
measure, appear to have protected the subjects of the Crown in 
Ceylon from the encroachment of the Crown upon their immovables.
But, as we have seen, there was no law to prevent the Crown's 
encroachment upon the property of its subjects. But there was 
indeed a law to prevent the encroachment of the subjects upon the 
property of the Crown. It is to the latter we must turn at this 
point.
99(iii) Encroachment upon Crown Lands Ordinance
The Ordinance which was first enacted in 1840 allowed any person 
to lay an information in the District Court against any other person
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supported by an affidavit, charging him or her with having:
"without the permission of the Government, entered 
upon or taken possession of any land which belongs 
to, or which immediately prior to such entry is 
Crown Land". ^ 0
The District Court was empowered to order a delivery of pos­
session, which placed the defendant in a position of contempt, a crim­
inal offence, if he failed to obey that order. The Ordinance had 
a much wider significance than being a mere regulatory law. It 
expressly declared that:
"All forest, waste, unoccupied or uncultivated lands 
shall be presumed to be the property of the Crown until 
the contrary thereof be proved, and all chenas and other 
lands which can be only cultivated after intervals of 
several years shall, if the same be situate within the 
districts formerly comprised in the Kandyan provinces 
(wherein no thombo registers have been heretofore 
established), be deemed to belong to the Crown and not 
the property of any private person claiming the same against 
the Crown except upon proof only by such persons,
(a) of a Sannas or grant for the same together, with 
satisfactory evidence as to the limits and boundaries 
thereof; or
(b) of such customary taxes, dues, or servies rendered
to the Crown or other person ; or
(c) of his or his predecessors in title having made 
and maintained a permanent plantation in and upon the 
same for a period of not less than thirty years, or of 
his having otherwise improved the same and maintained
it in such improved state for such period, and in either 
case of his having held uninterrupted possession of the 
same during the whole of the said period." 101
In all other districts in Ceylon, chena and other lands which
can only be cultivated after intervals of several years shall be
deemed to be forest or waste lands within the meaning of this
102seption.
Section 7 clearly had an acquisitive function, but it was
hidden away in among sections performing a prohibitive function,
such as prohibiting the encroachment upon crown lands. Several
Memorials on this hidden aspect were presented to the Governor,
Sir Henry Ward, in 1859, when its full impact came into prominence.
These were transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
103
but with no real success. It is, however, interesting to note 
that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was far from being 
equivocal in his decision to deny the Memorials. In his reply 
denying the prayer that the provisions in Section 7 be repealed,
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the Duke of Newcastle wrote to Governor Ward:
"It will be for you to consider whether it will be 
possibly by the instrumentality of a Commission of 
inquiry or by any other means, to devise some satis­
factory measure for removing the difficulties which 
this subject is embarrassed. The question is depen­
dent so much more upon local circumstances than 
upon any doubtful points of law— 104
The provisions enacted in 1840 appear to have survived the 
passing decades. It has come down in its original form and remains 
a part of the Law of Independent Sri Lanka.
C.d) Some Concluding Remarks Regarding Land.
The Whole saga relating to land in this context could be narrated 
under three headings: The acquision, distribution and control of
land respectively. At each stage there appeared to have been an 
interplay of law and policy. Law appeared to play a prominent 
part at the stage of land acquisition and land control, while 
policy became an uppermost consideration at the stage of land dis­
tribution. Naturally, unless the acquisitive procedures were legal, 
doubts as to title could well have be-devilled the whole plan for the 
economic development of Ceylon. For no investor would have invested 
in land subject to a doubtful title. The process of acquisition of 
land was therefore subjected, principally, to two enactments. Namely, 
section seven of the encroachments upon Crown Lands Ordinance of 
1840 and the Registration of Temple Lands Ordinance of 1856.
The work of the Temple Lands Commission under the 1856 Ordinance 
and the effect of Section 7 of the 1840 Ordinance produced the same 
result. Namely, a fund of ownerless property which by the rules of 
the Common Law Cnamely Roman-Dutch) or English Law passed to 
the Crown, automatically and without more. The control of these lands 
too was subjected to the Laws of the country. This was necessary so as 
to bring into effect the instrumentalities of the Courts to protect 
the Crown lands. The crucial factor which determined the direction 
which the new economic pathway would take, was the policy towards the 
distribution of land which formed the economic infra-structure of 
the new colony, which would effectively control the economic base of the 
Colony. Who should control the economic base of the Colony was a 
political question and it was by a political decision, as earlier 
indicated, that that question was determined. Within the political 
framework in which the world was cast in the mid-ninteenth century 
the economic base was destined to be held by the .agents the
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colonial power and not by those who were subject to that power, 
namely the natives of Ceylon. Ideas of popular participation in 
the economic construct had no place in the Colony at the time 
in question. It is this utilisation of the 'agents of the colonial 
power1 that require consideration as a backdrop not only to this 
chapter but also to the next. Much the same type of approach 
appears to have been taken by the British Government concerning 
land in other colonies. In Kenya, the British administration 
there had chartered a plan which had le^k what Meek described 
as the 'European Highlands', to be retained by the white settler 
population. Under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, the Kenyan 
administration prohibited the alienation of land to persons of a 
different race without the prior written consent of the British 
Governor or his authorized agent. The 'uplands' which comprised of 
the 'European Highlands' had by 1915 become completely colonised 
by the European planting community. The 1915 Ordinance was a 
result of the Elgin Report on land tenure which recommended that 
as a matter of administrative convenience grants of land in the 
uplands should not be made to Asiatics. The concern for the Asiatics 
over the natives in this respect was due to the fact that it was 
found to be conceivable that the Asiatics may have been the only 
persons in 1915 with the sufficient economic means of buying land 
in the 'European Highlands', from a competitive market.***
III. The Post-Colonial Plan for the Reform of Paddy Land
Problems and issues concerning paddy lands have a complicated 
background. The growing of paddy, unlike any other agricultural 
crop, required the help not only of the initiated but also of the 
experienced. The several stages of preparation that a Paddy Land 
must undergo before sowing the paddy seed needs a great deal of 
experience and skill. The several stages that paddy cultivation 
involved, both in the art of irrigation and 'bunding;', between 
sowing the seed and harvesting, required a great deal of dedication, 
attention and skill. Equally 'the harvesting', 'the thrashing' and 
'chaffing' involved experience and hard labour. Out of these energies 
and exercises had arisen a determinable group of persons called 
the paddy farmers or Govias. The latter is a recognised profession
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and a committed Govia by necessity must abondon all other means of
livelihood. As much as the un-ski lied owner of a motor car may
engage a chauffer to drive him about; an un-skilled owner of a
paddy field must by necessity engage a Govia/ For in Ceylon,
as a result of family interests in land and private ownership of
property, many Paddy Land owners had little or no skill in farming
paddy. The position of the Govia was therefore a vital element in
the paddy planting industry in Sri Lanka. The Govias were engaged
upon an Ande basis, which meant, at least in the Northwestern
Provinces, the supplying of three-quarters of the crop to the
Govia if the land owner provided the seed paddy, manure and had
paid for all the labour connected with the whole enterprise. In the
latter arrangement the work of the Govia was limited to providing
his skills as the head of a 'gang of labourers' when engaged in
preparing the earth for the sowing. The land owner in this case
provided the labour. The Govia monitored the progress of the plant,
sprayed it with Insecticide, prepared the bund, supplied the water
and then again would act as the head of a 'gang of hired labourers'
during the harvesting, reaping, and thrashing periods. Whether it
was the three-quarter Ande arrangement or the one-quarter Ande
arrangement, the importance of a Govia's position in the whole
enterprise is undeniable.
Until 1953 there was no law governing the relationship between
112
the Govia and the owner. The Paddy Lands Act of 1953 was the
first attempt ever to be made towards regulating the historic
relationship between the Govia and the owner. By this Act,
Parliament gave a statutory basis to the Ande, which meant that
Govias were entitled by law to a particular portion of the yield
subject to performing particular types of duties. These were
113
spelt out by regulations made under the Act. The Act pro-
114hibited any adjustment of the stated proportions. The Act
in addition gave the Govia a security of tenure. The Act forbade
the owner from engaging a Govia for a period less than 5 years.
The Act however, prescribed several grounds upon which a sitting
Govia may be dispossessed. The Act introduced a legalised
system of rights and duties between the Govia and the owner. In
addition it provided a limited security of tenure up to five years.
117
That was all. The thrust of the Paddy Lands Act of 1958 was to 
provide a greater security to the Govia, whom the Act described 
as a Tenant-Cultivator.
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Section 4 of the Act detailed the extent of his interest.
"(3) The rights of the Tenant-Cultivator of any 
extent of paddy land shall not be affected 
in any manner by the sale*(whether voluntary 
or in execution of the decree of'a court), 
the transfer by gift, testamentary disposition 
or otherwise, the assignment or disposal or 
otherwise, or the devolution under the law 
of inheritance of the right, title and in­
terest of the landlord of such extent.
(4) The rights of a Tenant-Cultivator over any
extent of Paddy land shall not be sequestrated,
seized or sold in execution of the decree or
process of any court.”
In addition a Tenant-Cultivator may nominate any citizen of Ceylon 
118to succeed him, which nomination he may cancel during his life-
119
time and make a fresh or further nomination. The Act prescribed
the way in which such nominations, cancellations and re-nominations
120may be made. In the absence of a nomination of a person who
would succeed to his rights as a Tenant-Cultivator, his rights
121devolve upon his spouse. If there was no spouse then they
would become subjected to, (with the elder taking precedence oyer 
the younger) to the following order of precedence:
Sons, Daughters, Grandsons, Grand-daughters, father, 
mother, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews 
and nieces.
Where all these persons fail to accept the rights and the duties of
a Tenant-Cultivator the Act nominates the Cultivation Committee of
122the area, as a temporary successor only. Where the Cultivation
Committee of the area assumes the position of the Tenant-Cultivator
the landlord may if he so wishes, give notice to the Cultivation
Committee that he would like to become an Owner-Cultivator of that
Paddy Land. If no such notice is given within 30 days, the owner will
lose an opportunity of breaking the grip held by the Act over his
Paddy Land. In such an event, the Cultivation Committee is required
to select a suitable person from the locality who would assume the
123position of the Tenant-Cultivator. During the hiatus, the Culti­
vation Committee will remain responsible to perform the duties which
124
may have been performed by the deceased Tenant-Cultivator. The
Act of 1958 provided that the owners of Paddy Lands may within the
first five years of its operation apply to the Cultivation Committee
125
of the area to have him/her declared as the Owner-Cultivator.
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Where a person has been an infant owner, in 1963, he or she has six
126months after gaining majority, to make such an application.
The thrust of the Act was clear. Aside from conditions which 
may give the owner a cause to have the Tenant-Cultivator removed, 
the Tenant-Cultivator was not only secure throughout his own life­
time but would, in addition, acquire a proprietory interest which he 
could devise by will or other instrument to his heirs. The pro­
prietory nature of a Tenant-Cultivator's interest was further enhanced 
by the Act, by giving him the power to transfer his interests to 
anyone, other than a non-citizen, by way of gift or sale. This is
subject to the condition that notice be given to the owner of the
127Paddy Land in question.
The primary effect of the Act was to secure the position of 
the Tenant-Cultivator by creating a parallel interest in the Paddy 
Land in his favour. The proprietory nature of his interest secures 
to him, rights which are similar in character to those enjoyed by
the owner - namely, such interests as those that could be alienated
128 129
by the Tenant-Cultivator. The Agricultural Lands Law of 1973
130closely followed the provisions of the Act of 1958 which it
replaced. However, it made one basic change. Under the 1973 Law
the Tenant-Cultivator was limited in his power to transfer his
interests to persons mentioned in the Schedule to that Law, which
in fact were the same as the list of those who would succeed at
131his death, if he were to die intestate. Unlike the 1958 Act,
the 1973 Law permitted the Tenant-Cultivator to transfer his rights
132to the owner with the written consent of an Agricultural Tribunal.
The 1973 Law created an Agricultural Tribunal to which ihteralia all
133defects in the system could be referred. The Cultivation Committees
under both the Act of 1958 and under the Law of 1973 had identical 
tasks. These were to provide the administrative base for the running 
of the system which the Act and the Law had created so as to facili­
tate State intervention in Agriculture. Aside from securing the 
position of the Tenant-Cultivator vis-a-vis the owner, which indeed 
was a new step in the agricultural enterprises on the Island, the 
Law of 1973 (and before that the Act of 1958) introduced a basic 
administrative infrastructure which merits some comment.
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The Law of 1973 required the Minister to create a Cultivation
Committee for Agricultural Lands situated in each such area as to
134 ■ .be determined by him. The Minister was empowered to appoint
to it not less than ten personSwho were engaged in agriculture,
135
or such other persons as the Minister may deem suitable.
The role of the Cultivation Committee is one of an agent of the
136Agricultural Productivity Committee. The latter is a creation
137
of the Agricultural Productivity Law of 1972. The Agricultural
Productivity Committee was created to supervise the utilisation of
agricultural land for its maximum productivity. It was meant to be
a watch-dog committee which was required to report back to the
Minister, when ever a particular land owner appeared to act in
breach of his duty to make the maximum use of his land. In such
an event the Minister may, under the Agricultural Productivity Law,
issue 'a supervision order1 which would require such owner to cause
a satisfactory improvement of his land within the space of one 
139year. Failure to do so would result in his land been taken
out of his possession and been vested in some other person or body
under the condition that its productivity be increased. Towards
this end the Minister was empowered to issue an 'order of dis-
140possession' against the owner. The Agricultural Productivity
141Committee, created under the 1972 Law, performed a watch-dog
function towards helping its implementation. Returning to the
Cultivation Committees established under the Agricultural Lands
Law of 1973, these Committees were required by section 39 of
the 1973 Law to assist the Agricultural Productivity Committee,
inter alia, in the preparation and in the maintenance of a
register of the agricultural land^, recording the names of the
landlords, Owner-Cultivators, Tenant-Cultivators and collective
144farmers, as the case may be. In addition, section 40 of the
1973 Law left the Cultivation Committee with some specific fiscal
matters. Further, section 41 provided the Minister with the power
to determine, confer or impose additional powers and duties by
regulations made under this law. The multiplicity of committees
and authorities tended to confuse the duties left to each of these
bodies, which may sometimes cause difficulties of some magnitude
to the citizen. To solve such problems, the 1973 Law created an
145Agricultural Tribunal with wide powers. The Tribunal, was
empowered to settle disputes and give consent to the transfer of
138
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146the rights of a Tenant-Cultivator to the owner. It was further
empowered to award damages against the landlord and in favour of a
Tenant-Cultivator whenever the latter had been unlawfully evicted.
147The Agricultural Productivity Committes, The Cultivation Com­
mittees and the Agricultural Tribunals provided the infrastructure 
for the workings of an integrated policy towards paddy cultivation 
on the Island. One thing which the Acts of 1953, 1958 and the Law 
of 1973 failed to do was to provide for the distribution of Paddy 
Lands to the landless in such a way as to loosen the grip held on
the cultivation of Paddy on the Island, by a few. This was left
148
to be achieved by the Land Reform Laws of 1972 and of 1975.
It is to these that we must next turn.
(iv) The Post-Colonial Plan for the Reform of Dry Land,
As a matter of history the passage of the Land Reform Law of
1491972 marked the first step ever to be taken by any administration 
on the Island to introduce a system which could lead towards an 
equalisation of land holdings among the population of Ceylon. The 
aims of the Law was succinctly stated in Section 2 of the Law of 
1972 in this way:
"The purpose of this Law shall be to establish a 
land Reform Commission with the following objects:
(a) to ensure that no person shall own agricultural 
land in excess of the ceiling; and (b) to take over 
agricultural land owned by any person in excess of 
the ceiling and to utilize such land in a manner 
which will result in an increase in its productivity 
and in the employment generated from such land."
The achievement of these purposes required four Interrelated sets 
of activities. First, the appropriation of the land held in excess 
of the ceiling. Second, the distribution of the land so appro­
priated. Third, the provision of an institutional infra-structure 
to organise and effectuate the related activities in an integrated 
fashion. And fourth, the payment of compensation to those from 
whom the land was appropriated. It is in this sequence that the 
Land Reform Law of 1972 will be examined.
(a) The Appropriation of the Land
The Law ordained that the maximum extent or agricultural land 
that could be owned by any one person was twenty-five acres of
-447-
Paddy Land, if his land holdings were exclusively Paddy Lands, or
fifty acres of agricultural land of which no more than twenty acres
should be Paddy. Any agricultural land a person may hold in
excess of that ceiling was: "deemed to vest in the Land Reform
152Commission" and "be deemed to be held by such person under a
153statutory lease from the Commission." The appropriation by the
Commission was automatic upon a person becoming the owner of land 
in excess of the ceiling. His ownership immediately and without 
more was transformed into one of a lessee of the Land Reform Com­
mission. The statutory lease may be determined at any time, and
154m  any event shall not be in excess of one year. This
necessarily meant that within a time span of one year the Land 
Reform Commission will take actual possession of the land which 
was held under the statutory lease. During that year or part of 
the year, the statutory lessee (the former owner) was required to 
pay the Land Reform Commission a rent-charge. The rent charge for 
non-paddy land was one-fifteenth of the compensation which the Land 
Reform Commission shall pay to the statutory lessee. This one- 
fifteenth was calculated pro-tanto if the lease had lasted less than 
a period of one full year. For Paddy Land it was fixed at one- 
tenth of the compensation payable, again the amount was reckoned 
as an annual rent-charge.
One of the large gaps that was found in the Land Reform Law 
of 1972 was its application to the plantation industry comprising 
of companies owning large estates. The Law was designed towards 
imposing a ceiling on small, private land holdings. The impo­
sition of a fifty acre ceiling on a tea or rubber plantation 
could be disastrous, as fragmentation was always counter-productive 
to the plantations. As for 'company estates' any reform appeared 
to be one of total nationalisation and it was towards this end that 
the Government was moving between 1972 and 1975. A new dimension 
to the complex nature of the plantation industry were the "Agency 
Houses" which supervised them. The role played by the 'Agency 
Houses' was a vital element in the Tea, Rubber and Coconut plant­
ation industries owned by multi-national companies. The 'Agency 
Houses' managed these estates for the foreign based companies as 
their agents. They, therefore, was an element to be considered 
in any plan to nationalise the company estates on the Island. The
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Government drafted an amendment to the Land Reform Law of 1972 
which took into consideration the position of the Agency Houses 
in the formula for land reform. This became the Land Reform 
(Amendment) Law of 1975. It declared that every estate land
owned by public companies shall:
"(a) be deemed to vest in and be possessed by the
Land Reform Commission ; and (b) be deemed to be
managed under a statutory trust for and on behalf 
of the Commission by the agency house or organi­
zation which, or the person who, on the day immedi­
ately prior to the date of such vesting, was responsi­
ble for, and in charge of the management of such 
estate land, for and on behalf of such company, 
and such agency house, organisation or person 
shall, subject to the provisions of this part of 
this law, be deemed to be the statutory trustee 
of such estate land." 157
The Law clearly laid down the duties of the statutory trustee
and the way he was required to manage the vested lands. The
government appeared to have had some concern as to the reaction of
the Agency Houses in Sri Lanka to these radical and unprecedented
steps. After all, the amendment was effectively dismantling a vast
financial empire which the sterling companies had created for the
'metropolis' since the earliest days of British rule in Ceylon. Fearing
the possible counter moves the directorates in the 'metropolis*
may take through their agents, the Agency Houses in Sri Lanka, the 
158amending Law enacted the following section:
"Where the Minister in consultation with the Minister 
in charge of the subject of trade, the Minister in 
charge of planning and economic affairs and the 
Minister in charge of Finance, is of the opinion 
that it is necessary for the purpose of giving 
effect to this part of this law, to vest in the 
government, the business undertaking of any Agency 
House or organisation which, under this part of 
this law, is the statutory trustee of any estate 
land vested in the Commission, the Minister may 
request the Minister of Finance to vest such busi­
ness undertaking in the government under the 
provisions of the Business Undertaking (Acquisition)
Act, Act No. 35 of 1971, and accordingly, the 
Minister of Fiance may by order made under section 
2 of that Act vest such business undertaking in 
the government." 159
Besides the power to vest any Agency House in the Government, 
the amendment empowered the Minister to replace any Director or 
other Executive Officer of any Agency House established on the
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Island. This effectively gave the government the power to control the 
activities of the Agency Houses, without actually nationalising 
them. This in turn facilitated the Land Reform Commission to 
determine and to direct the way in which Estate Land vested in the 
Commission was administered. The amendment declared that the 
government may replace existing Directors and other persons if it 
appeared that such a replacement was necessary "for the good and 
proper management of any Estate Land vested in the Commission."
This provided the government with the means to act without actually 
having to acquire a particular Agency House under the Business 
Undertakings (Acquisition) Act of 1971.
The combined effect of the Principal Law and its amendment 
was to reform the ^ land tenure system on the Island in a way that 
the ownership of land shall not hereinafter be a means to capital 
accumulation by a few, but would to a large measure be a means towards 
achieving a greater participation in the nation's economy by many.
It was believed at the time that this would lead to the progressive 
economic development of the Island for the common good of its 
citizens. This end was naturally linked to the method of distribution 
and utilisation of the land acquired from the effective implementation 
of the Laws of 1972 and of 1975. The Island at this point appeared 
to have come a full-circle. The theme of the mid-nineteenth century 
was the extraction of land by legal means, so that land could be 
available to provide the underpinning for a successful process of 
capital accumulation for the 'metropolis'. The theme, almost a 
125 years later, was the return of that land back to the nation, again 
within the parameters drawn by the laws of the land for national 
development. It is this method for the return of capital by a pro­
cess of land distribution and land utilisation that must be the 
next topic for investigation.
(b) Distribution and Utilisation of the Land
162The distribution and utilisation of estate land followed a
163different route and pattern from that of non-estate land. The two 
therefore must be considered separately.
As to Estate Land, the large Tea, Rubber and Coconut estates
were preserved, unfragmented and were transferred mainly to corporations
established or to be established under the State Agricultural Cor-
164porations Act of 1972 or to the Ceylon State Plantations Corpora­
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tion established under the Ceylon State Plantations Corporations
Act of 1958. By this method the unity of the representative
estates was preserved while the profits were returned to the nation
through the Treasury. However, those that could be utilised without
loss by fragmentation were used for village expansion and other
public purposei^nd by alienations to individuals for the construction
167of residences for personal use. The rest of the land was utilised
by:
"— alienation by way of saie, exchange, rent, pur­
chase or lease to persons for agricultural develop­
ment or animal husbandry, or for a cooperative or 
collective form or enterprise, *68 or for a farm 
or plantation managed by the Commission directly or 
by its agents." 16”
It must be emphasized that estate land was largely used for 
national development projects.. The building of residential 
premises was perhaps the only non-productive enterprise for which the land 
was used. Land given to private persons "for agricultural develop­
ment or animal husbandry" may be considered as having at least a 
peripheral benefit for the nation as a whole.
In contrast, the non-estate land acquired under the ceiling on
170land holdings provisions of the Land Reform Law, had a different
distribution route and a different utilisation pattern. Such land was
distributed mainly to persons who did not have sufficient land to
achieve the 50 acre limit. The landless, and those with less than
50 acres, received the benefit of this category of land. The law
provided that the land acquired by the Land Reform Commission should
be utilised, inter alia for:
" agricultural development or animal husbandry
by way of sale, exchange, rent purchase or lease to 
persons who do not own agricultural land or who own 
agricultural land below the ceiling." 171 Alien­
ation by way of sale to persons who were minors 
at the time of the imposition of the ceiling 
on agricultural land and whose parents were
dispossessed of such land in excess of the ceiling
by reason of such excess land having vested in the 
Commission." 172
These two categories of persons (which includes the totally land­
less) were considered as being at the top of the list of potential 
grantees of these lands. In addition the lands were made available 
for all the other purposes enumerated under the (Amendment) Law
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of 1975. It was natural, and indeed was expected, that the
implementation of this programme for land reform could entail a 
complex bureaucratic network. To supply an infra-structure that 
could provide the bureaucracy that was required to function within 
a particular political framework, the Land Reform Law of 1972, 
established the Land Reform Commission, headed by a Commissioner 
responsible to the Minister of Agriculture and Land. The success 
or the failure of the Land Reform Programme ultimately lay in the 
hands of the Commission and it is to the Commission that one 
must next turn.
(c) The Land Reform Commission
The Land Reform Commission was established under the Land 
174Reform Law of 1972 and was utilised both under this principal
law and under its amendment of 1975. In other words, the Land
Reform Commission was put in charge of the reform of all land, both
non-estate (under the 1972 Law) and Estate (under the 1975 Law)
175Land. The Minister of Lands was empowered to appoint a chair-
176man for the Commission. Of the five members, the Minister was
required to appoint two members with experience in the administration 
of lands, land tenure, surveying or law. The other three were to 
be appointed after being nominated by the Ministers of Finance, 
Plantation Industry and Planning and Employment. These three
nominations were required to be drawn from the pool of state officers
177m  the service of these three ministries. In addition to the
five appointed members and the chairman, there were three ex officio
members, namely the Land Commissioner, the Commissioner of Agrarian
178Services and the Director of Agriculture. Besides the two
persons experienced in the administration of Lands etc., a wide
cross-section of the Departments of State connected with land,
land development and agriculture were represented in the Land
Reform Commission.
179
The Law detailed the powers and the functions of the Land 
Reform Commission in extenso. These were:
1. "To acquire, hold, take or give on lease or
hire, exchange, mortgage, pledge, sell or 
otherwise dispose of any movable or im­
movable property; "180
2. "To carry out investigations, surveys and
record data concerning and relating to any 
agricultural land and call for returns
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in the prescribed ^concerning and relating 
to agriculture land;
(This was a prelude to tracking down owners of land who had failed 
to declare the extent of their individual land holdings.)
3. 'To conduct, assist and encourage research into
all aspects of land tenure and reform;" 182
4. "To make charges for any services rendered by
the Commission in carrying out its business;" 1®^
5. "To establish and maintain branch offices for
the purpose of the Commission;"
6. "To call for and receive such documents relating
to title, valuation, surveys and plans for
agricultural land as may be necessary for 
carrying out such objects;” 1®^
(These steps were necessary for the computation of reasonable 
compensation to be paid to the owners.)
7. "To delegate to any member, officer or employee
of the Commission or any State officer, or 
any employee of a state corporation or local 
authority or to a District Land Reform Authority 
or to any Agricultural Productivity Committee 
established under any law any of its powers 
and functions other than the power to make 
rules [under s.57 ]
8. "To enter upon and inspect any agricultural
land;" 1®®
9. "To direct and decide all matters connected
with the administration of its affairs."
10. "To enter into and perform, either directly
or indirectly through any officer or agent 
of the Commission, all such contracts or 
agreements as may be necessary for enabling 
it to achieve the objects of this law and 
to exercise its powers under this law."
11. "To borrow money for the purposes of its
business;"
12. "To establish a provident fund and provide
welfare and recreational facilities, houses, 
hostels and other accommodation9for persons 
employed by the Commission."
13. "To do anything for the purpose of advancing
the skill of persons employed by the Commission 
vand the assistance or the provision by others 
of facilities for training persons required 
to carry out the work of the Commission."
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This catalogue of powers and functions have been included here 
in full to show the extent to which the success or the failure 
of the Land Reform Programme depended on the effectiveness of 
the Commission.
(d) Janawasa:
There was one important area in which the Land Reform Commission
had no power to interfere. That was in any social organisations
that may arise as a result of the distribution of large estates
to a number of individuals or individual families. There were
instances where persons banding themselves as private cooperatives
applied for land to set up a social unit akin to the Chinese Commune
or the Jewish Kibbutz. There was no infra-structure that could
integrate and hold such social units together as a cohesive and
effective means for development. To fill this vacuum the Government
194passed the Janawasa Law of 1976. The Law created a Janawasa
Commission in Part V of the Law, to which all individual social 
arrangements forming Janawasa could be affiliated. Under the 
Law any group of citizens of Ceylon, who are not less than 18 
years of age may form a Janawasa and have their own social unit 
so recognised by the Janawasa Commission, provided that the 
objects of their association fall within the following framework. 
Namely, that the objects of their Janawasa shall be:
"(a) (i) To foster the collective management and
development of agricultural land, and the 
collective development of animal husbandry 
and agro-based and cottage, industries;
(ii) To ensure maximum productivity and maxi­
mum utilisation of agricultural land for 
maximum employment and profit sharing in 
proportion to the quality and quantity 
of the work output;
(iii) To promote the social and cultural develop­
ment of the members;
(iv) To promote .and foster group farming among 
owners or cultivators of neighbouring 
agricultural land; or
195
Cb) To provide agricultural machinery, imple­
ments and i: 
to members.
np^g and other such services
Provided that the objects are as detailed as above and the member­
ship is of citizens over the age of 18, the Janawasa may apply for
197registration with the Janawasa Commission. The issuance of a
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certificate of registration by the Janawasa Commission is conclusive
198proof of its registration and thereafter the Janawasa assumes
199
the personality of a body corporate. Once registered the
Janawasa may acquire land in one of three ways:
(a) By leasing land from the Law Reform Commission.
Cb) By leasing land from any State Institution.
(c) By any other means. ^00
The most likely source of land for the Janawasa has been the Law
Reform Commission. Land leased by them may be purchased from the
201
Commission at some point prior to the expiry of the lease.
The Janawasa is forbidden by Law to use its land for the benefit
of any individual member of the Janawasa. The idea of collecti-
202visation is therefore pushed to its limit. However, the
Janawasa may permit individuals to build a house for residential 
purposes Mon such terms and conditions as may be determined by 
the Janawasa.” By a blanket provision, the Janawasa Law con' 
ferred upon every Janawasa on the Island additional powers.
Section 12 reads:
"A Janawasa may in addition to the powers and functions
conferred or assigned to it by the law, exercise and
discharge all such powers and functions as are necessary 
or conducive to the attainment of its objects or as ^q3 
may be conferred on or assigned to it by, by-laws.”
Part III of the Janawasa Law laid down its constitutional structure,
regarding the holding of meetings, the structure of its council of
management (a hind of a Committee of management), the Rights, powers
and privileges of members and the conditions under which membership
may be lost. The law also prescribed that the shares held by its
members may be sold or inherited only by those who are members of
204the Janawasa. The law further created a Federation of Janawasa
205by associating other Janawasas with it. The idea of the Federa­
tion was to expand the participation of Janawasas in the march 
towards increasing agricultural productivity, by the inter change
of ideas and experiences. It was also a method by which the
206marketing of products may be greatly facilitated. The overseeing
effect of the Janawasa Commission keeps the Janawasa management 
council of each Janawasa active and correct in their functions. The 
Janawasa Commission, therefore, carried the power to punish any
2lmiscreants among the family of Janawasas by compelling dissolution. 
Each Janawasa was required to have its accounts audited and profits
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distributed among its members. The powers and the functions
209 ■ ■ .of the Janawasa Commission appeared to be co-termmous with
those of the Land Reform Commission, to which reference has al- 
210ready been made. The Janawasas appeared as a direct social
consequence of the land reform movement of Sri Lanka. What is 
important is to emphasize that the Janawasas were an obvious and 
anticipated result of the land reform movement and the legal 
desiderata introduced through the Janawasa Law of 1976 seemed 
adequate to supply this new social dimension with an effective 
institutional base. The last item that needs discussion is the 
question of compensation for lost land.
C_e) Compensating the landowners.
A basic problem concerning compensation was the identifi­
cation of the land owner. In the previous chapter it was pointed 
out that the land tenure system among the Ceylonese was a most 
complex one. Particularly complex was the inter-play of relation­
ships created under the Roman Dutch Law by various institutions 
such as Hypothecs, Fiduciae and Fidei Commissum. In addition 
there had been land grants under the Land Development and Land 
Settlement ordinances to which reference had previously been made. 
To solve a few of these problems, the Land Reform Law of 1972 
declared, that:
"where land is held subject to ’a mortgage, a lease, 
a usufruct or a life interest, the mortgagor, the 
lessor or the person in whom the title to the land 
subject to the usufruct or life interest is; and 
where any land is held on a permit or a grant 
issued under the Land Development Ordinance the
911permit-holder or the alienee of such grant,
was considered as the owner of such agricultural land. Such a
statement, not only helped to locate the ow.er for the payment
of compensation, but it also helped towards determining the
ownership of land for the purposes of ascertaining whether or
not the ceiling had been exceeded by any particular Individual.
The section in effect prevented a person from claiming to hold
less land on the grounds that some of the land he holds was not
in his absolute ownership. As for property under, Fidei Commissa
and, entailed property under trust settlements, the abolition of
212
Fidei commissa and Entails Act of 1972 was sufficient to pro­
vide the solution. Under that Act, all land under Fidei Commissa 
and all entailed land were declared to be free from such encum­
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brances and was declared to be held absolutely by the person in 
lawful possession as the Fiduciary or as the beneficiary, as the 
case may be. In the case of successive interests created by a 
trust or by a Fidei Commissum, the interest of the present 
beneficiary shall be absolutely free from any encumbrances, so
that he could for the purposes of the Land Reform Law be deemed
213to be its absolute owner. As for future creations of Fidei
Commissa or Entails, the Act declared that all such creations shall
214be void and of no effect. Having thus cleared some of the
difficulties connected with ownership, the Land Reform Law of 
1972 and its amendment of 1975, concerning estate land, were able 
to introduce a comprehensive method for compensating the owners 
of the land who had lost their land holdings under these two 
laws.
The Land Reform Laws of 1972 and of 1975 introduced three
methods of compensation. First, the law of 1972 laid down a thumb
rule of payment, of a sum not exceeding fifteen times the average
annual profit as assessed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue,
for non-paddy land and a sum not exceeding ten times the annual
215
average profit similarly assessed for Paddy Land. Second,
the value assessed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue for the
216
year ending March 31st, 1971 for the purposes of wealth tax.
The compensation payable shall be the greater of these two amounts.
Where the land had neither been assessed for Income Tax nor for
Wealth Tax then, the governments chief valuer shall make his
own valuation for the purposes of Income Tax and for the purposes
of Wealth Tax, so that the methods laid down above could be put 
217
into effect. Thirdly, none of these two methods was appli­
cable to estate land: the Land Law Reform (Amendment) Law of
1975 subjected the determination of compensation for estate land 
to the assessment of the government’s chief valuer. In both 
instances, the quantum of compensation offered by the Land Reform
Commission for estate land and for non-estate land, could be
218challenged before a Board of Review. A decision by.that Board,
was declared to be final and therefore may not be called into
219question before a court of law. The payment of compensation
for both types of land,estate and non-estate,is partly in money
220 221 and partly in bonds called Land Reform Bonds. The Bonds
were normally payable at its maturity in 25 years, with an annual
222
interest rate of 7%. But they could be surrendered earlier
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and their value obtained earlier, if the moneys thus obtained were
223 1
required to he used for one of three purposes^ gamely, Qi)
Mfor agricultural, industrial or other development purposes approved
224
by the Minister of Lands.” £ii) "For the construction of
225
residential buildings with the approval of the Minister.” Ciii)
226”For any other purpose as may be approved by the Minister.”
Besides these, the bonds may be used at its par value for the
payment of taxes, Captial Levy, Estate Duty and Income Tax at any 
227
time. The underlying policy here is that the land acquired by
the Land Reform Commission and money paid by the goverment, on 
behalf of the nation, must as far as possible be utilised for 
national development purposes. It is this thinking that appeared 
to have driven the government to limit the maturing date of the 
bonds to 25 years subject to the earlier release of Its value for 
specific development purposes which must first be approved by the 
Minister.
(V) The Post-Colonial Plan for the Reform of Housing Property.
(a) An Introduction.
The Land Reform Movement did not affect the ownership of 
houses. The value of land in the towns was many times more than 
its value in the rural areas. Therefore, owners of land in towns 
were not planters but renters of houses. They owned very small ex­
tents of land but the profits they derived through renting of houses 
were immeasurably more than what a similar plot of land could bring 
from the plantations in the rural areas. One important fact 
was that the urban land owners owned much less than the ceiling 
of 50 acres. One important mistake in the Land Reform Law was that 
it did not distinguish urban land from rural land. Therefore, the 
need to reform urban land by some other means became a matter
of great controversy. The Ceiling on Housing Property Law of 
228
1973 was designed to plug that gap. Under that Law, what was 
controlled was ownership of houses and not the ownership of land.
The persons who held no more than an acre of land with more than 
one house standing on that fell within the ambit of the Ceiling 
on Housing Property Law, where ever the land was situated. The 
Ceiling on Housing Property Law could therefore be considered as 
an adjunct to the Land Reform Law of 1972. It is to this that we 
now turn.
i- ,
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The Law which was passed for the reform of Housing Property
229
holdings was the Ceiling on Housing Property Law of 1973. It
is important to state that the reform of housing property, similar 
to the reform of land was not based on value but on quantity. The 
number of acres of land under the Land Reform Law and the number 
of houses under the 1973 Law formed the central issue. The 
failure to link both Land Reform and Housing Reform to value as 
distinct from numbers appear to have been a serious error in the 
two enactments. If the basic premise is one of equalisation of 
wealth through central directives, then the person who owns three 
modest houses in a little village in the North Central Province 
should not be treated equally with someone owning the same number 
of houses in the Western Province. Even less justifiable should 
be a comparison between a house owner in rural Dambulla and a house 
owner in the capital city of Colombo. This fundamental error 
of failing to tie reform with value rather than with numbers left 
some of the house holders in prestigious areas of Colombo unaffected 
because they were within the specified number of houses (namely 
owning two]. But the middle class native of Dambulla with three 
houses, which may well be less than 1% the value of one of the 
houses in a prestigious suburb of Colombo such as 'Cinnamon Gardens' 
would fall outside the ceiling on housing property under the Law.
The result will be that the citizen from Dambulla would be 
required to surrender his one extra house to the National Housing 
Commission. The value of that surrendered house to the income 
of the citizen from Dambulla could be most significant. But 
the value of that house when compared with any one of the 
houses from 'Cinnamon Gardens' would be infinitesimal. The reform 
therefore did not effectively harmonise the national wealth but 
provided an extra house for the home less in Dambulla. The houses 
left to be privately owned in Colombo had now become real sources 
of wealth with exhorbitant rentals; for the Rent Restriction Laws 
did not control the rents beyond a basic level at which Colombo 
housing property was not normally available. The result therefore 
was that housing in Colombo became such a source of wealth that 
nationals of the Island found it difficult, if not impossible, 
to find accommodation in Colombo within their economic limits.
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The tenants in Colombo, therefore, became the very rich friendly 
aliens with access to convertible currencies tied to foreign 
earnings. This result must be related to the error of judgment 
seen in the Law of 1973. As most of the houses beyond the 
ceiling have now been allotted to the homeless, it is difficult 
to see how this Law could now be changed in a way that wealth
and not the numbers would become the key to its application.
The Law could be examined under the same four categories 
chosen for the analysis of the Land Reform Law. Namely, the 
appropriation of the houses for distribution, the distribution 
of the houses after they are acquired, the infra-structure for the 
integration and effective implementation of these activities 
chartered by the Law and lastly >the problem of compensation.
(b) The Appropriation of the Houses
The Law of 1973, in section 2, states:
Cl) The maximum number of houses which may be owned 
by an individual who is a member of a family
shall be such number of houses which together
with the number of houses owned by the other 
members of that family is equivalent to the 
number of dependent children, if any, in that 
family, increased by two.
(2) The maximum number of houses which may be owned 
by an individual who is not a member of a family 
shall be two.
C3) The maximum number of houses which may be owned 
by any body of persons, corporate or unincor­
porate, shall be such number of houses as is 
determined by the Commissioner to be necessary for 
the purpose of providing residence to the 
employees and functionaries of such body or of 
carrying out the objects (other than any object 
for the letting of houses on rent) of such body.
(4) An individual shall for the purposes of this
Law be deemed to be a member of a family if
such individual has a spouse or a dependent
child or is a dependent child of any indivi- ozn 4
dual.” 250
Despite the complexity of the wording in the foregoing section,
the law limits an individual to two houses, Any number of houses
owned by a person in excess of two are vested in the Commissioner
for National Housing. In computing this number, the Law requires
that a person who constructs houses for sale shall not be considered
231
as a person who owns them provided that the house is not occupied
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by any person before it is sold and provided that it is in fact
232sold within a period of 12 months after its completion. But
a person who has taken steps to demolish existing houses so that
the number shall become two, will be deemed to be the owner of
the demolished houses, provided he had demolished them at a time
233on or after November 9, 1971. Amalgamation of two or more
houses is permitted, if it appears to the Commissioner of Housing
that the requirements of any particular family demands such an 
234amalgamation. Houses built on land leased by the government
to an individual or by an individual to another individual will be
235considered as a house owned by the lessee. This provision
catches the Chena owner who farms the Chena land granted or leased
by the Government in some remote part of the Island, who may have
constructed more than two modest houses. The value of this kind
of housing bears no real significance to the overall purposes of
this law, namely for the control of wealth. The Only part of the
law which appeared to relate to the question of wealth was Part II.
Under that part, no person was permitted to construct a house in
excess of a floor space of 2,000 square feet including the thick-
236ness of the external walls. The law further placed a limit on
the space on which such a property was built. In municipal areas
the maximum extent of the land permitted to be utilised is 20
perches while in the urban areas it is 40 perches. No control of
237any sort was placed for rural areas. Further, the cost of
construction of a house was limited to a sum fixed by the Minister
of Housing, as per square foot of construction. A violation of
this provision was made a criminal offence, punishable by a fine of
not less than three times the amount spent in excess of the fixed 
238amount. It is a curious fact that the government, while attempting
to tie houses-to-be-built to a value indicator, failed to use the
239
same indicator as a basis for housing reforms. By an amendment 
to the Principal Law, the government added in 1976 four additional 
grounds on which housing property may vest in the National Housing 
Commission. These four new grounds were; where the owner of a 
house:
(i) had left Sri Lanka and has obtained a foreign 
citizenship;
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(ii) had been residing abroad for a continuous period 
of 10 years;
fiii) had left Sri Lanka for the purposes of settling 
abroad;
(iv) is not in existence, is not known,- or cannot 
be traced.
In each of these instances, the tenants of such houses may pur­
chase the house from the Commissioner of National Housing. This 
naturally affected absentee landlordism which had recently become 
prevalent in Sri Lanka, due to the increase of immigration by 
Sri Lankans to foreign countries. A principal lacuna in the Law 
was that it did not define as to what constituted a house. That 
left the court with a discretion to determine the applicability 
of this Law as a preliminary issue in any litigation. Grey areas 
such as the corner boutique attached to a residence could raise nice 
questions of Law and Fact. However, there are no reported cases 
as yet on this question.
(c) The distribution and utilisation of the appropriated 
houses.
24GWithin 12 months of this law coming into effect, all houses
in excess of the ceiling were deemed to have vested in the National
241Housing Commission, per force the Law. The Commissioner was
authorised to transfer the houses vested in him to any local authority,
government department or public corporation, subject to such terms
242and conditions as the minister may determine. The local authori­
ties usually rented those premises to persons in their localities 
at a nominal rent. As for government departments and public cor­
porations, the houses transferred to them were used exclusively 
for the benefit of such institutions. One of the recurring pro­
blems arising out of these arrangements were the unauthorized 
transfer of houses to other persons by the individuals to whom 
the local authorities or public corporations had rented or leased 
them.
To prevent this kind of misuse of the facilities provided,
the government enacted the Housing (Special Provisions) Law of 
2431974. Under the provisions of that law, all persons who had
a right of occupancy to premises owned and provided by: (i) the 
Commissioner of National Housing; (ii) Local Authority; Ciii) The
244Commissioner of Local Government, and £iv) any public corporation
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were prohibited from transferring that right of occupancy to some
other person without the prior authorisation of the "appropriate 
245
authority." The Law defined the "appropriate authority" in 
each case as being:
(1) The Commissioner-in the case of the National 
Housing Board. 246 
Cii) The Municipal Commissioner, the chairman of a 
village committee, a town council or an urban 
council-in the case of local authorities. 247 
Ciii) The Commissioner of Local Government. 248 
Civ) The head of a public corporation. 24-9
A breach of these provisions was made a criminal offence, punish­
able upon a summary conviction by a fine of 500/rupees or with 
imprisonment for six weeks or both. However, the Commissioner was
authorised to offer houses for sale, first to the tenant-in-occupancy
250and thereafter to others who own less than two houses. It is
this that became the high point in the implementation of this law.
For the tenants and the homeless were benefited by being given the
opportunity to acquire houses of their own at a very nominal price.
By an amendment to the Principal Law, the Ceiling on Housing
251
Property C.Aroenclment) Law of 1977 the Commissioner was empowered to 
transfer the ownership to the tenant of a house where the rent 
is not more than 25 rupees and which had become vested in the 
Commission under the Principal Law. It was further declared that
there shall he no stamp duty oft any payment of a purchase price
252regarding that transfer. In addition to the vesting of the
house, the law declared that certain appurtenances connected with
253the house, vest with it. These are: a reasonable extent of
254land necessary for the proper use of the house and in the 
case of flats, "land and other rights as are appurtenant to the 
flat." 255
256The law relating to condominium properties was reformed
subsequent to the Ceiling of Housing Property Law, in the same
257
year. Under the Apartment Ownership Law of 1973 apartment
258
dwellers were empowered to organise themselves into Associations
so as to regulate among themselves the use of common amenities
259
pertaining to the apartment block. Servitudes, ‘ the surrounding
land and other common elements such as staircases and approach-
260passages were deemed to be held in common for the use and enjoy-
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ment of apartment dwellers. All these rights and privileges
were subject to the overriding requirement to register the
262’Condominium Plan’ with the Registrar of Lands. While em­
powering the Registrar of Lands to register the Condominium
263Plan the Law laid down the matters that must be included in
264
the plan that was submitted for registration in an explicit way.
The purpose of the Apartment Ownership Law of 1973, appeared to be 
to integrate the community that had been established by virtue of 
apartments being transferred from one of tenant-occupancy into 
one of owner occupancy as a result of the application of the 
Ceiling on Housing Property Law of 1973. Among tenants the inter­
personal rights and duties became regulated by the owner of the 
apartment block. But now, when each of them had become the
absolute owner of the apartment they occupy, the inter-personal
relationships became differently conceived requiring different 
modalities for their enforcement. The Commissioner for National 
Housing was in no way considered to be in the position of the
original owner and it was this that required the passage of the
Apartment Ownership Law of 1973. Related to this aspect of apart­
ment ownership and dwelling was the establishment of a Common
265 266Amenities Board in 1973. The Common Amenities Board Law,
which created a Common Amenities Board, a Public Authority, just
prior to the passage of the Apartment Ownership Law, required the
Board to ’’control, manage, maintain and administer the Common
Amenities and the common elements of units of accommodation” in
267apartment blocks. The link between the two pieces of legis­
lation was struck by empowering not less than 75% of the owners of 
an apartment block to apply to the Common Amenities Board, a
public authority to have the provisions of the Common Amenities
268
Board law apply to their property. By these means the
legislature had attempted to provide a viable infra-structure to 
support the changes that an apartment dweller would surely undergo 
in being transformed from a tenant-occupier status to that of 
an owner-occupier status.
(d) The National Housing Commission
In 1954, the United National Party administration introduced
269the National Housing Act. The Act merely provided the infra­
structure, together with financial backing, to inaugurate a pro­
gramme of building houses for rent and rent-purchases. The Act
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created a National Housing Fund, which derived its financial support 
mainly from the Treasury. ^
Loans from this fund were made available to Building Societies,
272 273Housing Bodies and Building Companies. . The Act provided
274
for the appointment of a commissioner for National Housing 
275
and a staff capable of putting the objects of this Act into 
effect. The objects which the commissioner and his staff were 
required to achieve were described widely in section 2 of the Act.
These were:
Ca) the construction of buildings for residential purposes— ;
Cb) the manufacture, importation of supply of materials 
required for the construction of such buildings;
Cc) the provision of roads, water, electricity, gas and 
sewage;
Cd) the administration, management or control of buildings 
and building schemes;
(e) the provision of amenities for the inhabitants of any 
area in which any housing scheme has been carried out 
including transport and other services;
C.f) any other prescribed objects;
Cg) any object reasonably connected with or ancillary to 
any of the objects specified in paragraphs Ca)“Cf);
(h) the development of land for the carrying out of 
any of the objects herein before specified; ^76
Supporting these objects, the Act authorised the Commissioner of
277National Housing to lend money to prospective house builders
who were building societies, housing bodies and building companies.
279The government under the Act guaranteed the re-payment of the
loans, by charging them on the Consolidated Kind. The Act
empowered the Commissioner to acquire land for house building
281purposes under the Land Acquisition Act and left Crown Land
required for the purposes of carrying out the objects of this Act,
282at the Commissioner's disposal. Houses subject to this scheme
were given a special position by the Act. Section 90 Cl) read:
"The income accruing to any person from any new 
house shall be exempt from income tax under the 
Income Tax Ordinance in respect of the year of 
assessment commencing on the 1st day of April,
1955, and each of the seven years of assessment
immediately succeeding."
These provisions indicate that the aims and objects of the Act 
were to put more houses in the hands of private individuals who 
may rent and acquire an income which would be free from Income Tax 
for at least seven years. The expression 'Income' for the purposes
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of s. 90 (1) was defined in this way:
"If the house is let, the income accruing to that 
person by way of rent; or if the house is not let 
but is occupied by that person, the income that would 
accrue to that person by way of rent if it were 
let." 283
The National Housing Commission, until 1973 provided that in­
stitutional base for financing the building of houses for rent.
It was an element in the free market economy within which the own­
ership of houses was conceived since Independence. It is ironical 
that the same commission was utilised by the 1973 Law to reverse 
this economic policy by introducing a centrally directed ceiling 
on housing property ownership.
The National Housing Commission which was established under
284
Part II of the National Housing Act of 1954, provided the
administrative infra-structure for the implementation of the
Ceiling on Housing Property Law of 1973. Aside from the community
arrangements introduced under the Apartment Ownership Law of 1973,
the reform of housing did not require the establishment of
social arrangements similar to the Janawasas. However, by an
amendment to the present law in 1974, this principal law was
excluded from applying to cases where members of Janat>rasa were
permitted to construct their own houses for their own occupation
for so long as they do remain members of such Janawasas. The
285
Ceiling on Housing Property (Amendment) Law of 1974, declared 
in section 2 that:
"a house owned by a body of persons which is let by
such body to a person other than an employee or
functionary of such body shall not be taken into 
account in determining the number of houses necessary 
for the purpose of providing residence to the em­
ployees and functionaries of such body. 286
Besides this amendment the government did not find it necessary 
to provide any additional support to the Commissioner of National 
Housing. The powers he had, arising out of the National Housing 
Act of 1954 (*>^-deemed sufficient for the implementation of the 
Housing Property reforms entrusted to him by the 1973 Law.
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(e) Compensating the owners of Houses acquired under the Law.
Although the method of computation and the quantum of compen­
sation fundamentally differed from that which was used under the 
Land Reform Law, the method of payment and the conditions of pay­
ment appear to be a carbon copy of what was introduced in the Land
Reform Law of 1972. Compensation for houses acquired by the
287
Commission was payable partly in cash and partly in bonds.
But unlike the higher interest rate of 7% under the Land Reform
Law, here the bonds under the Law which would mature in 25 years,
288
carried an interest rate of 5%. The bonds under this Law
were capable of being transferred as a gift inter-vivos or by will,
289to one’s spouse or children and they could be cashed in at
anytime, for the same kind of purposes for which the ’Land Reform
290Bonds’ were considered for instant payment. These similar­
ities cease at this point at which the method for the computation 
of compensation comes into play. Of these the lesser amount 
becomes payable. Under the Land Reform Law too there were two 
methods for the computation of compensation for non-estate Land.
Of the two, there, the highest value became payable. Returning 
to the two methods of computation of compensation for the loss
of Houses: First, the market value of the house at the time of
291
appropriation was determined. Second, the market value of the
house on April.1st, 1957 is determined. Then, that value is 
increased by a figure of 6% for each year thereafter until the 
point at which the house became vested under this law is reached. 
The amount payable as compensation is the lesser of these two 
sums.
The higher rate of interest and the higher value of payment
under the Land Reform Law and the lower rate of interest and the
lesser value of payment, between two determinate values under the
Ceiling on Housing Property Law cannot be adequately explained as
a matter of serious policy. However, it is important to say that
while the Land Reform Law was the creation of the Minister of
292Lands, a Kandyan Land owner, the Housing Property Law was the
creation of the then Secretary General of the Communist Party 
293
(Moscow Wing). Whether that explains adequately these two
different approaches to the two Laws, is not a matter meriting
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serious thought.
(VI) Reflections ori the Reform of Immovable Property
In the lesser developed countries comprising the former 
colonial territories, the ownership of immovable property became 
the key to economic power. Often the control of economic power 
became the key to political power. And thereby political power 
became co-axial with the ownership of land. The underlining 
reason for this fact was that the colonial economic foundations 
were not built on industries but on land. The emphasis was on 
the production of the primary elements and not of manufactured 
items. Therefore, the reform of land was considered as a hey 
element in the formula worked out for the reform of the socio­
economic structure of a lesser developed country. These cursory 
observations apply, with full force, to the conditions found in 
Ceylon at the dawn of Independence in 1948. Tt is safe to assume 
that the land reform programme introduced in the present decade 
was primarily aimed towards altering the social formations that were
found at the time of Independence. These formations were main-
'\
tained by successive Administrations without any noticeable change. 
It must be said at once that the land reform movement by itself 
could not have brought about a detectable change in the original 
social formations inherited from colonial times. The land reform 
movement was one important catalyst for change. Changes in the 
education programme which had come down from the. colonial times 
and changes in the emphasis placed on Indigenous languages were 
some of the other catalysts for social change. These have been 
considered in previous chapters of this work. Despite the 
association of these catalysts, in a grand design for change,
Land Reform must be considered as an instrument of considerable 
strength forged towards dismantling the socio-economic power of 
a large slice of the population that had contributed to the 
particular social formations inherited from the colonial days.
To achieve this end it becomes both important and necessary 
to link any programme for land reform to the ’value factor’ 
rather than to the 'quantity factor’. This distinction seems 
fundamental to the planning of a Land Reform Programme for any 
lesser developed country. A basic error in the programme 
structured for Sri Lanka was that the programme was linked to 
the 'quantity factor* and not to the 'value factor*. For an acre
-469-
of land in Colombo or a house in Colombo was worth several times 
more than a house in rural Walahapitiya or 5Q acres of land in 
the North Central Province. Besides, in the computation of the 
50 acres, the owner was free to keep the best land in the best 
location and deliver to the Land Reform Commission land of 
little value and often of little utility. This kind of tactic 
could effectively frustrate the principal aims of the Land Reform 
Movement. For the transference of land with a low fertility con­
tent in the soil could substantially affect the fortunes of the 
landless peasants to whom the Land Reform Commission invariably 
transferred land for agricultural purposes. All these problems 
could have been avoided, had the Government proceeded along a 
'value factor' basis rather than upon a 'quantity factor' basis. 
This underlying error of judgment appears to have adversely 
affected the whole programme for land reform in Sri Lanka. Both 
the Ceiling on Housing Property Law of 1973 and the Land Reform 
Law of 1972 had only been marginally effective, if at all, 
in cutting any decisive inroad^into the existing social-formations 
of Sri Lanka. The resulting system of rights, to land and 
housing property distributed as a result of the reforming laws, 
made the introduction of any changes to the original programme 
for reform, at this stage, likely to cause a great deal of In­
convenience. Any change to a 'value factor' oriented system of 
land reform now could cause very considerable injustice. The 
choice of the quantity factor should explain, at least partly, 
why the land reform programme in Sri Lanka had failed to achieve 
the desired results.
The Land Reform CAmendment) Law of 1975, which concerned 
estate land, was better conceived. This was so, because it was 
directed to a particular category of land and therefore to a 
particular economic unit. The estate lands to which it applied 
formed the sum total of the infra-structure of the colonial 
economy. The nationalisation of the estate lands was tantamount 
to the absorption of that infra-structure into the economy of 
the whole nation. That largely was the effect of vesting estate 
land in the Land Reform Commission and subsequently in the 
Ministry for the Plantation Industry. The 1975 Act was conceived 
within the framework of a 'value factor' rather than a 'quantity 
factor', for it did not bring into effect the 50 acre limit
294
imposed by the Principal Act. The three pieces of legislation
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central to this area have attempted to avoid the possibility of 
conflicts arising out of their implementations. They had care­
fully defined the concept of 'owner1 in a way that 'the lessee' 
and the 'grantee' of Crown Lands, inter alia Tell into the cate­
gory of 'owner'. The abolition of Fidei Commissa and.Entailed 
Property Law of 1972 had been introduced so as to help in avoiding 
any disputes concerning the rights of a 'fiduciary' or a 
'beneficiary'. Further, by subjecting the assessment of compen­
sation to the sphere of administrative and bureaucratic action, 
without any resort to the courts, the government had effectively 
restricted the operation of the land reform programme to that 
nebulous area of Government, called political policy. This 
approach effectively increased the power of the Bureaucracy and 
any ills of the system must therefore be related to that quarter 
normally referred to as the Civil Service. This indeed was the 
state bureaucracy.
It had previously been mentioned with reference to Education 
and Language that the role of law in development was to blend 
Government policy with social policy so that social changes could 
to a large measure be controlled and directed so as to conform with 
policy. The legislations concerning Land Reform did perform such 
a function. They merely related the policy of the Government 
at the time, to social needs.
The reform of non-paddy land and housing property was an 
answer to the concentration of land and housing property in the 
hands of a few, thus creating an acute state of landlessness and 
homelessness on the Island. But the reform of Paddy Land was an 
answer to several complex social and economic problems. The main 
problem was an economic problem where the Paddy Lands had fallen in 
to disuse and neglect under a 'dead hand'. Paddy Lands had 
become vested in family interests and persons who should rightly 
be concerned in developing the potential of such land had taken
up other employment leaving the tasks of a Govia, to paid labour.
295
The Minister of Agriculture while proposing the Paddy Lands 
Bill alluded to this in the following passage in his speech:
"It is only right to provide opportunities for a 
man to become a carpenter because paddy cultivation 
is for people who are interested in paddy culti­
vation. It is not for people who are interested
in clerical work . Paddy cultivation should be
undertaken by people who are interested in Cultivation,
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who understand cultivation, who know the problems 
of agriculture and it is for that purpose that 
the various clauses are in the Bill to see that 295 
a certain standard of cultivation is maintained.1'
Connected with the economic problem was the non-availability of 
land for paddy cultivation. As an end result of the concentration 
of Paddy Lands in the hands of a few, less and less of such land 
had been "Asweddumized" - a term used for preparing the soil for 
planting paddy. This had progressively decreased the extent of 
land available for cultivation while the extent of cultivable land 
lying fallow had increased during each year. The Land Reform Laws 
and the Paddy Lands Acts had all attacked this basic problem by both 
ferreting out land with a potential for paddy cultivation and by 
distributing them among those who were most suited to cultivate 
them. As early as in 1951, when one of the earliest Bills on 
the reform of Paddy Lands were being debated, the then Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr. Bandaranaike remarked:
"An interesting fact was brought to my notice the 
other day that in about 1930 or 1931, according to 
the figures in the Government reports, there were 
850,000 acres under Paddy Cultivation in the 
country. For last year, in spite of the fact 
that over a period of 15 to 20 years about 100,000 
to 150,000 new acres have been asweddumized in 
the dry zone, the total number of acres that were 
cultivated for the Maha season was only 650,000 
in this country." ^97
Another factor for underdevelopment was the problem of ownership. 
Unlike in the Land Law in England where there was a recognition of 
primogeniture, the Roman Dutch. Law which was applicable in Ceylon 
gave rise to a position of co-ownership. During the 1951 debate, 
the then Minister of Finance, Hon. J. R. Jayawardene explained 
this problem:
"In Ceylon, once a parent dies or an owner of a land 
dies, unless he has passed over the ownership by a 
will on a written document, the land belongs to the 
entire family, —  our families are not small. So, 
co-ownership has become the rule rather than the 
exception throughout the maritime provinces. In the 
Kandyan areas the vast areas of land owned under 
nindagamas of land tenure create difficult problems 
and the nindagama landowners and nilakarayas cannot 
be ousted from their possession." ^98
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These two aspects of land holdings had evolved a system called;
" Thattumaru possession of property that is held
under co-ownership without recourse to partition, 
whereby one owner may cultivate the land for a 
period of years and the other for the next period 
of years, and so on - has created a unique system 
of land tenure in this country." 299
The system of Thattumaru which was in effect a result of the 
peculiar system of land tenure had an adverse effect on the potential 
for paddy cultivation. Unlike the coconut plantation industry, 
the paddy plantation industry requires a great deal of attention, 
particularly regarding manuring and spraying. It has been found 
that paddy lands held under the Thattumaru system had been 
neglected by the respective co-owners ivho do not remain psycho­
logically attached to such land as they would be if the ownership 
in them was not a shared one. The Paddy Lands Act of 1958 avoided 
the adverse effects of this system by introducing the Tenant- 
cultivator, who principally remained fixed and in charge of the 
cultivation programme, while the share that is due to the owner 
under the Thattumaru system could go to the particular co-owner 
who is entitled to that share at that time in question. As for 
the concern and the interest that the cultivation of paddy 
requires, the 1958 Act makes that the responsibility of the 
Tenant-Cultivator, with a fixed tenure, and Independent of the 
Thattumaru system. The Paddy Lands Act was a good example of 
the role that law plays in development. The Act clearly blended 
the social dimensions with Government policy as an element in its 
strategy for development.
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Chapter 12
The Legal Frame Work for Financing Development
I. An Introduction
A major road block in the way of Third World development is 
the lack of money. The mere availability of cheap labour and 
basic raw materials, together with the potential for irrigation 
and fertile land had been proved insufficient as a basis for 
development due to the paucity of the available financial 
resources. Many Third World Countries have been compelled 
to rely on International Funding Agencies such as the Inter­
national Monetary Fund and regional development agencies such 
as the Asia Development Bank as their principal sources of 
funding. The aim in this chapter is to examine the legal frame­
work within which Ceylon’s development had been financed, 
both from internal sources and from external sources.
II. Financing from Internal Sources
II. (a) The Role of Commercial Banks in Development
The first Commercial Bank was established in Ceylon in 1841 *
and there are now twelve such Banks on the Island. Of the twelve,
2
four are of Sri Lanka nationality while the other eight are of
3
foreign nationality. Of these eight, four are British Banks,
4 5three are Indian Banks and one Pakistani. Most of these Banking
Corporations have a number of branches spread across the Island.
Until the creation of the People’s Bank in 1961, as one of the
Ceylonese Banks, none of the existing Banks, both foreign based and
local based had the power to finance national development projects.
Such projects were generally regarded as uncertain financial
ventures for investments. Development financing in Ceylon may,
therefore, be broadly divided into two periods. First, the era
of free enterprise banking, and secondly, the period of controlled
banking. The end of free enterprise banking came in 1961. Through
-474-
the Finance Act of that year, the government introduced legis­
lation to regulate the business of banking in Ceylon in such a 
way that the capacity to acquire profits out of a Banking busi­
ness in Ceylon thereafter became somewhat limited.
II(a)(1) The Era of Free Enterprise Banking arid Development 
Financing: The Period Before 1961.
Despite the fact that the establishment of the Central Bank
7
under the Monetary Law which was enacted in 1949 introduced a 
'super bank.1 with supervisory and regulatory powers.over 
all commercial banks on the Island, the Central Bank has no 
power to alter the policy regarding lending of money and the 
provision of credit facilities to the people of Ceylon. Both these 
items were left in the hands of the Board of Directors of each 
commercial bank whose decisions were guided by a well established 
principle among Bankers that their main endeavour should be to: 
minimise the risks of lending while maximising the margin of 
profit through investments. The commercial banks, except the 
People's Bank, displayed an attitude of varying degrees of 
caution towards financing. The Bank of Ceylon, although pri­
vately owned until 1963, displayed the greatest interest in 
structuring a liberal policy towards credit financing. The Hatton 
Bank Limited and the Commercial Bank Limited, two recent additions 
to the banking circles on the Island, were equally liberal in their 
lending policies. The readiness to take financial risks was a 
key to development financing and it is this tendency that was 
understandably absent in most of the commercial banking companies 
on the Island.
To augment this lack of development aid, governments at 
various times introduced institutions, underwritten by the 
Treasury against financial losses. These institutions were 
specifically created to support development financing, encour­
aging them by Government guarantees of financial support to under­
take a certain degree of risks for the sake of development financing.g
The Ceylon Savings Bank which was first created in 1859 was
subject to strict government control. Despite the interest shown
by the government no active steps towards making its money available
for national development were taken until 1955. By an amendment
9to the Ceylon Savings Uhnk Ordinance, Parliament took a limited 
step and empowered the Bank to lend money on first mortgages of
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immovable property. However, the British Administration in 
1931 had established the State Mortgage Bank basically to lend 
money, largely provided by the government, on mortgages of im­
movable property. The State Mortgage Bank may be considered 
as the first step taken by an administration in Ceylon to finance 
national development. Describing the purpose for which the Bank 
may grant loans, the statute read:
"The Bank may make loans for any of the following 
purposes and such purposes only: (a} the purchase
or lease of agricultural land, its development, and 
improvement and the incurring of capital expenditures 
necessary for the preparation of its produce for 
the market; (b) any purpose incidental, accessory, 
or ancillary to any of the above purposes; (c) the 
liquidation of debts already incurred for any of the 
. above purposes.”—  12
Since independence, the ambit of the lending powers of the
State Mortgage Bank was steadily enlarged, so as to bring in
more of the goals of national development into it. The Ceylon
13State Mortgage Bank and Finance (Amendment) Act of 1968,
14by an amendment to section 51 of the ordinance of 1931, 
introduced a much expanded area in which the bank may invest 
its money by granting loans. The purposes for which the Bank 
may now lend money under the 1968 amendment Indicates the extent 
to which the goals of national development had changed since 1931. 
The amendment authorizes the Bank to finance national development 
in a number of areas which were considered to involve a far too 
great a risk for Commercial banks. Seven principal areas require 
particular mention:
1. Agriculture
The Bank was authorized to grant loans for the "purchase, 
lease, cultivation, improvement or development." of land used 
or to be used for agriculture. This extension appeared important 
in the light of the Paddy Lands Act of 1958. Under the Act, as 
it was mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Govia acquired the 
status of a Tenant-Cultivator together with the responsibility 
to prove himself to be a good farmer. Where the Tenant-Cultivator 
was on a three-quarter Ande arrangement which entitles the owner 
to receive a mere one-quarter of the produce, the Tenant-Cultivator 
must then pay both for labour and manure. The amendment to the 
State Mortgage Bank enabled him to obtain a loan to finance
-476-
'the development of improvement' of his Paddy Land, which in fact 
was land used for agriculture. The amendment in this aspect 
supported the implementation of the Paddy Lands Act.
In addition, the amendment authorized the granting of loans 
for "the purchase, or lease, or the construction, repair or 
renewal, of any Building, factory, mill, mine, machinery or 
equipment used, or to be used, In connection with any agricultural -
undertaking ^  This too helped the Tenant-Cultivator under
the Paddy Lands Act of 1958. Under this sub-section a Tenant- 
Cultivator may obtain a loan to purchase farm implements, Tractors, 
Hulling machines and a variety of other machinery. In addition, 
the repair of out-houses, such as barns could be accomplished 
through a loan obtained under this sub-section.
2. Dwellings
The amendment provided the Bank, with an opportunity to loan
17
money for the purchase of land for building dwellings, the
18construction, repair, renovation or extension of dwelling houses
19and for the purchase or lease of dwelling houses.
The amendment provided an opportunity for Ceylonese to own
more than two houses and five years later, in 1973, a different
administration to the one that enacted this amendment was compelled
to take the excess houses away under the Ceiling on Housing Property 
20Law, to which reference was made in the previous chapter.
3. Market Produce
The amendment empowered the Bank to finance "the manufacture
or preparation of any agricultural or other prescribed product or
21commodity for sale in the market," and "for all other incidental,
22
accessory or ancillary purposes."
This provision had a much wider implication than the mere 
financing of the preparation of agricultural products for sale.
Under the alternatives: 'or other prescribed products', the
Bank was able to finance a number of cottage industries. This 
helped the rural folk to commence such enterprises on the sidelines 
as weaving cloth, making handicrafts for sale in Tourist shops, 
creating batik patterns on cloth, and a whole catalogue of small 
industries. In addition this provided the industrious and skilled 
unemployed to use their talents for national development.
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4. Supportive Services
23
Under four sub-sections the amendment authorized the
granting of loans for a number of projects which would support the
plan for increasing agriculture on the Island. Under one of the 
24sub-sections the Bank was authorized to lend financial support
for businesses concerned with providing farm implements business
on a hire-purchase basis. The Bank was authorized to participate
25
directly in Corporations concerned with supporting agriculture.
In this respect the Bank was required to buy shares in such 
Corporations. This would necessarily involve the Bank in becoming 
a shareholder in such Corporations. The Bank was also authorized
to grant loans; "To any person for the purpose of conducting any
26agricultural business." This provision provided opportunities 
to persons interested in engaging in business as wholesale mer­
chants in Agricultural produce. The wholesalers play an important 
part in providing the distribution of Agricultural products 
through locally based retail outlets.
5. Advisory or Managerial Work
The Bank was authorized to engage in managerial, advisory or
supervisory activities in any enterprise in which the Bank,
directly or as a result of a loan granted to a client engaged in
such enterprise, has an interest in its success. Under.the sub- 
27sections in question, the Bank was authorized to undertake these 
activities with or without remuneration. This provision allowed 
the Bank to protect its own financial interest by ensuring that 
the enterprise in question was operated in a way that it would
be able, in time, to pay back the money lent. This provision
was clearly of great importance to the Bank in light of the 
risks the Bank was required to take in development financing.
6. The Marketing of Agricultural Produce
In two sub-sections the Bank was empowered to set up "the
necessary organization for selling or marketing any product of
28
any agricultural or other prescribed undertaking”, and to
29
act as an agent of any client of the bank. In each such acti­
vity the Bank would be supporting agricultural development, a role 
which Commercial Banks were unwilling or incapable of playing.
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7. To Provide Support Services for Development
In a, broad list of activities enumerated in three sub-sections
the Bank was authorized to provide particular supporting services
for development. This included the provision of technical, financial
30and management services. In this aspect the State Mortgage 
Bank has periodically engaged foreign experts provided through 
one of the International Organizations.. The World Bank in 
particular and the Asia Development Bank in general had. periodi­
cally provided the much needed foreign experts. The State Mortgage
Bank had been further authorized to conduct Economic surveys,
31studies and seminars.* It had also been empowered to train
selected personnel of the bank and other persons in accountancy,
banking and valuation, project and credit appraisal, and engineering
32
and scientific skills.
Although these amendments were enacted in 1968, almost seven 
years after the end of the free enterprise era for Banking, the 
need to expand the powers of the State Mortgage Bank was felt 
as a result of a situation created by the free enterprise system 
of banking dating from 1841. The need was to re-create a local 
source for development financing as an alternative to foreign ' 
aid - an alternative which the Commercial Banks on the Island 
were either unable or unwilling to provide. The amendments in 
a sense mirror the changes in political attitudes to develop­
ment financing. The need to re-create a locally%based foundation 
for the wealth of the nation and the need to finance rural 
advancement was an important consideration behind the 1968 amend­
ments. Similar thoughts and aspirations appear to have guided 
the policies of the British Administration in Ceylon during the 
last days of World War II. The British Administration found that 
the Commercial Banks on the Island cannot be persuaded to indulge 
in development financing. At the same time, the Administration
found that the State Mortgage Bank as constituted under the
33Ordinance of 1931 did not have the power to engage in the kind
of speculative financing which development financing called for.
The British Administration, therefore, enacted the Agricultural
34
and Industrial Corporation Ordinance of 1943. Under that 
Ordinance the British Aministration established an Agricultural 
and Industrial Corporation. It left at the disposal of the 
Corporation a sum of thirty million rupees voted out of the 
Consolidated Fund of Ceylon. The Ordinance spelt out a number
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functions which the Corporation was authorized to undertake. These
functions fell into the seven categories that have been enumerated
35under the 1968 amendment to the State Mortgage Ordinance of 1931 
above. What the 1968 amendment did was to marry the functions.
of the Agricultural and Industrial Corporation with the functions
36declared by the Ordinance of 1931 in light of the consequences
of the Paddy Lands Act with particular reference to the Tenant-
37Cultivators. The State Mortgage Bank and the Agricultural
38
and Industrial Credit Corporation represented two of the most
significant interventions of the colonial administration in the
national development of Sri Lanka. While monies voted out of
the Consolidated Fund were made available to the Credit Corporation,
the State Mortgage Bank was authorized to raise money through the
39sale of debentures. The repayment of these debentures with
interest was initially made from the funds of the Bank and failing
40that it was to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund. This
government guarantee proved vital to the activities of the Bank.
Neither of these two financial sources were available to the
co-operative movement of Ceylon. And therefore, on the eve of
Independence, the British Government created the Co-operative
Federal Bank of Ceylon Ltd. (Financial Aid), by an ordinance 
41
passed in 1947. The sole purpose of that bank was to produce 
a central source of credit for the co-operative movement in 
Ceylon. Upon registration of the Bank by the Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies, the government authorized the payment of 
2 million Rupees towards its capital and thereafter agreed to 
supply further sums of money from the Consolidated Fund when 
ever a resolution was passed by parliament. The creation of 
the co-operative Federal Bank proved of great assistance to the 
Co-operative Movement. This enabled individual Co-operative 
Societies, such as the Multi-purpose Co-operatives, to raise 
necessary loans to expand their own activites. The Co-operative 
Movement had been an active movement during the British Adminis­
tration of Ceylon, particularly, during the war years. Out of 
those trying and difficult days the Movement had emerged in a 
matured and an expanded role. This naturally created a need 
for extended credit facilities to widen their scope of business, 
particularly at that critical juncture of the nations history; 
namely, at the dawn of Independence. Aside from the expanded
objects provided for .the State Mortgage Bank by an amending 
41
Act in 1968, to which reference has been previously made,
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the post Independence administration provided yet another credit
financing agency in 1955. This was the Development Finance Corpor- 
42ation. The purpose of the corporation was to attract capital 
investment both from external and internal sources including 
the government. The authorized capital of the corporation was
438 million Rupees and each share was to be sold at 100 Rupees.
The declared purposes of the corporation were contained in 
section 4. These were:
"(a) to assist in the establishment, expansion 
and modernization of private industrial 
and agricultural enterprises in Ceylon, 
and
(b) to encourage and promote the participation 
of private capital, both internal and 
external, in such enterprise.11
44These three legal entities which were essentially credit 
financing agencies, from 1931, provided an alternative source 
for financing the Island's development. These agencies were in no 
way the competitors of the commercial banking enterprises on 
the Island. For the debtors who borrowed from these agencies 
were often not the ones who could have secured a loan from the 
Commercial Banks. The period of entreperunial banking continued 
until 1961, when, by the Finance Act of that year, the government 
nationalized, not the Banks but the business of banking on the 
Island.
11(a) (ii) The Era of Controlled Banking and Development 
Financing: 1961 and after.
The year 1961 was an important year for banking. On May 30th
45
of that year, the government enacted the People's Bank Act.
Under the Act, a new commercial banking establishment was created. 
The Board of Directors were drawn from five distinct and separate 
sources. These were:
"GO
00 
GO
C4)
\Ce)
The Commissioner of co-operative development 
who shall be the exofficio director; 
two directors appointed by the Minister; 
one director appointed by the Minister 
for the time being in charge of the subject 
of rural development;
one director appointed hy the Minister of 
Finance; and
three directors appointed or elected as 
provided in sub-section (2)."
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By sub-section two of section 8 and sub-section one of section 9, 
the last category of directors was initially appointed by the 
Minister and was thereafter elected:
"by a general body of the Bank consisting of the 
Secretary to the Treasury, the members of the 
Board and the persons elected by co-operative 
societies which are shareholders of the Bank to 
represent such societies In that body.” ^7
The government's control of the directorate of the bank was made 
clear. While providing the nation with normal banking services 
of a commercial bank, the government specifically provided the 
following services through the People’s Bank:
"In carrying out its purposes, the Bank may 
exercise all or any of the following powers:
fa) to grant— :
(i) short-term, medium-term and long-term 
loans and other accommodation to co­
operative societies, approved societies 
and Cultivation Committees
(ii) short-term, medium term and long-term
loans to co-operative societies, approved 
societies, Cultivation Committees and 
individuals for constructing, repairing 
or renovating buildings;
(iii) short-term, medium-term and long-term
loans and other accommodation to any per­
son who intends to carry on or is carrying 
on any agricultural, industrial or business 
undertaking which, in the opinion of the 
Board of Directors of the Bank, is a small- 
scale undertaking; and
Civ) short-term loans to persons resident in 
rural areas for the purchase of articles 
necessary for their personal or domestic 
requirements; 48
The inclusion of Cultivation Committees as potential recipients 
of loans granted by the People's Bank raises an important stage 
in development financing. The Cultivation Committees, it may 
be recalled, were a creation of the Paddy Lands Act of 1958.
These committees principally possessed a supervisory power over 
the Tenant-Cultivators. They also had the power to assume control 
over Paddy Lands in certain defined circumstances.
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One such instance was when the Tenant-Cultivator had neglected
in his duties towards the Paddy Land. Another is when the Tenant-
cultivator dies without leaving a heir who is both willing and
able to assume the responsibilities of a Tenant-Cultivator. In
such a situation the Cultivation Committees could have found
themselves without adequate financial support to help farm the
49
Paddy Land under its care. The Minister who was the architect 
of the Paddy Lands Act was also the architect of the People's 
Bank Act. It was a strange coincidence that the People's Bank 
Act was not a creation of the Ministry of Finance but of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The inclusion of Cultivation 
Committees in the People's Bank Act was, therefore, a recognition 
by the Government that its creation, the Cultivation Committees, 
may be found wanting in financial assistance while assuming and 
discharging the responsibilities placed upon them by the Paddy 
Lands Act.
Since commercial banking was first introduced Into Ceylon 
in 1841, the People's Bank was the first Commercial Bank that 
was empowered to finance particular aspects of national develop­
ment carrying some high financial risks. Besides, the Co-operative 
Societies, the Cultivation Committees, and Small-scale undertakings 
were within the ambit of its credit financing powers. The Act ^  
declared the purposes of the Bank in this way:
"The purposes of the Bank shall be to develop the 
co-operative movement of Ceylon, rural banking 
and agricultural credit, by furnishing financial 
and other assistance to co-operative societies, 
approved societies, Cultivation Committees and other 
persons." 51
The People's Bank Act introduced a new perspective to banking in
Ceylon and this new attitude became even further manifested in
52the Finance Act of that year which became law on the 12th 
October, 1961. In Part I of the Act, Parliament declared that;
"All the ordinary shares of the Bank of Ceylon--
shall be deemed to have vested in the government—
and accordingly the government shall be deemed--
to have been, and to be, the holder of such 
shares." ^
This short section brought to an end the status of the Bank of
54
Ceylon as a private enterprise. The Act laid down provisions 
for compensation and provisions for replacing the existing Board
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of Directors at the time of nationalisation, by a Board appointed 
by the Minister. ^  In Part III of the Act the government placed a 
prohibition upon opening new accounts in foreign owned banks in
Ceylon. Section 2 2 ( 1 )  read:
" ( a )  no persons who is a citizen of Ceylon,
(b) no body corporate of which any director is a
citizen of Ceylon,
(c) no firm of which any partner is a citizen 
of Ceylon, or
Cd) no other body of persons, by whatever name 
called, the affairs of which are managed by
one or more persons who is a citizen of 
Ceylon or who are citizens of Ceylon,
shall open any account whatsoever in any bank other than in the 
People's Bank, the Bank of Ceylon, the Ceylon Savings Bank, the 
Ceylon Past Office Savings Bank or any bank registered as a society 
under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance. " ^
The effect of these provisions was to limit the foreign-based 
Banking Businesses progressively, by leaving the foreign-owned banks 
to expand in the area of the non-citizen sector, while leaving the 
citizens solely to the government controlled and nationalised local 
banks on the Island. The provisions did not in any way result in the 
nationalisation of foreign owned banks. What it merely did was to 
exclude them from the local sector. Any citizens who had accounts in 
the foreign-owned banks opened before the promulgation of the law of
1961, were permitted to maintain them even after the promulgation of
this law.
57The Monetary Law Act of 1949, which created the Central Bank 
of Ceylon, did declare that one of the objects of the Bank was:
"(d) the encouragement and promotion of the full 
development of the productive resources of 
Ceylon."
The problem facing the co-operative societies, the Cultivation 
Committees and such other institutions was that, until the People's 
Bank was created in 1961, their sources of credit were limited.
After 1961, although the Bank of Ceylon and the People’s Bank 
were subject to government policy, the limited availability of 
liquid assets in the nature of cash reserves for credit financing 
appeared to limit the extent to which these two institutions were 
able to lend money for development. The government, therefore, in
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1963 amended the Monetary Law Act of 1949, hy empowering the Central 
Bank to grant medium or long-term credit:
"with the object of granting financial accom­
modation to any emit institution in respect 
of lending operations carried out by such 
institution for any productive purpose, the 
Central Bank may, from time to time, grant 
out of the fund, and loan or advance to 
such institution against a promissory note 
given by such institution.— " 59
The simplicity of the loan granting procedure, namely against a 
promissory note and the period for which such loans were granted- 
namely for a maximum of fifteen years, ^  proved to be most helpful 
to productive groups and institutions in their work towards national 
development.
The banking reforms of 1961 proved sufficient to support the
pace of national development by providing credit primarily to
various productive institutions. With the amendment to the State
62Mortgage Bank introduced in 1968, the character of the State Mortgage
63
Bank was changed. During the next seven years the governments
noticed a significant change in the potentiality of the Bank as an
instrument for development financing. The growth of the Bank within
64the rpje expanded by the 1968 Act was such that it had begun 
clearly to overlap the powers and functions of the Agricultural and 
Industrial Credit Corporation ^  which was first established in 1943. 
Therefore, with a view to streamlining the powers and functions of 
these two important agencies, the government in 1975 enacted the 
State Mortgage and Investment Bank Law. The primary purpose of 
this law was to amalgamate the objects of the two agencies and in 
doing so amalgamate the two into one grant giving agency for develop-
67
ment financing called The Ceylon State Mortgage and Investment Bank.
The new bank was given a Board of five directors, appointed by the 
68Minister. The Board of Directors was made responsible for ’the
69
supervision,.control and administration’ of the new legal entity,
subject to directions that may be issued from time to time by the 
70Minister. The authorized capital of the new Bank was 200 million
71Rupees and the Bank was empowered to create and issue debentures, 
stocks, shares and securities towards obtaining the authorized capital. 
Should the funds of the Bank prove insufficient to pay for the
'debentures and stocks-v-', the Law guaranteed its payment from the
73 - .
Consolidated Fund. The Law further provided that the Minister may
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make regulations under the Act, thus subjecting the Bank to the
policies of the government of the day. The powers and the objects
of the new entity were widely described.
75
By section 31 of the Law, the seven kinds of functions the 
Bank was able to perform under the 1968 amendment were preserved.
By the same section the 1975 Law adopted a number of powers which 
the Credit Corporation had, in order to protect its interest in the
loans it had given for Agricultural purposes. In this aspect
section 31 (y) of the 1975 law declared that the Bank possessed 
the power:
"generally to take or concur In taking, all such
steps and proceedings as the Bank may deem to be
best calculated to uphold and support the credit 
of the Bank—
The fact that the objects and the powers enumerated in section 31
of the 1975 law differed very little from such classes as those
that were found in the Agricultural and Industrial Credit Cor-
76poration Ordinance of 1943 and the State Mortgage Bank and
77Finance (Amendment) Act of 1968 , indicated the folly in not
having repealed the 1943 Ordinance at the time of enacting the 
1968 Amendment. The Law of 1975, therefore, did what the 1968 
amendment should have done; namely, repeal the Agricultural and 
Industrial Credit Corporation Ordinance of 1943 and revamp the 
1968 amendment relating to the State Mortgage Bank.
11(a)(iii) Reflections
The nature and the form of banking enterprises -- their goals
and their purposes - are a product of the political and economic
milieu in which they arise. The importance of banking to the
economic well-being of a nation needed little emphasis. Spun
within the framework of private enterprise and of private ownership
of property, the principal hallmarks of a free market colonial
economy, the Commercial Banks in Ceylon as from 1841 were deemed
to be a part of a world system of colonial mercantilism. The
78
Ceylon Savings Bank, which was founded in 1859, was merely an 
attempt by the established political order to extend the services 
of the world banking fraternity to a native population. For the 
Savings Bank had a very much lower minimum deposit and charged no 
specific’bank charges for the services provided. Besides it had a 
fairly simple procedure for banking, adopting the use of bank-
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deposit books in place of the more complex system of cheques. The
79establishment of the Bank of Ceylon in 1938 was again a step
taken by local entrepreneurs to enter into the system of world
mercatilism. The banking world, curiously, attracted the kind
of people who were, conservative in outlook,in thinking and in
action, cautious with the money entrusted to them, concerned
exclusively with its secure protection and its growth. Above all,
being a party to the system of world capitalism, the bankers1
instinct as mercantilists was naturally to avoid taking obvious
financial risks. It was merely to provide an alternative to this
type of attitude that the British Government in Ceylon created
80the State Mortgage Bank in 1931 and the Agricultural and
81Industrial Credit Corporation in 1943. Cast in the particular 
milieu to which they'belonged, these two suffered from the 
singularity of the goals of mercantilism of the time; namely the 
dedication 'to growth and security.1 As indicated earlier, even 
the locally - based Bank of Ceylon became a victim to this syndrome. 
In Part II of the First Schedule to the specific legislation which 
created it, limitation upon its lending powers were thus stated:
"(c) the amount of the advances and loans made by 
the bank and outstanding at any time shall not 
in the aggregate exceed fifty per centum of 
the total of the amounts lying at the time to 
the credit of depositors, in current, deposit 
or other account, in the bank, 
fd) No advance loan or accommodation shall be 
granted for more than fifty thousand rupees 
without security." ^
It is importnat to note that this type of limitation persisted 
throughout the colonial period and even after the nationalisation 
of the Bank of Ceylon in 1961. These two limitations were,
83however, removed by the Bank of Ceylon (Amendment),Act of 1968.
Their removal freed the Rank of Ceylon from a very real limitation. 
The point is that bank nationalization and the lapse of a further 
seven years became necessary before such an important step was 
considered by the legislature.
The changes introduced to the hanking world of Ceylon in 1961 
effectively detached the banking institutions in Ceylon from a 
scheme of world mercantilism, thus making the banks in Ceylon follow 
a different line of mercantilism, to the one thus far followed 
by commercial banks on the Island. This was clearly a necessary 
change of direction to meet the new role created for them as agencies
-487-
for development financing. The foreign-based and foreign-owned
banks were, however, penalised for the fact that they were not
totally amenable to local policy shifts. It is in this light that
the limitation placed on their powers to open new accounts for
84
Ceylonese nationals after 1961, may be viewed. However, jn 
1968, the Minister of Finance was empowered to remove this pro­
hibition, acting upon the recommendations of the Monetary Board.
By orders published in the Government Gazette, the Minister of 
Finance permitted all foreign banks to open accounts with
Ceylonese nationals. The only exception was The Habib Bank 
85(Overseas) Ltd.
The period after 1961 saw a number of changes in the socio­
economic base of the Island. The changes inaugurated in 1961 
commenced a fairly rapid progression towards transferring the 
principal sources of production, namely agriculture, from the 
control of a few to the hands of many of the inhabitants on the 
Island. In keeping with this diffusion of development, the 
need to provide greater financing for agriculture, cooperatives 
and rural development compelled the administrations to broaden 
further the base for development financing on the Island. It
was to meet this demand that such legislations as the Ceylon
86State Mortgage Bank (Amendment) Act of 1968 and later The
87State Mortgage and Investment Bank Law of 1975 were passed. 
11(b) Taxation and Development
11(b) i. An Introduction •
The second internal source of development financing was 
Taxation. Taxation is the type of instrument which provides the 
outside world with an indication of the economic strengths and 
weaknesses of any given country. Where the economy is weak and 
development is slow, taxation becomes both gross and confounded-. 
New types of taxes often descend upon the nation indicating the 
degree to which the nation is fearfully facing its inevitable 
bankruptcy. However, taxation could equally be used as an aid 
to national development, in which event the particular tax could 
be explained with reference to a particular goal. There are 
therefore these two categories of taxes. There is, however, a 
third category. These are facilitative types of taxes which are 
basically meant to enable the State to achieve certain social 
goals. These three categories do not take into consideration
the more direct type of taxation, namely the taxation of individual 
incomes. This category is excluded from this work for at least 
three reasons. First, the policies and purposes behind income 
taxes is more an analysis in the nature of economics than of Law. 
Second, an exposition of the Income Tax structure of Sri. Lanka 
would require a separate treatise rather than being a segment of 
a section of this chapter. Thirdly, the annual surveys published 
by the Central Bank presents the best possible commentary on the 
taxation of income on the Island and no particular improvement on 
that could be made within the scope of this work. It is, therefore, 
intended to examine a selection of tax laws from the three areas 
enumerated above.
II (b)(ii) Those tax laws that signal economic dangers.
Three statutes passed in 1961 give the clear indication that
the Government was in urgent need of ’spending money.’ These are the
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Rubber Export Duties (Special Provisions) Act of 1961, The Land
89 90
Tax Act of 1961 and the Companies Tax Act of 1961. In all
these Acts, the Government intended either to increase the present
91level of tax as in the Rubber Export Duties Act or to introduce
new taxes where there were none as in the other two cases. The
92Land Tax Act introduced a new tax upon those who owned land
93and the Companies Tax Act imposed a new tax on the share capital 
of companies. All three taxing provisions were clearly counter­
productive in so far as development was concerned. For these 
restricted growth and investment. The only result was that the 
Government by these means acquired some extra spending money, which
was indicative of the state of the national coffers at the time.
94The Revenue Protection Act of 1962 was perhaps more 
indicative of the difficult times. Under that Law the Minister 
(of Finance) was authorized to make an order subject to the 
measure being passed by the Cabinet of Ministers:
"(a) to impose a new customs duty upon an article, 
being not subject to such duty; or (b) In­
creasing or reducing the rate of such duty 
on any article for the time being subject 
to such duty; or (c) abolishing such duty 
on any article for the time being subject 
to such duty,
-489-
the Minister may make an order with a view to giving immediate
legal effect to such decision pending that Bill becoming an Act
of Parliament, or that resolution being passed by the House of
95Representatives, as the case may be.”
The need to manipulate the Governmentrs fiscal arrangements
with this kind of urgency indicated the difficulties that the
Government was facing monetarily upon a day to day basis. The
danger signals appear to have continued into 1963 when by a
96second Finance Act of that year . the Government imposed a
surcharge of 20% upon Income Tax payable for the year of assess-
97ment commencing on April 1st, 1962. Besides this measure
Parliament authorized the Minister of Finance to increase (or
reduce) the Excise Tax by an order "with a view of giving
immediate legal effect to such decision pending that resolution
being passed by the House." Governments are normally in no
unusual hurry to reduce taxes. The need here was the urgency
to increase the Excise Tax. The clearest indication of the
weakness of the Rupee at this particular time was given by
98
the Finance Act of 1963. In Part II of that Act, the 
Government introduced a special tax, known as the 'Exchange Tax'. 
It declared that any sale of Foreign Currency by any competent
99
authority, would be subject to a tax called the 'Exchange Tax'.
It was declared that this t"hx would vary and would be subject 
to ministerial orders issued out of the Ministry of Finance.
This clearly was an indirect devaluation of the Rupee. A 
direct devaluation was indeed avoided so that the imports shall 
not require a high level of payment using an officially devalued 
Rupee. Such a step could have further depressed the value of 
the Rupee which could possibly have had dire consequences for 
the nation's economy. It is to avoid this possibility that the 
Government being fearful of the situation, introduced this in­
direct method of devaluation. The administration that was 
responsible for these enactments was defeated at the General 
Elections, which were held in 1965. The new government repealed 
the 'Exchange Tax' in the Financial (Special Provisions) Act of
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These taxing provisions were chosen merely to indicate 
how certain types of taxes (other than Income Taxes) could he 
reflective more of corrective policies, correcting the national 
economy, rather than in aid of development. The next group of 
laws have been chosen to highlight the use of taxing provisions 
as aids to development.
11(b)(iii) Tax as an aid to Development
Numerous examples may be cited in support of this type of
tax laws. One of the earliest examples of this category was
found in the Tax Reserve Certificates Act of 19.57. Under
that Act, the Central Bank was authorized to issue on demand
Tax Reserve Certificates to any applicant who makes an appli-
102cation to The Superintendent of Public Debt. The certifi-
103cates acquire an interest of 1% per month and may be used 
in order to pay Income'Tax or Profit Tax of the holder of such 
certificates. This was an incentive to those who had
over paid their taxes to opt for Tax Reserve Certificates in 
place of claiming tax refunds. Further, by declaring that:
"The sum represented by the denominational value 
of every unexpired certificate held by any certi­
ficate holder carrying on any business to which 
Profits Tax Act, No. 5 of 1948, applies, shall 
be treated for the purposes of that Act as capital 
employed in that business,
the Government created a tax revenue advantage to itself. At the
same time the Taxpayer derives the advantage of receiving a 12%
interest per annum computed every month which clearly was about
100% more than the legal interest he would otherwise have received
with his tax refund. This fshared-interests' policy was an
important aspect of this law.
The Food Subsidies Temporary Taxes Act of 1952 and the
107Rice Subsidy Tax Act of 1967 were two further examples of
developmental aids through taxation. In both instances the
Government provided certain subsidies and in both instances the
Government received a contribution towards the subsidies only
from those who were most able to make that contribution. In the
first instance the Government levied an additional tax of 10% of
108
the Income Tax payable from all Income Tax payers. In 1952 the
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Income Tax base was high enough to exclude a large segment of the 
population from the burden of taxes on Incomes. In the second 
instance, in 1967, a tax to be determined by the Minister of 
Finance was imposed on those earning above 12,000 Rupees a year, 
at a time when a judge of the Supreme Court was on a pay scale bet­
ween 1,800 and 2,200 rupees a month. These provisions were designed 
to maintain the two subsidies evenly across the nation, thus 
cutting down the costs incurred in organizing the subsidies upon 
a selective basis and requiring those who are able to do without 
the subsidies to make a fair contribution towards the scheme.
Here too the principle of a *shared-interests' policy appeared 
to surface.
A more recent example of a 'shared-interests1 policy
109
oriented statute was the Land Betterment Charges Law of 1976.
The preamble to that Law represented clearly its main and only pur­
pose. The Preamble read:
"A Law to provide for the levy of Betterment Charges 
on Lands within the areas where the value of land 
has increased as a result of the construction within 
those areas of certain development projects, financed 
in whole or in part by the State— ." H O
Here again the approach was clear. The Government had improved 
the area where a particular land was situated; directly resulting 
from this improvement was an increase in the value of the land in 
question. The two parties shared their interests in the project 
by making a contribution to its overall expenditure.
Similarly, in the Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificates 
Act of 1968 the Government was interested in attracting 
foreign currency from abroad to support its dwindling foreign 
exchange reserves. Under this Act the Government extended the 
privilege to certain categories of persons to bring in foreign 
currencies into the country by giving them a premium of about 
65% of the official rate of exchange. This privilege was given 
to all remittances from abroad excluding those that were sent for 
the payment of exports, exported under export licences issued by the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce.
This arrangement helped the Government in two further matters. 
It helped to eliminate the illegal trafficing of foreign currencies, 
at least to some small extent. Secondly, by subjecting the premium 
system to authorized remittances of local currency to foreign lands,
-492-
more rupees were collected by the Treasury from foreign exchange 
remittances of local currency to foreign lands, from Ceylon. The 
'FEEC' Act, as it was called, attracted foreign capital into the 
country, by giving, at least during the 1970-71 period, a premium 
of 65% over and above the official rate of exchange. This, among 
other matters made Ceylon a financially attractive place for foreign 
investments setting "the Island, upon a competitive course with 
India. The shared-interests policy, the policy that benefited 
both the Government and the Foreign Currency holders, underpinned 
the application of this Law.
112The Bank Debits Tax Act of 1970 was another piece of 
legislation espousing a Shared-interests' policy. The Principal 
thrust of the Act was that account holders were required to pay 
by way of a tax, 1/10 of one percent on "total amount of debits 
made during each calendar month against each current account.”
The purpose of this provision was to encourage the depositors to
retain the maximum amount of money within the Commercial Banks on 
the Island, so as to maintain the stability of the economy, by
minimizing the danger "of a run on the banks". At the same time the
banks will be paying a certain level of interest (which in 1980 was 
in the region of 22%) on fixed deposit accounts. Aside from this 
the majority of the native accounts were in Government owned Banks, 
particularly after the Banking Reforms of 1961.
The importance of this Act to the Administration could be assessed
by a glance at its history. It was first enacted in 1957 and was
113repealed in 1965. It was later re-enacted in 1970 and was
114slightly amended in 1975. The indirect effect on the account
holders is that it stimulates savings for which a very significant 
interest was paid by the Banks. For Government, the availability 
of money in the Banks allowed it a considerable financial leverage 
in its day to day dealings.
The point that must be made is this. In all these enactments 
at the base there lay the policy of 'shared-interests*. In some, 
these were evenly balanced. In others, the interests of one party 
may overwhelm the interests of the other. In either case the 
policy was not the imposition of a direct tax, which is often 
characterized by its preponderant benefit to the Government.
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The next group of taxes are 'facilitative.' These are meant to 
facilitate the State to achieve certain ends. The Motor Vehicle 
taxes, the Road Taxes on all forms of vechicles including bicycles, 
and such other taxes are clear in their goals and purposes. But 
the two types of taxes that will be discussed in the next section, 
are some of the less obvious facilitative taxes, which have always 
been at the Government's disposal.
11(b)(lv) Facilitative Taxes
Of the extensive membership in this category the Temporary
Residence Tax Act of 1961 and the tax on the transfer of
property to non-nationals, shall receive comment. The Temporary
Residence Tax (of 500 rupees) was charged from all non-citizens who
had remained on the Island after the expiry of the initial period
allowed to them upon their first entry into the Island. Once the
initial period of stay expires, a non-citizen may have an extended
period of stay on what is known as "A Temporary Residence Permit."
It is the ’TRP1 as it is commonly known, that costs the foreigner
117a sum of 500 rupees by way of a tax. Weerasooriya (W) in his 
commentary on the Temporary Residence Tax wrote:
"The Temporary Residence Tax, which was introduced 
in 1961 and later repealed, has been reintroduced.
The rationale for the imposition of this tax is 
two fold. First, there is the need for every non­
citizen profitably employed or having a business 
in Ceylon to pay a tax for the social benefit 
that he receives from the Government. Secondly, 
it is an incentive for as many visa holders as 
possible to leave Ceylon of their own accord.
The levy under the new provisions will be rupees 500 
per annum." ^ 8
The facilitative nature of this law is clear. The Government could 
on the one hand receive a certain amount of revenue by facilitating 
some of the non-citizens to remain.in the country, engage in busi­
ness and enjoy what Weerasooriya refers to as’the social benefit.' 
The foreigners would no longer feel themselves unwanted. For they 
too make a contribution for being allowed to remain on the Island 
beyond the period allowed to them by their visa. Second, the levy 
may encourage others, particularly of the ’beatnik and such other 
exotic fraternities' to leave the Island upon the expiry of the 
initial period of stay allowed to them at their point of entry 
into the country.
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Another example of this type of taxation is the tax on the
transfer of property to non-nationals. This was first introduced in
119the Finance Act of 1963. Section 58(1) of the Act provided
that:
"Where there is a transfer of ownership of any
property in Ceylon to a person who is not a
citizen of Ceylon, there shall be charged from
the Transferee of such property a tax of such
amount as is equivalent to the value of that 
1 70property." -LZ,U
This introduced a 100% tax on foreign buyers of local real property. 
The Government obviously had the option of placing a total ban on 
foreign ownership of local real property, as many Third World 
countries have done. But the Government was interested as a matter 
of policy to encourage investment on the Island. However, the 
Government recognized the low cost of living and the low price of 
property when compared with western industrialized nations. And 
therefore, to both facilitate foreign investment and facilitate 
the collection of some reasonable amount of revenue, the tax on 
transfer of property to foreign nationals was introduced. Aside 
from these two provisions there are a large number of laws that
121could be categorized under this heading. The Embarkation Tax, 
which facilitates the Government of a Third World country to 
maintain the standards necessary for International Airports or Sea 
Ports, certain types of licensing fees, stamp duties for the Issue 
of certificates (pi: marriages-deaths and births) and for the 
attestation of deeds are all examples of this third category of 
taxes.
11(b)(v) Reflections
Taxation has been a multi-faceted instrument in the Third World. 
It has also been a much maligned agent of Third World administrations 
It has sometimes been regarded as a ruthless Instrument of Government 
Whatever the emotional reaction a citizen experiences to taxation, 
few countries have used tax as a stimulant for development. The two 
of the more popular roles prescribed for tax is that of acquiring a 
fund of money for the purposes of meeting Government expenditure and 
the other is to move an existing free market economy towards the 
creation of a public welfare state. Although these two roles are 
to a degree inter-linked, the establishment of a public welfare state 
may be regarded as a step in the direction of stimulating some
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fundamental social changes in the society. Aside from these two
roles, Taxation has a third and a more important role to play.
And that is to stimulate development. It is this role that the
Third World Countires should utilize to its fullest. The Laws
which were discussed under the broad heading of "shared-interest-
laws" fall into this third role which stimulates development. The
difficulty, however, is to ascertain with some degree of certainty
the point at which taxation becomes counter-productive and the
"shared-interest" policy begin to crumble. Commenting on the point
beyond which taxation may result in an "economy of backwardness,"
122Dr. Baran wrote:
"Even if measures like progressive taxation, capital 
levies and foreign exchange controls could be enforced- 
such enforcement would to a large extent defeat its 
original purpose. Where businessmen do not invest, 
unless in expectation of lavish profits, a taxation 
system succeeding in confiscating large parts of 
these profits is bound to kill private investment.
Where doing business or operating landed estates 
are attractive mainly because they permit luxurious 
living; foreign exchange controls preventing the 
importation of luxurious goods are bound to blight 
enterprise. Where the only stimulus to hard work 
on the part of intellectuals, technicians, and civil 
servants is the chance of partaking in the privileges 
of the ruling class, a policy aiming at the reduction 
of inequality of social status and income is bound to 
smother effort."
The difficulties that have been foreseen by Third World economists 
is that taxation is a dangerous instrument and unless it is used with 
care, there is a danger that it could result in the development of 
under development. The period dealt with in this section was prin­
cipally the 1960's, which indeed was a difficult period for the 
economic development of Sri Lanka. That would explain the need 
shown by the Government to use Taxation largely in the first two 
roles and relegating the !shared-interest-role to a peripheral 
stance. The lesson to be learned is that taxation as a stimu­
lant for development must be carefully conceived. For it carries 
the potential danger of creating ’backwardness1 in place of 
’development.’
III Financing Development from External Sources
GO '-Development Financing from International Aid 
The Government’s increasing interest in extensive development
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projects dates back to 1949, barely a year after Independence. That
was the Galoya Development Project. The massiveness of that project
permitted no individual participation. The Government, therefore,
handled the entire development programme through a Statutory Board;
namely, the Galoya Development Board, created under the Galoya
124Development Board Act of 1949. In 197Q the then Government
inaugurated a second massive development project; namely, the
Mahaveli Development. This again involved such a large financial
and a technological commitment that the Government decided to
remain in charge of the entire project through the Mahaveli
125Development Board, another Statutory Board.
The functions of The Galoya Development Board were:
"(a) to develop the undeveloped area;
Cb) to promote and operate schemes of —
(i) irrigation; (ii) water supply;
(iii) drainage; (iv) generation, trans­
mission and supply of electrical energy 
and (y) food control.
(c) to promote and control irrigation and 
fisheries;
(d) to promote afforestation;
(e) to control soil erosion;
Cf) to control public health;
(g) to prevent and control plant and animal
diseases; and
(h) generally to promote agriculture and in­
dustrial development and economic and 
cultural progress in the area of autho­
rity. 11 1 2 6
To make these functions possible the Government constructed an 
extensive irrigation scheme, cleared large areas of forests, con­
structed dwellings and encouraged persons to move into these new 
settlements. This altered the demography of the Eastern Province 
and created new societies in new agricultural zones. In turn the 
programme helped to increase food production which was of signifi­
cant help to a developing economy. The large amount of money 
mostly in foreign exchange had to be externally sought by way of 
development aids.
The Mahaveli Project was equally expansive and indeed expensive. 
It involved the linking of two waterways and thereafter its whole­
sale movement away from its original course, through massive under­
ground tunnels into the North Central Province which is a part of 
the Dry Zone. The view behind this large undertaking was to open \- 
up for rice cultivation the proverbial 'rice bowl of Asia', known
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in Sinhala as "Rajarata." Ancient mythology had identified that 
area as the source from which rice was exported to other parts of 
the Orient during pre-colonial times.
The Government felt compelled to undertake this scheme to 
provide the only element that was missing to re-succitate this 
forgotten land. This was water for irrigation. The Mahaveli Board 
which acted as the counter part to the Galoya Development Board 
was given the following functions:
"(.a) to provide and operate schemes of irrigation 
water supply, drainage, flood control and the 
control of soil erosion;
0>) to promote agricultural and economic development;
Cc) to ensure the necessary co-ordination between 
the government and local bodies in the develop­
ment of such areas.” ^
During the thirty- three years of Independence, Ceylon had seen just 
these two State controlled development projects. Besides the 
economic advantages, the two schemes have altered the cultural and 
sociological components of the nation.
First, the schemes drew out from the rest of the Island, large
groups of the native population from every caste on the Island.
Although, due to the largeness of certain castes like the GoLygama 
128and the Batgama, larger representations of these must invariably 
occur among the new colonists, the strict caste configuratons 
maintained at the rural level were dismantled and 1 new inter-caste 
marriages could become the beacon light that may propagate a new 
non-caste society in Sri Lanka.
Second, the development scheme drew in the native population 
from the lower middle class proletariat rather than the petty- 
bourgiouse or the upper middle class. A very important qualification 
for receiving grants of land in these new development zones was that 
the applicant must either be land less or must own land which clearly 
is insufficient for his needs and the needs of his family. The 
climatic conditions in the Eastern Province and in the North Central 
Province are such that hardened rural farmers have been the largest 
number of colonists to receive land in these new development zones. 
Therefore, among the colonists there is a clear homogenity of class, 
which has invariably helped in the organized development of these 
new zones.
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Third, the participants in these new ventures have been drawn 
from both the Christian and Buddhist communities. This inter-faith 
representation in the new society has been of remarkable success.
The Muslims, due to their religious cultural and^T ingulfs tic peculiar­
ities have been bad mixers. And the only social erruptjons that 
have gone on record have been between the Muslims and the Sinhalese.
In the case of the' Sinhalese, both the Christian and the Buddhist 
Sinhalese had taken part in skirmishes with the Muslims.
Fourth, inter-racial representation in this new venture had 
been almost non-existent. The principal complaint of some of the 
Tamil speaking people had been the colonisation of Padavia by the 
Sinhalese a part of the Island which runs a common boundary with 
the Tamil speaking areas of the Northern Province. More for 
political reasons than for reasons of security successive adminis­
trations have avoided mixing the races in the new development zones. 
This has largely left the nation with no point of racial contact.
The facilitation of inter-religious and inter-caste contacts 
through colonisation schemes of this sort merit recognition and 
praise.
Fifth, the three decades of colonisation of these new development 
zones have yet again, made the country self-sufficient in rice.
A recent export shipment of rice was hailed by the Minister of 
Trade as an event of historical significance. For the last ship­
ment that went out from the harbours of the Island was some seven 
centuries before.
The two development projects have been, on the whole, success­
ful. The Mahaweli scheme is now almost complete. But re-settlement, 
irrigation and agricultural production commenced several years 
ago. In around 1975.
The massive aid programme which helped the country to launch
such a project for national development merit some comment. The
basic law regarding the ability to raise loans from foreign sources
129is found in the Foreign Loans Act of 1957. Section 2 of that
Act read:
"The Governor-General or any person specifically 
authorized by him in that behalf may, in the name 
and on behalf of the Government of Ceylon, sign -—
(.a) a loan agreement relating to a foreign loan to 
the Government of Ceylon, and
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(b) any bond, promissory note or other document 
required by such loan agreement to be executed 
by the Government of Ceylon."
All sums payable by the Government of Ceylon under a loan agree­
ment relating to a foreign loan is charged on the Consolidated 
130Fund. The Act empowers the Minister of Finance by order
published in the Gazette to make:
"such provision as may be necessary to give effect 
to a loan agreement relating to a foreign loan to the 
Government of Ceylon 1^1 and every order made and 
published under sub-section Cl) shall have the 
force of law." 1 ^ 2
The latter provision has the effect of by-passing Parliament, which 
has the inherent power to make law. However, the explanation for 
such a step could be founded on the vague principle of 'prospective 
legislation' and maybe justified on the grounds of national import­
ance to receive foreign aid. The Act applies exclusively to foreign 
loans. Section 5 of the Act defines a 'foreign loan' as:
"a loan in any currency granted by a foreign 
Government or the agency of a foreign govern­
ment or by any international organization."
The fact that it is the source rather than the currency that identifies
a foreign loan is important. This facilitates such grants as loans
from the 'US PL 480' scheme. Under that scheme Ceylon was at one
time the recipient of United States wheat flour, for which the
Government was permitted to pay in Ceylon Rupees into a special fund
at the Central Bank, called the 'PL 480' fund. Money from that
source was available for aid. And when aid was given from that
particular source it was given in the form of Ceylon Rupees. This
too will be within the definition of 'a foreign loan'.
Sri Lanka's membership in a number of International aid giving
organizations qualifies her for loans from those international bodies.
The Foreign Loans Act, governs loan agreements from such organizations
too. In 1956 Ceylon became a member of the International Finance 
134Corporation. In 1966, she became a member of the Asian Develop-
135ment Bank. In 1950 Ceylon became a member of the International
Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
3.36Development. Except for her membership In the Asian Development
Bank, her association With the other two international bodies pre­
dates the passage of the Foreign Loans Act of 1957. However, the
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Foreign Loans Act does no more than supply a legal basis for
negotiation and execution of foreign loans. The Act does not
indicate the method of negotiation, execution or the terms to be
accepted. It merely supplies an open ended validity to the loan,
once it is negotiated and executed. The comments that have been
made by some economists and by some political scientists have often
been critical of these agreements between International agencies
and Third World Countries. It is not the intention here to make ^
any judgments regarding such loan arrangements. For that fallsj
outside the scope of this work. In addition to the ’foreign loans1
which the Government may raise for national development, the
137National Development Loan Act of 1950 and the Ceylon Develop-
138ment Loans Act of 1954 authorize the Government to raise loans 
up to a total of 1000 million rupees for National Development.
The Act of 1950 authorized the Minister of Finance to raise 400 
million rupees and the Act of 1954 gave the same Minister tlie 
power to raise a further sum of 600 million rupees for National 
Development. The 1954 Act gave somewhat wider powers in that the 
Minister may under that Act raise moneys both from United Kingdom 
sources and from International Bodies. It could be said with con­
fidence that the Republic of Sri Lanka has a number of options 
open to her for financing her present programme for national develop 
ment. Whether she has chosen the right options at the right time 
has been the subject of some controversy. However, the two develop­
ment projects, the Galoya scheme and the Mahaweli scheme have been 
of significant success. Whether the Island should have had three 
or four such schemes instead of two, during these three decades 
of nationhood is not a matter which has sparked off any great contro 
versy. But it is a point of some concern as to what extent the 
Galoya and Mahaweli schemes have helped the Northern end of the 
Island where most of the Tamil speaking people live. Their oft 
heard complaint is that development stops at the 'Elephant Pass', 
the gateway to the North. If it does, then it Is a matter of 
some concern.
111(b) The Free Trade Zone
The idea of the Free Trade Zone was modelled on a similar 
programme introduced by the Governments of South Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore for attracting foreign investments into those 
countries. The programme involved the carving out of certain
-501-
geographical areas.:on the Island and relegating them into zones in which 
foreign investors may under licence produce articles of manufacture for 
export from Sri Lanka and sale in foreign markets. What the host countries 
to this programme earn is the foreign capital investments that 
enter the country thus contributing to a strengthening of the local 
economy. In addition, the host country attempts to solve her 
own unemployment problem by providing cheap labour., in contrast 
to the cost of labour in the countries from which the investment 
originates. As an example, the Government issued the following 
information on wages for foreign investors:
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TABLE' XHII: Average wages in Sri Lanka
♦Wages per day 
in Sri Lanka- 
rupees
Wages per hour 
in Sri Lanka - 
rupees
Wages per 
day at the 
equivalent 
in U.S.D. 
Currency
Wages per 
hour at the 
equivalent 
in U.S.D. 
Currency
Minimum wages 
in each cate­
gory in the 
U.S.A. per hr 
per day
skilled
semi-skilled
unskilled
18.50RS. 
16.OORs. 
13.OORs.
2.13RS.
1.85RS.
1.38Rs.
$1.25
1.05
.80
$ .15 
.12 
.09
$9.00
5.50
3.10
$72.0C 
44. Of 
24.3(
* Per day in each case is of an 8 hour period.
In addition to the effect this programme may have on the unemploy­
ment problem, it could stimulate the local economy by the demands 
it may make on local supporting services necessary for the success 
of this programme. This may include such enterprises as road 
transportation, the hotel industry, the food industry, and a whole 
range of such necessary supports. Particular effect has been felt 
by the.real property market in Sri Lanka. The vqlue of land and 
housing has increased since the inauguration of the Free Trade Zone 
investment programme. The absence of rent control has made house 
rents rise and the need for more houses has become a very real 
need in and around the Free Trade Zone.
The legal framework for the Free Trade Zone was provided by
140
the Greater Colombo Economic Commission Law of 1978. The
purpose of this law was declared in its preamble. It read:
"A laic to establish the Greater Colombo Economic 
Commission to vest the said Commission with powers
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necessary for the development and resurgence of 
the economy 0f Republic; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith or incidental there­
to."
In a schedule to the Act, the Government provided a map of 415
square kilometers Q60 sq. miles) of the Western Province of the
Island and declared that area as the Free Trade Zone of the Island
within which the foreign capital investments on the Island may be 
141made. Among the several objects declared by the Law; five
such objects merit particular mention, for they provide the base 
for attracting and utilising foreign capital for Sri Lanka’s 
development. These are:
(a] to foster and generate the economic development 
of the Republic;
(b) to widen and strengthen the base of the economy 
of the Republic;
Cc] to encourage and promote foreign Investment 
within the Republic;
Cd) to diversify the sources of foreign exchange 
earnings and to increase the export earnings;
Ce) to encourage and foster the establishment and 
development of industrial and commercial enter-
1 4 ?prises within the Republic ."
14 3The Law created a Commission with a corporate personality with
the ability to sue and with a liability to be sued. The Commission
was empowered to enter into agreements with any enterprises, that
would further the objects declared by the Law, and cause the
issuance of a licence to such enterprises to establish commercial
144undertakings i\rithin the zone. The Law restricts the Commissions
authority in two ways. First, it is limited to the geographical
145area covered by the zone and second to such enterprises as are 
licensed by the Commission.
There are three aspects to the programme which require parti­
cular mention. First, article 157 of the 1978 Constitution exprecsly 
declared that any Treaty of Agreement signed between the Government 
of Sri Lanka and any foreign State:
"for the promotion and protection of the investments 
in Sri Lanka of such foreign state, its nationals, 
or of corporations, companies and other associations 
incorporated or constituted under its Laws; such 
Treaty or Agreement shall have the force of law 
in Sri Lanka, and otherwise than in the Interests 
of national security no written law shall bec* 
enacted or made, and no executive or administrative
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action shall be taken, in contravention of the 
provisions of such Treaty or Agreement,
provided that not less than two-thirds of the whole number of 
Members of Parliament (including those not present) have voted 
in favour of a resolution approving such an Agreement or Treaty.
By the end of November, 1979, the Government of Sri Lanka had
148approved such Agreements or Treaties with 25 foreign Governments 
149and 83 projects financed by investors drawn from those
countries have been licensed by The Commission. The wording
of article 157 of the Constitution appears to remove that
provision from the normal powers that Parliament has for constitutional
amendment. The Article in question appears to be unalterable
except "in the interests of national security". This type of
entrenchment was believed to provide the kind of security and
guarantee against future expropriation which was vital for attracting
foreign investments into the country. As for Taiwan, South Korea
and Singapore, the character of the political system, with a
virtually one-party system of government of a dictatorial nature
had provided, those much needed guarantees. However, in Sri Lanka
with political fortunes likely to change at each General Election,
a constitutional guarantee of this sort was considered necessary.
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the change of the Island’s
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electoral system introduced by the 1978 Constitution from 
one of 'first at the winning post' to a more complex system of 
elections combining both proportional representation and the re­
distribution of votes, appears to provide a particular political 
scenario which could make it difficult for any political party at 
any future General Election to win sufficient number of seats to 
change the Constitution through Parliament. It may be argued that 
the form in which Article 157 was couched appears to be such that 
it is unalterable even with a two-thirds majority, unless there is 
a demonstrable question of national security involved. Such an 
assumption appears to run counter to a well established rule in 
Constitutional Law that 'one parliament cannot bind its successors'.
In any event, as Sri Lanka's history may show, a Constitution 
believed to be partly unalterable even with an absolute majority
was totally replaced through what may be referred to as a political
153revolution, in 1972. Similarly, it may be that future Governments
154
may decide to overlook the rigid wording of Article 157 and
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attempt to repeat the history of 1972 at some future date. These 
are all imponderables regarding which the wit of man cannot 
adequately devise any absolute safeguards. However, the greatest 
security for foreign investment must be its effect on the national 
economy which could be felt by all the inhabitants, on the Island.
If the investments produce what it Is generally expected to pro­
duce; namely, a reduction In unemployment, and an increase in 
the standard of living on the Island,then that by itself could 
provide the surest guarantee against future expropriation of 
foreign investments.
The character of the investments were such that they were made 
under a Treaty obligation entered into between two sovereign 
countries. The second aspect of the programme has a bearing on
this character of the investment. By section 26 of the Law of
1978 it was declared that disputes relating to the interpretation 
of any provisions of an agreement made between any enterprise and 
the Commission would be referred for settlement to "the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes established under 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other states of 1965." It is also declared 
that any award made upon such a reference shall be final and 
binding on the parties and shall be enforced:
"in Sri Lanka in the District Court of Colombo as 
a decree of that Court and the provisions of the
law relating to the execution of a decree of that
court shall apply." 155
The law further declared that these provisions shall apply even to 
enterprises which become domiciled in Sri Lanka by registration, 
subsequent to its establishment in the Free Trade Zone as a foreign 
enterprise. The statutory obligation to refer disputes to the
’Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ was in line 
with the view that each investment in the Free Trade Zone should 
be considered as falling within the Treaty or the Agreement with 
the particular foreign country from which the investment was 
derived. This must necessarily mean that the capital utilized 
by the investors must be drawn from foreign sources so that the 
Free Trade Zone investments must have a foreign component. By 
Regulation 7, made under Section 24 of the Law of 1978, the 
Minister of planning whb was responsible for the Greater Colombo 
Economic Commission declared:
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"that all working capital of the enterprise shall 
be met by convertible foreign currency remittances 
to Sri Lanka--
This means that the investments must be derived from foreign sources 
so that the Commission may succeed in achieving one of the key ob­
jectives laid down by Law of 1978; namely: 'to encourage and pro-
158mote foreign investment within the Republic1. As the commission's
159report indicates, as of the end of 1979, 83 projects to the in­
vestment value of 150 million United States Dollars had come from 25 
foreign countries. By the powers vested in the Commission under
Section 17: "to enter into agreements with any enterprise", the 
Commission appears to be successfully using such powers, guided by 
the provisions contained in the aforementioned Regulation, to at­
tract foreign capital into the Island. It must be emphasized that 
investments in the Free Trade Zone are drawn from investors from 
countries with which Sri Lanka has obligations arising out of 
Treaties or Agreements ratified under the aforementioned Article 
157 of the 1978 Constitution.
The Third aspect of this development programme is that neither
the Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, nor the Companies
162 163(Special Provisions) Law shall apply to them. This is
meant to assure the investors that their investments shall not be 
acquired by the Government. Section 39 of the 1978 Law which 
makes this declaration could, however, be repealed by a simple 
majority in Parliament and therefore the protection provided by 
these provisions is more illusory than substantive. The pro­
tection that investors must ultimately look to is not the Law of 
1978 but the Treaty or the Agreement between the Governments of 
their own nationality and the Government of Sri Lanka.
The Law of 1978 gave the Commission a split legal person­
ality. By section 2(2) of that Law, Parliament had declared the 
Commission to be:
"a body corporate having perpetual succession 
and a common seal and may sue and be sued in . 
its corporate name, and may perform such other^^ 
acts as bodies corporate may by law perform."
-506-
This character of its corporate personality must indeed be 
restricted to all 'rights and duties' arising other than out of 
the investment agreements made with foreign investors under Section 
17 of the Law. In such matters, as do fall under Section 17, the 
Law of 1978 declared that the:
"Commission shall be an Agency of the Republic 
af Sri Lanka for the purposes of conferring juris­
diction for the settlement of such disputes by 
the said centre." 165
This duality of the legal personality of the Commission was clearly 
in line with the development objectives conceived by the Government 
relating to the Free Trade Zone. For all such matters as connected 
with the supply of services and the provision of physical and institu­
tional infra-structures for the Zone, the Commission may act as an 
independent legal entity. But when matters falling under the Treaties 
or Agreements assumed by the Government of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis other 
States are concerned, then the Commission in that limited capacity 
assumes the role of a department of the Government. Aside from 
this attribute in its role as an Agent of the Government of Sri 
Lanka, section 32 of the Law of 1978, exempted the Commission from 
the payment of:
"any tax, levy, charge or duty under the provisions 
of the Inland Revenue Act, No. 4 of 1963 and Customs 
Ordinance (chap. 235) and the Imports and Exports 
(Control) Act, No. 1 of 1969." 166
The dual legal personality of the Commission could raise an intri­
cate question as to the legal status of its employees. Questions 
may be raised as to whether they should be regarded as public 
servants or as employees of a Public Corporation who are not, 
under the law of Sri Lanka, considered to be Public Servants.
One of the indications in support of the latter conclusion is that 
employees of Public Corporations are both employed, and are 
subject to have their employments terminated by the Corporation 
without reference to the Ministry in Charge of the Corporation.
These matters shall be considered in detail in the course of the 
167next chapter. However, it might be mentioned that the Law
of 1978 declared that the Commission was responsible for both,
i i i 168 _ .engaging and dis-engagmg personnel. This provides strong
indication that the Commission's employees may be considered as
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non-public servants. In any event, in order to clarify any doubts, 
the Law of 1978 declared in section 34 that:
"Any member, officer or servant of the Commission 
shall be deemed to be a state officer 169
It seems to be clear that in those areas where the corporate person­
ality of the Commission was recognised the Commission was subject
170to the jurisdiction of the local courts. But in those instances
in which the Commission was required to act as an agent of the
Government of Sri Lanka, the local courts have no jurisdiction except
when invited to enforce an award obtained from the International
171Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The attraction
of foreign capital through an investment programme structured 
around the creation of a Free Trade Zone in Sri Lanka, was central 
to the economic package presented to the electorate by' the United 
National Party at the 1977 elections. The clear victory of that 
party at the ensuing election naturally fortified the Free Trade 
Zone plan for economic progress as one of the key policy concerns 
of the new Administration. The Government, therefore, considers 
the Greater Colombo Economic Commission as an important agency for 
the implementation of its economic policies. The Law of 1978 
which transformed the policy into Law, as expected, declared in 
clear and unambiguous terms that the Commission:
"In the exercise of its powers and the carrying
put of its objects under this Law shall comply
with the general policy of the Government.” *'2
Thereafter, the Law reposed a wide power in the Minister in charge 
of the Commission, to issue special and general directions to the 
Commission and in addition a power to make regulations 
regarding the work of the Commission. These arrangements, quite 
clearly, make the Commission an agency of the Government, which 
is in line with the purposes for which the whole idea was con­
ceived, namely, as a part of a plan for the economic development 
of Sri Lanka.
(IV) Conclusions
The strongest feelings about international aid may correctly
be characterised as negative ones. The criticism mounted against
international aid consortia is basically one of continuing under-
175development. Frank questions why the aid receiving Third World
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Countries (his focus is on Latin America) suffer recurring trade
deficits and balance of payment problems. Frank proceeds to show
that the receipt of International Aid places a heavy burden on the
recipients to pay In foreign exchange for related services such as
"transport and insurance, profits transferred abroad, servicing of
debt, travel, other services, donations, funds transferred abroad
176and errors and omissions." As for the whole of Latin America
(.excluding Cuba, which receives no aid at all], 61% of the total
Foreign Exchange earnings had been spent for services attandant
177upon receiving of International Aid. The hypothesis is there­
fore advanced that International Aid is counter productive and
1 7  q
must therefore be refused. Dr. Mahbub-Ul-Haq one of the former
Advisors on foreign aid to the Bangaladesh Government had expressed
some constructive views on International Aid. He considers that
International Aid could be used effectively^ for the development
of a nation provided that the national planners, do not commit,
179what he calls, 'the seven deadly sins.' The first deadly sin
is what Dr. Ul-Haq refers to as the "numbers game". Under this he 
warns the aid receiving countries to stop relying too much on the 
percentage increase of the Gross National Product and thus overlook 
the intangible benefits acquired by the utilisation of such aid.
In light of Sir Lanka's economic development programme embracing 
the Free Trade Zone, the increase in the demand for the supply of 
supportive facilities for its success, must be considered as an 
advantage In addition to the effect foreign investments have upon 
the Gross National Product.
The second is excessive controls. International aid is given 
for the improvement of productivity in the public sector or for 
public welfare purposes. The recipients, therefore, take the view 
that development planning with reference to the ^ \id received should 
be such that it must stimulate and encourage the public sector and 
impose bureaucratic and administrative controls to regulate the 
economic activities of the private sector. The fallacy of this 
approach becomes apparent if the development planners were to 
consider that f^Id is given for the total uplift of a nation 
and therefore it becomes necessary to use the (\id to develop not 
at the sacrifice of the private sector but in spite of the private 
sector. The policies pursued by the Administrations In Sri Lanka 
^Ojj^-taken this warning, to a large measure, into consideration, while 
providing financial j)^ d to the private sector for development. The
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reform of the banking enterprises in Ceylon, particularly after 
1961, was seen as a giant step towards financing the devlopment 
projects of the private sector. The creation of the People's Bank 
in 1961 could, in this light, be considered as a manifestation of 
the Government's commitment to help the private sector.
The third aspect is what Dr. Ul-Haq refers to as 'investment 
illusion'. In his view the utilisation of^dd exclusively as an 
investment has created a myopic approach to development.' The 
attitude taken by development planners was that the use of id 
for commodity assistance is deemed to increase consumption and 
therefore considered to be non-productive while its utilisation 
for project assistance was considered an investment. The result, 
therefore, was that in place of aiding the cultivation of garden 
and market products such as chillies, potatoes and onions, the/Qid 
was sometimes used to build hospitals, roads, schools and commun­
ity halls. The result therefore was to increase the need to 
utilise some of the foreign exchange obtained through ^ jid to 
import basic foods while inheriting shining white buildings without 
doctors, school teachers, road engineers (or vehicles) or community 
development officers to man the 'investments.' It is therefore 
important for development planners to appreciate the relationship 
between 'commodity assistance' and 'project assistance.* Here too 
the Sri Lankan planners have attempted to strike a balance between
180'commodity development' and 'project development'. The expansion 
of the objects of the Ceylon State Mortgage Bank in 1968 was a 
clear indication of the Government's intention to assist in commodity 
development. The 1968 amendment to which reference was made at an
earlier stage in this chapter, enabled the Bank to lend money to
181 182 
those involved in agriculture, in housing, in 'the manufacture
or preparation of any agricultural or other prescribed product or
183commodity for sale in the market' and a whole catalogue of
184other commodity development projects.
The fourth aspect of Dr. Ul-Haq's thesis refers to Development 
fashions. He says that development planners have often been influenced 
by current development fashions. In each period, International Aid 
giving agencies through conferences and symposia disseminate 
development models. These models are a result of the work of 
development planners working for these agencies who structure 
theoretical models working out of a 'Think-Tank' unit. During each
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'time-frame1 these models are pushed out to float across the globe 
and local development planners are required or even tempted to 
adopt them for the utilisation of ^ id received from these funding 
agencies. Sometimes it is felt that an application for j^ id 
incorporating the current development plan would help secure the 
loan. The danger here, is, that the local development planners 
may lose sight of national or local variations or peculiarities 
to which the general model may not in any event apply. Thus 
the Pj,id may, at the end of the day, prove to have been misapplied 
giving rise to certain economic difficulties in the ftid receiving 
country.
As early as in 1949, the Sri Lanka planners had worked out
a programme for national development within a localised framework
185
for its implementation. The Galoya Development Board and
186The Mahaveli Development Board are two such glaring examples.
This independence asserted by the Government in its approach to
development has enabled successive Administrations to obtain id
from a wide cross section of the world community. While the
'Kirindi Oya scheme1 is being financed by the Asia Development
Bank; the 'Ingimmitiya Reservoir Project' is financed by Japan,
The 'Muthukandiya project' is being financed by Australia and the
187
'Mahadivulwewa project' by the European Economic Community.
In addition; there is an entirely locally financed project which
commenced in 1978: the 'Tank Modernisation project' aimed at
modernizing the several hundred ancient water reservoirs on the
188
Island dating back to 200 B.C. This project, which is expected
to end in 1982 at a total expenditure of nearly 15 million
189United States Dollars is considered by the Government as a key 
to the creation of a viable irrigation system across the Island.
In none of these projects has the Government adopted the develop­
ment models produced and recommended by the World Bank 
Organisation. It certainly has not relied on aid coming exclusively 
from that quarter, either.
Fifth, a divorce between planning and plan implementation has 
been said to be wrong. However, a dichotomy does exist in the 
Third World Countries between planning and plan implementation. 
Planning is left in the hands of the developmentalists-the Government 
experts-while implementation is considered as the responsibility 
of the political system of Government. This absence of co-ordination 
at the economic integration level of Government, between planning
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and plan implementation has been bad for p,id utilization. In Sri. 
Lanka, after 1970, a separate Ministry under the Prime Minister 
(and after 1978 under The President of the Republic] was established 
for planning and plan implementation. This arrangement too could 
evolve further, to link hands with the Ministry of Finance, so 
that a more effective integration of the several economic strategies 
of the nation could be achieved. In some countries, such as in 
West Germany, the Ministry of Finance is designated the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs giving the portfolio a much wider ambit. At 
the very least, an integration of planning and plan implementation 
in one body is essential for the ultimate utilization of^-id.
A key agency for the utilization of International Aid today
(1980) in Sri Lanka is the Greater Colombo Economic Commission.
That Commission was empowered to plan and to implement its plans in
a way that the objects of the Commission may be achieved. However,
in order to integrate these responsibilites with the economic
policies of the Government, the Commission, as it has been shown
earlier, was made responsible under the Law of 1978 to 'comply
190with the general policy of the Government.' So as to further
integrate planning and plan implementation, the Commission was placed 
in charge of the Ministry for planning and Economic Affairs which 
indeed was the chief architect of the economic development programme 
for the Island.
The sixth aspect of Dr. Ul-Haq's thesis prescribes a concern 
for the improvement of human resources. In many Third World countries, 
International Aid was not used with the thought that development 
of human resources was an important adjunct to the proper utilisation 
of development aid. The purposive advancement of education within 
the framework of local susceptibilities was essential for Third 
World Development. Dr. Ul-Haq, commenting on the conditions in 
Pakistan wrote:
"It was often a tragic sight to watch a village child 
reciting some nursery rhymes with great pride while 
he did not know how to interpret the labels on a bag 
of fertilizer or to help his aging father decide which 
fertilizer would be more useful for what crop and at 
what time. Little was lost, therefore, when the 
parents withdrew their children from school after 
two or three years of schooling, making Pakistan's 
drop-out ratio of 85% one of the highest in the 
world." 191
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The failure in Sri Lanka to utilise some of the aid to produce 
'bare-foot doctors’ has left hospitals under staffed. For those 
doctors who graduate from the Faculty of Medicine of the University 
of Sri Lanka sought foreign appointments while abandoning their 
responsibilities to serve a nation which had provided them with 
the training at the tax-payers expense. No scheme had been worked 
out to provide a back-up system for essential services on the Island, 
particularly in the Medical, Dental and Pharmacists’s professions. 
Apart from this adverse comment-, indicators from the areas of edu­
cation, health and welfare seems encouraging.
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TABLE XXIV: Selected Social Indicators of Sri Lanka
Adult literacy (%)
1946
58
1953
65
1963
72
1975
78
Life expectancy (years) 43 56 63 68
Infant mortality (per thousand) 141 71 56 46
Death rate (per thousand) 20.5 10.9 8.5 7.7
Birth rate (per thousand) 37.4 38.7 34.3 27
Natural population 1.7 2.8 2.6 1.9
The increase in the social indications of all six indicators supplies 
cogent evidence in support of Governments’ care in utilising Inter­
national Aid for the development of human resources. Sri Lanka has 
an extensive and well organised system of education. Education is 
compulsory at the primary level and free up to University level.
As a result the country has a high level of literacy. It was 
estimated in 1974 that over 80% of children between the ages of 5
and 13 attended school and a substantive number of thesg continued
193their education up to pre-University level.
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TABLE XXV: Number oj' Schools and Pupils
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Schools Cl) 9,660 9,625 9,675 9,649 9,689
Pupils (2) 2,596,970 2,534,071 2,431,626 2,461,503 2,462,147
Notes: (1) The number of schools had remained more or less con­
stant as junior and senior sections of schools which 
were previously" counted individually are now treated 
as one school.
(2) The number of pupils had declined as the age of ad­
mission was raised from five to six years.
The seventh deadly sin according to Dr. Ul-Haq was economic 
growth without justice. In many instances, economic growth had 
taken place in the absence of any advancement of social justice. 
Often economic growth had resulted in mounting unemployment, 
worsening of social services and the increase of the gap between 
the rich and the poor. The result of this kind of development 
had been to increase the social tensions and thereby create the 
necessary conditions for the under utilisation of aid for develop­
ment. The energies and moneys of the state apparatus thereby 
became pinned down to the lab-OiMous task of maintaining the socio­
political infra-structure of the society without which development 
could become clearly impossible. The utilisation of International 
Aid, therefore, should be. carefully monitored so that economic 
growth should not be achieved at the expense of social justice.
It was this belief in a formula for economic growth with justice 
that the Government of Sri Lanka introduced a property reform 
programme during the seventies. This aspect of Sri Lanka's 
economic development was considered at an earlier stage of this 
work. That was concerned with a programme for the distribution of 
dwellings to the homeless and land to the landless. Besides these, 
the administrations in the past had introduced such taxes as the 
capital levy tax and the compulsorysavings scheme so that excess
earnings of those at a high income level could be taken off them
195
and utilised by the Government for the upliftment of others.
In this sense the current social welfare benefits in Sri Lanka
include an unemployment benefit of Rupees 50 per month to a head
of family and the availability of subsidised rice and sugar supplies
196
to those earning less than Rs. 300 per month. This had also
helped to keep down the rate or urbanisation. In addition, medical
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care is largely free and widely available. This has resulted in
life expectany rising to 68 years, a level comparable with many
197western countires, and an adult literacy rate of 78% in 1974.
In Dr. Ul-Haq's view International Aid used within the seven
aforesaid principles could avoid the several pit falls which many have
been described as the uncharitable face of International Aid.
198Frank1s total condemnation of International Aid is poignant 
in the Latin American Context. For they have committed more than 
one of the seven deadly sins. Sri Lanka's record is more impressive. 
Admittedly, her Administrations have committed some of the seven 
sins only when they became unavoidable. Unlike Brazil, Sri Lanka 
has taken great care towards acting within the parameters 
chartered by Dr. Ul-Haq. The present chapter and some of the other 
chapters in this work may testify to that view.
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Chapter 13 
Institutional Supports for Development 
1. An Introduction
Some of the earliest achievements of the British Administration 
in Ceylon were the introduction of a selection of English Laws 
through Ordinances, the establishment of a court system together 
with English legal traditions, and a system of courts and pro­
cedure modelled upon the English legal system. The result was 
to introduce a viable infra-structure upon which some of the more 
specialised areas of the English law could be rested. Since the 
English legal institutions provided through the Charter of Justice 
of 1833 *, laid down the infra-structure for the application of 
the Roman Dutch Common Law of Ceylon, the British Administration 
felt free to chose from a wide variety of laws from the English 
legal system, laws, which were both suitable and necessary, for 
introduction into the Island. One of the earliest laws that were
introduced into Ceylon from the English legal system was The
?
Insolvent Estates Ordinance of 1853. By that time the Ceylon
3
Savings Bank had been established and as from 1833 it had become 
the centre for banking, particularly for the native population on 
the Island. The (Regulation ^ under which the Ceylon Savings Bank 
was established was subjected to a number of amendments between 
1833 and 1859; when the first comprehensive legislation on this 
subject was enacted. ^ The 1859 Ordinance transformed the Savings 
Bank into a viable financing institution, both from the depositors1 
standpoint and from the borrowers' standpoint. The Bank appeared . 
from that point of time ready to receive money for investments and 
for lending money for development. Section 29 of the 1859 Ordinance, 
as amended by Section 17 of Ordinance No. 12 of 1892, introduced 
a commitment, undertaken by the British Administration in Ceylon 
to development financing in the role of an underwriter for the 
Bank's activities. This was of particular interest to the financial 
community, who acquired considerable confidence as a result, for 
investing money in Ceylon. Section 29 read: i■■
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"All moneys, goods, chattels, and effects whatsover 
and all securities for money or other obligatory 
instruments and evidences or muniments of title, 
and all other effects whatsoever, and all rights and 
claims belonging to or held, by the said bank, shall 
vest in the Government of this colony for the use 
and benefit of the said bank and the respective 
depositors therein, their heirs, executors, admini­
strators, or assigns respectively, according to 
their respective claims and interests, and also 
shall, for all purposes of action or suit, as well 
criminal as civil, in any wise touching or con­
cerning the same, be deemed and taken to be, and 
shall in every such proceeding (where necessary) 
be stated to be the property of the "Crown", with­
out further description." ^
7
The Joint Stock Companies Ordinance of 1861 opened the way for 
participation in the financial affairs of Ceylon. The Ordinance 
was a re-enactment, with necessary changes of the 1856 Joint 
Stock Companies Act. of England. This adoption of the English 
Law on the subject attracted the participation of British 
Companies in the development of the Colony of Ceylon. The purpose 
of the Joint Stock Companies Ordinance of 1861 was to facilitate the 
introduction of the British economic infra-structure into Ceylon.
9
But not until 1897 was the concept of the Joint Stock Company 
extended to embrace banking enterprises on the Island. Between 
the original enactment of 1861 and the 1897 Ordinance a number 
of amending statutes were passed in Ceylon, on matters more 
of a peripheral nature. In the meantime the British Government 
had passed two comprehensive statutes improving the Company 
Law in response to the modern needs of the mercantile community 
in England.
The mercantile lobbyists in England were anxious to have 
the laws relating to companies in Ceylon brought into line with 
those of England. With reference to this matter the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies wrote to Governor Sir Hugh Robinson 
in a despatch of 1868 in these words:
"I should wish you to consider whether it would
not be well to consolidate and amend the colonial 
law on this subject by adopting, in a comprehensive 
Ordinance, the provisions of the English Companies 
? Act, 1 9 § 2  and Companies Act 1867 or such of them
as may be applicable to the circumstances of the
colony so as to bring the legislation in respect 
of Joint Stock Companies into accordance with 
that of England." 12
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Although no comprehensive legislation on companies emerged until
13 141938, a combination of the 1861 Ordinance and its amend­
ments and the 1897 Ordinance sufficed to satisfy the mercantile com- 
unity of Ceylon. In support of the mercantile community and their 
varying enterprises, the British Administration in Ceylon passed a 
series of statutes in a number of important areas. The Merchant
Shipping Ordinance of 1863 ^  and The Merchant Shipping Carriage
• 1 6 ’ 17
by Boat Ordinance of 1900 were two of the more important
Ordinances in the area of shipping.
However, the British Administration had, as early as in 1852,
18enacted an enabling statute which in a general way had intro­
duced the English Law into the colony in particular areas including 
commercial law. That Ordinance declared the law applicable to 
all matters concerning ships and property therein, stoppage-in- 
transit, freight, demurrage, insurance salvage, average, collision
19between ships, Bills of Lading and generally all maritime matters
and in respect of all contracts and questions arising (out of) Bills
20of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques: the law applicable in
Ceylon:
"shall be the same in respect of the said matters 
as would be administered in England in the like 
case at the corresponding period, if the contract 
has been entered into or if the act in respect of 
which any such question shall have arisen had been 
done in England, unless in any case other provision 
is or shall be made by any Ordinance now in £jrce 
in this colony or hereafter to be enacted."
As English commercial laws became codified at the end of the 
nineteenth century by the industry of Sir MacKenzie Chalmers, the
English statutes were introduced into Ceylon one after another.
22The Partnership Ordinance in 1866, the Sale of Goods Ordinance
23 24
in 1896 and The Bills of Exchange Ordinance in 1927 were the
three most important importations from the English Law. As Professor
25Nadaraja had said:
"The Charter of Justice of 1833, which introduced 
a uniform system of judicature throughout the country, 
has been described as a *purely judicial charter*; 
and it made no changes in the law that was to be 
applied by the courts. Subsequent changes in the 
law consisted mainly in the definition of the 
spheres of application of the bodies of the "Special
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Laws", in the abrogation of some of the rules of the 
residuary general law and in the introduction of more 
rules of the English system.” 26
What is suggested here is that the foregoing catalogue of laws that 
were borrowed from England had served to create a system of laws which 
were a carbon copy of those that were in force in England. This, 
it is suggested, was instrumental in creating a sense of commercial 
security for the potential investor so that their understanding of 
a familiar system of laws, legal institutions and procedures would 
encourage investment, which, indeed, was a necessary prelude to 
colonial economic development. Laws and legal institutions were in a 
sense a reflection of the political and philosophical foundations of 
a given society. The English Laws and legal institutions of the mid­
nineteenth century could be regarded as a reflection of a free market 
economy containing little or no social elements espousing the creation 
of a welfare society. These, however, could be regarded as axiomatic. 
The type of society which the British Government was attempting to 
create for Ceylon during this period was one of a close parallel to 
the one existing in Britian. The socio-ecomonic structure which Ceylon 
acquired at this period of time seemed, therefore, to be one that 
was designed towards creating the type of social divisions and class 
configurations that had existed in Britain during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. While the laws and legal institutions 
borrowed from England were designed towards perpetuating these 
socio-economic divisions, the cbncommitant tensions within the 
Ceylonese society at the time may well have been a mirror image of \ 
those that were present in Britian at the same historical period.
It has been mentioned at an earlier stage of this work that the 
Dominion of Ceylon inherited the colonial socio-economic institutions 
at Independence in 1948. The period between 1948 and 1956 had been 
generally regarded as a period of conservatism, when these institutions 
were conserved and applied within the framework of an Independent 
Ceylon. The period commencing from 1956 inaugurated a plan for radical 
change of the socio-economic base of Ceylon. Included in this plan 
were changes to the institutions that supported the socio-economic 
base which Ceylon had once inherited from the British Administration. 
The present chapter shall consider these institutional changes at 
two levels. First, at the macro level, the public corporation as an 
institution for development shall receive comment. Second, at the
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micro level, the development boards created under particular statutes, 
designed to achieve particular types of economic goals, shall be 
considered.
II* The Public Corporation
11(a) Ah Introduction
The orthodox view of government espoused the theory that a 
government had three basic duties or responsibilities to discharge. 
These were in the areas of (1) legislative duties, exercised through 
Parliament Cii) executive duties, exercised through a cabinet of 
Ministers responsible to Parliament and Ciii) the responsibility 
to maintain an infra-structure for the administration of Law and 
the dispensation of justice. The 1972 and the 1978 Constitutions 
of Sri Lanka altered the third obligation by declaring that, it 
was centrally the responsibility of Parliament to administer 
justice through the agencies of the courts, which were presumed 
to be responsible to Parliament. Despite these variations of 
emphasis, the three basic responsibilities of government were 
conceived in terms of legislation, executive action and of the 
judicial functions.
Since the beginning of the process of de-colonisation, a new 
dimension to these attributes of government had been added in 
the form of State participation in the economic development of the 
territory over which it governs. This additional aspect of govern­
mental functions received international recognition for the first 
time in the declaration of the rule of law formulated in Delhi
at the International Congress of Jurists in 1959. In its declar- 
27ation, the Congress declared that it:
"Recognises that the rule of law is a dynamic concept 
for the expansion and fulfillment of which jurists are 
primarily responsible and which should be employed not 
only to safeguard and advance the civil and political
rights of the individual in a free society, but also
to establish social, economic, educational and cultural 
conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and 
dignity may be realized." 28
The recognition lent by the Congress to the legitimate right of
governments to intervene through the instrumentalities of the law
to create inter alia the necessary socio-economic conditions in 
which its citizens could achieve their legitimate aspirations and
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dignity was a welcome departure from the Athens declaration of
1955, by the same body. The Athens declaration laid heavy emphasis
29
on 'fundamental freedoms' and on 'equal protections to all'.
Conceived within these two benchmarks was the belief that acquisition 
of property, of businesses and governmental interference with a free 
market economy were all against the notion of 'the rule of law*.
The intervention of a government in the economic development
of a country may arise in two ways. Describing these two methods,
* 30 Ghai wrote:
"One can draw two models of control of an economy.
The first is where the state does not itself take over 
any sectors of the economy, but seeks through a 
variety of regulatory and other mechanism to in­
fluence the conduct of the economic factors, who 
are private parties. The other model is where the 
State actually enters into production, and moves 
from control to the management of the economy.
These models do not exist in isolation, one from 
the other, and indeed given the mixed economy of most 
developing countries, they exist side by side, some­
times reinforcing each other, and sometimes in some 
degree of confusion, if not actually in antagonism." 31
The controlling and regulatory influences of the government on the
private sector in Sri Lanka had principally been through the tax 
32structure. In addition, the application of regulatory laws of
33a centrally directed economy had served to reinforce the control 
of the private sector. These have been considered at several stages 
in this work.
The creation of the public corporations however, afforded a 
direct intervention in the economic development of the Island.
Using these economic arrangements the administrations in Sri Lanka 
have functioned at two specific levels. First, it had acted to pro­
vide a whole range of alternative institutions for development. The 
varying public corporations which Parliament specifically created 
were primarily meant to provide a competitor in the field so that 
an alternative was provided to the citizen in his role as the con­
sumer. The alternative provided was such that between it and the 
private sector, an uneven scheme for competition was created. In 
every competition, it is axiomatic, that the public sector by virture 
of its relationship to parliament could always win. Parliament, there­
fore, held the key as to how the competition went between its own 
creation - the public corporation - and the private sector. By
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holding this balance, Parliament was able to rectify the defects 
of existing consumer services while providing the best possible 
service to the consumer in that particular area. This then was 
the first implication for development, arising out of the public 
corporation. The second aspect was the nationalisation of key areas 
which had provided the necessary support for economic development.
Into this category fell the Ceylon Transport Board (a creature of 
the Motor Transport Act of 1957), the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, 
the Insurance Corporation and the Ceylon State Plantations Corpor­
ation. These public corporations operate some of the key areas of 
economic development while holding a complete monopoly in each of 
these areas. The petroleum, insurance and the plantation industries 
were largely in the hands of multi-national corporations and their 
nationalisation and investment in public corporations was a major
step towards freeing the Island's economy from foreign domination.
The nationalisation of the Island's Motor Transport Companies and 
vesting their assets in the Ceylon Transport Board, centralised the 
transport services of the country in such a way that it became 
amenable to central control and central direction.
These two aspects of the effect of public enterprises must
be related to the political ideology of the time. The effective
implementation of that ideology when translated into policy depended
largely on the attitudinal makeup of a bureaucracy that must occupy
a central position in each of these public corporations. The increasing
number of public corporations had generally resulted in an increasing
number of bureaucrats upon whom the State must ultimately rely for
the efficient functioning of the public corporations. A common
criticism heard very often from other Third World countries, about
34
the era of public corporations was its resulting bureaucracy.
35Shivji , referred to the way the new class, arising out of the 
bureaucracy of public corporations, had functioned more as an 
instrument to eliminate the Asian and foreign businesses in Tanzania, 
than to implement any effective programme for national development.
The result Shivji argued, was the creation of a new petty bourgeoisie 
with entrenched social, political and economic interests of their 
own rather than of the nation. The public corporations in Sri Lanka^ 
fortunately, have failed to create a distinct class with a particular
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class interest. This may be a result of the fact that 
the miscreants in the Sri Lankan political economy were 
considered to be business conglomerates, whether locally or foreign 
based. Parliament had itself seen to the elimination of these 
interests, by nationalising key enterprises through regulatory laws 
geared towards creating a centrally directed economy. What the 
bureaucrats themselves had attempted to do in the Tanzanian system, 
it must be pointed out, was done by the several Administrations in 
Sri Lanka by actively promoting a competitive spirit among public 
corporations it had helped in creating. The problem for Sri Lanka, 
however, was a different one. For Sri Lanka the problem was one of 
creating a bureaucracy with an understanding of the by-ways and 
highways of development, so that they may not lose their way when 
travelling through this vast jungle, unable to arrive at their 
right destination.
11(b) The Emergence of the Era of Public Corporations
The earliest legislation facilitating government participation
in the development programme of Ceylon was enacted in 1955. This
36was the Government-sponsored Corporations Act of 1955. The Act 
of 1955 empowered the Government to take over and carry out the 
activities of 'manufactories’ already established and in existence 
on the Island. The basic limitation imposed by this Act is signi­
ficant. It does not empower the government to commence a new venture, 
either monopolistically or competitively in any particular area. It
merely enabled the government to acquire the 'manufactory' by
37publishing an 'Incorporation Order' in the Gazette, specifying 
the manufactory and declaring that:
"a corporation shall be established to take over and 
carry out the purposes of the specified manufactory." 38
The 'Incorporation Order' may specify the objects of the Corpor-
39 40ation, determine its initial capital and declare a number
41of other matters connected with the provision of an infra­
structure to the new corporation. The Act provides for three
types of take-overs. Namely; 'where the government holds the
42entire capital of the corporation,' where the government holds
43
only a part but in excess of 20% of the capital of the corporation
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and where the government holds less than 20% of the capital of 
44
the corporation. The basic differences in these various levels
of government participation were manifested in the differing extents
to which a government desired, as a matter of policy, to control
the activities of these corporations through their Boards of
Directors. A very significant step taken by the Government was
to exclude the application of the Companies Ordinance, as a general 
45
rule, while leaving the discretion open to the Minister of
Industries to introduce specific sections of the Companies Ordinance
46if and when the need did arise, by Regulations made under the 
47
Act. These provisions effectively limited the governance of
any new types of corporations (The Government-Sponsored Corporations) 
to the provisions of the Act of 1955.
The Corporations formed under the 1955 Act provided a com­
mencing point for government participation in development. That 
was all. The first comprehensive legislation enabling the govern­
ment not only to commence totally new industries, but also to take
over existing industries under the 1955 Act and run them in a
monopolistic and competitive manner was enacted some two years
48later in 1957. This was the State Industrial Corporations
48aAct of 1957. That was a product of the first S.L.F.P. Government of 
Mr. Bandaranaike. The 1957 Act declared that:
"Where the Government considers it necessary that a
corporation should be established for the purpose of
(a) setting up and carrying on any industrial under­
taking, or
(b) taking over and carrying on any industrial under­
taking previously carried on by any corporation which 
was established under the Government sponsored Corpora­
tions Act, No. 19 of 1955, and was subsequently dis­
solved, 49
the Minister may by Order published in the Gazette:
"declare that a corporation shall be established 
for the purpose of setting up and carrying on, or 
taking over and carrying on, as the case may be, 
the specified Industrial undertaking. ^
Many of the key provisions of the 1955 Act were found in the present 
Act, including the provisions governing the incorporation order 
which determines the type of infra-structure that corporations 
created and established under this Act shall possess. Following the 
pattern adopted by the 1955 Act, the present State Industrial 
Corporations Act excluded, as a general rule, the application of
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the Companies Ordinance. ^  The Minister, however, was left free 
to introduce by Regulations ^  any provisions of the company law 
of the Island if he had so wished. ^  Under both acts, the cor­
porations thus formed were empowered to acquire private land under
54the Land Acquisition Act of 1950, if such an acquisition was 
deemed necessary for any purpose of the Corporation. The State 
Industrial Corporations Act of 1957, ^  like the Government- 
Sponsored Corporations Act of 1955, ^  provided 'umbrella pro­
visions', under which the Government acquired a facility to enter 
into commercial and industrial ventures either alone or in partner­
ship with the private sector. The 1957 Act, however, went a step 
further by providing the means to commence new ventures either in 
competition with others or by holding a monopoly in that specific 
area of activity. In either case the Government by acquiring a 
controlling majority could compel the corporation to adopt the
socio-economic policy of the Government. Alluding to this aspect
57of the enactment, the Minister for Industries, who piloted the 
Bill through Parliament, said:
"The powers of the Minister are for two purposes.
Firstly, general powers are necessary - because 
these are entirely State-owned enterprises - to 
transmit Government policy to the Board of Directors 
of the Corporation. I do not think any Hon. Member 
would say that that is interference. We could not 
have enterprises owned and controlled by the State 
going counter to Government policy. Government 
policy may be with regard to the price factor and 
various other questions. These powers are found 
in respect of all the nationalised industries in 
Great Britain." ^8
It is important to realise that public corporations were useful 
channels through which the Governments were able to implement their 
policies. Although the two Acts - The Government-Sponsored Cor­
porations Act of 1955 and The State Industrial Corporations Act of 
1957 - did provide a generalised legal basis for government partici 
pation in the Island's industry or commerce, in later years the 
creation of new entities in the nature of public corporations was 
largely done by the legislature through specific Acts of parliament 
The pattern established by the State Industrial Corporations Act 
of 1957 had been adopted and been pressed into service in the twin 
areas of State Commercial and State Agricultural undertakings. The
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59
Sri Lanka State Trading Corporation Act of 1970 provided the 
"umbrella" legislation under which the Government could establish 
’satellite* Corporations for the importation, exportation, dis­
tribution, supply, promotion and expansion of any article which
the Minister may from time to time determine by order published in 
61 62the Gazette. The Act declared that the Minister may specify
63
the objects of the corporation in the incorporation order. By
a different section the Act gave the ’satellite1 corporation the
"power to do anything necessary for or conducive or incidental to
64the carrying out of its objects". A similar ’umbrella’ legis­
lation was introduced in 1972 for the furtherance of state partici­
pation in agricultural undertakings. This was the State Agricultural 
Corporation Act of 1972 . The Act declared that:
"where the minister considers it necessary that a 
corporation should be established for the purposes 
of the planning, promotion, co-ordination on develop­
ment of any agricultural undertaking, the minister 
may, with the concurrence of the Ministry of Planning 
and the Minister of Finance, by order (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Incorporation Order") published 
in the Gazette," 66
establish a corporation under this Act. Following closely, the
State Trading Corporations Act of 1970, this 1972 legislation
declared that the objects of the Corporation shall be specified
67in the Order of Incorporation and that the Corporation shall
have a general power to do what is deemed to be necessary for
carrying out the objects of incorporation.
68The three 'umbrella Acts' cover a wide area of State
activity in the development of Sri Lanka. In industry, commerce
and agriculture, these laws empower the government to establish
satellite corporations whenever it considers necessary to do so.
The political policy of the government determines the objects
and the extent to which powers are given to the new ’legal creatures'
to act towards achieving them. The flexibility, free from
parliamentary controls, that the government of the day enjoys in
69these three key areas of development could be considered as vital 
to those 'Third World' countries with a parliamentary form of two 
or more party governments.
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11(c) The Legal Characteristics of the Public Corporations 
in Sri Lanka.
70In Sri Lanka today, there are about 22 public corporations.
Of these, the majority have been created unde* the State Industrial
71Corporations Act of 1957. A few specialised public corporations,
72
such as the Ceylon State Plantations Corporation, The State
73 74Insurance Corporation,‘ The Ceylon Motor-Transport Board and
other corporations have been created through statutory enactments. 
Irrespective of the sources of their creation, some common legal 
threads may be found in their structure and in their composition.
First: The statute which creates the particular legal entity
determines and charters the sum total of its objects and powers, 
by providing a clause similar to an 'objects clause' of a company 
memorandum. This necessarily means that whenever Parliament desires 
to expand, contract or amend the objects and powers of the Corporation, 
it could do so, guided principally, by political policy.
Secondly, aside from the Parliamentary control exercised over 
the objects and powers of the public corporation, the minister in 
charge of the particular enterprise has a power to appoint members 
to the Board of Directors and also to remove them, at his absolute 
discretion. He holds a further power to appoint and indeed to remove 
the chairman of the Board without reference to Parliament. Every 
change of Government has resulted in a change of personnel at the 
level of directors and chairmen of all public corporations. When 
viewed against the number of changes of Government that Sri Lanka 
has witnessed since 1948, the radical changes that the public cor­
porations have undergone, every few years, have not been good for
75development. Sri Lanka has had eight General Elections since 1948 
and except in one case, in 1952, in every election the Government 
in power had suffered defeat thus altering the political directions 
of the Island in a radical manner. After each such change of 
government, the composition and the political directions of 
public corporations also change.
Thirdly, the statutes establishing the public corporations have 
empowered the Minister to issue special or general directions in 
writing to the Board of Directors, directing them as to the way 
they should exercise the powers given to them under the relevant statute. 
This enables the government in power to subject, the Board of 
Directors to seasonal changes of policy without having to bring in
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amending legislations. In addition, a power is given to the Minister 
to issue orders, by Regulations issued under the relevant statute 
and published in the government Gazette. The combination of these 
two powers is akin to a power to alter the memorandum and the 
articles of a company, without reference either to courts or to 
its share holders.
Fourthly, the capital of every public corporation, is deter­
mined and controlled by Parliament. To that extent, the govern­
ment in power could determine the particular role the entity can 
play in the development strategies of the nation. Unlike private 
enterprises, the great majority of public corporations have no 
private share holders. Those that were established under the 
Government-Sponsored Corporations Act of 1955, were perhaps the 
only corporations with a private share holding. In all others, 
and more particularly in specialised corporations created by 
special legislative enactments, no room was left for private 
investments. The total control of capital exercised by Parlia­
ment, subject to changes of political emphasis, was a particular 
hallmark of the public corporation.
Fifthly, unlike private enterprises, every public corpor­
ation has a statutory power to acquire privately owned land un-
75ader the Land Acquisition Act of 1950. In each case if any
immovable property appeared to be necessary for the purpose of 
the particular enterprise, the Minister in charge may at his 
absolute discretion cause such property to be acquired under the 
1950 Act. The procedure for such an acquisition was the pro­
cedure which the legislature had laid down in the 1950 Act it­
self.
Although the five aforementioned elements have been identi­
fied as providing the peculiar legal and economic character­
istics of the new legal entity called the public corporation, 
there were a few other elements of equal value.
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The foregoing highlights the principal legal aspects of public
corporations in Sri Lanka. The absence of case law on these matters
leaves one,with the enactments concerned with the creation of each
such corporation as the sole guide to the law on this subject.
Fortunately, as Amerasinghe has shown in his.exhaustive work on
76public corporations in Ceylon, disputes involving public corpor­
ations have largely been in the area of policy rather than of law. 
Similar to problems regarding private corporations, the question of 
vires could be a matter for the Courts. As Amerasinghe has indicated
" a Court should remember that the administrative
process is not and ought not to be a succession of 
justiciable controversies, for economic progress and 
development would be impeded and brought to a stand­
still if the Acts of Public Corporations are to be 
too frequently reviewed. They should be reviewable 
but only on the restricted grounds of excess of 
power or objectionable motives. The permission to 
interfere on such grounds as want of reasonableness 
when there is no express requirement would precipitate 
a dangerous conflict between the Judiciary and those 
responsible for policy." ^
As Amerasinghefs work indicates the Courts in Ceylon had not con­
cerned itself with laying down a body of laws regarding public 
corporations. Therefore, apart from the legal characteristics 
that may be discerned from the enactments creating them little 
else could be found by way of guidance from the Courts.
This leads to the next important question: How then are
public corporations controlled? It appears that they are con­
trolled by the institutions that control and determine state 
policy. As for Sri Lanka two such institutions could be located. 
These are Parliament and the Government.
II Cd) Extra-legal controls on Public Corporations 
II (d) Ci) Control by Parliament
With reference to Parliamentary control of Public Corporations, 
Amerasinghe wrote:
"Ideally, from the corporations1 point of view,
Parliament should be a sort of shareholders' 
meeting reviewing annual accounts and reports and 
holding special general meetings when necessary." ^8
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It is important to recognise that public corporations being creatures 
of Parliament, Parliament and not the Courts have the power to enlarge, 
contract or amend the objects and the powers of such a corporation.
In the case of private corporations the Courts, under the Companies 
Ordinance^hold a residual power^ vr> ^
to the company's memorandum of Association or to the Articles of 
Association. This power in the case of a public corporation is held 
by Parliament and to that extent Parliament is more than a mere 
meeting of shareholders. For this reason it is important to examine 
whether Parliament has the necessary accoutrements to impose an 
effective control over public corporations.
Parliamentary debates raising criticisms of public corporations
is an important method of raising issues that concern the public
regarding the way in which a particular public corporation may
function. But Parliament needs an institutional structure that could
monitor, regulate and direct the workings of public corporations if
there were to be an effective Parliamentary control of these legal
entities. In this aspect, in Sri Lanka, the Public Accounts Committee
79
appears to provide this institutional structure. The Audxtor- 
General, who is required to audit the accounts of public corporations 
is also required to submit a report to the Public Accounts Committee. 
That Committee being an organ of . o makes the 
report together with its own observations and recommendations avail­
able to the Treasury. The Treasury as a matter of course brings to 
the notice of the Ministry in charge of the corporation the observations 
and the recommendations of the Committee and the report made by the 
Auditor-General. In addition to these matters the Treasury may sub­
mit its own guidelines for consideration by the Minister in charge
80
of the corporation. Under the Finance Act of 1971, the Minister
in charge of the particular public corporation is required to bring
to the notice of the Board of Directors of the public corporation
in question, the views expressed by the three institutions that had
examined its overall record of activity during the previous fiscal 
81year. The three institutions being: the Auditor-General, the
Public Accounts Committee and the Treasury. Prior to 1971, however, 
the Ministers were not required to bring these observations to the 
notice of the Board of Directors of the public corporations in 
question. The Ministers did, however, inform the Boards merely 
to protect themselves from criticisms levelled against them in
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Parliament. The report of the Public Accounts Committee - which is a 
Committee of Parliament - is ultimately made available to Parliament 
and therefore could be the basis for a number of sharp questions.
Although parliamentary controls of public corporations is a 
necessity so that their Boards of Directors and the Government of 
the day do not follow policies which are diametrically opposite to 
each other; too rigid a control exercised by Parliament could prove 
to be counter productive of the development aims that the corporations 
are required to pursue. If the Boards of Directors were subject 
to controls of a strict nature, then the power to make decisions 
quickly which may be necessary for the business efficacy of the 
corporation may become somewhat restricted. This may lead to delays
in the workings of the corporation, because the Board may for its
own protection refer a large number of matters for Ministerial direction 
rather than making decisions on its own and thus risking the censure
of the Minister or of the Board or both.
(ii) Control by Government 
82
Amerasinghe, commenting on the power which the Government has, 
to control public corporations, pointed out that this type of control 
was exercised through the directions issued by the Ministers respon­
sible for particular public corporations.
- ^  -. Amerasinghe concluded that:
"The directive influence of a Government on a 
particular Corporation would vary with such cir­
cumstances as the personality of the Minister, 
the status of the corporation and the strength 
calibre of its permanent personnel.M<§^
The Ministerial power to issue special or general directions is 
the key to development. It plays a role similar to that played by 
law in development; Ministerial directions to Boards of public 
corporations blend Government policy with the social and economic 
policies pursued by the corporation. In previous chapters, parti­
cularly in those on Education and Language, the point was made 
that the laws enacted at the relevant times in question were merely 
instances where the legal institutions were utilised by the Govern­
ments to control and direct the changes to the socio-economic base 
of the society, so that those changes fall into line with the 
declared policies of the Governments in power. In that sense Law
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was seen to lie at the interface of policy and its implementation.
Similarly, it may be suggested, that the residual power left in
the hands of the Ministers responsible for public corporations, to
issue Ministerial directions, is no more than an effective method
of blending Government policy with the policies declared by the
Board. By this method the Government could, as in Education and
Language, control and direct the changes at the social and economic
levels of the society in a way that the Government's declared
development goals could be achieved: Ministerial directions in
this sense must be recognised as essential tools for development.
Another aspect of Government control of public corporations
may be seen in the contents of Treasury Circular No. 1052 of 31st 
85August, 1969. The circular was meant to lay down certain guide­
lines for Ministers who are in charge of public corporations. One 
of the guidelines there contained required each such Minister to 
submit all new proposals and plans for public corporations, first, 
to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs for its approval. 
This requirement was to ensure that the corporations' policies 
and the overall economic policies of the Government were co-ter- 
minous. The guideline in effect would result in having the policy 
framework of each public corporation fall into place with the 
general framework for the Island's development worked out by the 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. Apart from the guide­
lines laid down in the Treasury Circular, the Treasury does, in a 
much more direct way, control the activities of public corporations, 
in that it: examines the annual budget, reviews the annual accounts,
determines the amounts from profits of the corporation which should 
go into the Consolidated Fund, advises and suggests measures to 
improve its finances, assists in formulating business procedures,
supervises and directs corporation investments so as to obtain the
86best returns and a variety of similar activites. In each of
these activites the Treasury plays a vital role in guiding the
corporation along a path determined by the policy of the Government
for the day. So as to institutionalise these roles, the Treasury
created in 1964, a special Division called the 'Public Corporations 
87
Unit'.
The foregoing description both of Ministerial control and
Treasury control presents a confused and complex picture for the
public corporations. A Cabinet sub-committee that looked into a
whole range of matters regarding public corporations reported that:
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"various agencies such as the Ministry in charge, 
the planning Ministry, Treasury and Central Bank call 
for different types of information from public 
corporations to examine and review their operations.
This unco-ordinated attempt to review, only results 
is a heavy burden of clerical work on the Corporations.
The figures submitted cannot be considered to be 
reliable. Therefore, while there has been the 
good intention, of the Government to oversee and review 
the work of corporations, in practice the operation 
has been a failure."
Apart from the foregoing recommendations of the sub-Committee at
89least one Finance Minister had openly declared the unsatisfactory 
nature of Government control through the Treasury. The answer 
may be the creation of a single Ministry to remain in charge of 
public corporations and nationalised industries, so that the two 
aspects of national development could be co-ordinated under a single 
Minister. The position today is that, while nationalised industries 
fall under the Ministry in charge of Industries, public corporations 
are spread right across the Ministries in the Government.
(e) What is the Legal Status of a Public Corporation?
The answer to the question whether a pah lie corporation is a 
department of the Government raises a number of interesting issues. 
First, if the Corporation is an agency of Government then its em­
ployees will deem to have the status of public servants. Second, 
where the employees have the status of public servants then they
will be regarded as being under a special liability under the Penal
90 9lCode , The Public Servants (Liabilities) Ordinance , and under
92the Post Office Ordinance . Third, if employees of Public 
Corporations were Public Servants, then they would be entitled to 
special privileges concerning travel, holidays, security of employ­
ment and retirement benefits. This very question, came before the 
Supreme Court on at least three occasions and on each such occasion 
the Courts held that a servant of a piblic corporation was not a 
public servant in the employment of the Crown (before 1972) or of 
the State (after 1972).
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In The Ceylon Bank Employees Union,v. Yatawara l^ he Supreme
Court was asked to rule as to whether employees of a nationalised
bank had the power to seek redress from the Industrial Tribunal, under
the Industrial Disputes Act. If the employees in question were
Public Servants, it was conceded that they could not seek any re-
94dress from such a Tribunal. Adopting a passage from a judgment 
of the Supreme Court of Madras, Sansoni J. found that notwithstanding 
the nationalisation of the Bank of Ceylon in 1961, its employees 
were not servants of the Crown (as determined under the Soulbury 
Constitution). Sansoni, J. laid down the following tests which he 
had adopted from the decision of the Supreme Court of Madras:
"The tests for determining the constitutional 
position of such a Corporation laid down by the 
learned Judge are:
(1) the incorporation of the body, though not 
determinative, is of some significance as an indica­
tion by Parliament of its intention to create a 
legal entity with a personality of its own dis­
tinct from the State.
(2) The degree of control exercised by the Minister 
over the functioning of the Corporation is a very 
relevant factor, a complete dependence on him 
marking it as really a government body, while com­
parative freedom to pursue its administration is 
treated as an element negativing an intention to 
constitute it a Government agent.
(3) The degree of dependence of the Corporation on 
the Government for its financial needs." 95
The Courts thereafter examined the Statute which nationalised the 
Bank of Ceylon and concluded that:
"Guided by these authorities and applying them 
to the provisions of the Finance Act, No. 65 of 
1961 —  ," 96
the employees of the Bank of Ceylon are not Public Servants. The 
decision does not lay down a general rule that all public corpora­
tions are non-governmental organisations. But it does lay down 
a test under which the courts could determine the legal status 
of a public corporation.
97In Air Ceylon Ltd. v. Rasanayagam the same question came
before the Divisional Court. There it was argued that under the 
98Air Ceylon Act, the Government’s responsibilities towards the 
Air Ceylon Corporation was such that the corporation became more 
a branch of Government rather than an independent body. Three
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areas were identified as crucial to this submission. First, it 
was submitted that under the Air Ceylon Act the Government remained 
liable to make contributions to the Air Ceylon Corporation's Capital 
when ever such a contribution was called for. Second, it was sub­
mitted that members of the corporation’s Board were appointed and 
their appointments terminated by the Government acting through 
the Minister in charge of the corporation. Third, certain portions 
of the net receipts of the corporation were required under the 
Act to be paid into the Consolidated Fund. Therefore, the sub­
mission was made that Air Ceylon Corporation was in fact a depart­
ment of the Government and was in no sense an independent entity.
In spite of these weighty submissions on behalf of Air Ceylon, 
Fernando, C. J. held that Air Ceylon Corporation was not a depart­
ment of the Government but was a separate entity. The learned Chief 
Justice said:
”1 am unable to agree that the provisions of Air Ceylon 
Act which are mentioned above, and other provisions 
thereof, have the effect that in law the Crown or the 
Government is the employer of persons, employed on the 
staff of Air Ceylon. The Act establishes a Corporation 
to be known as "Air Ceylon Limited" and section 14 
empowers the Corporation to appoint and dismiss its 
staff and to determine the remuneration and other 
conditions of service to the staff. As the President 
of the Tribunal has pointed out in his order, the 
Corporation has under the Act (5*3) the duty to 
secure the fullest development of efficient Air tran­
sport services to be Operated by it, and has all 
necessary powers to facilitate the performance of that 
duty. There are of course certain powers vested in 
the Minister to supervise and in some instances to 
direct the policy of the corporation but the exist­
ence of these powers does not, in my opinion, have 
the consequence that the Crown or the Government is 
the employer. The staff of the Corporation is in 
fact employed by and under the Corporation itself, 
and it is clear beyond doubt that the relationship 
of employer and employee does exist between the 
corporation on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
the members of its staff." ^ 0
The corporations ability to take decisions regarding the imple­
mentation of its objects; namely, the provision of ’efficient 
Air Transport Services ’ appears to be the key to the determination 
that the corporation was independent of the Government.
In the third case, The Coconut Research Board v. Subramaniam, 
the Divisional Court was required to determine the status of the 
Coconut Research Board. Mr. Justice Weeramantry, finding the
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Board in exactly the same position as Air Ceylon was, in the previous 
decision, concluded that the Coconut Research Board was not a 
department of Government but an independent and separate entity.
While reaching that decision His Lordship reiterated the position 
taken by previous decisions that dependence on the Government for 
funds and Government’s control of the corporation would not
102"necessarily render a corporation a servant or agent of the Crown.’’ 
Having said that Weeramantry, J. observed that:
"Though dependent on Government funds, the Board has 
full power and authority generally to govern, direct 
and decide on all matters connected with the appoint­
ment of its officers and servants, the administration 
of its affairs and the accomplishment of its objects 
and purposes. There is also express provision in the •
Ordinance that any such officers or servants when 
appointed shall for the purposes of discipline and 
otherwise be subject to the control and supervision 
of the Chairman of the Board." 103
104The three decisions discussed above lay down some valuable 
ground rules for the determination of the legal status of a 
public corporation under the Law of Ceylon. It seems to be clear 
that the obligation of the Government to make a financial contri­
bution to public corporations out of the Consolidated Fund or the 
obligation of the corporations to pay back moneys to the Consolidated 
Fund from their annual profits is not to be regarded as a relevant 
fact to this determination. But the power of the public corporations . 
both to employ and to terminate employment of its personnel appears 
to be a vital factor. Where a corporation was left free to make 
decisions on engagement and on disengagement of personnel, the 
courts have held that the public corporation has a personality 
distinct from the Government. The cases surface another point 
of distinction too. This is the question of control. Particularly, 
in the Air Ceylon Case, Fernando, C. J . spoke of the power given 
to the corporation to achieve the purposes for which it was created, 
free from Government interference, as a criterion for recognising 
the corporation as a separate entity. This point of distinction
cannot be too greatly relied upon. As it was succinctly stated 
106at a conference on public enterprises held in Colombo:
"— although the public corporation and the Government 
department are different in certain respects, it is 
dangerous to exaggerate this difference in form, for
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no public corporation Is completely autonomous and no 
government department administering a service of some 
magnitude can be managed without a considerable degree 
of independence."
The fact of the matter is that while there is.a degree of control 
exercised by the Government over the affairs of public corporations, 
this control is, as a general rule, limited to matters of Govern­
ment policy while the method or the manner of execution of that 
policy is left in the hands of the Board that runs the corporation. 
Although the corporation is free to adopt the most efficient 
method of achieving the ends identified by policy, the corporation 
at all times remains answerable to the Ministry in charge of its 
activities. The Ministry in its turn through its Minister is 
answerable to Parliament, which leads the line of command 
ultimately to the people. This arrangement as a rule does not 
make a public corporation a department of Government. But it 
would, if the responsibility for the execution of the policy 
and the choice of the means by which such policy was executed had 
ultimately been left, not in the hands of the corporation, but 
in the hands of the Ministry in charge of it. This in my view 
seems to be the point at which a public corporation could in 
law be considered a department of the Government. Connected with 
the issue of the legal status of a public corporation was the 
question as to whether the public corporation had a corporate 
personality, which made it liable to be sued and able to sue in 
its own rights. All public corporations are creatures of 
Parliament. The statutes that create them sometimes declare
expressly that they shall have a corporate personality. The
108State Industrial Corporations Act, which created the public
corporation of that name, declared by section 2(2), that:
"Upon the publication of the Incorporation Order
in the Gazette, a Corporation-- with the corporate
name specified in such Order, and with perpetual 
succession shall be deemed to have been established.
Section 2(3):
"The Corporation may sue and be sued in its corporate 
name".
In The Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board v. The Commissioner of Inland 
109
Revenue, the respondent claimed Income Tax payments on money 
received from the principal collector of customs as proceeds from
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a special export duty paid on the exportation of Tea from the 
Island. These duties were levied under the Tea Propaganda 
Ordinance. The Board created under that Ordinance was
declared to be entitled to receive the aforesaid export duties.
The Tea Propaganda Board was a public corporation created for 
the purposes of propagating the production and sale of Tea grown 
on the Island.
The Divisional Court held that The Tea Propaganda Board 
being a separate entity from the Government was liable to pay 
tax, on profits as would any other corporation. However, the 
Court declared that the money from export duties did not fall 
into the category of ’profits' or 'income' and therefore, did 
not fall within the taxing provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance,* 
However, in the course of his judgment, Fernadno, J . said:
"The functions of the Tea Propoganda Board are not 
carried out by Government officers and although some 
officials are members of the Board, they receive no 
renumeration on that account from the Government.
The fact that in a sense the Government may be re­
garded as making a contribution towards the expenses 
of the Board by appropriating to it the proceeds of the 
special export duty does not render the Board's under­
taking a Government undertaking. There are many 
undertakings, non-governmental in nature, which 
receive financial assistance from the Government.”
This passage supports the conclusion made earlier that the 
point at which a public corporation ceases to remain an independent 
and separate entity and becomes in law, a Government Department, 
is when the execution of the Government policy formulated with 
reference to the corporation is carried out by the Ministry 
in charge rather than by the officers of the Corporation. The 
fact that the functions of the Tea Propaganda Board were being 
carried out by its own officers appeared from the foregoing 
passage to be the key to the recognition that the Board had 
an independent Corporate personality liable to be sued and able 
to sue in its own right.
Cf) The Public Corporation as an Economic Unit
In recent times, much literature on public corporations ha£
emerged, high-lighting particularly the importance of the
112concept of public corporations for development. The Attlee
Government which was returned to power in the United Kingdom after
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the 2nd World War was responsible for the refinement and the 
increase of public corporations there, which naturally set the 
pattern for her colonies in the present Third World. Describing 
the legal characteristics of one of the most'powerful public
113
corporations at the time, the British Transport Commission, 
Denning, L.J. (as he then was) wrote in his judgment in the 
Court of Appeal in Tamlin v. Hannaford:
’'The protection of the interests of all these-taxpayer, 
user and benficiary-is entrusted by parliament to 
the Minister of Transport. He is given powers over 
this corporation which are as great as those possessed 
by a man who holds all the shares in a private company, 
subject, however, as such a man is not, to a duty to 
account to parliament for this stewardship. It is the 
Minister who appoints the directors-the members of the 
Commission - and fixes their remuneration. They 
must give him any information he wants; and, lest 
they should not prove amenable to his suggestions 
as to the policy they should adopt, he is given power 
to give them directions of a general nature, in 
matters which appear to him to affect the national 
interest, as to which he is the sole judge, and they 
are then bound to obey. These are great powers but 
still we cannot regard the corporation as being his 
agent, any more than a company is the agent of the 
share holders, or even of a sole shareholder. In 
the eye of the law, the corporation is its own master 
and is answerable as fully as any other person or 
corporation. It is not the crown and has none of 
the immunities or priviledges of the Crown. Its 
servants are not civil servants, and its property 
is not crown property. It is as much bound by Acts 
of parliament as any other subject of the King. It 
is, of course, a public authority and its purpose, 
no doubt^ are public purposes, but it is not a 
government department nor do its powers fall within 
the province of Government.”
This legal analysis of the public corporation appears to fit 
squarely the type of public corporations to be found in Sri Lanka. 
It appears that the mould for the Sri Lanka creation was borrowed 
from the United Kingdom. The point made by Denning, L.J., that 
the public corporation was ultimately in the control of the 
Minister who could, by specific directions on policy matters, 
have the corporation implement the policies of Parliament, is 
of very real significance to development. This necessarily means 
that the government in power may use the public corporation as an
-539-
instrument for socio-economic change. By shifting the levers of policy 
the directions of the public enterprise too could be changed as poli­
tical parties change, together with political ideologies at general 
elections. It is to this 'revolutionary'but'precarious and uncertain 
nature that Ghai referred when he said:
"Ultimately, the functions of public enterprise must 
depend on the nature of the state. This helps to 
explain the apparent paradox that— countries with 
socialist as well as capitalist aspirations employ 
the device so extensively."
This creates a precarious situation for the economy, for radical
changes in the Administration could result in radical changes to
the system of public enterprises in the country. It creates an uncertainty
for the economy because, as the Sri Lankan experience has shown,
at every General Election a new administration with a political
ideology different from the one from which it takes over, has
resulted. The introduction of a new system of voting by the 1978
Constitution to which reference was previously made, was considered
necessary to prevent the radical changes that were taking place in
the political and ideological directions of the Island every five
(now six) years; hamely, at each General Election.
The success or the failure of a private corporation was 
determined in terms of its profits and its losses. The difficulties 
with public corporations was that their success or failure was 
not related directly to its profits or to its losses. The public 
corporation was considered as a means for regulating the price of 
commodities rather than as a means for making -profits. The idea 
was conceived, within the overall plan for controlling both inflation 
and deflation. It was suggested that public corporations could 
contribute to both inflation and deflation if they were to incur 
either a loss or a gain of profit, respectively. If they were to be 
operated at a loss it could place a strain on the Island's Treasury 
which could result in inflation. If they, on the other hand, were 
to gather a profit, then it was said that it would result in 
deflation. Either economic posture was believed to be harmful to 
development.
A counter view had been put forward by a different school of
118
thought. Propagating the counterview, Oskar Lange suggested:
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"As a rule public corporations should make profits. 
Part of the profits may remain at the disposal of 
the corporation, but the major portion of the pro­
fits should revert to the budget to be used for
purposes of new industrial investment. In any
case it is important that the major part of the 
profits of public corporations go into general 
reserve and serve to finance public investment 
policy accor’‘ to the national plan of economic
Of these two views, the latter appears to be eminently suitable 
for Third World countries, where lack of financial resources appears 
to be a major roadblock to development. Adopting the view that 
the public corporation should be considered as a vehical for econo­
mic growth, it follows that the Governments should be interested 
in undertaking profitable ventures rather than attempting to make
unprofitable ventures work by the infusion of capital. In this
120
sense the Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act of 1971 ,
becomes a useful instrument in the hands of the Government. Under
that Act, the Minister of Finance on his own initiative or at the
request of any other Minister may acquire any business undertaking
121on the Island. This could be done either by negotiation leading 
to an agreed acquisition or by compulsory acquisition of the pro­
perty. Where the acquisition was compulsory it was effected by 
a primary vesting order published in the Gazette. The Act required 
that the 'vesting order' be placed before Parliament for its approval 
within six days of its publication in the Gazette, when Parliament 
was sitting and within fifty days of the commencement of the next 
session when Parliament was not sitting at the time of such publi­
cation. The Act required the approval of the 'vesting order' to be 
moved in the form of a motion that 'such order be approved.' If 
Parliament were to disapprove the vesting order then that business under­
taking was deemed never to have vested in the Government. If it 
was approved, then the 'vesting order' became final and conclusive 
and cannot thereafter be questioned in a Court of Law whether by 
writ or by other means. Utilising this Act, the Government trans­
formed a number of profitable private corporations into public
122
corporations. The Bogola Graphite Company Limited, the British
Ceylon Corporation Limited, The Ceylon Extraction Company Limited,
125 126
the Orient Company (Ceylon) Limited, the Anwil Distilleries Limited
development.
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and the United Motors Limited were acquired by the Government
within the first three months after the promulgation of the
Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act of 1971.
In a number of statutes creating public corporations financial
provisions were laid down, indicating the way the Corporation should
handle its finances. In each of those provisions, a statutory
obligation was placed upon the Board to make a new profit. However,
until 1971, a general financial provision applicable to all Public
Corporations on the Islnad, in the form of a Charter for general
economic progress had not emerged and the public corporations were
merely responding to ad-hoc directives issued by the Treasury
regarding the financial management of such corporations. By the
128Finance Act of 1971 , the Government laid down a charter for
general economic progress. Section 7 of the Finance Act, laid 
down:
"It shall be the duty of the governing body of a 
Public Corporation to conduct the business of the 
Corporation so that the ultimate surpluses on revenue 
account shall at least be sufficient to cover the 
ultimate deficits on such account over a period 
of five years or such other period as may be deter­
mined by the Minister of Finance."
129In two other sections the Finance Act carried a detailed
statement as to the way the public corporations should regulate
130their financial matters. First, the Act defined what the 
Corporations should consider as 'Income'. This was indicated as 
earnings arising from three specific sources; namely, proceeds 
from the sale of products or supply of services, subsidies re­
ceived from Government sources and income including profit 
accruing from the sale of capital assets. Second, the Finance 
Act laid down a list of recognised expenditures which the Public 
Corporations may 'set off' against its 'income'. What results after
this 'set-off' would be considered as 'profits' for the corporation.
131The recognised expenditures fell into six categories. These
were: the working expenses of the corporations, allocations to
cover the depreciation of the value of movable and immovable pro­
perty, the payment of interests on any loans obtained by the 
corporation, loss incurred by the sale of capital assets, payment 
of income tax or any other tax which the corporation is required
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to pay under any written law, and payments made into the Consoli­
dated Fund for whatever reason. The difference between the 'income' 
and the foregoing payments shall be considered as 'profits'.
The Finance Act laid down in another section the way the pro­
fits of a Public Corporation ought to be utilised. Section 10(2) of
the Act laid down five areas in which the profits may be used.
These were:
"(a) writing off the whole or any part of any 
accumulated losses brought forward;
(b) writing off the whole or any part of the 
preliminary expenses incurred in the formation 
of the Corporation;
(c) writing off the whole or any part of any
unproductive expenditure or loss not properly
chargeable to revenue account;
(d) transfer to a loan redemption reserve which 
the Corporation is hereby authorized to 
establish and maintain; and
(e) transfer to other reserves." 132
The Act further laid down that in every case where the profits
were used for any one of the foregoing purposes, the approval of
both the Minister in charge of the corporation and, if he is not
the Minister of Finance, then in addition, the consent of the
Minister of Finance must be obtained prior to any transfer of
133the corporation's profits. However, when payments are made
specifically under headings (d) and (e), in addition to the
approvals required generally from the Minister in charge and from the
Minister of Finance where the two are not the same, the Boards of
each Corporation were required to obtain the approval of the
Minister of Planning in addition, before any payments were made
134from the corporations' profits. This kind of ministerial
controls may be an answer to the fears expressed by Sir Arthur Lewis
that profit making public corporations may, in a sense, contribute
to deflation while loss incurring corporations may create inflation.
By centralising the regulation of the destinations of 'profits',
in this way the Governments could to a large measure strike a
balance between 'inflation creating' corporations and 'deflation
creating' corporations. The Finance Act at the end declared that
what money was left after the utilisation of the net profits in
the way described above, shall be credited to the Consolidated 
136Fund. These somewhat elaborate financial arrangements appear
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to have paid rich dividends. Out of the vast number of public
corporations some considerable number of public corporations may, 
at the end of each fiscal year, be called upon to contribute through 
the Consolidated Fund for the subsidisation oT other public corpor­
ations which may have incurred a deficit. What has to be examined 
upon an yearly basis was the overall contribution the public corporations 
make towards the national economy. As this section was limited to 
the economic aspects, such public corporations as those concerned 
with cultural and educational objectives of the State cannot be 
evaluated against the same criteria as used here. Their utility 
was more suited for an analysis at a social level than at an 
economic level.
III. Development Boards
State participation in the economic development of a nation
may take several forms. First, there could be a direct participation
in the Nation's economic development. This could be achieved by
the State assuming control over the sources of production. The
138Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act and the Companies
139(Special Provisions) Law may be regarded as two examples where
the Sri Lankan Legal System had provided its Governments with the
necessary instrumentalities for such direct participation. The
State's participation under this heading could involve its assumption
of the ownership and possession of existing enterprises under the
two aforementioned enactments. Reference had been made to them at
an earlier stage of this work.
Second, the State may set up institutions in competition with
existing enterprises or may create institutions to commence new
enterprises in new areas of activity. The State Industrial Corporations 
140
Act of 1957 and the Sri Lanka State Trading Corporation Act 
141of 1970 may be regarded as two examples where the legal system 
had provided the Sri Lankan Administrations with the legal instru­
mentalities required to intervene in the economic development of 
the country under this second heading.
Third, the State may set up institutions to aid the sources of
142production by administrative directions. Friedmann, referred
143to these as "auxiliaryorgans of administration." The first two
methods of state participation had been the core of this chapter.
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But this section is devoted to the third aspect of state participation. 
In all three methods of participation the State utilises the juridical 
concept of the public corporation. But the ’auxiliary organs of 
administration1 differs fundamentally from the other two in that 
these do not indulge in commerce but only as aids to development.
In that sense, the 'auxiliary organs of administration* function as
144 ."Social Service Corporations," and not as commercial corporations.
The former type of corporation appear in Sri Lanka as 'Statutory
Boards', and are generally under close ministerial supervision, «»
unlike the commercial corporations. The Statutory Boards as a rule
are financed as part of a departmental budget of the Government and
therefore, are subject to a closer public accounting procedure than
in the case of the commercial corporations. Friedmann finds the
'Statutory Boards' which he refers to as 'Social Service Corporations':
"In a far more direct sense, prolonged arm of the Executive." *^4^
In Sri Lanka, the 'Statutory Boards' (or 'Social Service
Corporations' or 'Auxiliary organs of Administration') are formed,
mainly, to aid, direct, control and advise the various sources of
production, so that they may produce the best result and create
'a community of producers' in their own spheres of activity. In
other words, these 'Statutory Boards' provide an institutional
framework within which the sources of production could enhance their
capacity to develop. The laws that have created these types of
Boards have displayed the five following characteristics:
FIRST: The law creates an Authority or Board to
supervise, superintend and administer the pro­
duction of the particular commodity. The Board thus 
created falls squarely within the area of respon­
sibility of a particular Ministry, thus establishing 
the ultimate power of control by Parliament.
SECOND: Agriculturalists or productionists in the 
particular area of activity becomes linked to the 
Authority or Board requiring them to follow the 
direction set out by that Authority or Board for the 
better management of the particular source of pro­
duction and for better results.
THIRD: The law provides the Authority or the Board 
with instruments of coercion so as to maximise 
obedience to their directives. The powers of coercion 
are such that they in their nature are convenient 
and simple to enforce.
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FOURTH: The Law constitutes the failure to observe
these directives as constituting a criminal offence; 
but the greater emphasis is placed on administrative 
sanctions rather than in the imposition of criminal 
penalties. Administrative sanctions, .such as 
forfeiture of the corpus of production subject to
an extra-legal review by a Board of Reveiw was con­
sidered to be an effective instrument of coercion.
FIFTH: Subject" to the Board or Authority, in every
instance there is a decentralised body, elected by 
persons in the locality and by persons engaged in 
that type of production. This body becomes the Agent 
of the Central Authority or Board, thus establishing 
a direct line of command stretching from parliament 
to the grass-roots level of production.
These five elements may be considered as common to every such Board 
or Authorit)^^They differ from public corporations in that they
do not engage in any commercial or productive venture, but merely
act as supervisory or superintending organs. The Agricultural 
Productivity Law of 1972 provides a good example.
The Law of 1972 primarily introduced the idea of state
control of agricultural production. The Law centred chiefly on 
quality control and on the maximum utilisation of the available land. 
Towards this end the Law laid down a set of principles underlying the 
concept of ’’good management". The Law required that:
" every owner or occupier of any agricultural land--
manage it in accordance with the rules of ’good manage­
ment  with a view to improving the productivity and
maintaining efficient standards of production both as 
to quantity and quality of the produce." *46
The failure to conform to the standards of"good management" was
147made a criminal offence, attracting a penalty of an imprison­
ment for a period not exceeding six months or to a fine of one
148thousand Rupees or to both. Besides the availability of
this criminal sanction, the government had additional coercive
powers. The failure to observe the standards of 'good management'
gave the Minister the power to place the owner of such land under
149supervision by issuing him with a 'Supervision Order', for a 
period of twelve months. If after the expiry of that period, it 
was found that the owner had failed to comply with the 'Supervision 
Order' the Minister may at that point issue 'Orders of Dispossession' 150
-546-
followed by an application before a magistrate for the owner’s
eviction. The order for eviction results from the failure of
the owner to quit the land subsequent to an 'Order for Dispossession1.
The dispossession of Agricultural Land under these proceedings was
153
subject to the payment of compensation by the State. The Law
provided for the assessment of compensation by the government's 
154chief valuer and appeals against that determination laid to the
Compensation Review Board established under the Land Acquisition Act,
and disputes regarding the 'Dispossession Orders' lay to the
Agricultural Tribunal established under this law in the geographical
157area in question. Aside from a power to make an application to
157athe Supreme Court, upon a question of law decisions of the
158
Agricultural Tribunal were deemed to be final. Equally, a
decision on the question of compensation by the Compensation Review
Board was final and in that case it was also "conclusive and shall
159not be called in question in any court" of law. This was the
machinery provided by the Law for the effective implementation 
of the policy prescribing state participation in Agricultural pro­
duction, both as to the qualitative measure and as to the quantitative 
measure of production. Associated with this programme were a number 
of local bodies which the law had established, in order to ensure 
local participation at the grass roots level in the Government's 
development programme. It is to these that we must next turn.
The Law created four sets of institutions. These were: (a) The
Agricultural Productivity Committees, (b) The Agricultural Co-
162operative Societies, Cc) The Agricultural Co-operative Leasehold 
Societies, and (d) The Small-Holders Service Co-operatives.
111(a) Agricultural Productivity Committees
In every 'Agricultural Area', as determined and declared by 
the Minister in charge of Agriculture, the Law declared that there 
shall be an Agricultural Productivity Committee, which shall be 
a body corporate with perpetual succession. The Law declared
that the Agricultural Productivity Committees:
"so established shall be charged within the area of 
its authority with the duty of promotion, co-ordination 
and development of agriculture, of assisting in the 
formulation and implementation of programmes and 
targets for the production of crops and livestock and 
of exercising such powers as the Minister may entrust
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to such Committees under this La\v' or by any regu­
lations made thereunder." 167
The Law spelt out in several sub-sections, the specific aspects of
the aforementioned overriding obligations of the Committees. One
of the key elements of the Law was to involve the Agricultural
168Productivity Committees (A.P.Cs) in the 'Supervision Order.'
The membership of these committees was determined by the Minister.
The law declared that:
"The members of each such Committee shall be appointed 
by the Minister and shall consist of not more than ten 
persons as the Minister may think necessary should be 
appointed." 169
The extent to which the State had retained the power to control the
membership and the duties of the Agricultural Productivity Committees
should provide an indication as to the extent to which the Government
had intended to participate in the agricultural production on the
Island. By subjecting the Agricultural Productivity Committees to
ministerial regulations, the Committees became subject to the
changing patterns of Government policy. The Law confirmed in the
170Minister a power to make Regulations, for this purpose.
Ill (b) Agricultural Co-operative Societies:
The Law provided for the establishment of Agricultural Co­
operative Societies in each of the geographical areas within which 
an Agricultural Productivity Committee may be found. Such societies 
were formed out of cultivators of the agricultural lands in that 
area. The choice of membership and the decision to create such 
societies were both left to the discretion of the Minister of 
Agriculture. But he was, in this matter, required to act in 
consultation with the Minister in charge of Co-operative Development.
The Agricultural Co-operative Societies were required to per-
172form a number of functions, such as:
"(i) obtain agricultural advances in proportion to the 
area of lands owned by its members;
(ii) supply farmers with working capital, including the 
necessary seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, cattle, 
pumps, agricultural machinery and provide facilities 
for storage and transportation of crops;
(iii) organize the farming of the land and its utilisation 
in the best possible manner including the selection 
of seeds, the classification of crops, the combating
171
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of agricultural pests and weeds and the construction 
of canals and drains;
(iv) sell the produce of the members subject to such con­
ditions as may be agreed upon; and
173(v) take all such measures for the welfare of its members."
All these activities of the Societies were required to be carried 
out under the supervision of an officer appointed by the Minister 
of Agriculture with the advice of the Minister of Co-operative 
Development.
Again, what is manifested here is the complete control of the
government over the work done by these societies.
III(c) Agricultural Co-operative Leasehold Socieities
175Where an Agricultural Co-operative Society decides to obtain
a lease of land subject to private ownership and decides to farm
such land under a joint management with its owner, the Agriculture
Co-operative Society became transformed into Agricultural Co-operative
176Leasehold Society. The Law provided for the method of fixing
177the rent for the leasehold and a number of other matters. The 
Law did not, however, specify with any clarity as to the specific 
duties of this new creature. One could, therefore, assume that this 
new creature carried the same type of duties as did the Agricultural 
Co-operative Society, because both statutory creatures remain inter­
linked. The utility of this new creation was to facilitate joint 
agricultural productive activities with land owners of the locality.
By entering into such ventures, land, which was privately owned, 
came under the influence of Government policy. By this method the 
Government was able to bring land, without requisitioning or acquiring 
privately owned land, under the influence of its distinctive agri­
cultural policies.
IllCd) Small-holders Service Co-operatives 
178The Law declared, in Section 39 that:
"The Minister may, in consultation with the Minister 
in charge of the subject of cooperative development, 
make regulations to establish in any area serviced by 
an agricultural productivity committee a system of 
small-holders service co-operatives as an initial 
step towards the transition of development of agri­
cultural land from the present system of individual 
and independent holdings to co-operative or collective 
system of production."
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The creation of small-holders service co-operatives marked an 
intermediary stage in the march towards the establishment of 
Janawasas. Collectivisation was the ultimate goal of the govern­
ment, and the creation of small-holders service co-operatives was 
considered as a mere starting point for a new social configuration.
The importance of a schematic social formation was perhaps 
borrowed from the Chinese experience. At the beginning, soon 
after the land reforms were first commenced in 1950, the peasants 
worked in 1Mutual-Aid-Teams1, which slowly evolved into co-operatives. 
These, by a steady dialectical process of evolution gave rise to 
"Advanced Agricultural Producers1 Co-operatives." By 1958, 'the 
Advanced Agricultural Producers Co-operatives had reached the 
gateway to communication. The next step required no more than a 
structural change to achieve the stage of an 'Advanced Co-operative.'
The changing concepts of ownership and possession in the Chinese 
Law were linked to these structural and organizational developments 
in the Chinese society. Together with such changes as were 
necessary to move the 'Mutual-Aid-Teams* into co-operatives and 
then into Advanced Co-operatives in their march towards the 
creation of rural Communes, the society too had undergone organ­
izational changes of some considerable importance. These organizational 
changes were found necessary not only to accommodate the Commune con­
cept of social organisation but also to lend institutional support 
to the type of socio-legal system which they were evolving.
The Sri Lankan approach was to a large extent underpinned by 
similar assumptions. It appeared to be the belief of the Government 
that out of the Land Reform Movement must evolve a new society with 
the elements of collectivisation. The march towards that ultimate 
stage was chartered in measured steps and with Janawasas as the 
ultimate goal, the point of commencement was fixed with the 
creation of small-holders service co-operatives. As mentioned 
earlier, the Janawasas were ultimately established in 1975 and the 
subsequent change of administration, in 1977, ended its short span 
of life.
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IV. Conclusions
Many have pointed out the curious nature of public corporations 
in that they possess the capability to provide a means, both to 
'Free Market' economies and to 'Command' economies, for achieving 
their respective political and economic goals. However, throughout 
the history of Colonialism persons grouped together as corporations, 
had been used as agencies for European powers situated at the 
metropolis, for the implementation of a 'Free Market' economy in 
the colony, constituting its satellite. The use of private 
corporations in this process of creating a colonial economy has 
received much comment.
179While synthesising his work in Latin America, Dr. Frank
projected what he called the 'metropolis-satellite relation' as
an explanation of the 'development of underdevelopment in Latin 
180America'. In his view the European capitals forming the
metropolis based their economic growth upon the exploitation of 
their colonies forming the satellite through private corporations. 
The principal satellite in the colony was its capital city.
Frank commences his exposition by first explaining the politico- 
economic significance of capital cities in this way:
"The privileged position of the city has its origin 
in the colonial period. It was founded by the con­
queror to serve the same ends that it still serves 
today; to incorporate the indigenous population into 
the economy brought and developed by that conqueror 
and his descendants. The regional city was an in­
strument of conquest and is still today an instru­
ment of domination."
The capital city as the first economic out-post of colonialism 
functioned as an integrating point for the economies of the 
metropolis and of the satellite. This integration of the two 
economies was implemented by the Government at the metropolis, 
largely through the instrumentalities of the corporations. The 
fact that the nationality of the corporations taking part in 
the integrative process happened to be the same as for the Metro­
politan State in question, helps both, in the enforcement of strict 
controls over the corporate policies of the corporation, and in 
directing their respective activities. By this way the colonial 
powers in Europe were able to implement their colonial economic 
policies through a willing agent - the corporation. But thereafter, 
Frank points out, that the capital city of the colony became the
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national metropolis while the provincial towns become the satellite
of an internalised economic exploitative order. The national
metropolis at this stage constituted an agency of the international
metropolis in Europe. The inevitable result therefore was to
facilitate the control and thereby perpetuate the economic
dependence of the farthest point on the globe upon the metropolis
in Europe. This must necessarily mean that both the price of a
commodity like Lactogen manufactured in the metropolis and sold
182to a mother in rural Walahapitiya and the price of coconut
183from rural Gorakana, or the price of a pound of tea in Ratnapura, 
were all determined not by the satellites but by the economy of the 
metropolis through several institutional arrangements made through 
the participation of corporate bodies, like in the fixing of Tea 
prices by 'Mincing Lane'. Irrespective of the fact that the con­
sumer who buys a coconut in the Western province of Ceylon or a pound
185 186of tea from a boutique in Uva or Sabaragamuwa was paying
for a local product, its price at the point of sale is not a matter
for the satellite economy to determine but for the corporations
at the metropolis. For the local product sold locally must
ultimately derive its price from the fluctuation of world commodity 
187
prices. This, notwithstanding the fact that tea, unlike
Lactogen, was a locally produced product. This ultimate economic 
control held by the metropolis was explained by Frank in the 
following passage:
"Thus these metropolis-satellite relations are not 
limited to the imperial or international level but 
penetrate and structure the very economic, political, 
and social life of the Latin American colonies and 
countries. Just as the colonial and national capital 
and its export sector become the satellite of the 
Iberian Cand later of other) metropoles of the 
world economic system, this satellite immediately 
becomes a colonial and then a national metropolis 
with respect to the productive sector and population 
of the interior. Furthermore, the provincial capitals, 
which thus are themselves satellites of the national 
metropolis-and through the latter of the world metro- 
polis-are in turn provincial centers around which their 
own local satellites orbit. Thus, a whole chain of 
constellations of metropoles and satellites relates 
to all parts of the whole system from its metropolitan 
centre in Europe or the United States to the farthest 
outpost in the Latin American countryside."
184
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The formation of a national metropolis commences the process 
by which the exploitative economic tentacles of the international 
metropolis spreads into the countryside of the colony. It is to 
this particular characteristic that Frank referred when he said 
that the satellite (which now is the national metropolis): "serves 
as an instrument to suck capital or economic surplus out of its
own satellites and to channel a part of this surplus to the.
189world metropolis of which all are satellites."
The economic structure of a given society is primarily a |
product of a commitment by a political order to a given ideological 
or a philosophical standpoint. In that sense it rests upon a 
particular political ideology or upon a given political philosophy. 1 
The British Administration in Ceylon espoused the twin principles 
of private ownership of property and a Free Market economy. Within 
these two principles the whole of the economic policies of the 
British Administration were spun.
The legal institutions and laws that were introduced from 
England merely provided the institutional underpinnings for the 
colonial economic venture. Besides laws, the British Administration 
provided the functional accoutrements such as roads, railways, a 
banking system, a system facilitating mercantile investments, 
communication-postal, telephonic, telegraphic-and a host of other 
institutional supports. In addition the British Administration 
provided the necessary manpower by organising the importation of 
labour from India. These were all a part of a deliberate compact 
worked out for the effective implementation of a free market 
economy based on private ownership of property and channeled through 
Corporations of British nationality.
The social formations resulting out of the obvious needs of 
the system namely to create an agency and a sub-agency group at 
the satellite, principally recruited from among the natives, resulted 
in a particular type of socio-political configuration which had 
frequently attracted the opposition of those who believed in a 
command economy with a plan for the distribution of property, 
underpinned by a programme for the State control of the sources 
of production. The latter had found that the members of both 
the agency and the sub-agency groups, which kept the corporate 
system of the metropolis functioning effectively, had supported
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the perpetuation of a system of private enterprise largely for their 
own financial gains. Their support for the Free Market economy and 
the principle of private enterprise had been a strong focal point 
to rally the opposition to public corporations at every general 
election since 1948. The opposition of the Agency and Sub-agency 
groups to the ’progressive1 forces was found to spring, to a large 
measure, from their own self-seeking motives for the accumulation 
of wealth through the corporate structure, rather than for the 
economic development of the Island.
The realisation that this national bourgeoisie were con­
tributing very little, if at all, towards the development of an 
independent economic system out of the colonial economic system 
which the Island had inherited in 1948, became the rallying point 
at the general elections of 1956. The perpetuation of the colonial 
economic system during the first eight years of Independence came
up for comment in a big way during that election campaign.
190Commenting on this type of problem, Frank wrote:
"The colonial structure had created a high profit­
ability of production for export and an unequal dis­
tribution of income at home, and the consequent 
class structure deprived the majority— of adequate 
purchasing power and rendered production for the 
domestic market relatively unprofitable. Therefore, 
the domestic bourgeoisie used the remaining capital 
surplus for reinvestment to expand the export pro­
ductive apparatus, or to import capital goods for 
the same purpose and some luxury goods for the 
bourgeoisie's own consumption. Thus, unlike the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, the satellite 
bourgeoisie did not construct or invest in a 
productive apparatus or create a social organization 
capable of generating self-sustained economic 
development. Instead, the satellite bourgeoisie 
made the development of underdevelopment into a 
self-reenforcing part of the historical process 
of world capitalist development for as long as its 
metropolitan capitalist senior partner was willing 
and able to maintain the fundamental colonial 
relationship. The colonial relationship--has 
persisted until today." 191
Frank's exposition is of the Latin American countries. In
1956, it was recognised that the Independent Dominion of Ceylon
had not even commenced a programme for altering the colonial
economic system inherited from the British Administration. It
was the declared commitment to change the system, by changing
the twin principles of a Free Market economy and of private ownership
♦
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of property - that swept the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mr. S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike into power. That marked the commencement of a new era
for Ceylon: the emergence of.the public corporation as an instrument
for the creation of a command economy in Ceylon. The introduction of
the public corporation into the Sri Lankan economy may, therefore, be
considered as an instrument for change from a Free Market economy to
a Command economy. As much as the colonial power at the metropolis
was able to U5C the corporate structure to implement its policies
towards creating a Free Market economy at the satellite, the sovereign
power of an independent former colony could use the same type of
infra-structure to transform the economy into something different from
colonial times. This use of the corporate infra-structure by a
Government was the public corporation: "Clothed with the power of
Governments but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a
192private enterprise."
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Part E
Conclusions
Chapter 14: Towards a Theory of Law and Development: Some Con­
cluding Remarks. Pages 558-592.
CHAPTER 14
Towards a Theory of Law and Development: Some Concluding Remarks
I . An Introduction
This chapter presents the conclusions of the enquiry conducted in the 
preceding chapters into the role of law in Sri Lanka's development from 
colonial times to the present day Republic. This historical period stretches 
across eighteen decades. During the past two decades a marked interest 
in the study of law as an aid for development, under the somewhat pedes­
trian rubric, 'law and development1 had become prominent, particularly, 
among academics ^ in the United States of America. As a starting point
to their work, they made the initial assumption that none of the tradi-
2tional theories of law did in any way explain the role of law in develop­
ment. As a matter of fact it was their assumption that the framework
within which those traditional theories Were formulated had no relevance
3
to the problems encountered in development. The traditional theories 
have been generally found to be concerned not so much with the need to 
modernize society or cause some radical changes in it, but to explain
and provide a justification for the existence of a system of laws in a
4 5given society. To this extent the position taken by American academics,
that the traditional theories of law are irrelevant to development may
well be justified. However, the traditional theories of law should not
be totally discounted as having no importance to a theory of law in
development. During the course of this dissertation some reference to
Maine and Kelsen have been made. To a large extent some of the ideas
of the Historical and Anthropological schools of Jurisprudence could have
some relevance to development. ^ The Marxist school or the Economic
theory of Law have been utilised by a number of scholars as a basis for
re-structuring societies of the Third World.  ^ Therefore, to varying
degrees~of emphasis and importance, certain aspects of the traditional
theories of law could be utilised in the search for a theory of Law in
Development.
g
The earliest proponent of these studies was Professor Seidman
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who has now published a compendium of his own writings in: The State,
9
Law and Development. Seidman*s theory rests largely upon the belief
that rules of law are the key to social change, to modernization of
social institutions and to what he conceives as ’Development*. In
Seidman*s view law is a useful instrument for achieving development,
because law implies the existence of established rules of conduct which
are meant to be observed. Seidman wrote: ^
"The legal order is the tool most easily 
available to politically organized society 
to bring about purposive social change.
Law does this by re-defining norms so 
that, if the new rules in fact induce the 
behaviour which they prescribe, new pat­
terns of social interaction will ensue. ^
Society will be to that extent changed."*
An important feature of Seidman*s model is the extreme reliance which 
he places on law as a means by which development, modernization or 
social change may be achieved. Seidman is, however, willing to admit 
that social change may be induced by non-legal stimulants that are in 
a sense intractable and often impervious to empirical research. As a 
result of this extreme dependence on law, Seidman, calls upon the 
development minded lawyer to examine the legal system together with 
its rules of law with an eye to improving the system both qualitatively 
and quantitatively so that it could bring about the desired end re­
sult, in the most efficient manner.
Any reliance on law as a tool for development must necessarily 
be preceded by a study of the ideal types of laws and administration
that would facilitate development. Reviewing Seidman*s thesis, Martin
«. 12 wro te:
"Law also connotes a system of administration 
which seeks to inhibit discretion and the 
exercise of arbitrary power. It would seem, 
then, that Seidman’s entire theses stands or 
falls on the likelihood of the development - 
oriented legal system which he advocates be­
coming normative. Legality is thus the ^  
implicit major premise in his argument."
14In a recent writing Seidman made the point that law lies at the 
interface between policy and implementation. Expanding his original 
thesis described earlier, Seidman laid heavy emphasis on the need to 
use the legal system to normatise the policies regarding development.
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He appears to believe that once the policies are normatised their im- 1 
piementation shall proceed to completion per force the law. Seidman, 
however, admits, ^  while agreeing with Myrdal, ^  that policies of 
development to a large extent remain on paper and fail to achieve the 
stage of implementation. Myrdal*s principal argument is that: "With­
out much more social discipline, development will meet great diffi­
culties and, in any case-, will be delayed". ^  Myrdal, in his work:
18Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, stigmatised
development programmes of the Third World as those in a *soft state*.
19Myrdal explained what he meant by that term in the following pas­
sage:
"By that term I mean to characterize a general 
lack of social discipline in underdeveloped 
countries, signified by many weaknesses: de­
ficiencies in their legislation and, in parti­
cular, in law observance and enforcement; lack 
of obedience to rules and directives handed 
down to public officials on various levels; 
frequent collusion of these officials with power­
ful persons or groups of persons whose conduct 
they should regulate; and at bottom, a general 
inclination of people in all strata to resist 
public controls and their implementation. Also 
within the concept of the soft state is con­
ception, phenomenas which seems to be generally 
on the increase in underdeveloped countries."
It appears from Myrdal*s analysis that a reliance on law alone will
not effectively implement the policies of development. For the equation
of development contains a heavy social element for which law does not
provide a complete answer. This appears to be a glaring weakness in
Seidman*s theory of law in development. Aside from Seidman, American
scholarship has produced what has become to be known as the theory of
21’Liberal Legalism*. The principal proponents of this theory are 
Professors Trubek and Galanter of the University of Wisconsin. Their 
theory was based on the fundamental assumption that development in 
any form was difficult to achieve, unless the legal system of a nation 
adopts the values and the principles of a Western legal system. While 
denying the validity of Seidman’s theory, the two academics put forward 
a definition of development which led to the conclusion that: "the
Third World is thus assumed to be doomed to underdevelopment until it
22adopts a modern Western legal system." After pursuing this theory 
for a number of years, the two scholars, Trubek and Galanter have now
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23 24
recanted and have admitted the falacy of their beliefs. They
have admitted that the motive for formulating the fliberal legalist*
theory, originally, was merely to attract the attention of funding
25agencies to their research. In their new view of development,
26which they characterise as * eclectic critique*, • they promise not
27 28to be persuaded by needs for funding. In a joint writing, the
two scholars postulate:
"Eclectic critique transforms the central 
assumptions underlying the law and develop­
ment enterprise into critical standards.
They always were this in part, but the be­
lief that they were also factually descript­
ive involved the scholar in premature and 
uncritical commitment to particular insti­
tutions and policies. In ’eclectic critique*, 
the assumptions are purified of the admixture 
of descriptive assertion; they are completely 
and self-consciously normatized."
Beneath this verbiage there appears to lie a re-statement of their
original theory of ’liberal legalism*. All that is missing is a
commitment to the goals of aid giving organisations. They re-affirm
this and conclude that: ,
"This lack of institutional loyalty frees 
the practitioner of eclectic critique to 
assemble his critical armory from diverse 
and disparate sources." 30
After a penetrating analysis of this new twist to their original theory,
31Seidman concluded that the new label was nothing more than the pro­
mise to pursue their former theory of ’liberal legalism* without res­
ponding to the demands of funding agencies. There are poignant ref-
32erences in some passages-of the joint work of Trubek and Galanter, 
that could support Seidman*s complaint. A fundamental disagreement 
with both the original view and the amended view of Trubek and Galanter 
is that, it is wrong to presuppose that development is possible only 
within the framework of a Western legal system. Such an assumption
is both against the available evidence gathered from empirical re-
33 34search and is contrary to theory.
Aside from Seidman, Trubek and Galanter, studies in law and 
development in the United States stand devoid of any prominent ad­
vocate of a theory to explain the role of law in development. However,
35in a less exhaustive treatment of the subject, Merryman, recently
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suggested a study of Comparative Law and social change. In his view
36development was merely a synonym for 'progressive social change.'
Merryman justified the use of 'Comparative Law' as a means to remind
the scholars that they were dealing with other legal systems. The
combination of Comparative Law and Development, Merryman argues, gives
37a wide scope to the studies of law and development. He believes
that the scope of the study will extent from law to Comparative Law,
with a study of society shared between them. Merryman admits that
his proposals are merely tentative and are essentially put forward
as an opportunity for the,
"depressed, isolated and forlorn in the law
and development movement, --  to come in from
the cold." 38
Viewing this landscape from an objective standpoint, these theories 
in essence fall far short of a comprehensive explanation of the role 
of law in development. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the 
data and the conclusions contained in the body of this dissertation 
and thereafter attempt to formulate an explanation as to the role of 
law in development.
//
II. What are the elements that are essential for development?
One of the roles thus far perceived for law in the field of
development is that of an integrator of ecological, cultural, social,
economic, institutional and political dimensions of a given society,
so that the diverse trends and human aspirations in each of these
fields could be synthesised in a way that the society as a whole could
evolve into a cohesive social unit. The role of law in this sense
is to integrate the various elements that comprise the society so that
conditions of social stability could be achieved; in the absence of
which efforts taken to change conditions of underdevelopment could
prove to be wasteful and even counter-productive. The conditions of
underdevelopment could be found in a number of related fields but
the four basic areas that have been recently identified by a research
39group at the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation are: Food, Habitat or
40Shelter, Health and Education. These four areas were selected as 
the principal elements that should provide the framework for any
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definition of 'underdevelopment1. The satisfaction of these needs 
provide the gateway to ecological, cultural, social, economic, in­
stitutional and political development and provide a stable found­
ation upon which the dignity of a group of people could be enhanced 
and used as a catalyst for social integration. This, it is believed 
would achieve the social cohesiveness which must be an essential
element in any programme.for development.
41The Brandt Commission, recognising the limitations of any
attempt to define development, explained the notion of development
in the following way:
"It refers, broadly speaking to desirable 
social and economic progress, and people 
will always have different views about what 
is desirable. Certainly development must
mean improvement in living conditions -- .
But if there is no attention to the quality
of growth and to social change, one can­
not speak of development."
43The areas which the Brandt Commission identified as those that
should be relevant to a definition of development, appear to be
co-terminous with the four elements suggested by the Dag Hammarskjold
44Foundation, particularly by Ghai, as early as in 1978. These
four elements are: Food, Habitat or Shelter, Health and Education.
i
11(a) Food
The importance of food as a basic element in development re­
quires little emphasis. Underdevelopment in this area may be at­
tributed to a multiplicity of factors: lack of planning, delay in
planting, soil erosion, lack of agricultural equipment to meet parti­
cular demands, Acts of God resulting in a bad harvest and such other 
difficulties. Development in the production of food in Sri Lanka, 
required the introduction of reforms at two principal levels. First, 
the reform of the methods of Agriculture. Second, the reform of the
institutions intimately connected with agriculture.
45The Paddy Lands Act of 1958 provided a good example of insti­
tutional and methodological reform in the production of rice, the 
staple food of the Islanders. Although the Paddy Lands Act of 1958 
is regarded as the starting point for sweeping reforms into Paddy
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46cultivation, the Paddy Lands Act of 1953 may be remembered as the
46
first step taken towards the recognition of the position of the Govia.
For the first time in history, the Govia was given a particular status
in 1953, in the eyes of the law, which continued to be so recognised in
47 48the 1958 Act and later in the 1973 Law, Once the law began to
recognise the position of a Govia or a tenant-cultivator as a question 
of status then it was logical for the legal system to recognise in him 
a list of rights and duties ^^attaching to his position. ' In ad­
dition to the duties enumerated in the 1973 Law, the Agricultural
48c 49Productivity Law of 1972 prescribed ’standards of good management
which the tenant-cultivator was called upon to observe. This provided 
a juridical basis for development of the Paddy plantations on the Island. 
The ’standards of good management* provided a change to the somewhat 
disinterested, uncontrolled and often careless methods of paddy culti­
vation which was devoid of any real development goals. The ’standards 
of good management* enumerated in the Act required the Govia to observe 
such a standard of conduct as:
"(a) the proper timing of agricultural operations;
(b) the efficient management of irrigation water;
(c) joint measures for conservation of soil;
(d) water conservation and drainage;
(e) protection of pests and diseases;
(f) any other collective responsibilities which 
may be prescribed by regulations under the 
law for efficient land use and the improve­
ment of agricultural productivity; and
(g) ensure that the prescribed period between 
the harvesting of any agricultural produce 
and the marketing thereof .fl ^0
The 1972 Law, created a social organisation at the village level called
the Agricultural Productivity Committee, inter alia to monitor the
observance of the required ’standards of good management*. Further,
the 1972 Law vested a power in each of the Agricultural Productivity
Committees at the village-level, to determine the standard of good 
52management with reference to local factors. To this extent the de­
velopment strategies became locally based. The Agricultural Productivity 
53Law, which legitimised the programme for development of Paddy Culti- 
53avation laid down in broad detail the ’functions and powers’ of the 
Committee. Aside from monitoring the ’standard of good management’, 
and a whole list of other functions, these Committees were empowered:
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"to prepare and submit to the Minister for imple­
mentation by regulations made under this Law, 
schemes for ensuring the efficient farming of 
agricultural lands and their management, main­
tenance and improvement. ^5
This provided the Government with village-level advice for its develop­
ment programmes. The Committee on the whole was made responsible for the 
implementation of the programme. The Law declared that:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
any other Law an Agricultural Productivity 
Committee so established shall be charged 
within the area of its authority with the 
duty of promotion, co-ordination and develop­
ment of agriculture, of assisting in the form­
ulation of implementation programmes and tar­
gets for the production of crops and livestock 
and of exercising such powers as the Minister 
may entrust to such Committees under this Law 
or by any regulations made thereunder." ^6
It is, therefore, important to recognise the importance of these Committees 
for the village-level implementation of the development programmes of the 
Government. The implementation of the programme is considered to be law­
ful so long as the Agricultural Productivity Committees are acting within 
the powers given to them while implementing the programme. Any activity 
which is deemed to be ultra vires those powers are considered to be il­
legal notwithstanding the result obtained. The Law requires the Minister
to appoint ten members to the Committee out of those who could adequately:
"represent the interests of persons engaged in 
agriculture." ^7
In practice the Member of Parliament acting through local organisations
(both social and political recoinmencjs the names of 10 persons
to the Minister for appointment. In some areas an election is held
among those who are engaged in agriculture for the purposes of choosing 
58the ten persons required by the Law. From my fieldwork I learnt that 
the method for choosing the 10 members is largely a matter of elections 
rather than by some kind of ad hoc procedure for selection. The Law 
does not provide a procedure for selecting the 10 names to be recommended 
to the Minister for appointment. The Law, therefore, appears to leave 
the determination of the selection procedure in the hands of the agri­
culturalists at the village-level. In practice the election of the 
10 members is conducted by the village headmen, or the Gramasevaka, about 
whom reference will be made later.
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The creation of the Agricultural Productivity Committees provides
a new village-level organisation relevant to the advancement of Paddy
Cultivation through popular participation. A similar village-level
social organisation for the advancement of dry land development was
59provided by the Janawasas under the Janawasa Law of 1976. Very
similar creations are the Agricultural Co-operative Societies, ^
Agricultural Co-operative Leasehold Societies ^  and the Small-holders
6 2Service Co-operatives. In each of these the legislation which 
legitimises the development programme has been responsible for the 
creation of these village-level social organisations. The key to the 
success of these village-level social organisations was popular parti­
cipation. These village-level social organisations to a large measure 
carry the responsibility of satisfying the local needs. These organ­
isations have the ability to monitor the implementation of the develop­
ment plan with reference to the availability of local resources.
This would raise the need to blend the programme for development 
with the capacity for self-reliant development at the local level.
The whole purpose of linking the ’standard of good management* to 
the Agricultural Productivity Committees was to submit that standard 
to an appraisal, against local conditions. The failure to observe 
the standards, subject to a number of intermediate steps like the
administration of a caution ^ a could end in the dispossession of
63the land and as a consequence to a loss of ownership.
The village in which my research was conducted, namely, Walahapitiya, 
was bi-sected into two parts using the ancient Dutch Canal as the base­
line. West of the Canal were about 100 families which had their own 
Agricultural Productivity Committee. This area was designated Pahala 
(or lower Walahapitiya). East of the Canal was designated Ihala (or 
upper Walahapitiya). Each section of the village had its own Product­
ivity Committee. The significance of this type of micro-division was 
to make popular participation in the activities of the new social 
organisation possible. Although each half of the village of Walahapitiya 
had approximately 100 families. Less than 100 persons as a rule 
participated in the activities of the Productivity Committee on both
64sides of the Canal. The way that these Committees work fits Ghai1s
suggestion that development needs to stem:
" from the heart of each society, which
defines independently its values and the
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vision of its future. It must also be self- 
reliant, so that each society relies primarily 
on its own strengths and resources in terms 
of its members1 energies and its natural 
and cultural environment. It is•recognized 
that self-reliance needs to be exercised at 
national and international levels, but that 
it acquires its full meaning only if rooted 
at local level, in the praxis of each commu- 
nity." 65
Associated with the development strategies in the provision of food 
is the question of development financing and aid utilization. This 
involves much more than the provision of agricultural credit to the 
tenant-cultivator to buy his implements - a new hoe or a rake - or 
the periodic use of insecticides and manure. It includes the effect­
ive mobilisation of the masses at the village-level of participation 
for the efficient implementation of the programme for development.
It is the latter kind of activity of the Productivity Committees 
that becomes crucial for the implementation of a plan for develop­
ment based upon self-reliance. The Agricultural Productivity Committees 
qualify for Government loans and credit facilities and this enables 
the Committees to provide the tenant-cultivators with easy access 
to financial assistance whenever a legitimate need does arise. The
State Mortgage and Investment Bank, the Peoples* Bank and
65cthe Agricultural and Industrial Credit Corporation are the 
principal sources from which the Productivity Committees receive 
financial assistance. In addition, direct grants to these Committees 
from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture are a common feature.
Aside from these types of village-level aid, International Aid for 
the construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of bunds 
of rivers, of reservoirs and such other projects as the Mahaveli 
and the Galoya schemes are common place. The Agricultural Product­
ivity Committees which are the beneficiaries of the latter projects
are made responsible to monitor * the efficient management of irri­
gation water* ^  and ensure that there is *water conservation and 
drainage*. ^
In conclusion, it is important to stress the evolving pattern
for the utilisation of law in development. There appear to be emerging
from the foregoing description a two-tier structure. At the first 
level of legislation is the legitimisation of the broad development
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programme and the creation of village-level social organisations. At 
this level the rules of law have been used to create a new status in 
the Govia or the tenant-cultivator and declare the legal incidents 
that inhere to that status. In addition the legitimising statute 
establishes the village-level social organisations and provides a 
legal framework of functions and powers* they may legitimately per­
form.
At the second level of legislation the statute provides the
means by which, the activities of the village-level social organisations
when implementing the development programme - could be supervised,
corrected, challenged or terminated, at the suit of the people at
67athe village-level or by the State. At this second level of
legislation, the legitimising statute provide for the settlement of
disputes arising out of the implementation of the development pro- 
6 7bgramme. The procedure made available for settling disputes in
these cases is by conciliation and not by adjudication. This para­
digm of a two-tier system has been rigorously followed not only in
68the case of Agricultural Productivity Committees, but also in
the Janawasas, ^  the Agricultural Co-operative Societies, ^  the
Agricultural Co-operative Leasehold Societies ^  and the Small-
72holders Service Co-operatives. This two-tier plan for the uti­
lisation of law in development appears to be a common feature parti­
cularly, in the areas of economic development in Sri Lanka.
One of the practical difficulties one faces with village-level 
organisations is one of linkage with the centre of power. The latter 
could be with the legislature linked through the relevant Minister 
of State or with the central bureaucracy linked through the various 
ministries. This line of communication from the village-level to 
the legislature has been maintained by a rigorous process of de­
centralisation of the administrative apparatus in Sri Lanka. The 
principal unit of local government administration is the Province, 
which is headed by a Government Agent. His immediate sub-ordinate, 
the Assistant Government Agent, was placed in charge of district 
and sub-district levels of administration. Each Assistant Govern­
ment Agent has under his governance a number of Gramasevakas or 
Village Headmen. Each village has a Gramasevaka. The latter forms 
a vital point of contact between the ’Government* in the collective
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sense of that term, at the centre and all village-level social organ­
isations scattered around the Island. The village, therefore, pro­
vides a single local unit within which all the village-level social 
organisations remain directly in contact with the Gramasevakas - the 
village-level administrative unit with a direct access to the 1Govern­
ment* occupying a central position of administration. The continuing 
dialogues and interactions between the Gramasevakas and the several 
village-level social organisations (of which the Agricultural Productivity 
Committees are one) provide an important element in the structuring 
and the implementing of a development programme for Sri Lanka. In 
addition, the Gramasevakas, perform the functions of useful listen­
ing posts for the Cabinet of Ministers. In an ideal condition any 
programme for development should first seek a general acceptance 
by the people at the village level prior to its legitimisation by
Parliament. The Gramasevakas have often been used to determine
73what views the ’targeted people* have, of the proposed programme.
The Gramasevaka*s immediate superior to whom he reports is the
Assistant Government Agent. The Assistant Government Agent remains
directly in contact with the local Member of Parliament. Where such
Member of Parliament is a member of the opposition group of Members
in Parliament the Assistant Government Agent’s report to that Member
could be of marginal value. Where the Member of Parliament in
question is a member of the Government group of Members, he may
be able to take effective action where ever it seems necessary through
one of the Ministers under whom the particular village-level social
organisation falls for review. This facility may not be available
for a Member who belongs to one of the political parties outside
the ranks of the Government. In such a case, the Gramasevaka*s
report will travel to the next stage up the ladder, namely to the
Government Agent at the provincial level. Prior to 1980, the
Government Agent would report directly to the particular Minister
who has been designated by the ’legitmising statute* as the Minister
who shall remain responsible for the proper execution of the ’functions
and the powers* of the village-level social organisation. However,
73aafter 1980, I have learnt from a recent unpublished communication
that the Government Agent report directly to one of the District 
74Ministers in whose district, the particular village-level social 
organisation was located. In either event, the report originating
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at the Gramasevaka level has access to the ’Government1 at the centre 
of Administration.
This arrangement leaves room for disputes that may arise between 
the village-level social organisations and the aforementioned officers 
or the institutions of Government. There may also be disputes between 
the people at the village-level and the social organisation. In either 
case a need to settle these disputes quickly and with careful reference 
to the local conditions do arise. The settlement of these disputes, 
therefore, have, as a rule been subjected to conciliation as distinct 
from adjudication before a Court of law. Excluding points of law, which 
the varying conciliating tribunals may state by way of a reference to 
a Court of Law, all matters of fact in the dispute are subjected, ex­
clusively, to a conciliation process. Limiting this expose to the 
Agricultural Productivity Law of 1972, ^  all disputes arising under 
that law have been subjected to conciliation before the Agricultural 
Tribunals ^  established under it. The following diagram represents 
this emerging structure:
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The three remaining areas: habitat or shelter, health and education
- which both the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and the Brandt Commission 
Report identified as areas which are relevant to a definition of 
development may not fit this evolving pattern for the role of law in 
development. This could be explained on the grounds that habitat, 
health and education form an area which largely incorporates elements 
which are relevant to social and not to economic development and, there­
fore, has been the concern of the Government as a part of a centralised 
plan for implementation. However, the laws passed for the reform of 
land (both private land and estate land) may appear to fall within the 
two-tier paradigm which has been suggested here. This aspect will 
receive attention in the discussion of fhabitat or shelter*. The 
reform of land was partly for social development and partly for eco­
nomic development at the village-level. Where the reform programme 
became involved in village-level development, it may be noticed that 
the two-tier approach to explain the role of law in development was 
adopted, by separating the process of legitimising the programme 
from its implementation. Against this framework it would be useful 
to examine the remaining areas of: habitat or shelter, health and
education.
11(b) Habitat or Shelter
Improvements in the conditions of habitat or shelter is as basic 
as food in the progressive movement away from underdevelopment.
Habitat embraces a wide variety of human conditions. It includes 
the space and environmental conditions necessary to achieve a mini­
mum standard of material, spiritual and economic standards asso­
ciated with the quality of life. This aspect of improving one’s 
habitat remains dependent upon the availability of economic re­
sources to support a uniform population spread. This raises the 
need to include regional development, land use planning, the pro­
vision of. an effective system of public transport, the distribution 
of water and the general improvement of community amenities. The 
provision of sanitation and protection against natural disasters 
such as floods and droughts become essential components of the 
habitat. The ecology and the protection of the environment too
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77are crucial elements for an improvement of the habitat. Ghai com­
mented:
"Development must also be ecologically sound, 
utilizing rationally the resources of the 
biosphere in full awareness of the. potential 
of local ecosystems as well as the global and 
local outer limits imposed on present and 
future generations, which in turn means 
equitable access to resources by all as 
well as careful, socially relevant techno­
logies." 78
Although these and perhaps many other items are clearly essential 
for the development of the habitat; Sri Lanka has placed even heavier 
emphasis upon housing. The provision for suitable housing assumed 
such a high priority in Sri Lanka’s development, that environmental 
needs have been reduced to a secondary role.
The two principal attempts made in Sri Lanka concerning the
79development of the habitat and shelter were the reforms of land
80and housing property. This legislation restricts the maximum
81extent of land holdings to 50 acres per person and the maximum
82number of houses owned by persons to two and transferred the
rest of the land and the rest of the houses to two Government insti-
83tutions - the Land Reform Commission and the National Housing 
84Corporation. In addition to the reform of individual land hold-
85ings, through legislation enacted in 1975 the State transferred
all ’Estate Land* owned or possessed by public companies into the
86Land Reform Commission. In so far as the houses that vested
in the National Housing Commission were concerned, the Commissioner
was authorized to sell them to those who were homeless on such
87terms as the Commissioner deemed it reasonable to do so. Exten­
sive credit facilities were made available through the Commission 
or through other government financing agencies to finance their 
purchase. The end result of the enterprise was to make housing 
available to those who needed them at a price they could afford.
The goals regarding land acquired within the ambit of the two 
aforementioned legislation, were differently conceived« The Govern­
ment was primarily concerned with the utilisation of the excess of 
private land collected under the 1972 Law, for the eradication of 
landlessness. The ’Estate Land’ collected under the 1975 Law was 
primarily destined for the State Plantation Corporation. This was
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thought to be necessary so as to maintain the economic and productive 
strength of the land un-interrupted. ’Estate Land’ being of large ex­
tents of Tea, Rubber and in some cases Coconut, it was thought, that n
fragmentation would result in undeijbevelopment. Tea and Rubber being 
the backbone of the Island’s economy, any act which could disturb its 
economic potentiality presented a fearful spectacle to the development 
planners of the Government. Therefore, to a very large extent, ’Estate 
Land’ acquired under the 1975 Law was given to the State Plantation 
Corporation by the Land Reform Commission. This applied in the main 
to Tea and Rubber estates. However, a considerable acreage of coconut 
land was used by the Government to provide for the landless through
village-level social organisations.
88According to the figures made available by the Land Reform 
Commission, the Commission appears to have acquired a total of 563,411 
acres under the 1972 Law and 417,957 acres under the Law of 1975. A 
total of 981,368 acres in all under both pieces of legislation. This 
total of nearly a million acres had been distributed according to 
the following Table:
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TABLE: XXVI
Distribution of Land acquired under the 1972 and 1975 Land Reform Laws.
Institution or Management Land Reform Land Reform Total Percentage
Methods Law of 1972 Amendment Law (Acres) of total
* (Acres) of 1975 (Acres)
*
area alien­
ated
Janavasama (J.E.D.B.) 73,795 232,147 305,942 31.18
State Plantation Corpor­
ation 107,397 167,465 274,862 28.01
Electorate level Co­
operative Societies 71,446 4,641 76,087 7.75
Individual villagers 70,154 70,154 7.15
Co-operative Janawasas 61,635 835 62,470 6.37
Land Commissioner’s
Department 39,675 39,675 4.04
District Land Reform
Authority 38,585 38,585 3.93
Under G.A., A.G.A, D.R.O,
Grama-Sevaka 17,777 17,777 1.81
Livestock Development
Board 7,020 2,870 9,890 1.00
District Development Pro­
jects and Special
Projects 8,939 8,939 0.91
Rubber Research Institute 1,725 5,309 7,034 0.72
Productivity Committees 4,295 4,295 0.44
Conservation of Forests 4,128 4,128 0.42
Tea Research Institute -- 3,990 3,990 0.41
Sri Lanka Sugar Corpor­
ation 2,831 2,831 0.29
Multi-purpose Co-operative
Societies 2,841 2,841 0.29
Coconut Cultivation Board 2,262 2,262 0.23
Special Co-operative orgai -
izations 1,966 1,966 0.20
Sri Lanka Cadju Corpor­
ation 883 883 0.09
Coconut Research Institute 381 381 0.04
Rehabilitation Department 351 351 0.03
Others 45,325 700 46,025 4.69
Total 563,411 417,957 981,368 100.00
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It is important to note that lands alienated to the: Janawasama (31.18%),
Electoral level co-operative societies (7.15%), co-operative Janawasas
(6.37%), District Land Reform Authority (3.93%), District Development
projects and special projects (0.19%), Productivity Committees (0.44%),
Multi-purpose co-operative societies (0.29%) and special co-operative
90organizations (0.22%), a total of 58.2% - were alienated to village-
level social organisations. In these cases the utilisation of such 
land would become the subject of the popular will of the members of 
those several village-level social organisations. In other words over 
one-half of the land acquired by the state for development purposes 
were left with social organisations espousing village-level popular 
participation. The emerging pattern is a two-tier arrangement, where 
the legal system both legitimises the programme for development and 
creates village-level social organisations for its implementation.
The village-level social organisations must therefore act to implement 
the plan, but in doing so, they must act within the specific powers 
that the legitimising statute delegates to them. That makes their 
actions intra vires and therefore legal.
11(c) Health
Commenting on health as an element of development, the Report
from The Dag Hammarskjold Foundation contained the following passage:
"If- it is accepted that health depends first 
on food, habitat and preventive measures, all 
the practical implications of this assertion 
have not yet been drawn. The satisfaction of 
health needs cal] for, in particular: a
reallocation, directed towards prevention, 
of available resources; the integration of 
health services into development services as 
a whole; the adaptation of health services 
to specific circumstances, using local re­
sources, to the maximum, instead of imitating 
models from countries in which conditions, 
notably the epidemiology are different." 91
This approach to the development of Health services raises a number
of important points. First, it calls for the increasing utilisation
of indigenous forms of medicine. In the Sri Lanka experience the
availability of an ancient form of medicine - The Auyrvedic system
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- requires to be developed and utilised. The Auyrvedic doctors have 
a limited expertise. Their training and skills in major surgery is 
very rudimentary, their skills in minor surgery and medicine appears 
to be extensive and pronounced. Their training- does not involve the 
scale of expenditure that is normally associated'with a training in 
Western medicine, and accordingly, Auyrvedic medical treatment is 
less costly. In Sri Lanka the native medical halls primarily found 
in the villages have an intimate relationship with the society they 
serve and to that extent the Auyrvedic medical system in addition 
provides the type of psychological satisfaction which enhances the 
curative effect of its treatment. The Auyrvedic doctor plays an 
important part in the community which he serves. This pattern of 
village-level health care is still largely followed. Particularly, 
since Independence, some Auyrvedic doctors have even attained 
national renown. Nonetheless, they represent less than 1% of the 
total number of such doctors on the Island.
The State has institutionalised this type of medicine by creating 
a School for Indigenous Medicine. Although this school initially 
was established to introduce such modern equipment such as the 
stethescope and instruments for the measuring of blood pressure, 
the Auyrvedic doctors continue to rely on their traditional diag­
nostic tools such as observation of symptoms and the feel of the 
patient1s pulse.
Second, the Brandt Commission’s Report calls for a re-examin­
ation of the wisdom of placing too great an emphasis on Western 
models of medicine. The Western model of medicine which is both 
expensive as to its cost of delivery to the needy and remote from 
the traditional setting from which the patients are drawn, is gen­
erally regarded by the Third World countries as a luxury rather 
than a necessity. The Peoples1 Republic of China has to a large 
extent grasped this fact and has effectively blended the Chinese 
traditional system with that of the Western model, so as to provide 
the Acupuncture method of cure backed by herbal drugs. There is no 
such movement towards a blended medical facility in Sri Lanka today. 
This does not distract from the fact that for certain types of 
ailments the most effective method of cure could well be the Western 
medicinal system.
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Third, the Report calls for a re-structuring of a number of areas 
of health-needs with reference to the immediate and long-term require­
ments of a society. The creation of a system of TBase Hospitals1 in
Sri Lanka merit particular mention. Within every 30 miles radius the
91aGovernment has established a ’Base Hospital1 and for every 10 to
91b15 miles radius the Government has created 1 Ordinary Hospitals so 
as to provide the Island with health facilities within affordable 
distances of travel. The ’Base Hospitals’ and the ’Ordinary Hospitals* 
form the nucleus for a number of related services such as immunization 
and preventive medicine, the provision of pre-natal and post-natal 
care and related facilities.
Fourth, the Report recommends the provision of health services 
to the rural poor. The Government of Sri Lanka has to a large measure 
failed to address this problem. The rural poor are left to the Govern­
ment dispensaries run by Government Apothecaries in the rural areas. 
These Apothecaries are in no way to be considered as doctors as they 
have had no more than a basic training in Medicine and in Surgery.
The answer to the need to provide health services to the rural poor may 
be the training of para-medics comparable to the ’barefoot* doctors 
of the Peoples’ Republic of China.
In the area of health the role of law is more regulatory than 
facilitative. Health forms an area of development which requires 
the achievement of a certain stage of improvement in the provision 
of Food and of Habitat as a part of the development struggles of a 
nation. Such forms are necessary pre-requisites to the effective 
implementation of a programme of health services. It is, therefore, 
very important to recognise that development in the provision of 
food and of habitat are inter-related and are closely associated 
with the improvement in the condition of health in the Third World.
Development in the area of health falls into the broad cate­
gory of human development at the social level, and therefore this 
has, in many Third World countries, been the concern of the Govern­
ment. To that extent health programmes have always been imple­
mented centrally, through a Ministry and a department of Health. 
■Notwithstanding this fact, any real improvement in the health care 
of the people could be achieved by adopting the two-tier principle 
enunciated above. What the Government of Sri Lanka ought to do is
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to recognise by a process of licensing the various Auyrvedic doctors 
at the village-level and place them within a legal framework to pro­
vide health services to the people at the village-level. This could 
be done through a legitimising statute legitimising the health services 
provided by them. The absence of any such legislation has left the entire 
profession of Auyrvedic doctors unrecognised and in the periphery 
of the society. The consequences of this non-recognittCftV is to 
deny them the capacity to isssue medical certificates, death certi­
ficates, birth certificates or give expert evidence in courts of 
law. This has reduced the Auyrvedic doctors to the position of 
non-professionals.
11(d) Education
It must be recognised that upward social mobility in the Third 
World as a rule was not achieved through material acquisitions alone 
but through birth and caste or tribal affiliations. However, as a 
result of colonial conquests during the 18th and 19th centuries, a 
new pathway was added to the upward movement of Third World societies.
This was education. The colonial powers as a rule utilised education 
in the medium of the colonial language, as a pre-requisite to Govern­
ment employment and as a gateway to professional education. The 
prestige attached to both these goals in a given colony made edu­
cation a primary concern of every person in that society. The 
recognition of this fact became an important element in development.
During the colonial period in Sri Lanka, education was used as an 
instrument, both for religious conversion and for elite formation.
Throughout the colonial period the struggle of the native pop­
ulation was to achieve proficiency in English education. In 1956 the
91cGovernment introduced legislation which made Sinhala the only 
official language of the Island. These two approaches stood in op­
position to one another.
The policy of the Administrations regarding education during 
both the colonial period and the post-colonial period has been a 
centrists one. The Administrations considered itself the guardians 
of the nation’s education and, therefore, thought it best that there 
was a centrally worked out plan for education. This centrist approach
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to education has continued unabated. However, the Administrations
91dhave on a number of occasions attempted to leave the implement­
ation of the policies on Education with the societies intimately 
concerned with the day to day governance of the- schools. But when
92
this arrangement appeared to break down under religious pressure,
the Government in 1960, felt compelled to enact the Assisted Schools
93and Training Colleges (Special Provisions) Act. The principal
effect of this legislation was to provide the Government with the
necessary legal powers to appoint the Director of Education as the
Manager of any school, if it appeared to the Government that the
Board of Management of any particular school was not carrying out
94the declared policies of the Administration. In essence, this 
was a means by which the Government was able to take away the im­
plementation of a given educational policy, whenever it appeared 
necessary, from those at the village-level. Here toQ it could be 
suggested,that while the legitimisation of a developmental policy 
on education was left to the legal system, the primary responsi-r 
bility to implement it was left in the hands of those at the 
village-level of administration, acting within the powers chartered 
by the legitimising statute ; the Education Ordinance at any given 
point of time.
III. Reflections
This enquiry has encompassed a number of relevant areas of study.
It has encompassed education, religion, ^  language, ^  consti­
tutional reform, ^  land reform ^  and investment problems. In
each of the chapters specific conclusions were drawn with respect 
to the relationship between political policy and developmental goals. 
There has been an attempt to show how the legal system has been 
utilised to legitimise the development programme, create village- 
level social organisations to implement them, ensure popular parti­
cipation in their implementation and allocate or control the distri­
bution of essential national resources (both human and material) 
through village-level organisations such as The Cultivation Committees
formed under the Paddy Lands Act of 1958, the Janawasas formed
102under the Janawasa Law of 1976 and the Agricultural Productivity
103Committees created by the Agricultural Productivity Law of 1972.
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In addition an attempt has been made to show that village-level social 
organisations were created for the implementation of the development 
programmes legitimised by the legal system. The creation of these 
village-level social organisations was considered as basic to the 
propagation of popular participation and the inculcation of self- 
reliance among the people at the village-level. Despite the fact 
that development is generally viewed as a process engulfing the whole 
nation, the emphasis placed by the Sri Lanka Governments, particularly 
since Independence, was to bring about the progressive development 
of the nation, commencing at the village-level of participation.
There is evidence that one could find in the history of human 
societies that particular types of social organisations have been 
utilised for the organised propagation of enhanced production, control, 
distribution, regulation and allocation of property and other vital 
resources and in the form of other types of supports for human 
development. The utilisation of the traditional village councils 
or the Gamsabhavas, the Agricultural co-operative societies and 
the Small Holders Service Co-operatives, together with others pre­
viously mentioned, formed such village-level social organisations 
which, indeed, became some of the vital elements in the programme 
for development in Sri Lanka. These social organisations carry 
the basic responsibility to act within a framework of norms, with­
in which popular participation in the implementation of the pro­
gramme is made possible. Acting within a framework of norms is 
an essential pre-requisite to ensure that the implementation of
1
the programme for development shall be lawful. This would in addition 
exclude ad hoc behaviour verging on anarchism, nepotism or corruption 
at the village-level of implementation. These social organisations 
must, therefore, as their primary responsibility introduce into 
the implementation process some kind of specific, regular and organ­
ized behaviour. Several sections of the Statute which legitimises 
the programme for development and legalises these social organisations,
lay down patterns of conduct that such organisation should follow
104under the broad heading of functions and Powers’. These have
been described in the relevant areas of this dissertation. These 
’Functions and Powers’ to a large measure indicate what actions are 
legitimate and what actions of the organisation are ultra vires.
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The legitimising statute lays down the processes by which the social 
organisation may take decisions. Those include rules to be observed
at the meetings, the method available for consultation and
. . _  104c , . 104dparticipation and the way m  which disputes may be settled.
In these cases disputes are not generally brought before the Courts,
as ordinarily constituted, but may be heard and adjudicated before
is su<
104 f
104eextra-judicial bodies ch as the Conciliation Boards or Agri­
cultural Tribunals.
This kind of development arrangement calls for what the proponents
104g
of Another Development & have characterised as Development Admin­
istration. This branch of study appears to specialise in the exam­
ination of the way officials of the Government work in harmony with 
the planned implementation of development programmes by the village- 
level social organisations. The legitimising statutes in Sri Lanka 
do not indicate how the process of implementation could be monitored, 
supervised, altered, amended or terminated by the State acting through 
its officers. Taking the Agricultural Co-operative Society as 
a random example, the legitimising statute declares that:
"An Agricultural co-operative society shall 
conduct its activities under the supervision 
of an officer appointed by the Minister on 
the advice of the Commissioner of Co-operative 
Development. Such officer may be in charge 
of more than one Agricultural Co-operative 
Society." 106
The supervisory functions of the official may appear, according to the
statute, as the only controlling effect which the State may exercise
over the activities performed by the Agricultural Co-operative Society.
However, the Minister in charge of each of these organisations, does hold
a residual power to.dismiss the members of any of these Committees if
it appears to him that they are ’unsuited to continue to discharge such
duties’. ^ ^ a in all these matters good development administration
would assume a need to explore certain fundamental interests between
the organs of the State and the people. Professor Paul declared:
"good administration is characterized by good
officials working in collaboration, rather than
in conflict with intended beneficiaries (or
1 08targeted people) of programmes."
The legislation which legitimises the overall development programme
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must identify its goals, the method for achieving them and the desig­
nation of village-level social organisations for carrying them out.
As it was mentioned earlier, the legitimising law must provide all the 
ingredients for popular participation. It must*prescribe the organ­
izational form, allocate powers and designate roles to persons within 
it and prescribe particular obligations. The legislation should in­
dicate the line which divides lawful developmental activities from 
unlawful activities and the legitimate actions of the village-level 
social organisations from ultra vires activities. The need to adopt 
and adhere to the lawful and legitimate actions would be seen as an 
essential element for ensuring that there will be popular support for 
the programme of development, without which its implementation could 
end in failure.
Although the legitimising laws are often in written form, much 
of the plan for implementating them could be derived from local custom. 
The Cultivation Committees formed under the Paddy Lands Act of 1958, 
developed their cultivation programme according to the prevailing 
customs of the geographical areas in which they were established.
In some rural areas, the cultivation pattern was tied to two seasonal 
harvests for each year, the Yala season and the Maha season. The 
type of paddy used in these areas were totally different from those 
areas in which there was only one harvest - the Maha harvest - in 
each year. Participation in the Agricultural programme in each of
these areas were differently conceived. Both the Paddy Lands Act
109 110of 1958 and the Agricultural Productivity Law of 1972 stated
in broad terms a notion of 'good management' to which a marginal
112reference has already been made. The Agricultural Productivity
Law by Section 2(1) stated that:
"it shall be the duty of every owner or occupier 
of any agricultural land to farm such land with 
such crops or breeds of livestock as are best
suited for the land, having regard to the ex­
tent and the situation and the natural resources 
of land. "
Failure to observe these standards of ’good management' resulted in
the owner being deprived of the land and having it vested in the
possession of some other person for its 'good management'. However, 
the legislation laid down an elaborate procedure to be adopted before
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the original owner could be dispossessed. The decision as to whether
the owner had failed in these standards is primarily for the Agri-
114
cultural Productivity Committee of that area to make. In this
regard one of the key factors that the Committee may take into con­
sideration is whether the owner had observed "the proper timing of 
agricultural operations". Returning to the two types of seasonal
harvests mentioned above - the Yala and Maha - it is essentially for 
the Agricultural Productivity Committee to determine whether it was 
reasonable to cultivate in two seasons for the year or only during 
a single season. That determination could be the key to determining 
whether the owner of the land had observed the proper timing for 
agricultural operations as required under the Law. Aside from the 
timing of agricultural operations, the legitimising law establishes
other criteria by which the Agricultural Productivity Committees
X16can measure standard of ’good management1. These have been
enumerated earlier.
In all these matters the Agricultural Committees in each area 
would be free to determine the standard of good management with ref­
erence to local factors. To this extent the development strategies 
become locally based and will therefore facilitate village-level 
participation in the .implementation of the overall plan for develop­
ment. The village-level social organisations to a large measure 
shall carry the responsibility of satisfying the local needs. The 
decisions taken towards these ends would invariably be taken with 
little or no reference to the centre, but in accordance with the 
powers given to these organisations by the legitimising statute.
In this respect the village-level organisations should monitor 
the implementation of the development plan with reference to the 
availability of local resources. This would require the blending 
of the development programme with the capacity for self-reliant 
development at the local level. It may be pointed out that this 
paradigm for development is radically different from the one used 
during the colonial period. During the period of British Admin­
istration and, indeed, until as late as the first Bandaranaike 
Administration of 1956, the strategies for development were central­
ised. There was a single-tier approach where the Government of the 
day legislated provisions for development which were effectively
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carried out by the various Ministries concerned through the instru­
mentalities of their officers and sub-ordinate functionaries. There 
were no locally based social organisations which were designated as 
authorities charged with the duty of implementing the overall develop­
ment programme. The major agricultural schemes at the time were 
executed by labour engaged by the Departments of Agriculture, of 
Labour and of Irrigation. There was no opportunity for local parti­
cipation in any of these ventures at the village-level of social organ­
isations .
The creation of new village-level social organisations calls
for ’the transformation of social, economic and political structures*
117ain Sri Lanka. The introduction of the Public Corporation and
XX7bStatutory Boards as vehicles for economic development and for
the integration of economic policies paralleled the creation of 
village-based social organisations. Both the Corporations and the 
Boards provided useful functional supports for the social organ­
isations. The Paddy harvests of the members of the Agricultural 
Productivity Committees were purchased at a fixed price by the Paddy 
Marketing Board for distribution while the Fats and Oils Corporation 
purchased the Coconuts from the Janawasas and private land owners 
alike. The Marketing Board purchased the fruits, the Milk Board 
the milk and the Tea Board the Tea. The Coconut Board supplied the 
coconut seedlings and advice for good husbandry. The Irrigation Board 
ensured that the ’Water Tanks’ were kept in good repair and that 
the irrigation channels were not silted. These Boards and the Cor­
porations played a very significant supportive role in the programme 
for Sri Lanka’s development. The new social organisations were such 
that they created the local conditions which made popular participation 
in their work possible. This made it necessary for the Government 
in 1958 to move the dispute resolution process away from Adjudication
and towards Conciliation. The establishment of Conciliation Boards
118under the 1958 Act marked the beginnings of an alternative system 
for dispute settlement by the utilisation of informal procedures.
The Conciliation Boards inaugurated an era of popular participation
in the settlement of disputes. In addition, the Nationalisation of
119 120Schools, the imposition of an official language for the Island
became necessary aids to promote popular participation at all levels
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of Government. In the light of the language change from English to
121Sinhala, the reorganisation of the Judicial system, educational
122 123system and of the administrative system became vital for
the social transformations commenced on the Island. As the dis­
cussions in the previous chapters have shown, these re-organisations
were carried out in several stages commencing from the Tamil Language
124(Special Provisions) Act of 1958 and ending with the Language
125of the Courts Law of 1973. These fundamental changes which were
brought about by legislative enactments needed to be founded upon 
constitutional provisions which could lend constitutional validity 
to these changes. Unless the legitimising statute was valid, it can- >
not legally create the social organisations required for the imple- t
)
mentation of the programme for development. In addition, the powers 
that the legitimising statute delegates and vests in the village- 
level social organisations will be of no effect. This would neces­
sarily mean that every act that the village-level organisation per­
forms \tfhile implementing the programme will be considered as un­
lawful. In short, the constitutionality of the legitimising statute
becomes an essential pre-requisite to the legality of the process
of implementing the development programme. As witnessed in the
126 127Maradana Mosque Case and in Kodeswaran v. A-G, the Consti-
128tutional validity of the Schools Nationalisation Act and the
129Official Language Act became a matter of vital importance. Had
the two Acts been declared unconstitutional, the entire programme
for the reform of Education and of language could have been placed
in serious jeopardy. The importance to Sri Lanka’s development,
130of the promulgation of the 1972 Constitution which made the
statutes legitimising the reform of Land, of housing property and
a whole catalogue of other reforms constitutional, should not be
underestimated. The constitutional provisions contained in the
131Soulbury Constitution would have declared a number of key pro-
visionsin several reforming legislations unconstitutional. One of 
the more important provisions enacted in the 1972 Constitution which 
set the development goals of Sri Lanka within a constitutional frame­
work was Article 16. Among a number of different objectives described
132under the broad title of "Principles of State Policy," the Article 
declared that the objectives of The Republic shall be:
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: social pi 
.__  133equitably among citizens;- 
the development of collective forms of 
property such as State property or co­
operative property, in the means of pro­
duction, distribution and exchange as a 
means of ending exploitation of man by 
man . 134
the State shall strengthen and broaden 
the democratic structure of Government 
and democratic rights of the people by 
affording all possible opportunities 
to the people to participate at every 
level in national life and in Govern­
ment including the civil administration^^^ 
and the administration of justice ."
These three items selected at random would provide the constitutional
136validity to the Property Reform Legislation, Ceiling on Incomes 
137Legislation, legislation concerned with Conciliation as a method
138
of dispute settlement and a whole list of other statutes. The 
Constitutionality provided by the 1972 Constitution to the legitimising 
statutes at the first-tier, made the activities of the village-level 
social organisations lawful at the second-tier of development imple­
mentation.
Developmental programmes must essentially concentrate on the
needs of the society taken as a small but cohesive social unit. In
that regard the village-level development in the Third World has
proved to be a very desirable one. Borrowing a term from von Savigny,
139the Volksgeist principle should be closely monitored and effectively
used when planning a development project. The village as a basic socio­
logical unit has been recognised in history as a complete and cohesive
140social unit. As early as in 1872, Maine described a village commu­
nity in this way:
The village communities which are still 
found in the Eastern world, exhibit, at 
first sight, a much simpler structure 
than appears on close examination. At 
the outset they seem to be associations 
of kinsmen, united by the assumption 
(doubtless, very vaguely conceived) of 
a common lineage. Sometimes the commu­
nity is unconnected with any exterior 
body, save by the shadowy bond of caste.
Sometimes it acknowledges itself to be­
long to a larger group or clan. But in 
all cases the community is so organised
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as to be complete in itself. The end for 
which it exists is the tillage of the soil, 
and it contains within itself the means of 
following its occupation without help from 
outside. The brotherhood, besides the 
cultivating families who form the major part 
of the group, comprises families hereditarily 
engaged in the humble arts which furnish the 
little society with articles of use and com­
fort. It includes a village watch and a . 
village police, and there are organised 
authorities for the settlement of disputes 
and the maintenance of civil order. 1^1
It has been shown during the course of this dissertation that in Sri
Lanka various village-level social organisations have been charged
with the responsibility of implementing the varying policy oriented
legislation for development. It has also been shown that disputes
arising out of such implementation were primarily determined and
settled through the Conciliation Boards, also at the village-level
of organisation. This emphasis on the village-level approach to
development raises two separate issues. First, it calls for a
thorough going decentralisation of the programme for development.
The implementation of the programme in village No. 1 could be very
different from that of village No. 26. A pig farm, in village No. 1
may be substituted by a poultry farm in village No. 26 to respond
142to the religious beliefs of a large Muslim community. These
decisions are essentially made at the village-level, with consider­
ations of religious and racial harmony in view.
Second, it calls for the development process to take principles 
of local customs and customary laws into consideration. The need 
to conduct extensive research at the village-level could be the 
key to the success of any development programme. As it has been 
mentioned in some of the preceding chapters, Sri Lanka presents a 
classic cultural, ethnic, religious and a linguistic mossaic. To 
further complicate and, indeed, to confuse this picture the country 
provides a homeland for as many as 43 castes with deep and 
clear social divisions. Any development programme which intends 
to ensure popular participation must without a doubt respond to 
these many and varied divisions. This necessarily means that no 
single programme for development could totally succeed unless the . 
competing and diverse interests of a village community were taken 
into consideration at the time of its implementation. This is yet 
another reason why the Government should rely heavily on village-
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level social organisations for the implementation of the development 
programme.
The central thesis submitted here is that development must prin-j <■>
cipally proceed within parameters chartered by the national legal
system. The norms must not only legitimise the programme at the
first level of analysis but must also prescribe the limits within
which the village-level organisations created by the legitimising
statute should act when implementing the programme. The method of
implementation forms the second level of analysis. The two levels
144are linked to each other as mentioned above by a variety of 
intermediate institutions, stretching between Government Agents 
at the provincial level and the Gramasevakas at the village-level.
The relationship between these intermediate institutions, the 
Government (represented by the various Ministers in charge of 
development) and the village-level social organisations raises 
what might be referred to as’development administration.’ This, 
provides a new area for study as Administrative Law did,parti­
cularly, after the Second World War.
Even as late as in 1935, the then Lord Chief Justice of 
England, Lord Hewart, was seen to dismiss the use of the term
’Administrative Law’ as "nothing but continental jargon". In
146more recent judicial pronouncement, Scarman L.J., declared
147that ’there is no droit administratif in England.’ However,
148Griffiths and Street in their joint work on Administrative Law, 
wrote:
"Administrative Law poses that most import­
ant problems of our time: the relationship 
between public powers and private rights.
We are concerned, then, not merely with the 
powers and processes of the administration, 
but with the controls of the administration, 
legal and political, without which that es­
sential balance between individual liberty
•I / Q  *
and public good is impossible."
Similarly, the purpose of development administration is to regulate 
the Individual liberties in the broadest sense with the advancement 
of public good through development. Development could involve, as 
the preceding chapters of this dissertation show, the loss of property 
rights, limitations on the rights to compete in the field of economy, 
loss of privileges based on language rights and a re-structuring of
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class interests and regional interests in a way that certain acquired 
rights (such as social or economic) may be lost. It is, therefore, 
necessary to place these matters squarely within the framework of law, 
thus controlling>regulating and directing the functions of the many 
village-level social organisations which effectively implement these 
as a part of the overall development programme. The International 
Centre for Law in Development has put forward a proposal for 
the study of the way the people at the village-level protect their 
own rights and enforce the performance of certain duties undertaken 
by the village-level social organisations. This study, according to 
the centre, should embrace the methods available for the social 
organisations to protect themselves and exercise their rights against 
the State institutions as well. This kind of specialised study which 
has many of the appearances of ’Administrative Law’, has been labelled 
’development administration’.
A postulation of the role of law in development strategies along 
the two-tier arrangement elaborated earlier makes a study of ’develop­
ment administration* important. The Centre appears to have recognised
the importance of village-level studies as a prelude to formulating
152plans for development. This must necessarily mean that a sep­
aration between the organs that legitimise a development plan and 
the organs that implement it should be the subject of separate treat­
ment. The emphasis which the Centre Is now placing upon research 
into village-level organisations and into ’development administration’ 
could to a large extent support the two-tier analysis of the role of 
law in development. For, the two-tier analysis pre-supposes an 
administrative relationship between the first-tier and the second- 
tier. And a similar relationship between the people at the village-
level of participation and the social organisations or qua the social
153organisations, the State Institutions. In a recent (1981) seminar 
paper presented by the Centre for Law in Development, its team of 
researchers argued that their*s was a new approach to develop­
ment structured along the lines set out by the Dag Hammarskjold 
Foundation Report in 1975. They called it the ’Alternative Approach* 
to development, which:
"emphasizes quite different, interdpendent ends 
and means for rural development. The rural poor 
are not simply the objects of "development", they,
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themselves, provide the source of-and force 
behind-effective efforts to change the con­
ditions and relations which produce impover­
ishment. Much of that strength can be found 
through mobilization, organization and col­
lective efforts; the poor can:
1) Secure more equitable allocation of re­
sources from state agencies ,
2) Secure changes in state structures-as 
when an organization secures changes in the 
rules governing procedures or eligibility of 
credit,
3) Create alternatives to state allocational 
agencies-as when a community organization 
creates its own health clinic or credit dis­
pensing structures,
4) Create new forms of group-managed economic 
enterprises-as when a group becomes a commu­
nal structure for production of marketing, 
and for resolution of disputes arising from 
these activities". ^56
Some of the features of the two-tier approach to the role of law in 
development suggested here do not appear to be in conflict with the 
theory of ’Another Development*. In fact they appear to supple­
ment each other. The core-concept of the two-tier approach is based 
upon six basic assumptions. First, that the process of legitimisation 
of a development programme is centralised and is, therefore, left with 
the ’central level of Government’. Second, that its implementation is 
decentralised and is executed through village-level social organ­
isations."* Third, that the two levels are related to each other by 
administrative procedures while they each function within a framework 
of rules or laws enacted by the legitimising statute. Fourth, that 
there are means available to the people at the village-level of parti­
cipation to protect their own rights and enforce the performance of 
duties undertaken by the village-level organisations and the State. 
Fifth, the conditions created by the legitimising statute are such 
that the village-level social organisations are able to maximise 
popular participation as the key to development implementation. Sixth, 
the process of development is basically spun within a legal framework 
and a study of development becomes a study both of the types of laws 
and the types of programmes that are acceptable to people at the 
village-level of organisation. Such a study would in essence involve 
a careful assessment of such diverse factors as Education, Language, 
Religion, Traditional Myths, Customary Beliefs, Superstition, the 
availability of economic resources, the ecology, the conditions of
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health in the community, demographic data and such other relevant 
factors that have been the areas of concern in this study. These 
do not appear to be in conflict or in any way inconsistent with 
the central thesis of ’Another Development’. Sri Lanka, therefore, 
may have commenced, as early as in 1956, under the first Bandaranaike 
Administration, a novel approach to Third World development.
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See Chapter 4.
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The first British Governor of Ceylon, 1799-1805.
Turner, (L.J.B.), Collected Papers on The History of The Mari­
time Provinces of Ceylon, 1795-1805, published by the Times 
of Ceylon Company Ltd., Colombo, 1923, pp. 161-176.
The Missionaries and the younger civilian employees of the 
British East India Company held the view that western influ­
ence should be spread in India through the propogation of 
the English language. In the early 1834*s MacCauley came .to 
India, as an educationist, and assumed the leadership of this 
group. His minute on education dated 2nd February, 1835 set 
down in bold terms their philosophy towards English education. 
See Nurullah and Naik, fn. 4, pp. 51, 58 and 62.
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is gratefully made. Jayaweera, (C.S.V.), The Control of Edu­
cation in Ceylon-The Last Fifty Years of British Rule and 
After (1900-1962), M.A. thesis, London, 1966.
In his Preface to Frantz Fanon*s, The Wretched of the Earth, 
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London, from Amsterdam we would utter 
the words 1parthenon*! Brotherhood! 
and somewhere in Africa and Asia lips 
would open (...thenon! ...therhood! *
It was the golden age."
* Comprador* has been defined as: "-- the name of the principal
native servant, employed in European establishments, both as 
head of the staff of native employees and as intermediary bet­
ween the house and its native customers". The Oxford English 
Dictionary, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, 1961, p. 741.
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They were reduced to the status of stateless persons soon after 
Independence.
See Caps. 349 and 350, Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Govern­
ment Printer, Colombo, 1956.
106. Denham, (E.B.), fn. 91, pp. 26 and 28 in the volume on: occu­
pation and statistics.
107. This category consists of "All officers described as Government 
servants or Government clerks". Ibid.. p. 26.
108. Ibid., p. 26.
109. Ibid.. p. 26.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.. Lawyers, namely the locally trained Advocates, Proctors 
and Notaries and the British trained Barristers.
112. Ibid.. p. 28.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid. This category includes: Veterinary Surgeons, Oculists, 
Dentists and Physicians.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.. p. 28.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Turner, (L.J.B.), Report on the Census of Cevlon. 1921. The 
Government Printer, Colombo, 1923.
121. Ibid.. p. 314. The categories included here correspond to those
mentioned in fn. 107 for the 1911 figures.
122. Ibid.. p. 316. The categories included under this heading are
the same as those under fn. 111.
123. Ibid. The categories included there are the same as those to be
found in fn. 114.
124. Ibid. Here schoolmasters, tutors and school teachers are men­
tioned.
125. Ibid.. p. 314.
126. Ibid.. p. 316.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.. p. 314.
130. Ibid.
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131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Denham, (E.B.), fn. 91, p. 195.
138. Ibid., Low Country Sinhalese: 1,716,859 and Kandyan Sinhalese 
amount to 998,561 making a total of 2,715,420.
139. Turner, (L.J.B.), fn. 120.
140. Ibid.
141. Namely; the two un-official seats and the Kandyan seat. All 
three were ’selective* by the Governor. None of these "represent­
atives" were elected.
142. Hansard, The Government Printer, Colombo, December 13th, 1916, 
p. 355.
143. Ordinance No. 13 of 1910, ss. 15 & 16. See fns. 77-87.
144. Statutory Rules & Orders, 1920, Vol. II, p. 1572. See para­
graph 2 of the Order which brought the Legislative Council 
established under the Crewe-MacCallum reforms to an end.
145. Mendis, (G.C.), Ceylon Under the British, 2nd Edn., Colombo,
1948.
146. Ibid., p. 122.
147. The Revolt in the Temple, fn. 57, p. 140.
148. The speech was delivered on April 2nd, 1917, to the Ceylon National 
Association entitled: "Our Political Needs".
149. Fn. 57.
150. Fn. 57, p. 141.
151. Sir John Anderson died on March 24th, 1918. He was a much be­
loved Governor. He had succeeded Sir Robert Chalmers who had
gained some notoriety in the way he had handled the riots of 
1915. Sir John was sent to pacify the Island.
152. Statutory Rules & Orders, 1920, Vol. II, p. 1572.
153. The Ceylon (Legislative Council), order-in-council, 1923.
See Statutory Rules & Orders, 1923, p. 1035.
154. Fn. 3.
155. Fns. 152 and 153.
156. Fn. 152.
157. Statutory Rules & Orders, 1920, Vol. II, p.1607.
158. Sessional Paper II, 1910.
159. C.O.55.74, Paragraph 35.
160. Fn. 157, para. IV.
161. A British business man who had thus far kept out of politics 
- Mr. James Lochore.
162. Sir Ambalavanar Kanagasabai - who was once a.nominated member 
of the Legislative Council under the Colebrooke Constitution.
163. Sir Marcus Fernando, an un-official member of the Legislative 
Council, nominated by the Governor. Under the Crewe-MacCallum 
reforms he represented the Karawe Community as the second Sinhalese 
member.
164. Order-in-Council, 1920, fn. 152, paragraph 5(1).
165. Fernando, (Q.G.), The Minorities in Ceylon, 1926-1931: With
Special Reference to the Donoughmore Commission, Ph.D. London,
1973, p. 32.
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166. Fn. 152, paragraph 4(1).
167. Ibid., paragraph 49.
168. Ibid., paragraph 50.
169. Ibid., paragraph 4(11).
170. Ibid., paragraph 6.
171. Ibid., paragraph 5(1).
172. Ibid., paragraph 5(2).
173. Ibid., paragraph 5(3).
174. Ibid., paragraph 19.'
175. Ibid., paragraph 5(4).
176. Ibid., paragraph 17.
177. Namely, representing the commercial interests on the Island and 
the Low-Country Produce Association. Ibid., paragraph 17(c) 
and (e) respectively.
178. Namely, European electorate (Urban), European electorate (Rural) 
and Burgher. Ibid., paragraph 17 (a), (b) and (d) respectively.
179. Fn. 152, paras: 20 and 29 (Burgher), 26(European-Urban), 27 
(European-Rural), 28(Commercial), 30(Low-Country Products 
Association).
180. Ibid., paras: 17(f) - (p). Namely, Western, Central, Northern, 
Southern, Eastern, North-Western, North-Central, Uva and 
Sabaragamuwa.
181. Ibid., paragraph 17(h).
182. Fn. 182.
183. Ibid., p. 32.
184. Fn. 3.
185. Wilson, (A.J.), fn. 3, pp. 276-277 says:
"Thus a measure could be carried through 
in the Legislative Council by the Govern­
ment in any of the following ways:
(i) 14 officials + 3 Europeans + 1 Burgher 
+ the Governor’s original vote making in 
all 19 votes in a Council of 37.
(ii) 14 officials + 7 nominated un-official 
members and/or the Governor’s original vote 
making in all 21 or 22 votes in a Council 
of 37 assuming that the 3 Europeans and 1 
Burgher (communally elected members) were 
to vote against the Government.
(iii) There was the possibility of Govern­
ment attracting to its side at any time 4 
members from either of the two groups of
4 communally elected members (3 Europeans,
1 Burgher) or of the 7 nominated un-official 
members or a mixed group of adherents from 
both groups. All that the Government needed 
was the support of 4 members -from its 9 
sympathisers to push through a measure in 
Council. There would have been little 
difficulty in obtaining this support.
(iv) Finally, the Government had the op­
tion of introducing measures which would 
win the support of any 4 of 23 un-official
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members of the Legislative Council. This 
too was not a difficult proposition for a 
shrewd and vigilant government." .
186. Order-in-Council, 1920, fn. 152, paragraph 52(2).
187. One half of 5 ex-officio members and 9 nominated unofficial mem­
bers amounts to 7. A majority should be 8.
188. Namely: 5 ex-officio, 9 nominated officials, 7 nominated un­
officials under paragraph 5(1), (2) and (3) and 16 elected 
members. In addition the Governor who has a casting vote and 
an originating vote. A total of 39 or 38 votes respectively.
189. Wilson, (A.J.), fn. 3, pp. 273-274.
190. The occupant of the seat representing the commercial interests
on the Island was always a European.
191. The occupant of the seat representing the low-country Products 
Association was a Sinhalese.
192. The 9 members elected from the Sinhalese areas.
193. The members for the Northern Province and for the Eastern Province
were Tamils. Those were the Tamil speaking areas.
194. Order-in-Council, 1920, fn. 152, paragraph 8.
195. Wilson, (A.J.), fn. 3, pp. 291-335.
196. Statutory Rules & Orders, 1923, p. 1035.
197. Fernando, (Q.G.), fn. 165.
198. The Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order-in-Council, 1923, fn.
196, Paragraph V.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid., Paragraph VI (1).
201. Ibid., Paragraph VI (2).
202. Ibid., Paragraph VII (1).
203. See fns. 173 and 174.
204. The Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, Paragraph VII (2).
205. Ibid. The procedure for elections was, as before, laid down 
in Paragraph XXI.
206. Ibid., Paragraph VII (3). The procedure for elections was laid 
down in paragraph XXI.
207. Ibid., Paragraph XIX.
208. Namely, by creating a North, South, East, West and central sub­
division out of the Northern province. See Ibid., sub-paragraphs
XIII-XVII.
209. Ibid., sub-paragraph (x).
210. Namely, into Trincomalee Revenue District and Batticaloa Revenue 
District. Ibid., sub-paragraphs XXI and XXII respectively.
211. Namely, by creating a Western sub-division and an Eastern sub­
division. Ibid., sub-paragraphs XXIII and XXIV respectively.
212. Namely, by creating an urban division and a rural division.
Ibid., sub-paragraphs XI and XII respectively.
213. Namely, by creating an Eastern Division and a Central Division. 
Ibid., sub-paragraphs XIX and XX respectively.
214. Ibid., sub-paragraph VIII.
215. Ibid., sub-paragraph IX.
216. Ibid., sub-paragraph XXVII.
217. Ibid., sub-paragraph XXVIII.
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218. Namely, Colombo Town (North), Colombo Town (South) and Colombo 
District. Ibid., sub-paragraphs (V - VII).
219. The former two European seats - Urban and Rural were preserved. 
Ibid., sub-paragraphs 1 and 11 respectively.
220. Ibid., sub-paragraph IV.
221. Ibid., sub-paragraph 111.
222. Ibid., paragraph XXX which reads: "Every member of the Ceylon 
Chamber of Commerce, not otherwise disqualified, shall be quali­
fied to have his name entered on the register for the Commercial 
Electorate".
223. See fn. 186.
224. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, paragraph LIV (1).
225. Ibid., paragraph LIV (2).
226. Ibid., paragraph VI (1) (i) & (ii).
227. Ibid., paragraph VI (2).
228. See fn. 187.
229. See fns. 169 and 170.
230. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, paragraph VI (2).
231. For a comprehensive analysis of the forces and the circumstances 
which brought about the Ceylon National Congress, see: de Silva, 
(K.M.), fn. 102.
232. See fn. 173.
233. deSilva, (K.M.), "The Reform and Nationalist Movements in the 
Early Twentieth Century", History of Ceylon Vol. Ill, Edt. by 
de Silva, (K.M.), University Press Board of Ceylon, Colombo, 
1973, p. 402.
234. Ibid., pp. 402-403.
235. Sir Arunachalam claimed that at the point of the formation of 
the Ceylon National Congress, the Sinhalese leaders Mr. (later 
Sir) James Pieris and E.J. Samarawickreme had given an under­
taking that when constitutional reforms were discussed, the 
Sinhalese group in the new body - the congress - would support 
the idea of a communal seat for the Tamils in the Western pro­
vince. In 1921, the Sinhalese group maintained that the under­
taking was a broad one and was merely to accept a scheme put 
forward by the Jaffna Association which excluded any alter­
ation of the ’territorial* concept of representation which in­
deed was a fundamental point upon which the Congress would not 
budge. See deSilva, (K.M.), fn. 231, p. 93 etc.
236. Fn. 233.
237. Ibid., p. 400.
238. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, Article XIX (x).
239. An exhaustive exposition of the social upheavels have been 
presented by Fernando, (Q.G.), fn. 165, chapter II.
240. Ibid., p. 95.
241. Ibid.
242. Ibid., p. 98.
243. Ibid.
244. Fn. 242.
245. Maheswari, 3rd Edn., Gunasena & Co. Ltd., Colombo, 1959, parti­
cularly pp. 6-12.
246. Ibid., p. 9.
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247. Order-in-Council, 1920, fn. 152, Article 13.
248. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, Article XV.
249. Mills, (L.A.), Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932, Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1933, p. 267. See also The 'Report of the Special
Commission on the (Ceylon) Constitution, H.M.S.O., 1928, Cmd.
3131, p. 82.
250. Ibid.
251. The Sinhalese Constituencies were: Colombo Town (North),
Colombo Town (South), Colombo Town, Negombo, Kalutara, Central 
Province (urban), Central Province (rural), Southern Province 
(Eastern), Southern Province (Central), Southern Province 
(Western), North Western Province (Western), North Western 
Province (Eastern), North Central Province, The Uva, Kegalle 
and Ratnapura. See Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, Article 
XIX.
252. The Tamil Constituencies were: Western Province (Ceylon Tamil),
Northern Province - North, South, West, East and Central, 4|
Trincomalee and Batticoloa. See Order-in-Council, 1923, fn.
196, Article XIX.
253. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 196, Article VII (3).
254. Ibid., Article VII (2).
255. Ibid., Article XIX, (i), (ii) & (iii). Apart from the European
(Rural) and European (Urban) The Commercial seat traditionally 
was a European seat because the electorate was limited to the
Ceylon Chamber of Commerce. The latter was dominated, at the
time, by the European community.
256. Ibid., Article XIX (iv).
257. Ibid., Article VI (1). Add the Governor to the list, making
it 6.
258. Ibid., Article VI (2).
259. Ibid., Article VII (1).
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1. The Commissioner’s commenced their hearings in 1927.
2. The reforms were introduced in the form of a new Constitution 
in 1931.
3. See chapter 5, section iv(b).
4. Mills, (L.A.), Ceylon Under British Rule 1795-1932, Oxford
University Press, 1933, p. 269. Also Ceylon Report of the
Special Commission on the Constitution, H.M.S.O., London,•1928,
Cmd. 3131, p. 88.
5. The Constitution was contained in The Ceylon (State Council) Order-
in-Council, 1931, Statutory Rules and Orders, 1931, H.M.S.O., London,
1931, p. 1448.
6. Jeffries, (Sir Charles), Ceylon The Path to Independence, Pall 
Mall Press, London, 1962.
7. Ibid., p. 47.
8. See fn. 5.
9. Cooray, (J.A.L.), Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri
Lanka, Hansa Publishers Ltd., Colombo, 1973, pp. 43-53.
10. The Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order-in-Council, 1923, Statutory 
Rules & Orders, 1923, H.M.S.O., London, 1923, p. 1035, Article
VI gives six ex-officio members and seven nominated official 
members.
11. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5, Article 7(a).
12. Ibid., Article 5.
13. Order-in-Council, 1923, fn. 10, Article Lll.
14. Ibid., Article Llll.
15. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5, The Second Schedule:
I. Chief Secretary: External Affairs, Defence, The Public
Services.
II. Legal Secretary: The Administration of Justice, Drafting
of Legislation, Legal Advice to Government, Criminal prose­
cutions and civil proceedings on behalf of the Crown,
Elections to the State Council, Functions of the Public 
Trustee.
III. Financial Secretary: Finance, Supply, Stores and Printing,
Establishments, Customs, Estate Duty and Stamps, Valuations 
on behalf of Government.
16. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 10, The First Schedule:
I. Home Affairs: Police, Prisons, Excise and Local Option, Funct­
ions of the Government Analyst, Religious Associations and 
Temporalities, Subjects of internal administration not other­
wise allotted.
II. Agriculture and Lands: Lands, Forests, Irrigation, Agri­
culture, Veterinary Services, Surveys and Meteorology, 
Co-operative Societies.
III. Local Administration: Local Government, Mines and Salt,
Fisheries, Acquisition of land for public purposes.
IV. Health: Medical Services, Sanitary Services, Housing.
V. Labour, Industry and Commerce: Labour, Industrial welfare,
Commerce, Functions of the Registrar-General, Poor Relief.
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VI. Education: Education, Museums, Archaeology.
VII. Communications and Works: Public Works, Railways, Electrical
Undertakings, Posts and Telegraphs, Ports and Harbours.
17. Order-in-Council, 1920, Statutory Rules & Orders. 1920. Vol.
II, p. 1572, Article 52(2), and Order-in-Council 1923, fn. 10 
Article LIV.
18. Ceylon Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution, 
H.M.S.O., 1928, Cmd. 3131, pp. 72-73.
19. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5., Article 72.
20. Ibid.. Article 22.
There was only one occasion when paramountcy was invoked.
Another occasion when its use was contemplated but the measure 
was passed even without the unofficials realizing that the 
Governor intended to exercise his rights. The final occasion 
when the unofficials were informed that the Secretary of State 
had given instructions that the right be exercised if the un­
officials proved recalcitrant and insisted on throwing out 
the measure. On this occasion the unofficials gracefully gave 
in without provoking an incident.
These are the details: On July 5, 1929 the Government moved a
resolution regarding "increase of import duties" as a matter 
of urgency. Notice of this had been given by the acting Colonial 
Secretary on the day previous, that is the 4th of July, 1929, 
to the effect that he will introduce a resolution to confirm the 
order of his Excellency the Governor as regards a surcharge on 
customs revenue as a matter of urgency (refer Hansard 1929, 
p. 623).
On the 5th of July, 1929 a resolution was introduced but the un­
officials opposed it to a man. There were 27 of them present, 
including the European representatives. They all voted against 
the resolution. While those who voted for it were only the 12 
official members (see Hansard 1929, p. 665 for the Division 
list). The acting Colonial Secretary then declared that he was 
authorized by his Excellency the Governor to declare the reso­
lution as a matter of paramount importance (Hansard 1929, p.
666).
The second incident was where the use was contemplated and the 
measure was passed without the unofficials even realizing it.
For the details (refer Hansard 1922, p. 577). On the 28th of 
September, 1929 at the Committee stage of the Supply Bill for 
1929-30 the Clerk called Head 66. This head related to 1. 
Passages of Officers etc, 2. Holiday warrants and, 3. Mis­
cellaneous services rendered by the railway.
The select Committee had recommended that the amounts allocated 
to these items by the Government be deleted, but the acting 
Colonial Secretary, when the Clerk called ’Head 66’, moved 
that the amounts be restored. He added "the house is aware 
that the Government attaches much importance to the restor­
ation of these items". (Hansard 1929, p. 1233). And he went on 
to add later that the Secretary of State had stated inter alia 
that the withdrawal or reduction of the votes for passages and 
holiday warrants, without warning and without inquiry, should
- 634 -
Chapter 6
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properly be resisted, if necessary, by the use of the Governor’s 
reserve powers. The necessity to use the Governor’s special 
powers, however, did not arise as a motion of the acting Colonial 
Secretary for the restoration of the cut was passed with twenty- 
six voting for it and eleven against (see Hansard 1929, pp, 1277, 
1279 and 1280).
See also: Jennings, (Sir Ivor.), "The Emergency Procedure of the
State Council" The University of Ceylon Review 1943, Vol. 1,
No. 1, p. 8 and Weerawardana, (I.D.S.), "The Governor's Reserve 
Powers During the First State Council", The University of Cevlon 
-Review 1949, Vol. VII, p. 41.
21. Fn. 18, p. 76.
22. Ibid., Article 23(2).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., Article 23(1) and (2).
25. Ibid., Article, Secretary of State for the colonies has a power 
to refuse legislations. See Order-in-Council, 1931, Fn. 5, 
Article 73.
26. Ibid., p. 72.
27. Ibid.
28. Fn. 18, p. 99.
29. London County Council.
30. An excellent historical survey of the Nationalists lobby is to
be found in The Revolt in the Temple, Sinha Publications, Colombo 
3, 1953, Chapter III. Fernando, (Q.G.), The Minorities in Ceylon, 
1926-1931: With special reference to the Donoughmore Commission.
Ph.D., London, 1973, chap. II.
31. Fn. 18, pp. 47-48.
32. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5, Article 7(b).
33. Ibid., Article 7(c).
34. Ibid., Article 7(a).
35. Ibid., Article 30(1).
36. Fn. 16.
37. Order-in-Council, 1931, Fn. 5, Article 34(1).
38. Ibid., Article 34(2).
39. Fn. 16.
40. See fn. 46.
41. This must be because the first speaker is elected before the 
formation of the Executive Committees - See Order-in-Council,
1931, fn. 5, Article 30(1).
42. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5, Article 34(2).
43. The ex-officio members are limited to representing their port­
folios as detailed in the Second Schedule of the Order. Ibid., 
Article 33.
44. See fn. 16.
45. Order-in-Council, 1931, fn. 5, Article 30(2).
46. Ibid., Article 34(2).
47. Ibid., Article 35(1).
48. Ibid., Article 35(2).
49. Ibid.
50. Fn. 18, p. 89.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 89.
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53. Ibid., p. 90.
54. Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, recognised 
Universal Adult Suffrage in the U.K. in 1928. 18 & 19 Geo. 5,
chap. 12.
55. Fn. 52.
56. See fn. 30.
57. Wilson, (A.J.), Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973, MacMillan &
Co. Ltd., 1974, pp. 46-52.
58. deSilva, (K.M.), "The History and Politics of the Transfer of 
Power", History of Ceylon, Vol. 3, University of Ceylon Press 
Board, pp. 489-533.
59. Messrs: E.W. Perera, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and R.S.S. Gunawardene 
representing the Ceylon National Congress. Ibid., p. 493.
60. Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, representing the Tamil Mahajana 
Sabhai. Ibid., p. 493.
61. Ibid., p. 493.
62. All these matters with interesting asides could be found in
Jeffries,.(Sir Charles E.), fn. 6, Chapter VI.
62a. Fernando, (Q.G.), fn. 30.
62b. These were subsequently published by H.M.S.O., London, 1929,
Cmd. 3419.
63. Fn. 5.
64. See fn. 54.
65. Order-in-Council, 1931, Fn. 5, p. 1482.
66. Order-in-Council, 1931, Fn. 5, p. 1484.
67. Section 7, ibid., p. 1485.
68. Ibid.
69. Section 8, ibid.
70. Section 9, Ibid., p. 1486.
71. Ceylon Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform, H.M.S.O., 
1945, Cmd. 6677, p. 59, Paragraph 220.
72. See fns. 66-70.
73. The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order-in-Council. 1946,
Statutory Rules and Orders, 1946, Vol. 1, H.M.S.O., 1947, p.
2279.
74. Jeffries, (Sir Charles), fn. 6, p. 60.
75. See fn. 6.
76. Jeffries, (Sir Charles), fn. 6, p. 67 mentions 708, 318 persons 
as representing 59% of the electorate at the 1931 elections. 
Therefore, 100% must have been 1,200,539.
77. Fn. 18, p. 80.
78. Jeffries, (Sir Charles), fn. 6, pp. 68 and 76.
79. Ibid., p. 68.
80. Fn. 71, p. 54, paragraph 190.
81. Fn. 71, p. 58, paragraphs 214 and 215.
82. Fn. 71.
83. This table was constructed from the data made available to the 
Soulbury Commission, see fn. 71.
84. See recommendation 223, fn. 71, p. 60.
85. Fn. 73.
86. This table was culled from the figures worked out by Dr. A. J. 
Wilson. Wilson, (A.J.), fn. 57, p. 170.
87. Act No. 18 of 1948. The Act was amended by Act No. 40 of 1950
and Act No. 18 of 1948. But the amendments had no effect on the
Indian question.
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88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
95a.
96.
97.
98.
99. 
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Act No. 48 of 1949.
Fn. 87, s.4(l)(a).
Ibid., s.4(l)(b).
The first Indian Tamil came to Ceylon in 1837. But systematic 
recruiting did not commence until 1839. The Indian Labour immi­
gration was terminated in 1939. In 1946, there were about 700,
000 Indian Tamils on the Island. See fn. 71, paragraphs 123-124. 
Act No. 18 of 1948.
Ibid., s.4(2)(a).
Ibid., s.4(2)(b).
Ibid., Part III, ss. 11-17. In the Indian and Pakistani (Resi­
dents), Citizenship Act, Act No. 3 of 1949, it was provided by 
sections 3 and 4 that Residents of Indian and Pakistani origin 
may under certain conditions apply for citizenship by registration.
The Act came into effect soon after it received the assent on
February 29th, 1949 and was limited in its period of application 
for two years only (s.5). The Act attracted much litigation.
See also Act No. 37 of 1950 and Act No. 45 of 1952 which amended 
the Act No. 3 of 1949 in minor aspects.
Ibid., s.11(2)(b).
Fn. 88.
Fn. 88, ss. 2 and 3.
Fn. 88, ss. 4 and 5.
Fn. 86.
Sir Charles Jeffries discusses the history of the Donoughmore 
reforms 1936-1947, at chapter X. See fn. 6.
Donoughmore Commission Report, fn. 18.
Ibid., p. 31.
The Ceylon Independence (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1946, 
Statutory Rules and Orders, Vol. 1, H.M.S.O., 1947, p. 2248. 
s. 12 states: "Subject to the provisions of this order, a
person who is qualified to be an elector shall be qualified to 
be elected or appointed to either chamber".
Qualification for voters was made equivalent to those that were 
found under the Donoughmore Constitution. See The Ceylon (Par­
liamentary Elections) Order-in-Council, 1946, ibid., p. 2279, 
sections 4-7.
Namely, the electors and the elected.
Jennings, (Sir Ivor), and Tambiah, (H.W.), The Dominion of Ceylon, 
Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1970.
Fn. 71, chapter VII, p. 38.
Ibid., paragraph 119.
These figures have been worked out from a Table to be found in 
The Census of Ceylon, 1953, Report published by the Department 
of Census and Statistics, Colombo, 1957, Volume I, p. 191.
The 21.6% of the Tamil population is comprised of 11.0% Ceylon 
Tamils and 10.6% Indian Tamils. See fn. 108.
These figures are originally from Kearney, (R.N.), Communalism 
and Language in the Politics of Ceylon, Duke University, Durham, 
1967, p. 9 and adopted by Phadnis, (U.), Religion and Politics 
in Sri Lanka, Hurst, London, 1976, p. 5. The 1946 Census reports 
do not provide such a breakdown.
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111. Department of Census and Statistics of Ceylon, Preliminary report 
on the socio-economic survey of Ceylon, 1969-70, published in 
1971, p. 7, Table 50.
Previous census reports have not worked out such a table. In 
using the figures worked out for 1969-70 one is making an assump­
tion that these figures are correct for 1946. The point, however, 
is this. Due to lack of mobility and education, there could have 
been a higher concentration of the Rural Population embracing all 
the religions, than what is represented in the table. That would 
only have strengthened the socio-economic argument further. For, 
that would have given the Soulbury Commissioners a greater need 
to recommend the enactment of the entrenched clauses in the 
Constitution.
112. These tables were formulated from a writing by Tambiah, (S.J.), 
."Ethnic Representation in Ceylon’s Higher Administrative Services 
1870-1946", University of Ceylon Review, Vol. 13, 1955, pp. 133-134.
113. Census of Ceylon for 1953, Department of Census and Statistics,
The Government Printer, 1957, Vol. 3(i), p. 606.
The figures are not available for the year 1946. That Census 
did not produce such a classification. These figures for 1953 
could if at all represent a greater degree of English literarcy 
than what it was in 1946. The difference in reality between 
these figures and English literarcy at 1946 could be very small.
114. Fn. 71, recommendation 242(iii) p. 64.
115. Fn. 103.
116. Fn. 103, s.29(4).
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was held that a servant of the Crown under the Roman Dutch Law, 
as practiced in Ceylon, was entitled to sue the Crown for his 
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hear the matter regarding the constitutionality of the Official 
Language Act. The hearing was postponed sine die in the light 
of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly which was at the 
time in the final stages of drafting the 1972 Constitution.
136. The only other alternative was to stage a political revolution 
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success, thus relying on the Kelsenian theory concerning the 
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137. The Court officials conerned with the re-hearing delayed the 
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months. No reasons have been provided as to why he or his party 
did not obtain the necessary leave from Parliament, for his 
absence, which could have been obtained pro forma. At the end 
of the three month period, Mr. Pilapitiya ceased to be a Member 
of Parliament under Article 66(f) of the 1978 Constitution. The 
seat for Kalawana being now vacant, it became the duty of the 
Secretary of the U.N.P., the party to which Mr. Pilapitiya be­
longed, to nominate a person to occupy that seat as a Member of 
Parliament. This is provided for by Article 161(d)(iii) of the 
1978 Constitution. The Secretary of the U.N.P., nominated Mr. 
Pilapitiya, and he was duly accepted by the speaker as M.P. for 
Kalawana under that Article. This was in late 1978. Subsequently, 
the original election petition was heard by the High Court and 
Mr. Pilapitiya was found to have committed an election offence.
The Court declared that Mr. Pilapitiya's election in 1977 was 
null and void. This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal 
and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Both appeals were dis­
missed and by the end of 1980 Mr. Pilapitiya exhausted all 
avenues of appeal to the Courts of Justice. As a result of this 
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Kalawana electorate. Subsequent to this declaration by the 
Commissioner of elections, in a surprise move, the speaker of 
the House of Representatives, Mr. Bakeer Markar, M.P. announced 
in Parliament, that the Kalawana seat was not vacant, and that 
Mr. Pilapitiya was in fact the Member for that seat and his 
nomination by the Secretary of the U.N.P. in 1978, under Article 
161(d)(iii), was a valid nomination and that the Supreme Court 
had no jurisdiction to interfere with a valid nomination under 
that Article. This announcement was made a few days before the 
holding of the by-election, on January 12th, 1981. To solve 
this difficult problem, the Government tabled a Bill, making 
provisions for dual representation for Kalawana. The purpose 
of the Bill was to recognise the person elected at the by- 
election as a second member for Kalawana. This Bill was chal­
lenged before the Supreme Court under Article 83(b) of the 1978 
Constitution. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the 
eve of the by-election. By a unanimous decision of that court, 
the Bill was declared ultra vires the Constitution. In its 
opinion the Court characterised the Bill as one which was 
attempting to enlarge the membership of the House not through 
the normal channels provided by the Constitution (i.e. through 
the Delimitation Commission, see Articles 95 and 96) but through 
a' very different method which falls squarely under Article 83 
(b). That Article, according to the Supreme Court, calls for 
the holding of a Referendum, without which the Bill in question, 
as proposed, could never be valid under the 1978 Constitution.
The by-election was, nonetheless, held, and Mr. Sarath 
Muthetuwegama, the petitioner in the original election peti­
tion, was elected from the Communist Party. Subsequent to this 
result, by a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of 
Parliament, on January 15th, 1981, Mr. Pilapitiya resigned as 
a Member of Parliament. This was done under Article 66(b) of
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the Constitution. The Government is now (February 1981) hoping 
that this would be the end of a long and costly saga. However, 
the matter raises a further interesting issue. Is the Secretary- 
General now under a duty under Article 161(d)(iii) to request 
the Secretary to the U.N.P., the party to which Mr. Pilapitiya 
belonged, to nominate a person to the position vacated by Mr. 
Pilapitiya? I think he is. If so, is the Secretary of the 
U.N.P. obliged to nominate? If he is obliged to do so, then 
could he take the extraordinary step as to nominate Mr. Sarath 
Muthetuwegama as that person? Or, must he appoint a person from 
hiw own party? If he were to appoint any person other than,
Mr. Sarath Muthetuwegama, the country would surely face the 
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